India: JSA Newsletter - Competition Law

High Courts

Delhi High Court refuses to grant stay on remedies imposed by CCI on MMT-Go

The High Court of Delhi ("DHC") disposed of the writ petition¹ ("Writ Petition") filed by MakeMyTrip (India) Private Limited ("MMT-Go"), challenging the order dated December 6, 2022 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal ("NCLAT") whereby the DHC refused to grant a stay on the remedies imposed by the Competition Commission of India ("CCI") on MMT-Go.

Brief Background

On October 19, 2022, the CCI passed the final order ("CCI Order") and noted that: (a) MMT-Go abused its dominant position in the market for online intermediation services for booking of hotels by imposing room parity and price parity obligations, along with exclusivity conditions on hotel partners; (b) the agreement between MMT-Go and Oravel Stays Limited ("OYO") through which Casa2 Stays Private Limited ("FabHotels") and Ruptub Solutions Private Limited got delisted from MMT-Go's platform has caused an appreciable adverse effect on competition ("AAEC") in the market. Accordingly, the CCI imposed monetary penalties on MMT-Go and OYO. Further, the CCI also imposed certain remedies on MMT-Go ("Directions") to amend their anti-competitive business practices. For a detailed summary of the CCI Order, refer to JSA Newsletter for the month of October 2022.

Aggrieved, MMT- Go on November 22, 2022 challenged the CCI Order before the NCLAT ("Appeal"). The NCLAT admitted the Appeal subject to deposit of 10% of the total monetary penalty amount imposed by the CCI ("NCLAT Order"). However, it did not grant any stay on the Directions.

Aggrieved, MMT-Go on December 9, 2022, filed the Writ Petition before the DHC and challenged the NCLAT Order primarily on the ground that the NCLAT did not have the jurisdiction to pass the NCLAT Order as the statutory scheme of the Competition Act, 2002 ("Competition Act") does not provide for pre-deposit of monetary penalty for admitting an appeal. MMT- Go also requested the DHC to direct the CCI not to take any coercive steps against MMT-Go and to direct the CCI not to enforce the CCI Order (including the Directions) until final determination of the Appeal by the NCLAT.

DHC Decision

The DHC disposed of the Writ Petition and inter alia held that: (a) subject to deposit of 10% of the total monetary penalty imposed on MMT-Go, the remaining 90% of the total monetary penalty amount is stayed; (b) with respect to the Directions, the DHC refused to stay the Directions but granted liberty to MMT-Go to approach the NCLAT for any interim relief.

JSA represented FabHotels before the NCLAT and the DHC.

(Source: DHC order dated December 14, 2022)

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal

NCLAT remands matter to CCI to reconsider penalty imposed on several waste processing companies

The NCLAT remanded the matter to the CCI to reconsider monetary penalty imposed by it on Fortified Security Solutions ("Fortified Security"), Ecoman Enviro Solutions Private Limited ("Ecoman"), Lahs Green India Private Limited ("Lahs Green"), Sanjay Agency ("Sanjay Agency"), Mahalaxmi Steels ("Mahalaxmi Steels") and Raghunath Industry Private Limited ("Raghunath") (together, the 'Waste Processing Companies') for indulging in a bid-rigging cartel in relation to the tenders floated by the Pune Municipal Corporation ("PMC") for procurement of municipal organic and inorganic solid waste processing plants (together, the 'Tenders').

Brief Background

On May 1, 2018, the CCI passed an order ("CCI Order") against the Waste Processing Companies indulging in a bid-rigging cartel in relation to the Tenders, in contravention of Section 3(3) of the Competition Act.

The investigation was initiated by the CCI pursuant to a complaint filed by a Pune based NGO alleging that the Waste Processing Companies indulged in a bid-rigging cartel in relation to the Tenders. During the investigation, the Waste Processing Companies filed leniency applications before the CCI disclosing the existence of a cartel.

Accordingly, the CCI decided to impose a maximum possible monetary penalty at the rate of 10% of the average turnover on the Waste Processing Companies. However, Ecoman, Lahs Green, Sanjay Agency and Mahalaxmi Steels received certain reduction in monetary penalty from the CCI on account of the leniency applications filed by them. However, the CCI did not grant any reduction in monetary penalty to Fortified Security and Raghunath Agency.

NCLAT Observations

Aggrieved, the Waste Processing Companies challenged the CCI Order before the NCLAT inter alia contending that the CCI, while computing monetary penalty, exercised its discretion in an indiscreet manner as the CCI ought to have provided detailed reasons for imposing maximum possible monetary penalty on them.

