South African Competition Commission Issues Final Guidance Note For Online Intermediation Platforms

On 6 February 2026, the South African Competition Commission ("Commission") released its final Guidance Note for Online Intermediation Platforms ("Guidance Note"). This followed the release of a draft guidance note for public comment on 31 October 2025.

The Commission concluded its Online Intermediation Platforms Market Inquiry in 2023. During that process, the Commission identified various types of conduct engaged in by online intermediation platforms that the Commission believed had the effect of impeding or preventing competition in online intermediation platform markets. At the conclusion of the market inquiry, a number of firms agreed to implement remedial action to address the Commission's concerns. However, these remedial actions were time-limited and specific to platforms that had participated in the market inquiry process.

The purpose of the Guidance Note is now to provide more general guidance to online intermediation or business-to-consumer ("B2C") platforms, particularly those that have market power, on the types of conduct that the Commission will likely consider harmful to competing platforms or businesses listed on the platforms, including small medium enterprises ("SMEs") and businesses controlled and owned by historically disadvantaged persons ("HDPs") as defined in the South African Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 (as amended) ("Competition Act"). The Guidance Note covers broadly the same conduct and concerns that were raised during the market inquiry, but also considers findings from other jurisdictions on the same or similar conduct.

The Guidance Note has the status of "guidelines" issued under section 79 of the Competition Act, which are intended to provide practical guidance on the Commission's enforcement approach. Importantly, guidelines of this nature are not binding on the Commission, the Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal") or the Competition Appeal Court ("CAC") in the exercise of their respective discretion, or their interpretation of the Act. However, any person interpreting or applying the Act (including these bodies) must take guidelines into account. The Guidance Note therefore provides a strong indication of how the Commission intends to approach the assessment of platforms' conduct and may also influence how the Tribunal and the CAC interpret certain provisions of the Act insofar as they apply to platforms.

In the final Guidance Note, the Commission has made clear that its intention is not to introduce ex ante regulations for intermediation platforms but rather to provide guidance on specific types of conduct that could raise competition concerns. If platforms operating in South African are found to engage in the types of conduct set out in the Guidance Note, the Commission may call upon them to justify these practices based on financial and economic evidence. The Commission will, in each case, consider whether the practices are necessary for the sustainability of the platform. The Commission will nevertheless remain bound by the legal thresholds established by the relevant provisions of the Competition Act (including in relation to "market power") if the Commission decides to pursue a platform for any alleged contravention of the Competition Act arising from such conduct.

Market delineation

The Guidance Note indicates that the Commission will adopt a more holistic competitive assessment of the relevant market, beyond "static" market definition based on market shares. The Commission will consider differentiation and closeness of competition to determine the extent of a constraint and potential for an adverse effect on competition.

The Guidance Note states that online intermediation platforms are likely to be deemed closest competitors of each other for consumers and especially for SME business users that have no or limited direct online channels. Broader market definition might be considered where there is limited user adoption for particular B2C service types, and the platforms are nascent and sub-scale.

Platforms with market power

The draft guidance note was directed at "the largest or leading platforms" operating in South Africa. The final Guidance Note has clarified that this refers simply to platforms that have market power.

To analyse market power and determine dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act, the Guidance Note provides that the Commission will, in addition to market shares, also consider whether a platform:

• is significant in the market;
• is important in order for business users to reach consumers;
• can benefit from network effects to grow its significance and importance by attracting more business users and consumers; and
• has the ability to adversely affect rival platforms or business users.

In assessing these factors, the Commission will consider, among other things, (i) the size of the platform, (ii) the number of business users and consumers, (iii) business user dependency, (iv) scale and network effects of the platform, (v) platform conduct and observed outcomes, (vi) market structure, (vii) transaction volumes, and (viii) revenue derived by the platform.

The Guidance Note does not provide any quantitative thresholds for measuring these factors.

