ARBITRATION
Date: 30 April 2025
Case Name: Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (with several connected civil appeals) arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos. 15336-15337 of 2021.
Forum: Supreme Court
The appeal arose from a reference made by a full bench of the Supreme Court vide order dated 20 February 2024, directing that the Special Leave Petitions in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, be placed before the Chief Justice of India for an appropriate order. The matter was to be examined to determine the need to refer the questions of law stated below, to a larger Bench in order to reconcile conflicting judicial pronouncements on whether Indian courts possess the power to modify arbitral awards under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act"). The case did not involve detailed facts specific to the parties but served as a vehicle to resolve a fundamental legal issue in arbitration jurisprudence following divergent views taken in previous decisions, particularly in Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem ("Hakeem"). While Hakeem categorically denied the court's authority to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act, other decisions had either upheld or themselves undertaken such modifications. Consequently, a need arose for authoritative interpretation by a larger bench.
Issues:
- Whether courts have the jurisdiction to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act?
- If so, whether this power is exercisable only when the award is severable, and only part of it requires modification?
- Whether the power to set aside an award under Section 34 includes, in substance, a power to modify, and if so, to what extent?
- Whether the power to modify can be inferred from the statutory power to set aside an award under Section 34 of the Act?
- Whether the decision in Hakeem lays down the correct position of law, particularly when seen against judgments permitting modifications of awards?
Observations of the Court:
The court observed that while Section 34 of the Act is unequivocal in its reference to the setting aside of awards, the purpose and structure of the statute allow some judicial engagement with awards short of complete annulment. The court emphasised the principle of severability as reflected in the proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Act which permits separating invalid portions of an award from the remainder. It observed that modification may, in appropriate cases, be a milder and more proportionate response than setting aside the entire award particularly when the award is partly invalid or contains rectifiable errors. Moreover, the court took note of the practical need to prevent endless litigation and unnecessary remand to arbitral tribunals, specially where the error is patent and susceptible to limited judicial correction.
While reinforcing the statutory limitations on merits review, the court underscored that judicial correction of clerical, typographical, and computational mistakes has long been considered permissible as such corrections do not intrude into the substantive reasoning of the arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, the court recognized that where there is uncertainty about the propriety of modifying the award it is more prudent to remand the matter under Section 34(4).
The decision also acknowledged the possibility of post-award settlements between parties, in which case the terms can be recorded in decrees akin to Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") provided the settlement is bona fide and enforceable.
Finally, the court recognised that although Article 142 of the Constitution enables the Supreme Court to do complete justice, such power must be employed with constitutional restraint and in a manner that does not rewrite or substitute the arbitrator's decision with the Court's own conclusions.
Reasoning of the Court:
The majority held that although the legislative framework in Sections 34 and 37 does not explicitly provide for modification, it does not prohibit courts from granting effective and proportionate reliefs that may involve modifying certain aspects of an arbitral award in exceptional situations.
The court observed that the purpose of arbitration is to ensure efficient and final resolution of disputes, thus, denying courts all flexibility in this regard could defeat that objective. It was clarified that correction of manifest and objective errors does not amount to reappreciation of evidence or merit review. Inherent judicial powers, recognised even within the limited scope of Section 34 permit such corrections to uphold the integrity of the process without undermining party autonomy.
Moreover, where a severable portion of the award is found to be invalid, a court may sustain the valid portion while modifying or deleting the flawed part to avoid the injustice of setting aside the entire award. The judgment emphasised that such modification is not an expansion of judicial power but a calibrated and minimal intervention consistent with the scheme of the Act and international best practices under the New York Convention.
The court also reasoned that Section 34(4) of the Act which allows a court to adjourn proceedings to enable the tribunal to eliminate grounds for challenge implies that judicial oversight may extend to clarifying or rectifying awards when necessary. Importantly, the court found that the power to modify post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) is well within judicial competence when statutory defaults or inconsistencies arise.
