Canada

Good afternoon.

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of April 11, 2022.

Topics covered this week included a claim to professional fees charged for litigation support in a family law case, police liability for false arrest, negligent investigation and malicious prosecution, adding parties in a MVA/road maintenance case, and summary judgment dismissing claims as an abuse of process because they raised issues already dealt with in prior proceedings that had been settled.

Wishing everyone celebrating a Happy Easter and Passover.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Marmer Penner Inc. v. Vacaru, 2022 ONCA 280

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Professional Fees, Solicitor's Negligence, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, R. v. O'Brien, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591

Hall v. Niagara (Police Services Board), 2022 ONCA 288

Keywords: Torts, Police Liability, False Arrest, Negligent Investigation, Malicious Prosecution, Civil Procedure, Costs, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 463(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 57.01, Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35, Tremblay v. Ottawa (Police Services Board), 2018 ONCA 497, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

Taylor v. Mayes, 2022 ONCA 297

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, MVA, Crown Liability, Road Maintenance, Civil Procedure, Adding Parties, Limitation Periods, Discoverability, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, Azzeh (Litigation Guardian of) v. Legendre, 2017 ONCA 385

Ntakos Estate v. Ntakos, 2022 ONCA 301

Keywords: Contracts, Settlements, Releases, Rescission, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process, Summary Judgement, Limitation Periods, Fraudulent Concealement, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 20.04(2.2), Ntakos Estate v. The Queen, 2012 TCC 409, Ntakos Estate v. The Queen, 2018 TCC 224, York Condominium Corporation No. 382 v. Jay-M Holdings Limited, 2007 ONCA 49, 84 O.R. (3d) 414, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 31950 (September 6, 2007), Zeppa v. Woodbridge Heating & Air-Conditioning Ltd., 2019 ONCA 47, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 91, Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, The Catalyst Capital Group Inc. v. VimpelCom Ltd., 2019 ONCA 354, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 284; Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26, Winter v. Sherman Estate, 2018 ONCA 703, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 38899 (March 19, 2020), D'Addario v. EnGlobe Corp., 2012 ONSC 1918, aff'd 2014 ONCA 376, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), rev'd for the reasons of Goudge J.A., 2002 SCC 63, 790668 Ontario Inc. v. D'Andrea Management Inc., 2015 ONCA 557

Short Civil Decisions

1116227 Ontario Ltd. v. Telus Communication Company, 2022 ONCA 287

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Dismissal for Delay, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 48.14(1), 48.14(5), and 48.14(6), Faris v. Eftimovski, 2013 ONCA 360

Hornepayne First Nation v. Ontario First Nations (2008) Limited Partnership, 2022 ONCA 299

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Leave to Appeal, Costs, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, s. 49, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61.03.1(3)

Grillo Barristers P.C. v. Kagan Law Firm P.C., 2022 ONCA 303

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Orders, Dismissal for Delay, Setting Aside, Costs, Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. (2002), 48 C.P.C. (5th) 93 (Ont. S.C.)

Collins v. Canada Post Corporation, 2022 ONCA 295

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2.1.01, Salasel v. Cuthbertson, 2015 ONCA 115, 124 O.R. (3d) 401, Wilson v. The Queen, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594

CIVIL DECISIONS

Marmer Penner Inc. v. Vacaru, 2022 ONCA 280

[Doherty, Huscroft and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

F. V., self-represented as the appellant

T. Pagliaroli, for the respondents Legge & Legge and J.L.

M. E. Girard, for the respondent, Marmer Penner Inc.

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Professional Fees, Solicitor's Negligence, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, R. v. O'Brien, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591

facts:

The respondent, J.L. and his law firm Legge & Legge ("Legge"), acted for the appellant, F.V., in her divorce proceedings. The respondent, Marmer Penner Inc. ("Marmer"), was retained to provide forensic accounting advice during the divorce proceedings. F.V. paid substantial fees to Marmer but not all of the fees claimed. Marmer sued F.V. for the outstanding balance and sued Legge on the basis that counsel had given Marmer a personal undertaking to honour the fees. F.V. defended on the basis that there was an oral agreement that Marmer would limit its fees to a specified amount and that in any event, Marmer had overcharged for some of the services provided. F.V. also counterclaimed alleging negligence by Marmer. Additionally, F.V. crossclaimed against her co-defendant, Legge, alleging negligence by Legge in the course of the divorce proceedings and maintained that proper steps to prevent her husband from dissipating his assets during the proceedings. The negligence allegations focused on one specific property owned by the husband and his girlfriend and events in early June 2018.

