In litigation practice, the authority of an advocate to act is often taken for granted, with vakalatnamas and authority letters treated as routine paperwork. Yet beneath this apparent formality lies a dense body of law that determines the very legitimacy of representation. Questions of who may sign, how consent is proved, and whether a scanned signature suffices are not clerical details: they cut to the root of agency, evidence, and procedure.
The right of an advocate to represent a litigant in court is not merely a matter of professional etiquette - it is a question of authority grounded in statute, court rules, and a matrix of fiduciary obligations. The common perception that a vakalatnama is a mere "formality" conceals the fact that defective authorizations can invalidate entire proceedings. This Insight examines the juridical foundation of authority to represent and exposes the practical, often overlooked issues that continue to unsettle even experienced legal practitioners.
1. Authority as the Cornerstone of Representation
Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961, confers upon an advocate the right to practise before all courts, tribunals, and authorities. Yet this right is not unqualified. It requires the imprimatur of the client. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that an advocate derives locus standi to act only through an express act of authorization by the litigant - see T.C. Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge, (1999) 3 SCC 614).
Thus, the vakalatnama is not a procedural nicety but a manifestation of agency in its strictest legal sense. It is the instrument through which the client constitutes the advocate as an agent to bind the client in acts before the court, including filing, pleading, receiving, compromising, even withdrawing proceedings. Any absence or defect in this authority undermines the very jurisdiction and capacity of the advocate to act.
2. The Formal Rigour of Vakalatnamas and Authority Letters
Court rules across jurisdictions mandate the form, stamping, and execution of vakalatnamas. These rules emphasize that the form is not ornamental but substantive. Supreme Court Rules, 2013, require a vakalatnama to be executed by the party and accepted by an Advocate-on-Record, with court fee affixed. Similarly, the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, Chapter IV Rule 4 mandate stamping and countersigning by the advocate. Criminal courts often insist that the advocate sign "across" the client's signature. This is a practice rooted in preventing substitution or forgery.
The rigour around executing valid, genuine, and honest authorizations is deliberate:
- It ensures authenticity of consent, that the litigant has consciously mandated the advocate.
- It secures accountability, since the advocate, by countersigning, affirms that he has been validly instructed.
- It demarcates scope of authority, permitting or excluding powers such as compromise, withdrawal, or receipt of money.
Most court rules state that in case the vakalatnama is defective in any respect, the case in which it has been filed shall be treated as a defective case. Further, there are other substantive requirements - for instance, the Supreme Court Rules mandate that where the vakalatnama is executed in the presence of the advocate-on-record, he shall certify that it was executed in his presence. Alternatively, where the advocate on-record merely accepts the vakalatnama which is already duly executed in the presence of a Notary or an advocate, he shall make an endorsement thereon that he has satisfied himself about the due execution of the vakalatnama.
For corporates and institutions, the requirement of a board resolution or specific authority letter follows from the principle that a juristic person acts only through authorized agents. In United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, the Supreme Court held that a person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example, by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any inpidual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, a corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied.
3. The Problem of Non-Original Signatures
A recurring and under-discussed difficulty is the submission of vakalatnamas where the client's "signature" is only a scanned image, printed out and counter-signed in original by counsel. With the advent of technology and ease of documentary sharing through emails and other communication channels, signing a document and sharing its scanned copy with an intended recipient has become the norm rather than an exception.
From a strict evidentiary standpoint, such a document cannot be said to bear the "execution" of the client. The Indian Evidence Act treats electronic or reproduced signatures as secondary evidence, admissible only under limited circumstances. Unless the forum expressly recognizes e-signatures (e.g., through an IT Act–compliant digital signature framework), a printed signature lacks the juridical character of consent.