Held:
The Constitution Bench by a majority of 4:1 held that courts do possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act. This power is confined to circumstances where the award is severable and the invalid portion can be removed while preserving the rest; where clerical, typographical, or computational errors exist prima facie; and where post-award interest requires correction in light of statutory provisions.
Additionally, the Supreme Court may exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to modify an award to do complete justice between the parties, but such exercise must not contravene statutory boundaries or usurp the function of the arbitral tribunal.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice K.V. Viswanathan delivered a dissenting opinion disagreeing with the majority on the extent of judicial power under Section 34. He held that the court cannot modify an award as such intervention constitutes an impermissible merits review.
According to him, Section 34 only permits the court to set aside an award and does not imply the power to vary or alter its terms. He further asserted that reading a modification power into Section 34 violates the legislative intent and arbitration's foundational principle of limited judicial interference.
Justice Viswanathan opposed the majority's view on modifying post-award interest and applying Article 142 to alter awards, warning that such steps could introduce uncertainty and undermine confidence in arbitral finality. However, he concurred with the view that clerical or typographical mistakes may be corrected as this does not interfere with the merits of the award.
The Supreme Court provided a decisive and nuanced interpretation of the powers available to Indian courts under the Act in the context of arbitral awards. While affirming the principle of minimal interference, the court has paved the way for limited modifications that serve the ends of justice, particularly in cases of severable defects and manifest clerical errors. The judgment clarifies the scope of judicial powers and aims to harmonize conflicting precedents, thereby strengthening the credibility and predictability of the arbitral process in India.
CIVIL LAW
Date: 22 April 2025
Case Name: Amruddin Ansari (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. Afajal Ali & Ors., S.L.P. (Civil) No. 11442 of 2023
Forum: Supreme Court of India
The dispute began with a civil suit originally filed by the plaintiffs' father registered as Civil Suit No. 37A of 1996. The said suit was dismissed under the provisions of Order IX Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") on account of non-service of summons upon the defendants. Subsequently, the original plaintiff moved an application for restoration of the suit under Order IX Rule 4 CPC. However, the said application was also dismissed. Following the death of the original plaintiff, his legal heirs instituted a fresh suit bearing Civil Suit No. 27A of 2001 seeking essentially the same reliefs as in the earlier suit. The trial court adjudicated in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit.
On appeal, the first appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. In second appeal, the High Court formulated three substantial questions of law, inter alia, relating to the maintainability of the second suit, the evidentiary value of the Wajib-ul-arz i.e., the local revenue record, and the applicability of the bar of res judicata.
The High Court eventually set aside the first appellate court's decision and restored the judgment and decree of the trial court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the original defendants preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court of India.
Issues:
- Whether a fresh suit is maintainable after dismissal of a restoration application under Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC?
- Whether a fresh suit is barred by res judicata after dismissal of the suit for default?
The petitioners argued that the filing of the second suit i.e., Civil Suit No. 27A of 2001 was legally impermissible since the restoration application pertaining to the first suit i.e., Civil Suit No. 37A of 1996 made under Order IX Rule 4 CPC had been dismissed and that order had attained finality and permitting a fresh suit under such circumstances would defeat the procedural scheme envisaged by the CPC and amount to circumventing the consequences of procedural default.
Further, the petitioners challenged the evidentiary value of the Wajib Dava which was Exhibit P-1 averring that it lacked probative worth. They submitted that the document was affected by the operation of Section 54 of the principles of Mohammedan Law, when read with Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Since the document was unregistered, it could not be relied upon to prove valid title or confer any substantive rights.
Additionally, the petitioners contended that the second suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata given that the same cause of action and reliefs had been sought in the earlier suit which had been dismissed and not restored.
The respondents supported the reasoning adopted by the High Court and submitted that no error had been committed in the impugned judgment. They contended that the second suit was not barred and that the High Court, while drawing from established judicial precedents had rightly held it to be maintainable.
They also defended the reliance on the Wajib Dava which was Exhibit P-1 arguing that the High Court had comprehensively assessed its evidentiary value. According to the respondents, the document had been rightly relied upon by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court.
