Monthly Newsletter - June 2026

ARBITRATION

Date: 02 June 2026

Case Name: National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis & Anr. Civil Appeal No. of 2026 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 7570 of 2024)

Forum: Supreme Court

The present appeal arose from acquisition proceedings initiated under the National Highways Act, 1956. Pursuant to notifications issued under Sections 3A and 3D of the Act, the land belonging to Respondent No. 1 was acquired and vested in the Central Government. The Competent Authority passed an award determining compensation under Section 3G(1) of the Act. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, the National Highways Authority of India invoked arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the Act. Although the first arbitral award was set aside by the High Court and remanded for fresh consideration, the Arbitrator, upon remand, rendered a fresh award granting the respondents statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Aggrieved by certain findings in the fresh award, the appellant filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) seeking correction of the award, while Respondent No. 1 simultaneously sought an additional award under Section 33(4) of the ACA. Both applications were dismissed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Thereafter, the appellant instituted proceedings under Section 34 of the ACA along with applications for condonation of delay, which were allowed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge. However, the High Court held that the appellant's application under Section 33 was not maintainable and, consequently, ruled that limitation under Section 34(3) could not be computed from the date of disposal of the Section 33 proceedings. Holding the Section 34 applications to be barred by limitation, the High Court dismissed them, giving rise to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 commences from the date of the arbitral award or from the date of disposal of an application under Section 33 of the Act?
2. Whether the benefit of deferred commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) is available irrespective of whether the application under Section 33 is ultimately allowed, dismissed, or held to be maintainable?
3. Whether the appellant’s applications under Section 34 were filed within the prescribed period of limitation?

Submission of the Parties:

The appellant contended that once both parties had formally invoked the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 of the ACA, limitation under Section 34(3) could commence only upon disposal of those applications. It was submitted that the language of Section 34(3) unequivocally provides that the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date on which the request under Section 33 is disposed of. Reliance was placed upon Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav and other decisions to contend that the High Court had erred in relying upon State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co., which was distinguishable on facts.

The respondents contended that the appellant's application under Section 33 was, in substance, an impermissible attempt to seek review of the arbitral award rather than correction of clerical or computational errors. It was argued that only a legally maintainable application under Section 33 could postpone the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3), and that an incompetent application could not extend the statutory period of limitation.

Observations of the Court:

The Supreme Court observed that Sections 33 and 34 of the ACA operate harmoniously and that Section 34(3) expressly provides that where a request under Section 33 has been made, limitation for filing an application under Section 34 commences only upon disposal of such request. The Court held that the statutory provision does not distinguish between applications under Section 33 that are allowed and those that are dismissed, nor does it require that the application must ultimately be found maintainable before the benefit of deferred limitation becomes available.

The Court further held that once the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal is formally invoked under Section 33 and the application is entertained, the arbitral proceedings remain pending until such application is decided. Consequently, parties cannot be compelled to institute parallel proceedings under Section 34 merely as a matter of abundant caution. While distinguishing State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co., the Court observed that the said decision arose in a different factual context where no formal application under Section 33 had been filed. At the same time, the Court clarified that frivolous or mala fide applications under Section 33, intended solely to defeat limitation, may invite the imposition of exemplary costs. Applying these principles, the Court held that the appellant's Section 34 applications had been instituted well within the prescribed period of limitation.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. It restored the order condoning the delay in filing the applications under Section 34 of the ACA and directed that the said applications be decided on their merits. The Court held that where the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal has been formally invoked under Section 33 and such application has been entertained, the limitation under Section 34(3) commences from the date on which the Section 33 proceedings are disposed of, irrespective of the ultimate fate of the application.

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The judgment is a significant pronouncement on the interpretation of Sections 33 and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It clarifies that the limitation under Section 34(3) commences upon the disposal of a formally instituted application under Section 33, irrespective of its ultimate outcome. By promoting procedural certainty, discouraging multiplicity of proceedings, and preserving the statutory right to challenge an arbitral award while deterring abuse through frivolous applications, the decision strengthens the efficiency and fairness of India's arbitral framework.

CIVIL LAW

Date: 19 June 2026

Case Name: Rajat Kumar & Ors. v. S.D. Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura & Ors. Civil Appeal Nos. 19552-19553 of 2017

Forum: Supreme Court

The present appeals arose from two suits instituted by the original plaintiff seeking mandatory and permanent injunctions against the respondent-defendants. In the first suit, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had unlawfully encroached upon a common open space by constructing a wall, thereby obstructing his access to air, light, and the natural flow of water. In the second suit, the plaintiff challenged the construction of a lintel by the defendants on the wall of his house. The Trial Court decreed both suits, directing removal of the offending constructions, and the decrees were affirmed by the First Appellate Court.