The NCLAT restrained from getting into the merits of the case as the Waste Processing Companies themselves had accepted about the existence of a cartel and therefore, the NCLAT limited its findings/observations on the computation of monetary penalty by the CCI. The NCLAT held that though the CCI is empowered to impose maximum possible monetary penalty, however, in exercising such discretion, the CCI ought to have provided an opportunity of hearing to the Waste Processing Companies as to why the maximum possible monetary penalty should not be imposed on them, which in the present case, the CCI failed to do. Accordingly, the NCLAT remanded the matter to the CCI to reconsider monetary penalty on the Waste Processing Companies.

Further, the NCLAT noted that during the investigation, the Director General ("DG") found that an official of the PMC was in regular touch with one of the Waste Processing Companies, indicating some conspiracy. Accordingly, the NCLAT also directed the Director General of Police Maharashtra/ Director General, Anti- Corruption to conduct an enquiry in respect of the role played by the PMC in relation to the Tenders.

JSA represented Ecoman, Fortfied Security and Raghunath before the CCI.

(Source: NCLAT Judgment dated December 23, 2022)

NCLAT upholds CCI order against beer manufacturers for indulging in cartelisation

The NCLAT dismissed appeals filed by United Breweries Limited ("UBL"), All India Brewers Association ("AIBA") and their office bearers of Carlsberg India Private Limited ("Carlsberg"), UBL and AIBA against the order passed by the CCI finding them guilty of indulging cartelisation in contravention of Section 3(3) of the Competition Act.

Brief Background

On September 24, 2021 and November 4, 2021, the CCI passed an order against UBL, Carlsberg, SABMiller India Private Limited ("SABMiller"), Anheuser Busch InBev SA/NV ("AB InBev") and AIBA (together, the 'Beer Companies), including their respective office bearers for indulging in cartelisation in relation to the sale and supply of beer in various States and Union Territories of India from May 2009 to October 2018 ("CCI Order"). For a detailed summary of the CCI Order, refer to JSA Newsletter of September 2021.

The investigation was initiated by the CCI pursuant to a leniency application filed by AB InBev² disclosing the existence of a cartel. The said disclosure led to dawn raids conducted by the DG on the business premises of the Beer Companies. Subsequently, UBL and Carlsberg also filed leniency applications with the CCI.

Pursuant to a detailed investigation, the CCI concluded that the Beer Companies indulged in cartelization. Accordingly, it granted 100% immunity to AB InBev and its office bearers for disclosing the existence of the cartel in the beer market. UBL, was awarded a 40% reduction in penalty with total penalty of INR 751,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees seven hundred and fifty one crore). Carlsberg was imposed with total penalty of INR 121,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees one hundred and twenty one crore), after a 20% reduction.

NCLAT Observations

Aggrieved, UBL, AIBA and office bearers of the Beer Companies challenged the CCI Order before the NCLAT inter alia contending that: (a) the CCI bench that passed the CCI Order did not have a judicial member; (b) the CCI could have not passed the prima facie order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act directing investigation based on the leniency applications. As per the scheme of the Competition Act, the CCI can only initiate an investigation either on its own motion or on receipt of information from any person or on a reference made to it by the Central Government or State Government or a statutory authority.

The NCLAT upheld the CCI Order and noted that: (a) the Competition Act does not provide for a judicial member in the CCI bench; (b) forming a prima facie opinion by the CCI under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act on the basis of leniency applications and directing investigation is well within the CCI's jurisdiction; (c) the CCI has the discretion to decide the quantum of penalty and in the instant case, it took a lenient view while imposing penalty on the Beer Companies.

(Source: NCLAT Judgment dated December 23, 2022)

NCLAT sets aside CCI order exonerating DLF; remands matter to CCI

The NCLAT disposed of the appeal filed by Mr. Amit Mittal ("Appellant") against the order passed by the CCI, closing the case against DLF Limited ("DLF") and DLF New Gurgaon Home Developers Private Limited ("DLF Gurgaon") (DLF and DLF Gurgaon are collectively referred to as the 'DLF Group'). Vide the said order, the CCI held that the DLF Group is not dominant in the market for provision of services of development and sale of residential apartments/ flats in Gurgaon and accordingly, has not abused its dominant position.

Brief Background

The investigation was initiated by the CCI pursuant to a complaint filed by the Appellant alleging that the DLF Group is abusing its dominant position by imposing several arbitrary and non-negotiable clauses in the builder-buyer agreement for allotment of residential apartment to the Appellant.

