When All Seems Lost: How Thailand's Leading Energy Drink Brand "M-150" Defeated China's Most Sophisticated Trademark Squatting Syndicate

In 2022, Thailand's leading energy drink brand, M-150, faced trademark squatting and infringement attacks from professional groups in China. This article tells the story of how M-150 fought back and decisively beat the infringers in court. In 2024, M-150 decisively and won their lawsuit against the infringers. The Zhejiang court selected the case as one of its top 10 cases of the year for the year 2024, and one of three classic cases to show Zhejiang courts protect IP in 2025. The case was represented by lawyers Zhao Kefeng and Xu Anbi from the GEN Law Firm.

I. CHECKMATE: WHEN TRADEMARK SQUATTERS CONTROL EVERY MOVE

When the urgent email from Thailand's Osotspa Public Company Limited landed in our inbox in early 2022, the entire IP team at GenLaw Firm gathered around the conference table in disbelief. Their flagship product, M-150 energy drink—launched in 1985 to become Thailand's market leader by overtaking Red Bull in 2002, with a commanding 54.6% market share—had been completely boxed out of the Chinese market through what can only be described as surgical precision trademark warfare.

M-150's numbers told a grim story:

• 5 trademarks registered since 1993—all invalidated
• 100% failure rate in defensive proceedings
• 100% failure rate in offensive actions against the squatter's marks
• Zero successful appeals through all court levels

The reason for this heist is simple. China's trademark protection law does not protect trademarks based on prior use—as is the case in the United States. Instead, protection is given to the trademark that was registered first. This important feature of the Chinese legal system enabled the trademark infringers to make the argument that they were first to file, an assertion that was both untrue, but also hard to fight after the losses described above.

In addition, the original distributors were sued by the trademark infringement; all distribution channels blocked by custom recordation; a former distribution manager left to work for the infringers; the brand's goodwill was torpedoed by the infringers who claimed they were the only legitimate M-150 products, and the counterfeit products were virtually indistinguishable from the genuine ones.

(Without being told, can you tell which of the two above is the genuine product?
The answer is: the left one is the genuine OSP product, while the right one is the infringing product.)

This wasn't a fair fight—it was a carefully-executed strategy years in the making. But at the outset, we still needed to understand who we were up against. In the beginning, we knew only fragments—different company names, scattered trademark filings, and seemingly unrelated entities. We had no idea we were facing a sophisticated infringement enterprise.

If intellectual property litigation is typically like weaving a fishing net to catch infringers, we started this case with merely two threads. It is not much, but in this case, it was enough. Through painstaking investigation and creative legal strategy, we developed a strategy to weave those threads into a net strong enough to capture an entire syndicate.

II. STARTING FROM ZERO: UNMASKING THE CORPORATE WEB

When we filed our initial lawsuit, we were essentially fighting ghosts. We knew someone was infringing, but the corporate maze seemed impenetrable. We needed a comprehensive investigation—combining online research with on-the-ground factory investigations, in order to follow the trail of evidence.

1. Following the Evidence Trail

Starting with public records and corporate filings, we began uncovering connections that weren't immediately apparent, including:

• Family relationships revealed in public court judgments: spouses, siblings, parent-child connections among key figures;
• Account control relationships exposed in litigation records showing who actually controlled the money;
• Employment histories and career trajectories from public sources revealing personnel movements between companies, and
• Corporate internal filings showing shared natural persons, phone numbers, and financial staff across multiple entities.

Each discovery built upon the last. By cross-referenced business registrations, patent filings, litigation records, and conducted field investigations at manufacturing facilities, a pattern slowly started to emerge.

2. The Adversary Revealed: Anatomy of a Trademark Squatting Empire

After months of investigation, we uncovered something far more sophisticated than simple trademark squatting—a family-run industrial complex systematically targeting international brands.

The family network started at the top with Wei Tingjian and Wei Tingxi, brothers at the helm of the network, especially Wei Tingjian, who has a background in law as a patent attorney. Since 2003, the pioneers of the family were the parents, Wei Shian and Liao Mengren. Lan Rongjiao, Wei Tingjian's wife, controlled 22 affiliated companies. Liao Meinong was a strategic proxy for filing trademark cancellations against legitimate brands.