In second appeals, the High Court initially modified the decrees by directing payment of monetary compensation in lieu of removal of the constructions. The said judgments were set aside by the Supreme Court and the matters were remanded for fresh consideration. Upon remand, the High Court once again set aside the concurrent decrees and directed the Executing Court to assess the value of the constructions so that compensation could be paid to the legal heirs of the plaintiff. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of the courts below in second appeal without framing substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
2. Whether the High Court could substitute a decree for mandatory injunction with an award of monetary compensation in the absence of any such prayer by the plaintiff?
3. Whether the High Court could direct the Executing Court to assess compensation after setting aside the decree sought to be executed?
4. Whether the High Court erred in proceeding on an incorrect factual premise regarding the nature of the disputed wall?

Submission of the Parties:

The appellants contended that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by replacing the decrees for mandatory injunction with monetary compensation despite there being no prayer for damages in either suit. It was further submitted that the High Court failed to frame substantial questions of law as mandated under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure before reversing the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The appellants also argued that the direction issued to the Executing Court for assessment of compensation was wholly without jurisdiction, particularly after the decrees themselves had been set aside.

Despite due service, the respondents did not enter appearance before the Supreme Court and no submissions were advanced on their behalf.

Observations of the Court:

The Supreme Court observed that the plaintiff had sought only mandatory and permanent injunctions and had never claimed damages or monetary compensation. Consequently, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to compel the legal heirs of the plaintiff to accept compensation in substitution of the equitable relief granted by the Trial Court. The Court further held that once the decrees stood set aside, there remained no executable decree on the basis of which the Executing Court could undertake an assessment of compensation, rendering the directions issued by the High Court legally unsustainable.

The Court also noted that the High Court had repeated the very error for which its earlier judgment had been set aside by the Supreme Court. Further, it proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the Trial Court had treated the disputed wall as a common wall, whereas no such finding had been recorded. The Supreme Court additionally held that the High Court failed to formally frame and decide substantial questions of law before interfering with concurrent findings of fact, as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the common judgment of the High Court. It directed the High Court to reconsider both second appeals afresh on their own merits in accordance with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure after framing and adjudicating the substantial questions of law, if any. Considering the prolonged pendency of the litigation, the Court requested the High Court to dispose of the second appeals expeditiously.

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The judgment reaffirms the limited scope of interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reiterates that a High Court cannot substitute the relief claimed by a litigant with an altogether different remedy in the absence of any pleading or prayer. It further underscores that judicial discretion must operate within the confines of the statutory framework and that concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed without first identifying and deciding substantial questions of law.

CRIMINAL LAW

Date: 05 June 2026

Case Name: Devangana Kalita v. State of NCT of Delhi W.P. (Crl.) 925 of 2025 & Crl.M.A. 8681 of 2025

Forum: Delhi High Court

The petitioner, an accused in proceedings arising out of FIR No. 59 of 2020 concerning the North-East Delhi riots, sought inspection of un-relied documents retained in the Malkhana of the Investigating Agency. The prosecution had filed a chargesheet under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“UAPA”), while numerous documents and electronic records, including CCTV footage, videos and WhatsApp chats seized during investigation, were neither relied upon nor supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner contended that these materials were essential for effectively advancing arguments at the stage of framing of charge and demonstrating the peaceful nature of the protests in which she allegedly participated.

After the Special Court rejected the petitioner’s application seeking inspection of the Malkhana, holding that the issue stood concluded by an earlier order under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, read with the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, challenging the legality of the said order.

Issues:

1. Whether a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is maintainable against an interlocutory order of a Special Court notwithstanding the bar contained in Section 21(3) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 200?
2. Whether an accused is entitled to inspect un-relied documents retained in the Malkhana at the stage of arguments on charge?
3. Whether an order passed under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure precludes an accused from seeking inspection of un-relied documents separately retained during investigation?
4. Whether the right to inspect un-relied documents differs in prosecutions under the UAPA and the NIA Act as compared to ordinary criminal prosecutions?

Submission of the Parties:

The petitioner submitted that the right to inspect un-relied documents is an integral facet of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21 and is distinct from the statutory right to receive copies of documents under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was contended that several electronic records and other seized materials retained in the Malkhana could materially assist the defence at the stage of framing of charge and that denial of inspection would seriously prejudice the petitioner's right to effectively contest the prosecution's case.