Accordingly, the CCI directed the DG to cause an investigation in relation to the alleged conduct. The DG submitted its investigation report ("DG Report") inter alia noting that the DLF Group abused its dominant position in the market for provision of services for development/sale of residential units (apartments/ flats/ independent floors/ villas) under the licensed categories of residential group housing, and residential plotted land in Gurgaon i.e., the Relevant Market. The CCI did not agree with the Relevant Market defined by the DG and directed it to conduct further investigation on this issue and submit its report on the same ("Supplementary Report"). In the Supplementary Report, the DG held that the relevant market is the 'market for provision of development and sale of residential apartments/ flats in Gurgaon' and DLF Group is not dominant in the said market.

After analysing the Supplementary Report, on August 31, 2018, the CCI held that the DLF Group is not dominant in the relevant market and accordingly, closed the case ("CCI Order").

NCLAT Observation

Aggrieved, the Appellant challenged the CCI Order before the NCLAT inter alia contending that the direction issued by the CCI to the DG to conduct further investigation is without jurisdiction given that the DG vide the DG Report came to an adverse finding against the DLF Group.

The NCLAT inter alia noted that the CCI can only direct the DG for further investigation if the DG comes to a finding that there is no contravention of any of the provisions of the Competition Act. If the DG comes to an adverse finding against the party, then the CCI is obligated to pass an appropriate order. In the present case, the CCI was not authorised to direct the DG for further investigation when the DG, vide the DG Report, came to an adverse finding against the DLF Group. Accordingly, the NCLAT set aside the CCI Order and remanded the matter to the CCI to pass appropriate order basis the DG Report.

(Source: NCLAT judgment dated December 21, 2022)

NCLAT remands tyre cartel matter to CCI to re-examine arithmetical errors and reconsider penalty

The NCLAT disposed of the appeals filed by 5 (five) tyre manufacturers ("Tyre Manufacturers"), Automotive Tyre Manufacturers' Association ("ATMA") and their office bearers against the order passed by CCI finding them guilty of indulging in cartelisation in contravention of Section 3(3) of the Competition Act.

Brief Background

On August 31, 2018 the CCI passed an order ("CCI Order") against the Tyre Manufacturers including their officer bearers and ATMA for indulging in cartelisation³. Accordingly, the CCI imposed total penalty of INR 1,788,06.00,000 crores (Indian Rupees one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight crore and six lakhs) on the Tyre Manufacturers, penalty of INR 8,42,00,000 lakh (Indian Rupees eight lakh forty two thousand) on ATMA and total penalty of INR 1,01,00,000 (Indian Rupees one crore one lakh) on 8 (eight) office bearers.

NCLAT Observations

Aggrieved, the Tyre Manufacturers, ATMA and their office bearers challenged the CCI Order before the NCLAT inter alia contending that: (a) the CCI bench which passed the CCI Order did not have a judicial member; (b) the CCI directed investigations in the present matter on the basis of a letter forwarded by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs ("MCA")⁴. However, such letter cannot amount to a "reference" to the CCI on the basis of which the CCI directed investigations; (c) the DG made an arithmetical error while concluding that there was price parallelism among the Tyre Manufacturers to arrive at the finding of the cartel; and (d) the CCI erred in calculating penalty.

The NCLAT agreed with the findings of the CCI in relation to the cartelisation by the Tyre Manufacturers. Separately, the NCLAT noted that: (a) since the issue of judicial member is sub-judice before the Supreme Court of India it would abstain from making any observations; (b) the mere forwarding of a letter by the MCA to the CCI does not amount to a 'reference' under the Competition Act. However, the CCI has wide powers under Section 19 of the Competition Act to make an inquiry into a matter and when a reference is received by the CCI, it should consider compliance with the CCI (General) Regulations, 2009; (c) the DG made an arithmetical error while calculating the price increases and the corrected data reveals non-existence of price parallelism between the Tyre Manufacturers. Accordingly, the NCLAT remanded the matter to the CCI to re-examine the calculation of arithmetical errors and reconsider penalty imposed on the Tyre Manufacturers since the Indian tyre industry is under pressure from global tyre manufacturing companies and there is a necessity to promote the domestic industry.

(Source: NCLAT Judgment dated December 1, 2022)

Competition Commission of India

Merger Control

CCI approves acquisition of UPL Sustainable Agri Solutions by ADIA and TPG under Green Channel

The CCI approved the acquisition of the shareholding of UPL Sustainable Agri Solutions Limited⁵ by Abu Dhabi Investment Authority⁶ and TPG group⁷ (referred to as the 'Proposed Transaction').