Marmer was successful in the main action and was granted judgment against F.V. and Legge. F.V. abandoned her counterclaim against Marmer on the eve of the trial. The trial judge also dismissed F.V.'s crossclaim against Legge. The trial judge found the crossclaim failed for several reasons. He held F.V. failed to prove Legge breached the applicable standard of care and also failed to prove any causal link between Legge's alleged negligence and F.V.'s damages. The trial judge further held that F.V.'s claim was statute-barred.

F.V. appealed the judgment in the main action and the judgment dismissing her crossclaim. She also sought leave to appeal the costs awarded to Marmer. F.V. also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence on the appeal. The fresh evidence related to both the appeal in the main action and the appeal from the dismissal of the crossclaim.

issues:

(1) Can the court accept fresh evidence consisting of Legge's discovery evidence attached on the main action?

(2) Can the court accept fresh evidence on the appeal in the crossclaim consisting of emails from two former employees of Legge and two opinion letters from a person identified as a "court qualified, certified questioned document examiner"?

(3) Did the trial judge err in finding that Marmer did not in fact agree to a fixed fee for its services prior to trial, and did not overcharge or double-bill F.V.?

(4) Did the trial judge fail to ensure that they had access to the written version of the agreement between Legge and Marmer concerning Legge's position in the main action?

(5) Can the court consider F.V.'s argument Legge was negligent in failing to register a temporary non-depletion order made by Justice Jarvis in respect of the husband's property?

(6) Should the appellant be granted leave to appeal the costs order made in the main action?

holding:

Appeals and motions dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No.

There was no basis upon which it could reasonably be said that the contents of Legge's discovery could be expected to have any impact on the trial judge's decision in the main action. Legge's discovery evidence was not admissible as fresh evidence on the appeal in the main action.

(2) No.

F.V. did not satisfy the court that the proposed evidence would have made any difference to the outcome. F.V.'s case on the crossclaim failed for many reasons, some of which had nothing to do with Legge's credibility. The fresh evidence offered to attack Legge's credibility could not possibly have had any effect on the trial judge's findings on those matters that did not turn in any way on Legge's credibility.

(3) No.

F. V. did not demonstrated any palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's factual analysis.

(4) No.

There was nothing capable of attributing any misunderstanding F.V. may have had to anything said or done by the trial judge. Nor was there anything indicating the trial judge may have been aware that F.V. was under any misunderstanding.

(5) No.

There could be no finding that the failure to register the order of Justice Jarvis constituted negligence. The trial judge's findings are findings of fact. The trial judge's findings of fact are reasonable and reflect no misapprehension of the evidence. There was no basis upon which the Court could interfere with those findings. The issue was what a reasonable solicitor could be expected to do or not do in the particular circumstances. That inquiry usually hinges on expert evidence and not on submissions about the kinds of orders that a particular rule may or may not contemplate.

(6) No.

Leave to appeal costs is granted sparingly. As there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the award of costs on a substantial indemnity basis, and there was no reason to grant leave exclusively on the quantum question.

Hall v. Niagara (Police Services Board), 2022 ONCA 288

[Brown, Paciocco and Sossin JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Eugene G. Mazzuca and Rafal Szymanski, for the appellants/respondents by way of cross-appeal

P. I. Waldmann and C. Suliman, for the respondent/appellant by way of cross-appeal

facts:

The respondent, J. H., was acquitted at a criminal trial where he was accused of stealing a copper bar from the General Motors plant in St. Catharines, Ontario. The respondent subsequently brought a civil suit arising out of the police investigation that resulted in J. H.'s arrest.

