1 Overview of the law and enforcement regime relating to cartels
The "Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade" (Law No. 54 of 1947), commonly known as the "Antimonopoly Act" (the "AMA"), governs cartel enforcement in Japan. The AMA prohibits businesses from engaging in "unreasonable restraint of trade", which is defined as business activities by which a business, "in concert with other enterprises, mutually restrict[ing] or conduct[ing] their business activities in such a manner as to fix, maintain or increase prices, or to limit production, technology, products, facilities or counterparties, thereby causing . . . a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade" (AMA art. 2, para. 6). This covers price-fixing cartels (kakaku karuteru), bid-rigging in public projects (nyusatsu dango), and bid-rigging in private industry (juchu chosei). The AMA also prohibits businesses from engaging in "unfair trade practices", including concerted refusals to deal (AMA art. 2, para. 9(i)). Additionally, the AMA prohibits businesses from entering into an international agreement or contract that constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair trade practice (AMA art. 6).
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (the "JFTC") is the government agency responsible for the enforcement of the AMA. It may, depending on the case, impose administrative fines (called "surcharges") and issue cease-and-desist orders to firms that it finds to have engaged in cartel conduct. Surcharges are calculated pursuant to a complex but rigid formula set forth in the AMA. Since 1 April 2015, appeals from JFTC orders are considered by the Tokyo District Court. The JFTC may also give administrative guidance to firms that are suspected of having engaged in cartel conduct.
In addition to administrative sanctions, firms and individuals face criminal exposure for cartel violations. The filing by the JFTC of a criminal accusation to the Prosecutor General is the exclusive means by which a criminal prosecution may be brought against firms and individuals for cartel violation of the AMA (AMA art. 96.1). If the JFTC determines through its investigation that a case is particularly egregious and has a significant effect on people's lives, or that the administrative remedies are not sufficient, it may file a criminal accusation with the Prosecutor General, which may result in a fine of up to JPY 500m (approximately US$ 4.56m) for firms or imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of up to JPY 5m (approximately US$ 45,600) for individuals. If criminal penalties are imposed in addition to the JFTC's administrative sanctions, the JFTC surcharge is reduced by an amount equivalent to one-half of the criminal fine.
Firms may face civil damages claims from customers, but Japan does not have enhanced damages or class actions for antitrust claims. Firms may also be debarred from government contracts. In addition, directors of firms that have been found to have engaged in cartel conduct may be sued by shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.
The government sometimes exempts certain types of concerted behaviour. For example, in connection with the increase in the consumption tax in 2014, a law was passed to permit specific types of businesses to apply to the JFTC to set up "pass-on cartels" and "price representation cartels", which would allow for uniform behaviour and fairness among competitors in responding to the tax increase.
2 Overview of investigative powers in Japan
Under Article 47 of the AMA, the JFTC may conduct an investigation using the following measures: (1) ordering persons to be interrogated and gathering their opinions or reports; (2) ordering expert witnesses to give opinions; (3) ordering persons to submit books and documents and to keep such documents at the JFTC; and (4) entering and inspecting the firm's premises or any other necessary sites.
In practice, the JFTC typically starts a cartel investigation with simultaneous dawn raids or surprise inspections (called "on-site inspections") on all suspected cartel members, including any leniency applicants. While in most cases on-site inspections are triggered by leniency applications, they could also be triggered by third-party complaints (AMA art. 45), which the JFTC is required to duly consider. If the third party's report is sufficiently detailed and in writing, the JFTC must inform the third party whether it has taken steps in response to the report. Cartel investigations also may be triggered by the JFTC's own initiative or at the request of other ministries and agencies. The JFTC sometimes sends out written questionnaires regarding industry practices, which may be followed by an on-site inspection.
During the on-site inspection, the JFTC may seize any documents it considers to be relevant and will make copies of electronic files. Such inspections can take place at a firm's headquarters, as well as any offices, facilities, or employee residences that may have relevant materials. The JFTC will seize and keep original documents through the duration of the investigation, including any appeals. Firms may request to make copies of materials that are needed for business, either during the inspection or at the JFTC's premises. Also, the JFTC usually requires firms to submit detailed reports about the business operations and sales data. The JFTC may interview witnesses during the on-site inspection.