Furthermore, the respondents argued that the petition lacked merit raised no substantial question of law that would warrant interference by the Supreme Court, and accordingly, deserved to be dismissed.
Held:
The court observed that Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC contemplates two independent remedies available to a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order IX i.e., either to seek restoration of the dismissed suit or to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The court emphasised that these remedies are not mutually exclusive. In this regard, it relied on the authoritative pronouncement of the Privy Council in Bhudeo Mandal vs. Musammat Baikunthi Koer which held that the mere availing of one remedy i.e., seeking restoration does not foreclose the right to avail the other i.e., filing a fresh suit, particularly when the first remedy proves unsuccessful.
The Court also drew a crucial distinction between the language employed in Order IX Rule 4 and Rule 9. While Rule 9 expressly bars a fresh suit after a dismissal under Rule 8 unless the suit is restored no such express bar is found in Rule 4 in respect of dismissals under Rules 2 and 3. The court further noted that various High Courts have, in a consistent line of authority upheld the maintainability of a fresh suit in such situations.
The court held that the absence of a statutory bar in Order IX Rule 4 reinforces the legislative intent to preserve the right to institute a fresh suit even after the failure of a restoration application. It explained that Rule 9 of Order IX specifically provides that when a suit is dismissed under Rule 8 due to the plaintiff's default in appearance, no fresh suit can lie on the same cause of action. However, Rule 4 is framed differently as it contains no such limiting provision and thus cannot be interpreted to preclude a fresh suit.
Further, the Court clarified the jurisprudential understanding of what constitutes a "judgment" or "decree" under the CPC. It held that an order dismissing a suit for default does not involve an adjudication on the merits of the controversy and, as such, cannot be deemed a judgment or decree in the legal sense.
Consequently, such an order cannot attract the bar of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata applies only where a matter has been finally adjudicated upon between the same parties on merits. Since the dismissal under Order IX Rule 2 is procedural and not substantive, it cannot preclude a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the High Court. It conclusively held that a fresh suit is maintainable notwithstanding the dismissal of a restoration application under Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC.
The judgment rendered by the Supreme Court reaffirms the nuanced distinction within the provisions of Order IX of the CPC by clarifying that a fresh suit is maintainable even after the dismissal of a restoration application under Order IX Rule 4, the Court has reinforced the principle that procedural defaults should not extinguish substantive rights unless explicitly barred by law. The decision also underscores the limited applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to orders not rendered on merits, thereby safeguarding the right of litigants to a fair adjudication.
CRIMINAL LAW
Date: 23 April 2025
Case Name: Dinesh Sharma v. Emgee Cables and Communication Ltd. & Anr., Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 10744-10745 of 2023.
Forum: Supreme Court of India
The present case arises from a commercial relationship between the appellant representing BLS Polymers Ltd., and the first respondent i.e., Emgee Cables and Communication Ltd. between 2012 and 2018, the appellant's company supplied plastic compounds to the respondent on a credit basis. Despite accepting the supplies, the respondent company failed to make timely payments and issued several cheques, some of which were dishonoured upon presentation.
Owing to repeated defaults and apprehension of fraudulent intent, the appellant lodged FIR No. 218 of 2018 invoking Sections 420, 406, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC"). Simultaneously, Dena Bank had independently registered FIR No. 135 of 2018 against the same respondent and its directors alleging serious financial irregularities and defaults in banking transactions. The Enforcement Directorate ("ED") taking cognizance of the bank-related offences proceeded to attach properties under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 ("PMLA").
However, the High Court, treating the matter as a mere civil dispute arising from a commercial contract, quashed FIR No. 218 of 2018. Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the FIR No. 218 of 2018 filed by the appellant on the ground that the dispute was civil in nature?
The appellant contended that the High Court committed a manifest error in prematurely quashing the FIR, thereby frustrating the course of investigation into a potentially serious economic offence. It was asserted that the directors of the respondent company acted with dishonest intent from the outset, having induced BLS Polymers Ltd. to supply goods without any intention of making payment.
