Like several other states, Texas recently enacted a so-called "baby" Foreign Agents Registration Act ("FARA") law aimed at regulating foreign-influenced political activity.1 HB 119 (89th RS) requires registration by—and imposes a compensation ban on—anyone that lobbies on behalf of a "foreign adversary," "foreign adversary client," or "foreign adversary political party." The author's stated intent was to "prevent foreign adversaries from exerting [] undue influence on state policy."2
Many observers may have overlooked the impact of HB 119, assuming it only applies those who lobby on behalf of a country included on the United States' list of foreign adversaries. But the law stretches much further than that, covering—among many other things—private businesses with significant operations in those countries, their current and former executives and officers, and even future businesses created by those executives and officers.
HB 119 also changes the way the lobby law works in three important ways, all of which raise the stakes for the regulated community. First, there are no registration thresholds; any lobbying on behalf of these entities requires registration. Second, there is no amount of permissible compensation. And third, enforcement power was given directly to the Office of Attorney General.
A. HB 119 covers many private entities doing business in Texas.
HB 119 applies to anyone that lobbies on behalf of a "foreign adversary," "foreign adversary client," or "foreign adversary political party."3 But those terms are defined broadly to encompass a large number of private businesses and individuals.
For example, HB 119's definition of "foreign adversary" includes any "entity" under the "control" of a foreign adversary nation.4 But the Legislature defined "control" to include the "direct or indirect power to determine, direct, or decide important matters" affecting the entity through any means of exercising power.5 Does this include the countless businesses that manufacturer their goods in China? Does China have the "indirect" power to affect important matters for those business, even if only through its trade policy?
HB 119's definition of "foreign adversary" also includes any "subsidiary or parent of a business organization" that is "wholly or partly owned or operated" by a foreign adversary nation.6 But the bill defines "wholly or partly owned or operated" to include "access to any material, nonpublic, and technical information in the company's possession."7 What does this mean for major global corporations that maintain Chinese subsidiaries, including Apple, Tesla, Intel, Samsung, Walmart, General Motors, and Dell? These companies establish Chinese subsidiaries for market access, supply chain operations, and sales. But under HB 119, they could face a complete ban on lobbying in Texas.
HB 119 also applies to "foreign adversary client[s]," stretching the law even further. The Legislature defined "foreign adversary client" to include current or former executives and officers of the businesses discussed above, as well as their family members and any other business entity they may form in the future.8 For example, an American former executive of a global company, who has lived her entire life in United States, may not be able to hire a lobbyist to speak to Texas officials on behalf of a new business she forms in the United States. In fact, she may not even be able to advocate for that business herself, because her salary would constitute lobby compensation.
B. HB 119 raises the stakes for both lobbyists and businesses in three ways.
1. There are no registration thresholds.
The Texas lobby law generally shields those who only have limited contact with government officials from having to register as a lobbyist, pay a registration fee, and file ongoing reports. That protection comes primarily in the form of two "registration thresholds": one focused on the amount compensation received for speaking to government officials, the other on the expenditures made in furtherance of those communications.9 Both thresholds ensure that some amount of money changes hands before a person is required to disclose their efforts to influence government officials.10
A third threshold in the Texas lobby law focuses not on money, but on time.11 This threshold ensures, for example, that a business executive can occasionally talk to her elected representatives without fear of being subject to the lobby law.
But when it comes to lobbying on behalf of those covered by HB 119, the bill dispenses with all three thresholds.12 Any lobbying on behalf of one of these parties—even if it's unpaid, even if no money is spent, and even if it's only for a few minutes over the course of a year—triggers the requirement to register, pay a registration fee, and report ongoing lobby activities.
2. No compensation is permitted.
Traditionally, the Texas lobby law does not limit the compensation a person can receive for lobbying; it merely requires disclosure. And while there are some limits placed on the expenditures lobbyists can make, those limits are generally more generous than those applied to a non-lobbyist.13
But here again, HB 119 makes a radical change, prohibiting the receipt of any compensation—direct or indirect, tangible or intangible, monetary or in-kind—to lobby on behalf of those covered by HB 119.14 This not only prevents organizations covered by HB 119 from hiring registered lobbyists to advance their interests, it also prohibits their paid employees from speaking to government officials.
3. The Office of Attorney General can enforce.
Enforcement of the Texas lobby law is largely left to the Texas Ethics Commission ("TEC"). The TEC is a constitutionally created agency with an independent structure and an evenly split, bipartisan board. Its enforcement process is designed to remove political and personal bias and provides additional protections for the regulated community by, among other things: (i) providing a confidential investigation and early-resolution process; and (ii) requiring a supermajority vote of six-of-eight commissioners to initiate an investigation or find a violation.
But once again, everything is turned on its head with HB 119, wherein the Legislature gave the Office of Attorney General ("OAG") the authority to bring lawsuits to enforce the law without any involvement by the TEC.15 The decision to file suit is entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General; the process will play out in open court; and the pursuit will be backed by the OAG's budget and personnel.
C. What can be done to mitigate risk?
There is no substitute for a careful legal review, but those in the lobby community should immediately review their client lists to determine whether any may be affected by HB 119. They should also consider adopting compliance procedures to screen new clients for the potential application of HB 119. Such a compliance program would include, at a minimum, asking potential clients about foreign ownership, affiliates, operations, and employees. For the reasons discussed above, it would also need to ask about the employment history of the client's founders.
In addition to the lobby community, businesses need to consider their own compliance with HB 119. Any business with operations in China needs to carefully consider whether its paid employees are permitted to speak to government officials in Texas. For that matter, even businesses with no Chinese operations need to consider the employment history of their founders, because running afoul of HB 119—as interpreted and applied by the OAG—can expose a business to an expensive investigation and lawsuit.
Footnotes
1. https://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2025/07/02/texas-louisiana-and-nebraska-enact-baby-fara-laws/
2. https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/89R/analysis/pdf/HB00119H.pdf#navpanes=0
3. Tex. Gov't Code § 305.003(a)(3); 305.030(b)
4. Tex. Gov't Code § 305.030(a)(2)(B)
5. Tex. Gov't Code § 305.030(a)(1)(E)
6. Tex. Gov't Code § 305.030(a)(2)(C)-(D)
7. Tex. Gov't Code § 305.030(a)(5)(A)(ii)
8. Tex. Gov't Code § 305.030(a)(3)(A)-(C)
9. Tex. Gov't Code § 350.003(a)(1)-(2)
10. The thresholds are adjusted for inflation each year, but in 2025, a person is not required to register unless he or she receives more than $1,930 or spends more than $970, for the purpose of lobbying, in a calendar quarter.
11. Tex. Gov't Code § 350.003(b-3); 1 Tex. Admin Code § 34.43(b)
12. Tex. Gov't Code § 350.003(a)(3)
13. For example, the Penal Code generally prohibits gifts to public servants over $50, but the lobby law permits registrants to give gifts of $500 each year. Compare Tex. Penal Code § 36.10(a)(6) with Tex. Gov't Code § 305.024(a)(2)(C); Tex. Penal Code § 36.10(a)(5).
14. Tex. Gov't Code § 350.030(b)
15. Tex. Gov't Code § 350.030(c)-(e)
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