As discussed further below, the JFTC does not recognise the concept of attorney-client privilege or legal privilege as it exists in American or English law and potentially may seize documents that contain attorney-client communications as part of its on-site inspection. However, pursuant to the most recent amendments to the AMA, discussed below, the JFTC established rules and guidelines to protect certain attorney-client communications.
In addition to seizing documents and materials, the JFTC may request individuals to submit to voluntary interviews during and after the on-site inspection. If an individual refuses, the JFTC can issue an order for a compulsory interview. In both voluntary and compulsory interviews, the interviewee does not have the right to have counsel present. At the end of an interview session, the JFTC may require the interviewee to sign a statement that it has prepared. In the past, the interviewee was given an opportunity to correct mistakes, such as typographical errors, but typically was not permitted to make substantive changes and was not given an opportunity to consult with counsel before signing. The JFTC issued guidelines effective as of January 2016 clarifying that witnesses are permitted to consult with counsel during breaks and that the record should reflect any corrections suggested by witnesses. The interviewee and the firm may not receive a copy of the signed statement. An individual may be interviewed multiple times, though usually no more than eight hours per day excluding breaks. Employees of leniency applicants are subject to the same procedure.
Article 39 of the AMA requires the JFTC to keep confidential any information it has seized, been provided, or created, including witness statements. However, prosecutors may use such signed statements as evidence during a criminal trial, and a firm may obtain copies of its employees' statements in order to challenge or appeal an administrative order. In addition, "interested parties", such as injured parties, may seek to review and obtain copies of documents from the appeal, but the firm will be given an opportunity to request redactions of confidential business information.
Criminal investigations in Japan are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law No. 131 of 1948). The Prosecutor General may refer cases to a regional public prosecutor's office to commence a criminal prosecution based on the filing of an accusation by the JFTC. Prior to commencing the prosecution, prosecutors will try to obtain information from witnesses on a voluntary basis as much as possible, including obtaining signed statements. This process may occur in tandem with the JFTC's investigation. Prosecutors may also use written statements obtained by the JFTC as evidence.
The prosecutors or police may arrest a suspect, typically with an arrest warrant. If it becomes necessary to detain a suspect, the prosecutor must obtain a pre-indictment detention order from a court within 48 hours following the arrest. The initial detention period is 10 days, subject to extension by another 10 days if necessary. The prosecutor must initiate the prosecution of the suspect within that period or release the suspect. The prosecutor will therefore try to extract a confession from the suspect within the first 20 days but may immediately re-arrest the suspect on a different charge to begin the interrogation process anew. Once a suspect has been arrested, he or she has the right to consult privately with counsel and may assert the right against self-incrimination. However, counsel is usually not permitted to be present during the interrogation. Prosecutors may use signed statements obtained through interrogation as evidence at trial. The 2016 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law requires audio and video recording of interrogations in certain cases, but not for violations of the AMA.
3 Overview of cartel enforcement activity during the last 12 months
In recent years, the JFTC has referred cases for criminal prosecution at the rate of only one every two to three years. In fiscal year 2020 (April 2020 through March 2021), the JFTC filed a criminal accusation at the Public Prosecutors' Office against three pharmaceutical wholesalers and seven individuals for the allegation of bid-rigging concerning pharmaceutical procurement contracts for 57 hospitals operated by the Japan Community Health Care Organization. Previously, the JFTC referred cartel matters for criminal prosecution in connection with a bid-rigging case concerning snow-melting equipment engineering works in 2014, a bid-rigging case concerning Tohoku Earthquake reconstruction works in 2016, and a bid-rigging case concerning construction of new terminal stations for the maglev railway in 2018.
During the current fiscal year, the JFTC has not issued any administrative orders in cartel cases as of 31 January 2022. In fiscal year 2020, the JFTC issued administrative orders in three cartel cases, and the total amount of surcharges imposed were approximately JPY 4.3bn (approximately US$ 39m). In fiscal year 2019, administrative orders were issued in six cartel cases, with surcharges totalling approximately JPY 69.2bn (approximately US$ 630m). The COVID-19 pandemic can partly be blamed for the decrease in activity in 2021. Due to government-imposed restrictions on movement during the pandemic, the JFTC has had to refrain from conducting on-site inspections and face-to-face interviews.