At the civil trial, the trial judge considered the four elements of malicious prosecution as set out in Nelles v. Ontario, and focused her analysis on the latter two elements: (1) the plaintiff must show that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause, and (2) the defendant was actuated by malice.

The trial judge found that Detective S. M. lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds given the incomplete and improper investigation against J. H. and the challenges with the circumstantial evidence gathered in that investigation. The trial judge further found that Detective S. M. was not credible regarding his assertion that he believed he had reasonable and probably grounds for the arrest.

Further, with respect to malice, the trial judge found that Detective S. M. acted with an improper purpose in the prosecution of J. H. She found that after the Crown and the defence inaccurately answered a question posed by the criminal trial judge, Detective S. M. did not meet his obligation of notifying the Crown of the correct answer, which would have assisted J. H. in his defence. The trial judge also found that Detective S. M. engaged in inappropriate conduct in "high fiving" a Crown witness, and that inaccuracies in his police notes and testimony went beyond carelessness and amounted to deliberate falsehoods.

Accordingly, the trial judge found the appellants, Regional Municipality of Niagara Police Services Board and Detective S. M., liable for $686,216.92 in damages for false arrest, negligent investigation, and malicious prosecution.

The appellants appealed from the decision of the trial judge. The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's award of costs in his favour.

issues:

(1) Did the trial judge misapply the law relating to reasonable and probable grounds in the context of malicious prosecution?

(2) Did the trial judge misapply the law relating to malice in the context of malicious prosecution?

(3) Did the trial judge err in her award of damages?

(4) Did the trial judge err in her award of costs?

holding:

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No.

The trial judge's conclusion that Detective S. M. lacked subjective reasonable and probable grounds was based on her assessment of Detective S. M.'s credibility, which was entitled to deference. The conclusion was based on the trial judge's finding that the circumstantial case against J. H. was insufficient, which was buttressed by Detective S. M.'s concession that prior to interviewing J. H. he did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him. After reviewing the interview, the trial judge concluded that nothing occurred during the interview to furnish additional grounds.

The appellants focused their arguments on the trial judge's conclusion that the objective ground for arrest was insufficient. However, the Court noted that it did not need to decide whether any of the alleged errors regarding the objective analysis occurred because the subjective and objective components of the reasonable and probable grounds test were conjunctive. Accordingly, since both elements must be satisfied for reasonable and probable grounds to exist, given the finding that Detective S. M. lacked subjective reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, the Court saw no basis for disturbing the trial judge's conclusion with respect to the third element of the test for malicious prosecution.

(2) No.

In concluding the test for malice was met, the trial judge relied on the following facts: (1) Detective S. M. failed to intervene in the criminal trial to correct flawed evidence that was put to the judge; (2) Detective S. M. and one of the GM witnesses for the prosecution were seen giving each other a "high five" outside the courtroom at the criminal trial; and (3) Detective S. M. deliberately lied in his characterizing of the evidence of Mr. G., a key witness at trial.

The Court saw no errors in the findings made by the trial judge, which were available on the record, nor in her conclusion in light of the findings that Detective S. M.'s prosecution of J. H. was motivated by an improper purpose sufficient to meet the threshold of malice with respect to liability for malicious prosecution.

(3) No.

The Court saw no basis to interfere with the trial judge's award of damages. Specifically, the Court held the trial judge's finding that the costs of J. H.'s disability dispute was related to the prosecution was entitled to deference, as was the trial judge's finding that the loss of income was connected to the prosecution, as but for the prosecution, there was no evidence for why J. H. would be terminated by his employer.

(4) No.

The Court held the trial judge considered the bills of costs of each party and properly considered the criteria under r. 57.01 of the Rules. The Court saw no error in the approach taken or in the result reached by the trial judge. Accordingly, the Court had no reason to interfere with the costs award.

