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The National Security (State Threats) Bill 2026, introduced to Parliament on 9 June, grants the Home Secretary new powers under the National Security Act 2023 to designate bodies involved in foreign power threat activity. The Bill criminalises supporting, assisting, or receiving material benefits from a designated body, carrying sentences of up to 14 years.
The Government cites a 35% rise in MI5 state threat investigations and more than 20 ‘potentially lethal’ Iran-backed plots as justification. It is fast-tracking the legislation following the recent wave of antisemitic attacks, with commencement potentially as early as next month, subject to parliamentary approval.
There is plainly a need for effective action against hostile foreign state activity. But fast-tracking legislation that confers broad designation powers on a single minister, with limited checks and balances, and that criminalises conduct using vague language, should and does raise serious concern. The decision to expedite this Bill has led to a criticism from some MPs that the bill is being ‘waved through’ parliament without a suitable level of scrutiny.
Each expansion of the national security architecture, the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (to allow port stops without any suspicion), the National Security Investment Act 2021 (allowing the Government to intervene in business transactions on the grounds of national security), the National Security Act 2023 itself (which, amongst other things, removed protections under the 2019 Act), the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, and now this Bill, has widened the category of conduct attracting serious criminal liability, often through broad, intent-flexible offences.
Notably, section 17A of the 2023 Act, as it would become if the Bill passes into law, would criminalise expressing an opinion or belief supportive of a designated body where done for a "prohibited purpose", which is defined as a purpose the person "knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom." Neither the Bill nor the National Security Act 2023 defines what those interests are or sets out any limits on what those interests could be. The low knowledge threshold may also have a chilling effect on political commentary, journalism, academic research, and diaspora community engagement, well beyond conduct that could fairly be characterised as assisting a hostile state
Would be sections 17B and 17C of the 2023 Act, which deal with offences for assisting or receiving material benefits from a designated body, have also drawn criticism from the humanitarian sector. Humanitarian organisations routinely operate in complex environments, requiring engagement with the very parties that may be designated, including bodies that function as de facto or de jure state apparatus.
The Government’s own factsheet suggests that legitimate activity, including journalistic freedom and diplomatic or humanitarian engagement, is protected by defences built into the offences, though critics argue otherwise. Whilst the Bill does include statutory defences covering conduct carried out in compliance with UK legal obligations, in exercise of public functions, or under Crown agreements, in the case of humanitarian organisations it has been argued that the defences fall short of the express exemption needed to prevent obstructing, or in some cases halting, essential aid work.
Individuals, businesses, or civil society organisations with any connection to geopolitically sensitive entities should familiarise themselves with the designation regime now.
The Government's overarching factsheet is available here.
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