The number of leniency applications was 33 in fiscal year 2020, less than half compared to the previous year (73 applications in fiscal 2019). There has been a total of 1,343 leniency applications filed since its introduction in January 2006 until March 2021, with a sharp increase in applications since 2010, at which time the JFTC increased the maximum number of leniency applicants per case and permitted joint applications by firms in the same corporate group, which continued until 2012. The number of new cases resulting from leniency filings dropped to eight in fiscal year 2020, remaining below 10 over the past three years: there were four in 2014; seven in 2015; nine in 2016; 11 in 2017; seven in 2018; and nine in 2019.
The average surcharge per firm in fiscal 2020 was approximately JPY 1.1bn (approximately US$ 10m), decreasing from the previous year (JPY 1.9bn (approximately US$ 17.3m)) but still showing an increase compared to the several years leading up to fiscal year 2018: JPY 14.5m (approximately US$ 132,000) in fiscal year 2018; JPY 59.1m (approximately US$ 538,000) in fiscal year 2017; and JPY 286m (approximately US$ 2.61m) in fiscal 2016; and JPY 275m (approximately US$ 2.51m) in fiscal 2015.
There were no official announcements of international cartel investigation by the JFTC in 2021.
Domestic cartel investigation was also in a low gear in 2021. The JFTC generally conducts on-site inspections in more than 10 cases per year, but in 2021 (January 2021 through to December 2021) there were only three publicly reported JFTC on-site inspections, which took place while COVID-19 restrictions were lifted in western Japan. These on-site inspections related to major electric power companies and a gas company on suspicion of price-fixing regarding power and gas supply.
4 Key issues in relation to enforcement policy, investigation and decision-making procedures
The 2019 amendment to the AMA, which went into effect in 2020, significantly reformed the surcharge calculation and leniency regime (see "Overview of surcharge (administrative fine)" and "Leniency/amnesty regime" below). It also introduced a new regime called "Hanbetsu-Tetsuzuki" (Determination Procedure) (see "Hanbetsu-Tetsuzuki (Determination Procedure)" below) which gives some protection to attorney-client communications for the first time under the AMA.
JFTC investigations are fairly quick, typically resulting in the issuance of an administrative order within 12 to 18 months of the first on-site inspection. This speed imposes a great burden on firms and their lawyers, who are required to deal with a large volume of information in a compressed time period, often with limited access to documents. Even through the JFTC permits access to and copying of documents that have been seized, they must be reviewed and copied on JFTC premises in the presence of JFTC investigators. The situation is made even more difficult if the JFTC has interviewed employees during the on-site inspection, without an opportunity for such employees to consult with counsel before or during the interview. The JFTC permits counsel to be present at on-site inspections and permits employees to consult with counsel before they are interviewed in order to facilitate leniency applications, but the JFTC will not wait for counsel to arrive. For voluntary interviews after on-site inspections, the JFTC does not permit counsel to be present (although it permits interviewees to consult with counsel during breaks). If the interviews result in signed statements by employees acknowledging the cartel conduct, it obviously impacts the firm's ability to defend itself.
The challenge is multiplied if the conduct is international in scope, requiring firms and their counsel to consider strategy in other jurisdictions. Under the Japanese leniency system, firms may obtain a reduction to the surcharge, even if they seek leniency after the on-site inspection. If the cartel was purely domestic, with no effect on other countries, then it may seem sensible for a firm that is subject to an on-site inspection to apply for leniency, provided that there are facts supporting such an application. However, if the client has operations in other countries and it is uncertain whether the cartel may have affected other countries, it is essential to consult with foreign counsel and carefully consider the effect such a leniency application could have in other jurisdictions. In some cases, even if the client has relatively small operations in other countries or it is possible but not certain that the cartel had an impact in those other countries, it may be advisable for the client to consider seeking leniency in some or all of these other countries, because the exposure could be greater to the client company and its employees. On the other hand, in some cases, it may be better to not submit a leniency application in Japan, in order to mitigate exposure elsewhere. Not permitting attorneys to participate in witness interviews also creates risk not only for the firms but also for the individuals who may not fully understand that they face criminal exposure in Japan or elsewhere based on their statements.