Taylor v. Mayes, 2022 ONCA 297

[MacPherson, Paciocco and George JJ.A]

Counsel:

R. Moss and A. Dylewski, for the proposed third party (appellant), Cruickshank Construction Limited

R. Baldwin, for the respondents

C. Dorey, for G.T

A. Choi, for Her Majesty the Queen, in Right of Ontario, Represented by the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario.

facts:

S.M' vehicle rear-ended G.T's vehicle on Highway 401 in February 2013. G.T commenced a lawsuit against the defendants. The defendants, in turn, filed a Statement of Defence in which they blamed the accident on the condition of snow and slush on Highway 401 owned by Her Majesty the Queen, as Represented by the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario ("MTO"). The defendants then issued a third-party claim against MTO in 2016.

On October 1, 2019, the defendants obtained an order from Justice Ryan Bell of the Superior Court of Justice compelling MTO to attend discoveries and deliver productions. During the examination for discovery of MTO on November 19, 2019, MTO identified Cruickshank Construction Limited ("Cruickshank") as the contractor responsible for the relevant winter maintenance of the section of Highway 401 where the accident occurred. The defendants brought a motion to add Cruickshank as a party. Cruickshank and MTO opposed the motion on the basis that the proposed claim against Cruickshank was statute-barred by virtue of the Limitations Act, 2002.

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in determining that the defendants' third party claim against Cruickshank was not statute-barred by virtue of the Limitations Act, 2002?

(2) Did the motion judge err in determining that Cruickshank was not at liberty to plead a limitation defence to the third-party claim?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No.

Cruickshank argued that the motion judge erred by not concluding that the defendants ought to have known of the potential claim against Cruickshank once it was served with the Statement of Claim. However, the motion judge pointed out that MTO's "defence to third party claim makes no mention of an independent contractor whatsoever." Moreover, MTO completely refused to participate in the proceedings for a very long period of time. The failure of MTO to make timely and appropriate documentary disclosure and MTO's initial refusal to produce a representative for an examination for discovery should not be to the detriment of the defendants.

(2) No.

In an appropriate case, a motion judge can make a final determination on a limitation period issue. The Court determined that it was just for the motion judge to do so. The parties provided a comprehensive record and made full submissions on the limitation period issue. The litigation was on the cusp of being seven years old. The motion judge's legal analysis in support of her decision to add Cruickshank as a third party was sound.

Ntakos Estate v. Ntakos, 2022 ONCA 301

[Trotter, Coroza and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. C. Tibollo, for the appellants

D. Steinberg, for the respondent K. N.

M. Kestenberg, for the respondent Fogler Rubinoff LLP

W. Pepall and R. Shoom, for the respondent P. R.

facts:

Brothers J. N., N. K., and T. N. owned a construction supply business, Dupont Construction Supplies Ltd. ("Dupont"). Dupont was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ntakos Holdings Ltd. ("Holdings"), of which the three brothers were equal shareholders. J. N. died in 1995, and his shares in Holdings were transferred to his wife, A. N. After J. N. died, there were disagreements between N. K. and T. N. over various financial issues related to Dupont and Holdings. In 2003, Dupont and Holdings retained a lawyer, Mr. Rooney, who worked with the companies' accountants, initially Rubinovich Newton LLP and later Shimmerman Penn LLP, to address the issues. In July 2004, pursuant to Mr. Rooney's advice, the parties reached an agreement that involved N. K., T. N. and A. N. signing acknowledgments of the amounts they each received from and owed to Dupont and Holdings.

A. N. died in October 2004, and her shares in Holdings were transferred to her and J. N.'s children, P. N., O. F., and T. B. All three children worked at Dupont. In 2005, N. K., P. N., O. F., and T. B. bought T. N. out of Dupont and Holdings and signed releases. As a result of their agreement, N. K. held 50% of the shares in Holdings, while P. N., O. F., and T. B. jointly held the other 50%. All parties were represented by counsel. N. K. was represented by Fogler Rubinoff LLP.

