The criminal justice system in England and Wales is under immense strain. With Crown Court backlogs exceeding 75,000 cases as at the end of 2024 – double the volume seen in 2019 – delays in cases coming to trial are now measured in years, not months. In response, the Ministry of Justice appointed Sir Brian Leveson, former president of the King's Bench Division, to conduct an Independent Review of the Criminal Courts (the "Review").
The first part of the Review, focusing on long-term reforms to the set-up of the criminal courts, was published on 8 July 2025 (the "Report")and sets out a blueprint for reform which is bold and pragmatic – and in some respects controversial. Proposed restrictions on the right to a jury trial have attracted particularly strong views, on both sides of the debate.
This article highlights the Report's key proposals most relevant to our corporate clients. A second instalment of the Review, focusing on operational efficiency, is expected later this year.
The challenge: complexity, capacity and delay
While the Report acknowledges the impact of resource constraints, the COVID-19 pandemic, and industrial action by the Criminal Bar, it identifies the increasing complexity of criminal law and procedure as a central driver of systemic dysfunction. In particular, the burden of disclosure – exacerbated by the proliferation of digital evidence – has significantly extended the duration and intricacy of trials.
This is especially acute in fraud cases. Between 2010 and 2017, the average volume of documents involved in cases conducted by the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") cases tripled to six million documents, and the largest live case as of January 2025 involved over 48 million documents, as reported by Jonathan Fisher KC in Part 1 of his Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences earlier this year (for more information, please see our previous blogpost). The average time to resolve fraud cases in the Crown Court has nearly doubled since 2019, far outpacing the increase across other offence categories which averages a 70% rise.
The development of new technology has also led to a proliferation in fraud offences which often involve complex financial instruments, cyber-enabled offences or cross-border elements. The average length of time taken to deal with such cases once they have been sent to the Crown Court has increased by 99% (from 192 days in 2019 to 382 days in 2024) which is significantly greater than the 70% increase in average time from receipt to completion in the Crown Court across all offences.
Sir Brian identifies these challenges as emblematic of a wider systemic issue: the criminal courts are not currently equipped – procedurally or technologically – to manage the scale and complexity of modern criminal litigation.
Key proposals
Judge-only trials for serious fraud
The voluminous digital evidence and intricate financial arrangements often associated with serious and complex fraud cases not only prolong trials but also, in Sir Brian's view, risk overwhelming juries. Sir Brian observes that this may undermine the fairness of proceedings if jurors are unable to understand and assess the complexity of the evidence. Consequently, to reduce trial length and cost, as well as to ensure that the factfinder has the requisite expertise to understand the evidence, the Report recommends that serious and complex fraud cases be tried by a judge alone, with eligibility defined by the case's hidden dishonesty or complexity that is outside the understanding of the general public.
Sir Brian considers two models in this regard:
- Fraud Panel: A Crown Court judge would sit with two expert lay assessors with commercial and financial experience. The judge would rule on legal matters while the panel would collectively determine factual issues. This model offers enhanced comprehension and efficiency, but may present logistical and cost challenges in relation to appointing and accrediting suitable assessors.
- Judge Alone: A single judge, selected for their expertise, would preside over the entire trial. This model, already in use in jurisdictions such as New Zealand, is Sir Brian's preferred approach principally because of its simplicity and efficiency. While it places greater responsibility on the judge, it is seen as better suited to the demands of complex financial litigation.
In either case, Sir Brian focusses on the ability to understand and analyse conflicting and complex technical evidence as vital to the determination of a case. A contrary view is that assessments of dishonesty, on which fraud cases often turn, are issues which often do not turn on complex technicalities and are ones which juries are particularly well suited to determine.
The Report proposes that either party – or the judge – may raise the issue of a juryless trial at a preparatory hearing, with the judge's decision being subject to interlocutory appeal. The model would not be limited to SFO prosecutions but would apply to any case meeting a defined threshold of complexity.