The 2016 amendments to the AMA provided some protection to parties from such disadvantages, including giving an opportunity for parties to be heard before orders are issued, giving parties an opportunity to review the evidence before the hearing, changing the forum for administrative appeals from the JFTC to the Tokyo District Court, and permitting the submission of new evidence in the appeal. Also, the JFTC guidelines issued in 2016 on administrative investigation procedures expressly permit witnesses to consult with counsel during breaks and to request corrections to witness statements, as well as to submit complaints to the JFTC on the conduct of inspectors. The guidelines were updated in 2020 to permit employees of leniency applicants to take notes at the end of the interview about the contents of the interview, if requested by the employees.
5 "Hanbetsu-Tetsuzuki" (Determination Procedure)
The 2019 amendments to the AMA, which went into effect in December 2020, introduced a new system called "Hanbetsu-Tetsuzuki" (Determination Procedure), which gives some protection for attorney-client communications, aiming at making the leniency programme more effective. This procedure only applies to communications with Japanese law-qualified attorneys (bengoshi), not foreign attorneys.
This protection can be given to communications (meetings, telephone calls, emails, etc.) between a firm and an independent attorney which relate to providing a legal opinion concerning a cartel case to which the leniency programme could be applied. An in-house attorney generally will not be considered as an "independent attorney", unless the in-house attorney starts independently engaging in legal practice at the written instruction of the firm, for example as a result of discovery of a suspected violation, and thus is no longer acting under the firm's direction.
To be privileged under this system, the communication must be documented and stored appropriately in accordance with the requirements set by the JFTC. Specifically, the documents (including data; hereinafter the same applies in this section) containing the communication must be (i) marked as privileged under the JFTC rules, and (ii) stored in such a way that they are distinguishable from other documents.
The procedure is as follows: during an inspection by the JFTC for the alleged cartel, a firm may request the application of Hanbetsu-Tetsuzuki by identifying the documents it seeks to protect; the JFTC orders the firm to submit the identified documents and let a "Determination Officer", an official designated within the JFTC Secretariat who is unrelated to the investigation at issue, handle such documents; the firm must provide the JFTC with a log summarising the documents in question within two weeks after the submission; and if the Determination Officer determines that the submitted documents qualify for the protection, they will be returned to the firm without investigators' access.
6 Overview of surcharge (administrative fine)
The 2019 amendments to the AMA added the following basis for the calculation of surcharges: sales generated by subsidiaries of the infringing firm acting under the direction of or based on information provided by the infringing firm; sales generated in connection with the business closely related to goods or services subject to cartels (e.g., subcontract between infringing firms); and the financial gains obtained for not supplying or not being supplied with the goods or services subject to cartels.
The surcharge (administrative fine) imposed by the JFTC is calculated by applying certain rates to the sales of the relevant product over the period of the violation, up to a maximum of 10 years, which was extended from the previous maximum of three years by the 2019 amendments to the AMA. The applicable rate is 10% regardless of the type of the firm, as set by Article 7-2 of the amended AMA. This rate may be adjusted upwards or downwards based on certain factors. The applicable rate is reduced to 4% when the firm and all of its affiliated companies are regarded as small and medium-sized manufacturers. If the firm repeatedly engaged in the conduct during a 10-year period, or took a leading role (including, but not limited to, requiring other firms not to apply for leniency to the JFTC), the applicable rate is increased by 50%; and if the firm both repeatedly engaged in the conduct and took a leading role, the applicable rate is doubled. The 2019 amendments to the AMA abolished the reduction for the early withdrawal of an infringement. If the resulting amount is less than JPY 1m (approximately US$ 9,100), a surcharge will not be imposed.
Before issuing an administrative order, the JFTC gives parties prior written notification and an adequate opportunity to review the case file (and make a copy of other parties' documents), after which there is a hearing presided by a JFTC officer. In the hearing, a party may make arguments (orally or in writing) and submit supplementary evidence. The JFTC issues its administrative order only after the hearing.
7 Leniency/amnesty regime
Before the 2019 amendments to the AMA
Under Japan's system, before the most recent amendments to the AMA, a maximum of five firms could obtain leniency with regard to administrative fines on a given product. The first firm to apply for leniency before the JFTC investigation began was entitled to receive full immunity, the second applicant received a 50% reduction to the surcharge, and the third, fourth, and fifth applicants received a 30% reduction. After a case was initiated, a maximum of three firms could apply (up to a maximum of five, including applicants before the case began), and the amount of the leniency would be 30% for all of them.