Despite this resolution, in February 2006, P. N., O. F., T. B., and A. N.'s Estate started an action against N. K., Mr. Rooney and Shimmerman Penn LLP (the "2006 Action"). They alleged that N. K. misappropriated money from Dupont. Fogler Rubinoff LLP defended N. K. in the 2006 Action.

In 2012, the plaintiffs settled the 2006 Action with N. K. and Mr. Rooney. The plaintiffs signed a broad release that released N. K. and his agents, employees, representatives and solicitors from all current and future claims relating in any manner whatsoever to the 2006 Action. In 2015, the plaintiffs settled the 2006 Action with Mr. Rooney, and signed a broad release with terms that largely reflected the language in the agreement releasing N. K.

In May 2019, N. K. and his numbered company, 2324973 Ontario Ltd., brought an application against Holdings and P. N. to enforce an arbitration agreement related to a mortgage held by the numbered company.

Two weeks later, A. N.'s Estate and Dupont commenced an action against N. K., Mr. Rooney, Fogler Rubinoff LLP, and Rubinovich Newton LLP (the "Estate Action"), relating to events between 1995 and 2005. The plaintiffs allege that N. K. misappropriated funds from Dupont, and induced A. N. to sign documents acknowledging that she received management fees that she never received. The plaintiffs alleged that the other defendants assisted and conspired with N. K.

In November 2019, Dupont, Holdings, and P. N., O. F., and T. B., in their personal capacities and as Trustees of A. N.'s Estate, brought an application against N. K., 2324973 Ontario Ltd., Mr. Rooney, and Shimmerman Penn LLP, seeking a declaration that the 2012 settlement with N. K. and the 2015 settlement with Mr. Rooney were void ab initio because they were induced by fraud (the "Estate Application").
In December 2019, T. N. brought an action against N. K., Rubinovich Newton LLP, Fogler Rubinoff LLP and Mr. Rooney, alleging wrongdoing by the defendants between 1997 and 2004 ("T. N.'s Action").

N. K., Mr. Rooney and Fogler Rubinoff LLP brought motions for summary judgment in all three proceedings. The motion judge found that the proceedings were an abuse of process because they raised issues that had been dealt with in prior proceedings. The motion judge also found that the claims were barred by statutory limitation periods. The motion judge dismissed the actions and application against N. K., Mr. Rooney and Fogler Rubinoff LLP. The appellants appealed.

issues:

(1) Did the motion judge err in finding that this was an appropriate case for summary judgment?

(2) Did the motion judge err in finding that the proceedings were an abuse of process?

(3) Did the motion judge err in finding that the releases signed by the appellants were a bar to the 2019 proceedings?

(4) Did the motion judge err in finding that the 2019 proceedings were statute-barred?

(5) Did the motion judge err in finding that T. N. was an undischarged bankrupt?

(6) Did the motion judge err in finding that Fogler Rubinoff LLP did not owe the appellants a duty of care?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

(1) No.

There was no error in the motion judge's finding that this was an appropriate case for summary judgment. The motion judge found that the appellants' evidence did not support their position that the Estate Action, the Estate Application, and T. N.'s Action should not be dismissed on the basis of the "threshold" issues advanced by the respondents. His findings of fact were entitled to deference, as there was no error in his assessment of the appellants' evidence.

The allegations of fraud in the Estate Action were the same ones made in the prior proceedings. There was no evidence that the respondents obtained the settlements or releases by fraud. With respect to T.N.'s Action, there was also no evidence the settlements were obtained by fraud. The appellants were unable to identify any evidence to defeats these findings made by the motion judge.

There was no merit to the appellants' argument that the motion judge should have allowed them to conduct a viva voce cross-examination of N. K. On a motion for summary judgment, Rule 20.04(2.2) gives a motion judge the power to order oral evidence. However, this is an exercise of discretion.

(2) No.

The motion judge applied the correct legal principles in finding that the Estate Action was an abuse of process. There was no evidence that the 2006 settlement was tainted by fraud, and there was no air of reality to the claim against Fogler Rubinoff LLP was entitled to deference. These findings are well supported by the record, and there was no palpable and overriding error.