Conduct of concern

The Guidance Note identifies six practices that could have effect of preventing or restricting competition, falling under three categories as follows:

(I) Platform-related competition

1. Price parity clauses – which restrict businesses from offering better prices or terms elsewhere. Narrow clauses prevent businesses from offering lower prices on their own websites, while wide clauses also block them from doing so on competing platforms. Both types can limit competition, increase reliance on dominant platforms, and potentially harm consumers and smaller platforms, with wide clauses often considered particularly anti‑competitive. The Commission will require that platforms utilising such clauses provide more than theoretical claims about their efficiency or pro-competitive benefits, with reference to actual experience or strong financial modelling. The Guidance Note states that concerns regarding narrow and wide price parity clauses appear to arise regardless of the size of the platform as the use of price parity clauses by a multitude of smaller platforms could result in similar effects i.e. a lack of price competition to the detriment of consumers.
2. Interoperability – which is the ability of two or more components or systems to perform their required functions while sharing the same hardware or software environment. Interoperability is considered to be important in promoting competition among digital platforms and the following practices are highlighted as potentially preventing or restricting interoperability to smaller platforms and/or business users:
   • software systems of platforms with market power that restrict the ability for other systems and devices of smaller platforms and/or business users to interoperate freely with their own;
   • restriction of data that limits interoperability;
   • platforms restricting consumers from selecting services from competitors' platforms that offer those services; and
   • platforms charging a fee for access to their interfacing software.

   
   The Guidance Note states that platforms with market power in a category should consider allowing interoperability on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis, and may be required to provide evidence why refusing or restricting interoperability is not feasible.

(II) Competition among business users in the context of vertically integrated platforms

3. Self-preferencing – which arises if a platform is providing its own products and services in competition with business users operating on the platform and favours its own products or services over those of competing business users, for example by reserving better ranking positions or charging third-party commission fees.

The Guidance Note indicates that self-preferencing concerns will usually arise for platforms that possess market power where business users are dependent on the platform. Platforms are advised to maintain a transparent, fair and non-discriminatory approach when offering products or services in competition with business users.

4. Use of competitively sensitive data – when a platform that competes with business users has access to and utilises sensitive data of those business users to benefit its own competing products and services. Access to business users' sensitive data could create a conflict of interest that may distort competition.

To address such concerns, the Guidance Note suggests that platforms consider implementing measures that (i) prevent employees involved in the provision of the platform's own product from accessing competitively sensitive data of rival business users, and (ii) limit the use of competitively sensitive data to what is essential for the operation of the platform.

(III) Competition among business users impacting SMEs and HDPs

5. Differentiated trading terms across business users – when platforms offer preferential terms to large business users that disadvantage SMEs and HDPs. This conduct might have the effect of reinforcing the stronger position of larger users, limiting competition, and reducing consumer access to diverse, affordable, and high‑quality offerings. Examples of differentiated trading terms identified by the Guidance Note include

Where platforms with market power do not provide equal pricing and other trading terms across all classes of business users, the Commission may require those platforms to provide evidence to show the need for such differentiated trading terms and demonstrate the financial impact on the platform and its financial sustainability. The Commission is less likely to have concerns with differentiated trading terms that benefit SMEs and HDPs.

• the platform charging varying service, commission or subscription fees to different business users and in effect imposing higher fees on SMEs and/or HDPs compared to larger business users;
• offering value-added services at a lower cost or free for larger business users or only offering the value-added services to select larger business users;
• offering different trading terms to other business users compared to those offered to larger businesses; and
• providing additional marketing benefits exclusively to larger business users.

6. Unfair treatment – which, in the context of digital markets, refers to conduct of platforms with market power that extracts more from business users (particularly HDPs or SMEs) that are more reliant on the platform and therefore possess less bargaining power. Examples of unfair trading terms identified in the Guidance Note include:

• one-sided trading conditions;
• unreasonable transfer of risks or costs to business users;
• lack of dispute resolution mechanisms;
• requiring business users to exclusively use the platform's billing system;
• imposing steep annual fee increases that are unjustified;
• requiring business uses to offer good and services exclusively through the platform;
• imposing multi-year contracts to lock in business users with no additional benefits; and
• failure to provide terms and conditions of operating on the platform in plain and intelligible language.
  

Platforms with market power that utilise these types of trading terms may be required by the Commission to demonstrate that such terms are essential for the operation of the platform and that there are no less onerous alternative trading terms that could be imposed.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.