The issuance of dishonoured cheques and the incorporation of shell entities to circulate funds further indicated fraudulent conduct. The appellant also relied on the ED's action and the chargesheet filed in the Dena Bank FIR as corroborative evidence of criminal conspiracy and financial misconduct.
The State supported the appellant's stance by submitting that the High Court erred in holding that the transaction was entirely civil in nature. It argued that criminality and civil liability can co-exist, and the mere presence of a contractual relationship does not exclude the possibility of criminal prosecution where deception and fraudulent intention are alleged. The State emphasised the necessity of allowing the investigative machinery to function unhindered.
Respondent No. 3 defended the High Court's order arguing that the complaint was a disguised effort to recover money and lacked the necessary ingredients of a criminal offence. He contended that his resignation from the company insulated him from any subsequent liability. Furthermore, he averred that the appellant's reliance on the Dena Bank FIR and attachment proceedings was misplaced as they pertained to a separate transaction and did not directly involve the appellant.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court had misapplied the law in quashing the FIR at a nascent stage of the investigation. It observed that the formation of shell companies, the circulation of funds among related entities, and the issuance of dishonoured cheques were not mere instances of business failure but indicative of a calculated scheme to defraud.
The court distinguished between a genuine commercial default and a criminal conspiracy masked as a civil dispute. It reiterated that the existence of a contractual arrangement does not preclude the application of penal provisions where fraudulent intent is manifest. The court placed reliance on established jurisprudence that economic offences particularly those involving deception and breach of trust have wider ramifications and deserve stringent scrutiny.
With respect to Respondent No. 3's claim of resignation, the court noted that his continued involvement in the affairs of the respondent company belied his assertion of disassociation and raised factual issues that could not be decided summarily at the stage of quashing.
The court further emphasised the limited scope of the High Court's power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Unless it is evident on the face of the record that the allegations do not disclose any offence, the FIR should not be quashed. The High Court, by intervening prematurely, had denied the investigating agency the opportunity to examine the allegations in their proper context.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court quashing FIR No. 218 of 2018. It held that the FIR disclosed sufficient grounds warranting investigation and possible prosecution under Sections 420, 406, and 120B of the IPC. The trial court was directed to proceed with the matter strictly in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the observations made by the Supreme Court.
This Supreme Court reaffirmed the well-settled principle that criminal proceedings ought not to be stifled at the threshold where prima facie allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The Court found that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by quashing an FIR which raised serious allegations of fraud and criminal breach of trust in a commercial setting. The court acknowledged the gravity of economic offences and emphasised the importance of allowing the investigative process to unfold specially where the material on record suggested a premeditated scheme to defraud.
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
Date: 29 April 2025
Case Name: Visa Coke Limited v. M/s Mesco Kalinga Steel Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 357 of 2025
Forum: Supreme Court
The dispute in the present case arose from a commercial arrangement between the appellant i.e., Visa Coke Limited ("Operational Creditor") and respondent i.e., Mesco Kalinga Steel Limited ("Corporate Debtor") involving the sale and purchase of Low Ash Metallurgical Coke ("LAM Coke"). Initially, the contract stipulated that the buyer was to make 100% advance payments. However, through a series of amendments and subsequent email correspondences, the terms were altered, and the appellant ultimately supplied 1700 metric tonnes of LAM Coke on credit. Despite having acknowledged the outstanding liability, the respondent failed to discharge the debt. Consequently, the appellant being the operational creditor issued a demand notice under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC") followed by a petition under Section 9 of IBC before the National Company Law Tribunal ("NCLT") for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process ("CIRP"). The NCLT, and in appeal the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal ("NCLAT"), dismissed the petition on the ground that the statutory demand notice had been improperly served. Both forums held that service of the notice upon a Key Managerial Personnel ("KMP") of the corporate debtor rather than directly upon the corporate debtor itself was defective, thereby rendering the petition non-maintainable.