The motion judge properly stated that "[t]he law is clear that it is an abuse of process to relitigate a determination by a court in the hope of a different outcome". There are limited circumstances where a party may relitigate an issue, such as "when the first proceeding is tainted by fraud or dishonesty" The motion judge compared the 2006 Action to the 2019 Estate Action and found that all the wrongful acts pleaded in 2019 were already pleaded in 2006. There was no evidence the settlements were obtained by fraud.

Further, the fact that Fogler Rubinoff LLP was not a party to the 2006 Action did not affect his conclusion that the Estate Action was an abuse of process, based on the flexibility of the doctrine in preventing the litigation of claims that have already been determined. Adding Fogler Rubinoff LLP to the claim did not change the nature of the claim. Regardless, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim against Fogler Rubinoff LLP.

(3) No.

The motion judge found that the releases signed by the parties had the effect of releasing the respondents from the 2019 proceedings. With respect to the 2006 Action, the release signed in 2012 in N. K.'s favour expressly released him and Fogler Rubinoff LLP from "unknown claims arising in the future with respect to all matters raised or which could have been raised in the [2006 Action]". The release signed in 2015 in Mr. Rooney's favour released him from "not only all known injuries, losses and damages, but also injuries, losses and damages not now known or anticipated but which may later develop or be discovered, including all the effects and consequences thereof".
There was no error in the motion judge's finding that the Estate Action was barred by the releases signed by the appellants. The 2006 Action was not tainted by fraud, therefore there was no basis for disregarding or setting aside the releases.

There was no error in the motion judge's conclusion that T. N.'s Action was covered by the broad release he signed in 2005. T. N. released N. K. and Mr. Rooney from "any and all Claims ... which the Releasor has now, or may have in the future ... relating to or arising out of any cause, matter or thing whatsoever existing up to and including the date hereof".

(4) No.

The motion judge considered the appellants' evidence and concluded that there was no evidence that the settlements were obtained by fraud. Under the circumstances, there was no basis for him to find that fraudulent concealment was a triable issue. Therefore, there is no error in the motion judge's finding that all the claims were statute-barred.

(5) No.

There was no need to address this issue given the conclusion that the motion judge made no error in finding that the 2005 release and limitation periods each presented a bar to T.N.'s Action.

(6) No.

There was no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants did not have a cause of action against Fogler Rubinoff LLP. The motion judge made a finding of fact that represented K. N., and no one else, and therefore did not owe a duty of care to any individual other than K.N. This finding of fact was supported by the record and was entitled to deference.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

1116227 Ontario Ltd. v. Telus Communication Company, 2022 ONCA 287

[MacPherson, Paciocco and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Seddigh, for the appellants

R. Laurion, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Dismissal for Delay, Costs, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 48.14(1), 48.14(5), and 48.14(6), Faris v. Eftimovski, 2013 ONCA 360

Hornepayne First Nation v. Ontario First Nations (2008) Limited Partnership, 2022 ONCA 299

[MacPherson, Paciocco and George JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Outerbridge, for the moving party

Chief R.B.K., acting in person for the responding party

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Leave to Appeal, Costs, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, s. 49, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61.03.1(3)

Grillo Barristers P.C. v. Kagan Law Firm P.C., 2022 ONCA 303

[van Rensburg, Nordheimer and Harvison Young JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G. Sidlofsky and P. Neufeld, for the appellant

B.F. Morrison and S. Hale, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Orders, Dismissal for Delay, Setting Aside, Costs, Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. (2002), 48 C.P.C. (5th) 93 (Ont. S.C.)

Collins v. Canada Post Corporation, 2022 ONCA 295

[Roberts, Miller and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R.M.C., acting in person

M.R. Kestenberg and D.S. Lipkus, for the respondent, Norton Rose Fulbright Canada

T. Brook, for the respondent, Canada Post Corporation

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be ought about your specific circumstances.

Court Of Appeal Summaries (April 11 – 14, 2022)

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Civil Decisions

Short Civil Decisions

CIVIL DECISIONS

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

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Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

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