The respondent opposed the petition on the ground that the impugned order was interlocutory and therefore immune from challenge in view of Section 21(3) of the NIA Act. It was further contended that neither the NIA Act nor the UAPA confers any right upon an accused to inspect un-relied documents at the stage of charge, and that permitting such inspection would unnecessarily delay proceedings in sensitive anti-terror prosecutions.

Observations of the Court:

The High Court held that the statutory bar under Section 21(3) of the NIA Act extends only to appeals and revisions and does not curtail the constitutional or inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or its inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

On merits, the Court undertook an extensive review of the jurisprudence governing disclosure of un-relied documents and held that the right to a fair trial under Article 21 necessarily includes the right of an accused to inspect documents seized during investigation but not relied upon by the prosecution. The Court distinguished the supply of documents under Section 207 of the Code from inspection of un-relied material, observing that the two operate in distinct fields. It further held that permitting inspection strikes an appropriate balance between safeguarding the accused's right to prepare an effective defence and preserving the integrity of the investigation.

Rejecting the respondent’s contention that such rights are confined to economic offences or CBI investigations, the Court emphatically held that constitutional guarantees of a fair trial cannot be diluted merely because the prosecution is under the UAPA or the NIA Act. The rights of an accused under Article 21 remain uniform irrespective of the nature of the offence alleged.

Held:

The High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of the Special Court refusing inspection of the Malkhana. The respondent was directed to permit the petitioner to inspect the un-relied documents retained during investigation and to provide all necessary facilities for such inspection. The Court, however, clarified that the petitioner shall complete the inspection without causing unnecessary delay to the trial, and consequently vacated the interim stay operating in the matter.

The judgment is a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21. It clarifies that an accused's right to inspect un-relied documents is an indispensable safeguard against prejudice and is not confined to ordinary criminal prosecutions but extends equally to proceedings under special statutes such as the UAPA and the NIA Act. The decision strengthens the principles of transparency, procedural fairness and equality in criminal trials by ensuring that the prosecution's discretion in relying upon evidence does not impair the accused's ability to effectively defend the case at the threshold stage.

INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

Date: 01 June 2026

Case Name: CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited., Civil Appeal No. 5988 of 2026

Forum: Supreme Court

The appellant, acting as the liquidator of a corporate debtor under liquidation, challenged an order passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) before the Supreme Court under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”). Although the appeal was presented within the maximum condonable period of sixty days prescribed under Section 62, it was filed with defects. While the delay in the initial filing was sought to be condoned, the defects were cured only after a delay of eighty-two days beyond the twenty-eight-day period prescribed under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 for re-filing.

The appellant attributed the delay in re-filing to a bona fide administrative lapse within the office of the Liquidator, contending that the defects communicated by the Registry were not promptly relayed to the Advocate-on-Record due to an internal communication failure. The appellant further relied upon an earlier order of the Supreme Court in the same litigation, wherein delay had been condoned while challenging an order under Section 61 of the IBC before the NCLAT. The present appeal, however, questioned the NCLAT’s order passed after remand by the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 62 of IBC?
2. Whether delay in re-filing a defective appeal under Section 62 of the IBC beyond the twenty-eight-day period prescribed under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is condonable?
3. Whether a defective appeal can be regarded as a validly instituted appeal within the prescribed period of limitation?
4. Whether the appellant’s status as a court-appointed liquidator or the Court’s powers under Article 142 of the Constitution justify relaxation of the statutory limitation?
5. Whether the earlier order condoning delay in the appellant’s favour constituted a precedent warranting similar indulgence in the present proceedings?

Submission of the Parties:

The appellant submitted that, being a court-appointed liquidator acting for the benefit of all stakeholders, a liberal approach ought to be adopted while considering the delay. It was contended that delay in re-filing stands on a different footing from delay in filing and that the Court possesses unfettered discretion to condone re-filing delay upon sufficient cause being shown. The appellant further argued that the delay resulted from a bona fide administrative lapse and relied upon the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the same litigation, wherein a liberal approach had been adopted while condoning delay.

The respondent opposed the grant of any indulgence beyond the statutory framework governing limitation under the IBC.

Observations of the Court:

The Supreme Court reiterated that IBC is a complete code providing a strict and time-bound framework for insolvency proceedings, with expedition and finality forming its underlying legislative objective. The Court held that Section 62 prescribes an outer limit of sixty days for filing an appeal, beyond which the Court lacks jurisdiction to condone delay.

The Court further held that a defective appeal cannot be treated as a validly instituted appeal unless the defects are cured within the period prescribed under the Supreme Court Rules. While delay in re-filing may ordinarily be viewed more liberally in general proceedings, such principle cannot override the statutory scheme under the IBC. Permitting litigants to cure defects beyond the prescribed period would effectively defeat the legislative mandate of strict timelines and enable circumvention of limitation through defective filings.