Incentivising early guilty pleas
Another area of interest highlighted in the Report is the troubling trend in the timing of guilty pleas: while the proportion of guilty pleas entered by defendants has remained relatively stable, they are increasingly being entered late in the process. Since 2019, the proportion of guilty pleas entered at the fourth or fifth hearing increased from 12% to 22%. This delay contributes significantly to court congestion.
To encourage earlier resolution, the Report proposes a suite of reforms, including:
- Enhanced sentence reductions: The maximum reduction for an early guilty plea be increased from 33% to 40% if entered at the first opportunity, tapering to one-third at the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing ("PTPH"), and then left to judicial discretion thereafter.
- Mandatory Goodyear indications: Judges would be expected to offer advance sentence indications (Goodyear indications) in the Crown Court (preferably at the PTPH), even absent a defence request, unless there is a compelling reason not to. This aims to give defendants greater clarity and confidence in entering a plea early.
- Pilot for delayed PTPHs: A trial scheme to test whether delaying the PTPH allows for more meaningful engagement between parties and better-informed plea decisions.
There is a risk that increasing the maximum reduction in sentence length for an early plea may place pressure on defendants to plead guilty inappropriately. While Sir Brian has encouraged the Sentencing Council and Judicial College to research the validity of voluntary pleas and monitor the use of the reduction, it is unclear how this heightened risk will be mitigated in practice.
Expansion of the Deferred Prosecution Scheme ("DPS")
The Report considers ways to expand the use of diversions from the criminal justice system. In particular, the Report endorses the legislative expansion of the DPS – a scheme that allows prosecution to be paused for individuals accused of minor offences, provided they agree to fulfil certain conditions within a set timeframe. While the DPS is less likely to be relevant to readers of this blog, this approach aligns with the existing deferred prosecution agreement ("DPA") framework used in corporate crime cases, and indicates a continued willingness to explore alternative resolutions to criminal proceedings such as DPAs.
Implications for corporate clients
The proposed shift to judge-only trials for serious and complex fraud would mark a significant departure from current practice. It would demand a recalibration of trial strategy, case preparation and advocacy with potentially greater emphasis on legal argument and expert evidence presentation, and less emphasis on layperson persuasion. For corporate defendants facing allegations of complex financial misconduct, the prospect of a judge-only trial may, in some cases, offer a more predictable and informed forum for adjudication. However, as noted above, such a radical trial reform will elicit concern, particularly in relation to the assessment of matters of fact in such cases such as questions of honesty.
The Director of Public Prosecutions for England and Wales, Stephen Parkinson, has welcomed the proposal, noting that "judge-only trials may well represent a fitting solution in a range of cases – for example, those with significant legal complexity". The SFO has also acknowledged the Report, and confirmed that it will work closely with the government on next steps.
The Report's emphasis on early engagement in the Crown Court is broadly aligned with the approach to early engagement recently seen in the corporate sphere following the SFO's latest guidance on corporate cooperation (see our previous blogpost here). Together, these trends suggest a more pragmatic and resolution-focused approach to corporate crime. If the recommendations around incentivising early guilty pleas are adopted, and assuming no changes to the current DPA guidance (which recommends a penalty "broadly comparable" to the fine that would have been imposed following a guilty plea1), companies entering DPA negotiations in due course may also see a reduction in the resulting penalty.
While the government considers the Report's recommendations and awaits the publication of the second part later this year, further developments are expected as a result of Jonathan Fisher KC's ongoing review of fraud legislation. This will provide additional insight into the future of complex fraud prosecution in the UK.
Footnote
1. Although in a significant number of cases the sentence reduction for entering a DPA has been a greater percentage discount than the discount for entering an early guilty plea. Amongst other matters, the assessment of whether the same conduct would be in scope of a DPA and a prosecution (and hence the starting point for any fine) are also relevant in comparing potential outcomes.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