Many times, this results in court registries refusing to accept the scanned copies of vakalatnamas and insist on filing the authorization in-original. Registries that refuse such documents are not obstructing but safeguarding the principle that authority must emanate directly from the litigant's volition. The agency granted to the advocate must be presented in-original to the registry/court for validation. It is to be noted that even if the advocate wet-signs the print-out of the scanned copy of the client-signed vakalatnama, such advocate's wet signature cannot cure the absence of the client's wet signature, because the agency relationship is client-created, not advocate-ratified.
4. E-Filing and the "Dual Signature" Dilemma
E-filing has introduced a paradox. The uploaded vakalatnama often bears the client's scanned signature and counsel's wet signature. This is often found in scenarios where either due to paucity of time or geographical distance, the filing advocate prints out the scanned copy of client-signed vakalatnama, takes a printout of the same, signs this printout in wet ink, scans the document again, and e-files such document. As explained above, such a document would not suffice as an original, wet-signed, vakalatnama.
Thus, the filing advocate, later when originals are insisted upon from the client, must cautiously and diligently sign afresh on the original received by post. As a matter of best practice, when filing such original authorization later, a covering letter or affidavit may be filed explaining that the original, duly signed by client, has now been received and is being filed in compliance.
Notably, the signatures of the filing advocate in these two documents will not be identical (no two signatures of any natural person can be identical). However, this is not fatal. What matters is that both the client and the advocate have signed in original at some point. The advocate's two signatures not matching exactly cannot be treated as a defect, since the client's authority is continuous. The essence of authorization lies not in the perfect graphical match of signatures, but in the continuity of consent. So long as the original document bears the client's wet signature and is ratified by counsel, the authority remains unimpeached. The variance in counsel's signatures is a matter of fact, not of law.
Yet, this area remains a grey zone. Absent uniform rules, outcomes depend on the practice and discretion of inpidual registries, which is a disquieting state of affairs for something as fundamental as representation.
5. Lapses and Their Consequences
The consequences of lapses are not trivial. Courts have held that a petition filed without proper authorization is a nullity. An opposing party can legitimately object that pleadings filed without a valid vakalatnama are unauthorised. Even if subsequently ratified, the defect may impact limitation, maintainability, and costs.
The practical danger is greater in quasi-judicial fora (tax, regulatory, economic offences), where filings are often voluminous and deadlines short. Reliance on scanned signatures or generic authority letters may pass muster in routine practice, but in high stakes matters, a defect of this kind is a litigation risk in itself.
6. Towards a Normative Discipline
For a litigation practice to be institutionally robust, its internal discipline must exceed the minimum required by registry practice. A few norms follow from the above analysis:
- Wet Ink is Non-Negotiable: Client's original signature is the touchstone of authority. Scans are, at best, stop-gap measures pending courier of originals.
- Dual Documentation in Corporates: Every corporate vakalatnama must be backed by a specific resolution; reliance on standing authorizations invites challenge.
- Covering Affidavits: When filing originals belatedly (after e-filing), always accompany with an affidavit explaining continuity of authority.
- Zero Tolerance Policy: Internal firm protocols, for law firms working as large teams, should treat filing of an unauthorised vakalatnama as a professional lapse on par with missing a limitation.
7. A Call for Uniformity
Ultimately, the fragmentation of practices across forums is unsatisfactory. The rise of e-courts and digital litigation compels a reconsideration of what constitutes "execution" of authority. Whether by adopting IT Act-compliant digital signatures or a model uniform rule, the law must reconcile the traditional sanctity of wet ink with the operational realities of modern practice. Until then, the burden falls on practitioners to police themselves with rigor, otherwise avoidable lapses could significantly erode substantive rights.
Conclusion
Authority to represent is not an incidental formality but a doctrinal foundation of advocacy. The interplay of agency, evidence, and procedure means that even the smallest defect in authorization can cascade into jurisdictional challenges. While registries may treat vakalatnamas as routine filings, serious practitioners must view them as the juridical linchpin of representation itself. In an era where technology tempts shortcuts, fidelity to the principle of original consent is the only safeguard against an otherwise avoidable collapse of proceedings.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