The parties notified the Proposed Transaction under the green channel route ('GCR') as there were no horizontal, vertical, or complementary overlaps between the activities of the parties (including their respective affiliates) in India.

(Source: Summary)

CCI approves acquisition of Eastman Exports by Bharat Biotech under Green Channel

The CCI approved the acquisition of the shareholding of Eastman Exports Global Clothing Private Limited⁸ by Bharat Biotech International Limited⁹ (referred to as the 'Proposed Transaction').

The parties notified the Proposed Transaction under the GCR as there were no horizontal, vertical, or complementary overlaps between the activities of the parties (including their respective affiliates) in India.

(Source: Summary)

CCI approves acquisition of Sembcorp Energy by Tanweer Infrastructure under Green Channel

The CCI approved the acquisition of: (a) 99.99% shareholding of Sembcorp Energy India Limited ("SEIL")¹⁰ by Tanweer Infrastructure SAOC ("Tanweer")¹¹; and (b) beneficial interest in 90 (ninety) shares of SEIL by Tanweer (referred to as the 'Proposed Transaction').

The parties notified the Proposed Transaction under the GCR as there were no horizontal, vertical, or complementary overlaps between the activities of the parties (including their respective affiliates) in India.

(Source: Summary)

CCI approves acquisition of minority shareholding of UPL Agri Solutions by Woodhall Holdings under Green Channel

The CCI approved the acquisition of certain minority shareholding of UPL Sustainable Agri Solutions Limited¹² by Woodhall Holdings (DIFC) Limited¹³; (referred to as the 'Proposed Transaction').

The parties notified the Proposed Transaction under the GCR as there were no horizontal, vertical, or complementary overlaps between the activities of the parties (including their respective affiliates) in India.

(Source: Summary)

Miscellaneous

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance submits its report on 'Anti-Competitive Practices by Big Tech Companies'

On December 22, 2022, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance ("Committee") issued recommendations on anti-competitive practices by big tech companies and recommended the introduction of a law to regulate the same. A summary of the key proposals by the Committee is set out below:

1. Need for ex-ante Regulation: Unlike traditional markets, digital markets tend to grow quickly and are like "winner-take-all" markets. Therefore, competitive behaviour in digital markets should be assessed ex ante, instead of ex poste., before the markets end up monopolised by big tech companies instead of after such conduct occurs. Currently, the assessment is carried out ex post.

2. Defining Digital Intermediaries/Digital Gatekeepers: India must identify a small number of the leading players that can negatively influence competitive conduct in the digital market. Such players, 'Systematically Important Digital Intermediaries' ("SIDI"), must be defined on the basis of revenues, market capitalisation, number of active businesses and end users. SIDI should periodically submit a report to the CCI on measures they have taken to comply with their mandatory obligations.

3. Anti-Steering Provision: Anti-steering provisions are clauses whereby a platform prevents its business users from 'steering' the platform's users to offer other than those provided by the platform that may be cheaper or attractive alternatives in terms of a better interface. It is prominently associated with mobile 'App Stores' where the user is not allowed the choice of alternatives which may cost him less and provide a better interface. SIDI should not condition access to their respective platforms on the condition that the user purchase other products / services offered by the platform which is not intrinsic to those platforms.

4. Self- Preferencing/ Platform Neutrality: Self preferencing is a practice where the platform (directly / indirectly) favours its own service (including its subsidiaries) in situations where it provides access to its platform as well as competes on the same platform. SIDI must not favour its own offers on its platform as opposed to competing offers on its platform. Specifically, a SIDI should not: (a) present its own offers in a more favourable manner; (b) exclusively pre-install its own offers on devices or integrate them in any other way in offers provided by the platform.

5. Bundling and Tying: Bundling and tying in the digital market sector leads to: (a) asymmetry in pricing; (b) binding app developers into taking all services from app store operators; (c) eliminating competition from the market which harms innovation and consumer interest; and (d) leading players leveraging their market power in one core platform service to another. SIDI should not force users to utilise additional services (which are core platform services) of that platform beyond what the user signed up for.

6. Data Usage: Market leaders who have collected personal data over a period of time have an advantage over new platforms and therefore SIDI should not:

7. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A): Certain M&A are not notified to the CCI due to their low asset and turnover thresholds but have a deep impact on the digital market. SIDI should notify the CCI of such proposed transactions where parties provide services in the digital market or enable collection of data irrespective of whether these are notifiable to the CCI.