The Court rejected the contention that the appellant’s position as a court-appointed liquidator or the invocation of Article 142 warranted relaxation of the statutory limitation. It also distinguished its earlier order in the appellant’s favour, observing that the said order pertained to proceedings under Section 61 before the NCLAT, was rendered on its own peculiar facts, and had itself expressly recorded that it should not be treated as a precedent. Independently, the Court held that the explanations furnished for both the filing and re-filing delays did not constitute sufficient cause.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that delay in re-filing beyond the period prescribed under the Supreme Court Rules could not be condoned in proceedings under Section 62 of the IBC. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to extend the statutory timelines and that the appellant had, in any event, failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of either the filing delay or the re-filing delay. Consequently, the applications seeking condonation of delay were dismissed and, as a corollary, the appeal stood rejected as barred by limitation.

The judgment reinforces the strict limitation regime governing appellate proceedings under the IBC and underscores that procedural discipline cannot be diluted by invoking equitable considerations or administrative lapses. It affirms that the IBC constitutes a self-contained code with inflexible timelines designed to ensure certainty, expedition, and finality in insolvency proceedings, thereby discouraging attempts to circumvent statutory limitation through defective filings or repeated requests for condonation.

WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES

Date: 10 June 2026

Case Name: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shankar Singh & Ors. Criminal Appeal Nos. 2191-2192 of 2025

Forum: Supreme Court

The present appeals arose from a writ petition filed by the first respondent challenging the validity of the sanction granted for his prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”). While the High Court declined to interfere with the sanction, it proceeded to issue general directions requiring all trial courts dealing with prosecutions under the PC Act to examine the sanctioning authority under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) before framing charges. The State sought review of these directions, which was dismissed.

Subsequently, the first respondent was acquitted, rendering the challenge to the sanction infructuous. Nevertheless, the State approached the Supreme Court contending that the directions issued by the High Court, being prospective in nature, would govern future prosecutions under the PC Act and were beyond the High Court’s jurisdiction.

Issues:

1. Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could issue general directions requiring trial courts to examine the sanctioning authority under Section 311 CrPC before framing charges in all prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act?
2. Whether Section 311 CrPC empowers a criminal court to introduce a mandatory pre-charge stage for examining the sanctioning authority?
3. Whether the Supreme Court could adjudicate upon the validity of the High Court’s directions despite the principal dispute regarding sanction having become infructuous?

Submission of the Parties:

The State submitted that although the dispute concerning the validity of sanction had become academic following the acquittal of the accused, the directions issued by the High Court possessed prospective and general applicability and were liable to create serious procedural difficulties in future prosecutions. It was contended that Section 311 CrPC had been erroneously interpreted by the High Court and that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to supplement or rewrite the statutory procedure prescribed under the CrPC.

The respondents supported the impugned directions, contending that Section 311 CrPC authorises the examination of any witness at any stage of the proceedings and that the directions were intended to ensure the validity of sanction before commencement of trial, thereby advancing the cause of justice.

Observations of the Court

The Supreme Court observed that the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes a complete and self-contained procedural framework governing criminal trials, and the stages of trial can neither be modified nor supplemented by judicial directions. The Court held that Section 311 CrPC is a general enabling provision empowering the court to summon or examine witnesses during an inquiry or trial, but it cannot be construed as authorising the creation of an altogether new procedural stage requiring compulsory examination of the sanctioning authority before framing of charge.

The Court further held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot rewrite or supplement the statutory procedure enacted by Parliament. Although the appeals had become infructuous insofar as the challenge to sanction was concerned, the Court found it necessary to examine the legality of the impugned directions because of their continuing prospective operation and their potential impact on criminal trials under the PC Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals by setting aside paragraphs 32 and 33 of the High Court’s judgment containing the impugned directions and guidelines. The Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to mandate examination of the sanctioning authority before framing of charge or to introduce a procedural stage not contemplated under the CrPC. While the appeals were otherwise rendered infructuous by reason of the acquittal of the accused, they were allowed to the limited extent of quashing the impugned directions. The connected appeals supporting the High Court’s directions were accordingly dismissed.

The judgment reaffirms the principle that courts cannot, under the guise of exercising constitutional or inherent jurisdiction, legislate by introducing procedural requirements not contemplated by statute. It underscores the primacy of the procedural framework prescribed under the CrPC and delineates the limits of judicial intervention under Article 226, thereby preserving the separation of powers and ensuring uniformity in the conduct of criminal trials under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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