After the 2019 amendments to the AMA
The most recent amendments introduced the discretion of the JFTC in determination of the surcharge amount and, in particular, allowed the JFTC to increase the reduction rates of the surcharge for leniency applicants in accordance with a firm's contribution to the JFTC's fact-finding in the case. The JFTC may apply the reduction rate to the surcharge amount according to the degree of contribution after applying the reduction rate according to the order of application (see table below).
Note: The limitation on the number of applicants has been abolished.
There is no programme such as "amnesty plus", which refers to benefits that the authorities can offer to a cartel member who discloses previously undetected antitrust offences involving a cartel, even if they are not the member who originally brought that cartelist to the authorities' attention.
If a JFTC investigation has not yet started, before applying for leniency, an applicant may anonymously ask the JFTC by telephone whether leniency is available for a particular product and how many other applicants have already applied, if any. To obtain a marker, the applicant must submit by email to the JFTC a copy of "Form 1", a one-page form that requires the identification of the applicant, the relevant product, the type of conduct being reported, and the period that the conduct took place. Once a marker has been obtained, the applicant must submit "Form 2" within a period designated by the JFTC (usually two to three weeks), which requires more detailed information and submission of supporting evidence. In certain cases, for example, if there is concern about the potential discoverability of the submission in other jurisdictions, the JFTC may permit the applicant to submit certain information orally.
If the JFTC investigation has started, an applicant may apply for leniency by submitting "Form 3" within 20 days after the start of the investigation. Form 3 requires the submission of information similar to Form 2.
To obtain the reduction according to the degree of contribution, the applicant must submit "Form 4", a one-page form which states that the applicant proposes to start a consultation with the JFTC, within 10 business days of receiving the notice of investigation. During the consultation, the applicant must explain the cooperation it offers, including descriptions of information and evidence the applicant would submit after the application is accepted. The JFTC determines the applicable reduction rate based on the explanation made by the applicant. Reduction may be denied if, for example, the applicant submitted false information, failed to provide requested information, prevented others from leaving the cartel, or continued to participate in the cartel after the investigation started.
During the investigation, the JFTC does not publicly disclose the identity of the leniency applicants, and leniency applicants will be subjected to on-site inspections. Since June 2016, the JFTC has published the identities of the leniency applicants and the percentage reduction received by each for all leniency applications received after that date, with respect to issued administrative orders.
The JFTC is required to maintain the confidentiality of documents relating to its investigation, including leniency submissions, during the course of an investigation.
8 Right of appeal against civil liability and penalties
Once the JFTC has issued its order, a party may appeal it either based on the liability findings or the amount of the surcharge. Appeals are considered by the Tokyo District Court. The court is not bound by the JFTC's factual findings, and parties are permitted to submit new evidence.
9 Criminal sanctions
Firms face a maximum criminal fine of JPY 500m (approximately US$ 4.6m), and individuals face up to five years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of JPY 5m (approximately US$ 46,000). If the term of imprisonment is no more than three years, the court may impose a suspended sentence (i.e., probation). In most white-collar criminal cases in Japan, a first-time offender will receive a suspended sentence without any actual jail time. To date, no Japanese court has sentenced an individual to actual jail time for a cartel offence.
The most recent amendments to the AMA increased the criminal fine for the offence of obstructing an investigation committed by a representative, agent, employee, etc. of a company, from JPY 3m (approximately US$ 27,000) to JPY 200m (approximately US$ 1.82m).
Firms that are subject to both an administrative surcharge and a criminal fine will receive a reduction in the amount of the administrative surcharge, equivalent to one-half of the amount of the criminal fine.