8. Pricing and Deep Discounting: Leading platforms, particularly e-commerce sites, food delivery and hotel booking sites, offer huge discounts, without any transparency. Deep discounting by platforms with market power are concerning when the prices are pushed below cost levels thereby affecting online and offline retailers to compete. SIDI should not: (a) limit business users from differentiating commercial conditions on its platform (including price, increased commissions, delisting and other such terms and conditions); and (b) prevent business users from offering the same products / services to end users through their own sales channels or third party intermediaries.

9. Exclusive Tie Ups: Exclusive tie ups by major platforms (with brands) can foreclose markets, constrict competition and lead to increased prices for end users. SIDI should not prevent business users from offering the product / services to end users through their own sales channels or third party intermediaries so that fair market conditions prevail.

10. Search and Ranking Preferences: SIDI provides services like ranking, query, click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by end users on its online search engines. These services are important for an advertiser to reach the right customers. SIDI should: (a) provide services to third parties which provide online search engine in fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms; (b) anonymise personal data for services like queries and click and view data; and (c) maintain fair and non-discriminatory practice while providing search and ranking functionality between business users.

11. Third Party Applications: SIDI should: (a) allow the installation and effective use of third-party software applications or software application stores, using its operating system, by means other than the relevant core services of the platform; and (b) not deny the end users the choice to set the downloaded third party software application or software application store as their default.

12. Advertising Policies: The advertising business of SIDI is likely to make it a monopolist as it owns every step in the system that connects the advertisers and the publishers. SIDI should: (a) not process personal data of users using services of third parties that make use of core service of SIDI's platform; (b) provide information to the advertisers about price paid by the advertiser and the remuneration received by the publisher; (c) provide access to the performance measuring tool of the gatekeeper (being SIDI); (d) provide access to the advertisers and publishers to the information to verify their advertisement inventory (including the aggregated and non-aggregated data); and (e) ensure a fair and transparent equation between the news publishers and SIDI.

13. Need for Digital Competition Act: India needs to enhance its competition law to address the unique needs of the digital market, which are very different from traditional markets. Such legislation for the digital market will ensure a fair, transparent and contestable digital market.

14. Revamping the CCI: A specialised digital market unit should be established within the CCI staffed with skilled experts, academics and attorneys to: (a) monitor SIDI and emerging SIDI; (b) provide recommendations to the Central Government on designating SIDI; (c) adjudicate on digital market cases; (d) review SIDI compliance; (e) efficiently monitor digital market; and (f) monitor unfair practices of other digital players apart from SIDI.

(Source: Committee Report dated December 22, 2022)

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance proposes changes to the Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2022

In February 2020, the MCA released the draft Competition (Amendment) Bill 2020 inviting public comments on the proposed amendments to the Competition Act, 2002 ("Competition Act"). On August 5, 2022, the Competition Amendment Bill 2022 ("Bill") was introduced in the Lok Sabha and was referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance ("Committee") to present its report.

On December 13, 2022, the Committee presented its report on the Bill before the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.

A summary of the key changes proposed by the Committee is set out below:

Merger Control

1. Deal Value threshold:

Under the existing framework, only a transaction (M&A) that crosses specified asset or turnover thresholds requires approval from the CCI. The Bill proposes to introduce an additional "deal value" threshold for assessing whether a transaction requires approval from the CCI. As per the Bill, a transaction requires approval of the CCI if: (a) the deal value exceeds INR 20,00,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees two thousand crore); and (b) where either party has "substantial business operations in India".

Committee Recommendations:

2. Definition of control:

The Competition Act defines the term 'control' to include, controlling the affairs or management of the target enterprise. The CCI by way of its decisional practice has clarified that control includes 'material influence' i.e., the lowest form of control in addition to de facto and de jure control. The CCI has interpreted material influence as the presence of factors that enable an entity to influence the affairs and management of another enterprise. These factors include majority shareholding, veto rights (attached to minority shareholding), board representation, contractual covenants etc. The Bill proposes to codify 'material influence' as a standard for control.

Committee Recommendations: Since the CCI has been using "material influence" as the standard of control in its decisional practice, the CCI should pass regulations to explicitly define 'material influence'.

2.3 Procedural Timelines for Merger Control:

The Bill proposes to reduce the statutory timeline for the CCI to form its prima facie view on a merger notification from 30 (thirty) working days to 20 (twenty) calendar days. Further, the overall timeline is also proposed to be reduced from 210 (two hundred ten) calendar days to 150 (one hundred fifty) calendar days (extendable by an additional 30 (thirty) calendar days in certain events).