Issue:
- Whether the demand notice served upon the KMP of the Corporate Debtor at their registered office constitutes valid service under Section 8 of the IBC?
- Additionally, whether the appellant established the occurrence of a "default" as required under Section 9 of the IBC?
The appellant contended that service of the demand notice on a KMP at the registered office of the corporate debtor constituted valid service in accordance with Rule 5(2)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016. It was argued that the demand notice, although addressed to the KMP was manifestly intended for the corporate debtor as reflected in its contents and was sufficient to serve the purpose envisaged under Section 8 of the IBC.
The appellant further emphasised that the respondent's participation in settlement discussions demonstrated their awareness of the notice and the underlying debt. It was further argued that the relevant date of default was 19 November 2019 as per the contractual terms, and no credible defence had been raised.
The respondent maintained that service of notice under Section 8 must be effected directly upon the corporate debtor and not upon any individual KMP. They urged the court to treat the proceedings as vitiated for want of proper service. They also contended that the accounts between the parties and their group entities needed reconciliation and that the appellant's claim was negated by a novation of the original contract via subsequent amendments and email communications. On this basis, the respondent disputed the occurrence of default and sought dismissal of the proceedings.
Held:
The Supreme Court noted that both the NCLT and NCLAT had dismissed the Section 9 application purely on the perceived defect in service of the demand notice. The court, however, observed that such a hyper-technical approach defeated the substantive object of the IBC which is to enable resolution of insolvency claims in a time-bound manner. The purpose of the demand notice, as explained by the court is to provide an opportunity to the corporate debtor to repay or dispute the debt, not to elevate procedural formality over substantive justice.
The court observed that the respondent's own conduct specifically their willingness to engage in settlement discussions evidenced awareness of the notice and the underlying debt. Furthermore, the court took note of the registered office being the location where the notice was served, thereby satisfying the statutory requirement of notice delivery. The Court reasoned that rigid procedural interpretations must yield to the principle that substantial compliance should suffice, particularly when no prejudice is demonstrably caused to the respondent. The Court placed reliance on its earlier judgment in Rajneesh Aggarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla, where service upon a director was held to be sufficient for service upon a company.
Similarly, the Court referred to the decisions of the NCLAT in K.B. Polychem and Shubham Jain which affirmed the doctrine of deemed service and held that procedural technicalities should not impede the adjudication of matters on their merits.
The Supreme Court further reasoned that the question of whether a "default" had occurred, and whether the contract had been novated through mutual understanding and correspondence, involved mixed questions of law and fact. These were matters requiring a thorough evidentiary appraisal and therefore ought to be addressed by the NCLT upon remand.
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by the NCLT and the NCLAT. The matter was remanded to the NCLT with a direction to consider the Section 9 application afresh on its merits. The Court instructed the NCLT to adjudicate the petition by examining all relevant facts, evidence, and legal arguments, including the questions of default and novation of contract uninfluenced by any observations made by the previous tribunals or the Supreme Court in this judgment.
The Supreme Court's judgment underscores the primacy of substantive justice over procedural rigidity in insolvency matters. By holding that service of a demand notice upon a KMP at the registered office constitutes valid service under the IBC, the court reinforced the principle that statutory compliance must be assessed contextually, not mechanically. Furthermore, the judgment affirms that disputed questions involving default or novation of contracts require detailed examination and cannot be dismissed on preliminary objections. The decision reflects a balanced approach that safeguards the legislative intent of the IBC while ensuring procedural fairness and judicial efficiency.
WHITE COLLAR CRIMES
Date: 29 April 2025
Case Name: Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, Criminal Appeal 2025 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No. 13956 of 2023).
Forum: Supreme Court of India
The present case arises out of an investigation initiated by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office ("SFIO") into the financial dealings of the Adarsh Group companies under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013. Based on the findings, the SFIO filed a comprehensive complaint before the Special Court designated under the Companies Act naming as many as 181 individuals including the present respondents for various offences under the Companies Act as well as the Indian Penal Code ("IPC").