Together, the family built an infrastructure built around a staggering 41 shell companies, each with different addresses and nominal shareholders, many with names that brazenly took the names of their targets, such as Red Bull Holdings, Rio Holdings, and Nongfu Spring Dairy(a Chinese domestic mineral water company). The family filed a whopping 1,812 trademark applications filed through their in-house agency, Gaodazhuang Brand Management. As part of the deception, the family changed the names production facilities after each court loss, evading legal consequences and adding to the subterfuge.

The family's gameplan was simple, but multifaceted. First it identified vulnerable foreign brands with growing reputation but limited China presence. Second, using proxy applicants, the family's operation offensively filed non-use cancellations (applications to invalidate a trademark for failure to use the trademark). Third, the family filed defensive registrations across multiple classes while the brand is weakened. This was done as a way of solidifying their ill-gotten gains. Fourth, weaponize enforcement with customs blocks and distributor lawsuits. And lastly, the family attempted to extract settlements granting their organization exclusive distribution rights or licensing fees.

Their previous victims read like a Who's Who of international beverages: Red Bull, Pocari Sweat, Rio, and dozens more. M-150 was their latest target—but we were determined to make it their last.

III. THE TURNCOAT: WHEN TRUST BECOMES BETRAYAL

Our investigation revealed perhaps the most painful betrayal. Feng Jie, who had served as Osotspa's M-150 project director at their Chinese distributor, hadn't just switched sides—he had become part of a calculated, syndicate strategy.

The timeline we uncovered was damning:

• 2019-2021: Feng works for Osotspa's distributor, gains access to confidential materials
• December 2021: Feng joins Libaojing (controlled by the Wei syndicate)
• March 2022: Feng appointed as Legal Representative—just three months later
• April 2022: Libaojing begins using Osotspa's promotional materials

He took with him an intimate knowledge of Osotspa's business, including distribution agreements, promotional materials, photos with Thai executives, and an understanding of their strategy for the Chinese market. The syndicate had literally recruited an inside man.

IV. OUR STRATEGY: WHEN YOU CAN'T WIN THE TRADEMARK GAME, CHANGE THE GAME

Armed with our investigation results and the full picture of the syndicate's operations, we developed a comprehensive "combination punch" strategy. Having witnessed how they had systematically dismantled every traditional trademark defense, we knew conventional approaches would fail.

There is an important—but often overlooked—exception to China's trademark regime: protection afforded under the Anti‑Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) for a "unique name of influential goods." Even if a company has not registered its trademark in China, it may still enjoy legal protection under the AUCL if its product name (or other business identifier) has acquired certain influence—a significantly lower threshold than that required for recognition as an "unregistered trademark" under China's Trademark Law or international conventions like the Paris Convention.

In comparison:

• Unregistered trademarks under trademark law require proof of well‑knownness or prior business relationships or bad faith filings by the respondent—burdensome standards under Articles 13, 15, and 32 of the Trademark Law
• The AUCL remedy, by contrast, applies where a name (including product identifiers, app names, icons, trade dressing, etc.) has attained certain influence in the Chinese market—typically requiring far less evidence—and the defendant's use causes confusion

Hence, if you have limited use in China but can show the defendant acted in bad faith and created consumer confusion, pursuing protection as a "unique name of influential goods" under the AUCL is generally more practical and accessible than bringing a claim for an unregistered trademark, which sets a much higher hurdle.

Our four-pronged approach created a strategic cascade where each action reinforced the others:

1. Register Copyrights in China: Since the syndicate had weaponized the trademark system against us, we needed a different foundation for our counterattack. Copyright Registration Certificates would provide irrefutable evidence of OSP's ownership of the "" "" design.
   Unlike trademarks, copyrights cannot be cancelled for non-use or blocked by prior filings—giving us solid ground to stand on.
2. Launch Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition Litigation: With copyright certificates in hand and our knowledge of the syndicate's structure, we initiated civil litigation in Hangzhou. This wasn't just about one lawsuit—it was about opening multiple fronts simultaneously, forcing the syndicate to blindly defend their entire operation while we knew exactly where to attack.
3. File Invalidation and Non-Use Cancellation Applications: While they had used these weapons against us, we would turn the tables. Armed with evidence of bad faith—including Feng Jie's betrayal and the syndicate's systematic targeting of international brands—we would attack LBJ's "M-150" registrations. Our investigation gave us ammunition they didn't expect: proof of their prior infringement pattern.
4. File New Trademark Applications: Finally, we shored up OSP's future position by filing new trademark applications. Despite holding no active applications for "M-150" in Class 32 covering "non-alcoholic beverages, sports beverages, and functional beverages," OSP could still file fresh applications. Although these wouldn't immediately impact the syndicate, they would prevent future vulnerabilities once we cleared the battlefield.