10 Cross-border issues
On several occasions, the JFTC has issued administrative sanctions against foreign firms for cartel conduct affecting the Japanese market. Precedents include a cease-and-desist order against European firms in the Marine Hose case in 2008, a cease-and-desist order and surcharge orders against Asian firms in the CRT case in 2009, and a cease-and-desist order and surcharge order against a Norwegian shipping firm in the Automotive Shipping case in 2014. In the Marine Hose case, four European firms and one Japanese firm were found to have violated the AMA, but the Japanese firm was the only party that the JFTC decided to fine, because the European firms did not have Japanese turnover. In the CRT case, a surcharge payment order was issued against Korean, Malaysian, and Indonesian firms, even though those firms did not have direct sales in Japan regarding CRTs. The Asian firms appealed the orders but were denied by the JFTC in May 2015, which held that foreign subsidiaries of the Japanese manufactures purchased the CRTs under the direction of their parent companies in Japan, and thus the parent companies in Japan should be regarded as purchasers of the CRTs. In 2017, the Supreme Court upheld the JFTC's position and held that even if a price-fixing cartel is formed outside of Japan, if the cartel damages the competitive functioning of the domestic Japanese market, then this would constitute a violation of free competition in Japan, and so the AMA would apply. By so doing, the Supreme Court recognised the extraterritorial application of the AMA.
11 Cooperation with other antitrust agencies
The JFTC has cooperation agreements with foreign antitrust enforcers and coordinates investigations with them, for example, to conduct simultaneous dawn raids. In connection with the Marine Hose and CRT cases mentioned above, as well as in certain automotive parts cases, the JFTC has publicly stated that it coordinated the investigations with the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Commission. In multi-jurisdictional leniency applications, the JFTC will ask the applicant for a waiver to permit it to discuss the case with other competition authorities. As of December 2021, Japan has Anti-Monopoly Cooperation Agreements with the U.S., EU and Canada, Economic Partnership Agreements (competition-related provision only) with 16 countries, and Inter-agency Cooperation Memorandums/Agreements with 11 countries. In August 2021, the JFTC entered into a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Competition Commission of India. In addition, Japan has mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLATs") with various countries, pursuant to which Japanese prosecutors may cooperate with foreign authorities to obtain evidence in criminal investigations.
12 Developments in private enforcement of antitrust laws
Japanese law permits private antitrust actions, but there have been few cases in this area. Japan is not a litigious society in general, and the lack of a class action system, limited discovery and limited damages all tend to dissuade private actions.
One basis for a private action is Article 25 of the AMA, which provides that firms that have violated the AMA shall indemnify injured parties. Such cases can only be brought in the Tokyo High Court and only after the JFTC has instructed that its decision is final. In such cases, liability is usually not an issue, because there is a rebuttable presumption that the JFTC's factual findings are correct. Instead, the litigation is over the scope of damages, for which the court may seek the JFTC's opinion. Alternatively, an injured party may bring a general tort claim under Article 709 of the Civil Code in any district court in Japan. To establish a claim under Article 709, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's intent or negligence, the amount of the damages, and causation.
Any party that was injured by a violation of the AMA, including both direct and indirect purchasers, can bring a claim under either statute. But any incentive to pursue a private action in Japan is probably even smaller for indirect purchasers, because there is no class action system for antitrust violations, and the possible recovery may be too small for a single plaintiff to pursue. There is no "pass-on" defence as such, but it may be taken into account in assessing the damages amount. There are no punitive damages in Japan.
In addition, although not a "private enforcement" action as such, an increasing number of derivative claims are filed by shareholders of firms that have been found to be violating the AMA. Such claimants seek to collect damages from the firm's directors on behalf of the firm and improvements to the firm's antitrust compliance.
Discovery is limited in Japan, but a private plaintiff may seek the court's permission to obtain evidence from litigants and third parties by making specific disclosure requests for relevant documents that are known to exist. Also, an "interested party", including injured parties, may review and copy filings from appeal proceedings and criminal trials, subject to redaction of sensitive information. In 2012, the Osaka District Court made a decision accepting part of the request by a private plaintiff for disclosure of the documents collected by the JFTC during its investigation, after the in camera inspection.
13 Commitment Procedure ("Kakuyaku-Tetsuzuki")
In 2018, the AMA was amended to introduce a new procedure for administrative settlement (referred to as the "Commitment Procedure" in some jurisdictions) in antitrust cases ("Kakuyaku-Tetsuzuki"). The new Commitment Procedure can be applied to various unilateral infringements but not cartel infringements.
Originally Published by Global Legal Insights
Because of the generality of this update, the information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular situations.
© Morrison & Foerster LLP. All rights reserved