Committee Recommendations: Since reducing timelines would be burdensome for an already understaffed CCI, the timelines should not be amended.

Enforcement

1. Settlement and Commitment:

The Bill proposes to introduce provisions allowing an enterprise under inquiry for abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive agreements (except cartels) to offer settlements and commitments to the CCI. While the commitments can be offered at any time after an investigation has been initiated but before the investigation report is issued, the settlements can be only offered after the investigation report is issued but before the CCI issues its final decision, which is not appealable. While considering the proposal for settlement, the CCI shall provide an opportunity to the party concerned, or the DG or any other third party to submit their objections and suggestions, if any.

Committee Recommendations:

2. Effect based test for abuse of dominance inquiries: The Bill does not provide for conducting an "effect-based test" for abuse of dominance inquiries

Committee Recommendations: Given that the Competition Act does not presently require the CCI to carry out an effect-based test to analyse abuse of dominance and the inconsistent decisional practice of the CCI in this regard, an effect-based test for analysing abuse of dominance should be incorporated in Section 4 and Section 19 (3) of the Competition Act.

3. Ability of DG to Depose Legal Advisors: The Bill proposes to include legal advisors within the scope of an "agent", thereby allowing the DG to depose such legal advisors.

Committee Recommendations: The DG should be allowed to depose in-house legal counsel (and not external counsel). However, the Evidence Act, 1872 and any other law that protects attorney-client privilege should not be violated.

4. Hub and Spoke Arrangements: Under the existing framework, the cartel agreement between competitors (i.e., engaged in similar trade) is presumed to have an AAEC in India. The Bill proposes to extend the presumption of AAEC to hub and spoke arrangements implemented by entities involved at different levels of the value chain.

Committee Recommendations: It should be clarified that parties not engaged in identical or similar trade will be presumed to be a part of cartel agreement only if it is proved that such person intended to actively participate in furtherance of such agreement.

5. IPR as a Defence for Abuse of Dominance: The Bill does not provide for IPR as a defence for abuse of dominance.

Committee Recommendations: Parties should be allowed to take measures to protect their IPR and should have an IPR related exemption in abuse of dominance cases.

6. Requirement of a Judicial Member: The Bill does not provide for requirement of a judicial member.

Committee Recommendations: Given that the decision of the DHC in Mahindra Electric v. the CCI¹⁴ is pending before the Supreme Court of India it is appropriate to await its outcome.

(Source: Committee Report dated December 13, 2022)

Footnotes

1. W.P.(C) 16963/2022

2. SABMilller is ultimately held by AB InBev. SABMiller India was later renamed to Anheuser Busch InBev India Limited.

3. MRF Limited, one of the tyre companies filed a writ petition ("Writ Petition") before the MHC and challenged the reference letter forwarded by the MCA to the CCI on the basis of which the directed investigations. The MHC passed an interim order directing the CCI to keep its final order in a sealed cover in case it passed the same. Subsequently, the division bench of the MHC dismissed the Writ Petition and subsequently, the CCI communicated its order in February 2022 [Can we put the exact date here].

4. The CCI directed an investigation in the present matter pursuant to a reference letter forwarded by the MCA asking the CCI to enquire into the matter and pass appropriate orders.

5. It is an Indian agro-chemical company engaged in the manufacture, marketing, and sales of various agro- chemicals such as insecticides, herbicides, and anti-sprouting agents.

6. It is a public institution established as an independent investment institution by the government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

7. It operates across multiple sectors such as financial services, technology, consumer, travel, media, real estate and healthcare through its affiliates.

8. It is a private limited company and is engaged in the business of sourcing and buying, designing, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, sales and retailing of yarn, fabric and apparels in the domestic and international markets.

9. It is a public unlisted company and is engaged in the activity of manufacturing of human vaccines and bio-therapeutics.

10. It is a newly incorporated entity set up in the Sultanate of Oman and is ultimately controlled by various holding entities and individuals

11. It is an independent power producer which directly owns and operates two coal-fired power plants in TP Gudur Mandal, Nellore District of Andhra Pradesh, India.

12. It is an Indian agro-chemical company engaged in the manufacture, marketing, and sales of various agro-chemicals such as insecticides, herbicides, and anti-sprouting agents, etc.

13. It is a newly incorporated special purpose vehicle which is part of the Brookfield Global Transition Fund.

14. (2019) SCC Online (Del) 8032

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.