The syndicate had spent years perfecting their trademark warfare playbook. They hadn't anticipated someone would change the rules of engagement entirely.

V. CASE CHALLENGES AND OUR CORE THEORETICAL ARSENAL

With our strategy working from multiple angles, we still faced a harsh reality: our opponent's early strategy of invalidating our client's trademarks had cleared away all of OSP's registered trademark rights foundation, and had gained a dominant position over our client by repeatedly succeeding in nearly 30 prior challenges. Traditional legal arguments had failed repeatedly. We needed a new way to challenge these preemptive trademark attacks—legal innovations that work in against an opponent used to playing dirty with trademark laws.

1. Strategic Case Law Research: Building Our Ammunition

After our initial hearing, where judges seemed skeptical of our novel arguments, we doubled down on our belief in our case. Rather than accept impending defeat, we compiled an exhaustive 80-page case law research report as part of a supplementary legal opinion. Working around the clock for three weeks, our team analyzed every relevant precedent in Chinese IP jurisprudence.

The report identified several critical patterns that would become critical to our success. These included:

• Copyright originality threshold: simple artistic arrangements qualify for copyright protection
• Foreign trademark registrations as evidence: Overseas trademark certificates can be prima facie evidence of copyright ownership
• Cross-border reputation recognition: Judicial acknowledgement that there is reputation spillover in border regions
• "Certain influence" standards evolution: Regional influence sufficient—nationwide fame not required
• Temporal persistence doctrine: "Trademark reputation influence has certain persistence"
• Joint liability expansion: Individuals can be held personally liable when companies are determined to be mere "infringement tools"

When we submitted this comprehensive research as our post-hearing supplement, the judges' attitude shifted noticeably. Every argument was now backed by precedents they couldn't ignore.

2. The Reverse Inference Theory: Turning Their Strength Against Them

Based on our investigation revealing the syndicate's systematic targeting of foreign brands, we pioneered a novel argument: the syndicate's comprehensive copying itself proved our brand's influence. As we argued to the court:

The court ultimately agreed, stating: "In the context of economic globalization, the flow of people, goods, and information has transcended specific national and regional boundaries."

3. Cross-Border Reputation Spillover: Redefining Territorial Boundaries

We also challenged the traditional territorial approach to trademark rights, arguing that in the age of globalization, reputation transcends borders through:

• Tourism (11 million Chinese visitors to Thailand annually)
• E-commerce and daigou (代购) channels
• Sports sponsorships visible in China
• Social media discussions
• Border trade in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces

The court's acceptance marked a watershed for ASEAN brands seeking protection in China.

4. Breaking the Corporate Shield: Personal Accountability

Perhaps our boldest move was pursuing personal liability against Feng Jie. Using the fruits of our investigation, we demonstrated that he wasn't just an employee but a co-conspirator. We meticulously documented:

• His prior confidentiality agreements with Osotspa
• The suspicious timing of his appointment as Legal Representative
• His personal use of stolen promotional materials
• His profit participation in the infringement scheme

This wasn't just about winning one case—we were establishing precedents that would make individuals think twice before participating in trademark squatting schemes.

5. Case Outcome

The Turning Point: From Certain Defeat to Landmark Victory

• First Instance (December 2023)

The Hangzhou Intermediate Court delivered a mixed verdict:

• Victory: Copyright infringement confirmed (¥1,008,000)
• Victory: False advertising confirmed (¥438,000)
• Defeat: No recognition of M-150 as an influential trade name
• Defeat: No personal liability for Feng Jie
• Total: ¥1,650,000

The Appeal Battle

We refined our visualizations, added new evidence from our ongoing investigation, and pressed forward. Our appeal focused on correcting the evaluation date by more accurately defining the timeline; establishing "certain influence" by showing our investigative proof that the syndicate recognized our brand's value, and by proving individual liability through the use of a relationship map showing Feng's central role.

• Second Instance Victory (December 31, 2024)

The Zhejiang High Court's¹ reversal was momentous. In their final ruling, the Court:

• recognized M-150 as an influential trade name
• recognized M-150's packaging as influential trade dress²
• imposed personal liability on Feng Jie (¥1,082,000)
• increased total damages by 98% to ¥3,266,000
• established groundbreaking precedents for foreign brands

6. The Cascade Effect: From Civil Victory to Administrative Triumph

Armed with our civil victory and our comprehensive investigation files, we launched administrative proceedings to invalidate the syndicate's trademark registrations.