The crux of the complaint centred on the activities of Adarsh Credit Cooperative Society Limited ("ACCSL") which as per the SFIO was under the de facto control of Mukesh Modi and his associates. The allegations included illegal and unauthorised disbursement of loans amounting to approximately INR 1700 crores from ACCSL to other entities within the Adarsh Group in violation of statutory provisions.
Upon taking cognizance of the complaint, the Special Court issued bailable warrants. Due to the respondents' continued non-appearance, these were followed by non-bailable warrants and the initiation of proclamation proceedings. Despite these developments, some of the respondents sought and were granted anticipatory bail by the High Court which led to the present challenge before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the High Court erred in granting anticipatory bail to the respondents despite their deliberate non-appearance before the Special Court and the consequent issuance of non-bailable warrants and proclamation proceedings?
The appellant submitted that the respondents had wilfully evaded legal proceedings and were absconding which warranted the issuance of non-bailable warrants and proclamation notices by the Special Court. The SFIO emphasised the grave nature of the alleged economic offences, the significant financial impact on the public and economy, and the respondents' obligation to cooperate with the judicial process. It was also argued that the High Court in granting anticipatory bail had completely disregarded the mandatory conditions laid down in Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 which governs the grant of bail in cases involving serious corporate fraud.
On the other hand, the respondents argued that they were unaware of the proceedings and that the Special Court should have adopted a more lenient approach by issuing summons in the first instance. They also claimed to have approached the court in good faith by filing anticipatory bail applications. Some respondents asserted that the procedural escalation to non-bailable warrants and proclamation was disproportionate in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Held:
The Supreme Court categorically rejected the respondents' assertion of unawareness, noting that their filing of anticipatory bail applications before the Special Court negated any claim of ignorance. The court observed that the respondents had knowledge of the complaint and deliberately chose not to appear before the court, thereby evading the judicial process. It was further observed that the High Court in granting anticipatory bail failed to properly appreciate the seriousness of the allegations and the conduct of the respondents, and more importantly, the statutory mandate under Section 212(6) of the Companies Act.
The court reasoned that economic offences constitute a distinct category of criminal misconduct due to their systemic impact on the economy and the financial well-being of the country. Referring to precedents, the court reiterated that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only in rare and exceptional circumstances particularly where the accused has demonstrated cooperation with the investigation and judicial proceedings.
It emphasised that individuals who defy court orders, evade process, and are subject to coercive proceedings like non-bailable warrants and proclamation cannot be rewarded with anticipatory bail. Furthermore, the court clarified that the discretion conferred upon a Special Court to issue summons or warrants must be exercised judiciously taking into account the nature and gravity of the allegations.
In the instant case, the respondents' conduct justified the coercive process adopted by the Special Court. The court also held that the High Court's orders were legally unsustainable as they overlooked binding statutory provisions and established principles governing the grant of bail in serious economic offenses.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the SFIO except in relation to respondents Akshat Singh, Naveen Kumar, and Mahesh Dutt Sharma whose appeals were dismissed.
Consequently, the High Court's orders granting anticipatory bail to the remaining respondents were set aside. The respondents were directed to surrender before the Special Court within a period of one week from the date of the judgment. It was further directed that any regular bail applications filed by the respondents were to be considered by the Special Court strictly in accordance with the law on their own merits, uninfluenced by the Supreme Court's observations.
This judgment reinforces the jurisprudence surrounding economic offences and the heightened threshold for grant of anticipatory bail in such cases. The Supreme Court has once again reiterated that anticipatory bail cannot be sought as a shield by those who consciously evade the judicial process and flout court directives. The court has clarified the imperative to strike a balance between individual liberties and the public interest in ensuring accountability in cases of large-scale financial fraud. Through this decision, the court has underscored the sanctity of judicial process and emphasised strict compliance with statutory safeguards in prosecuting corporate fraud.
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