Strategic Differentiation Based on Evidence Availability

With respect to the most recent registrations (2012-2020), our investigation documented clear bad faith. In cases (2024) Jing 73 Xing Chu 19916 and 19934, the Beijing IP Court found that "[t]he trademark applications [by the syndicate] demonstrated obvious intent to copy and imitate others' trademarks, disrupting normal trademark registration order and damaging fair competition in market operations."

Without evidence of bad faith from 17 years ago, we pivoted in the case involving the 2007 registrations. In case (2025) Jing 73 Xing Chu 361, we successfully argued that:

• The syndicate's use of our copyrighted logo constituted copyright infringement, and
• Their products were energy drinks mislabeled as "coffee beverages."

The Domino Effect

By June 2025, our strategy had triggered a cascade of positive results, including establishing copyright ownership and proving unfair competition in civil court, invalidating multiple trademark registrations in administrative court, lifting all import blocks on M-150 with Chinese customs, returning authentic, legitimate M-150 products to Chinese shelves, and deterring the Wei syndicate's trademark applications by 90%.

7. Lessons to Learn for International Brands

1. Investigation is Everything
   We started with two threads and wove them into a net. It is important to invest in understanding who you're really fighting. Diligently searching corporate records, social media, and public databases can reveal connections that transform a case.
2. Visualize Complexity
   Judges are human. Our relationship maps and timelines turned 30,000 pages of evidence into comprehensible stories. Complex fraud becomes obvious when visualized clearly.
3. Bad Faith is Your Best Evidence
   The professionalism of the syndicate—their systematic approach, family involvement, and calculated targeting—became proof of our brand's value. Sometimes your enemy's competence is your greatest asset.
4. Think Beyond Trademarks
   Copyright and unfair competition law can be more powerful than trademark rights. Our ¥3.26 million judgment far exceeded typical trademark awards.
5. Create a Cascade Strategy
   Civil victories enable administrative success. Administrative rulings clear customs blocks. Each victory builds on the last.
6. Document Everything, Register Strategically
   Our emergency copyright registration succeeded because we had maintained documentation since 2012. But timing the registration during litigation actually strengthened our originality claim.
7. Make It Personal
   Breaking through China's corporate veil is difficult but not impossible. Our success in holding Feng Jie personally liable sent a powerful message that even a corporate veil will not protect individuals engaged in malicious trademark infringement from personal liability.
8. Patience and Persistence Pay
   This eight-year battle involved multiple failures before our ultimate success. In China's complex legal environment, losing early battles doesn't mean losing the war.

Epilogue: A New Dawn for Foreign Brands

In keeping with the culture of respect and appreciation for the wisdom of the court, on a humid afternoon in June 2025, Osotspa's executives flew from Bangkok to personally deliver thank you banners to the Zhejiang High Court—a gesture of profound gratitude. As we stood outside the courthouse, Osotspa's CEO Wannipa Bhakdibutr turned to me and said, "You didn't just win a case. You gave us back our faith in the Chinese market."

But the bigger victory was broader than winning a case for our client. Our investigation had exposed not just one bad actor but an entire illegal enterprise. The visualizations we created became templates for other brands facing similar challenges. The legal precedents we established opened new avenues for foreign brands to protect their rights.

Now, M-150's products are thriving on Chinese shelves. The Wei syndicate has largely retreated from trademark squatting. Other syndicates are voluntarily canceling dubious registrations.

We started with two threads—a copyright claim and an unfair competition argument. Through investigation, creativity, and persistence, we wove those threads into something stronger: a new paradigm for how foreign brands can defend their rights in China.

For international brands facing similar challenges, remember: when traditional IP protection fails, become a detective first, a strategist second, and a warrior last. The evidence you uncover and the story you tell can be more powerful than any legal precedent.

Footnotes

1. China's court system is split into four levels, the Primary People's Court, the Intermediate People's Court, the High People's Court, and the Supreme People's Court. The Primary People's court is the court of first instance for most civil, criminal, and administrative matters, however Intermediate Courts also hear first-instance cases, as well as appeals from Primary courts within their jurisdictions. The Supreme People's court is the final appellate court of China. There are also special courts, like the military court, for issues related to current or former members of the military, and the Intellectual Property Court in Beijing.

2. Trade dress refers to the style and overall feel of the product or brand.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.