Quick Read: Competition Law Updates In Türkiye – March 2026

Insights

April 2026 – In March, the Turkish Competition Authority (“TCA”) significantly broadened its enforcement agenda. It announced the launch of comprehensive sector inquiries into both the artificial intelligence ecosystem and the cement industry, signalling a growing focus on data-driven markets and traditional sectors alike. At the same time, the TCA initiated a new wave of investigations spanning a wide range of industries, from food and insurance to banking and independent audit firms, demonstrating its continued commitment to scrutinising diverse markets.

Beyond these developments, the TCA recently published reasoned decisions addressed several notable and, in some cases, long-unseen issues. These include the re-emergence of fines imposed on company executives, the assessment of killer acquisition concerns in merger control, and further clarification on the circumstances under which a transaction may qualify as “gun-jumping”. This issue of Quick Read provides a concise summary of the most notable competition law developments in Türkiye.

Dive into March case updates

1. Total turnover or employee costs? Uncertainty persists in the TCA’s approach to fines

The TCA published its reasoned decision in the investigation concerning labour market practices of various pharmaceutical companies, which was concluded in September 2025 with significant administrative fines imposed on the undertakings involved.¹ One aspect stands out in the decision: the methodology used to calculate the fines. The Turkish Competition Board (“Board”) did not rely on the undertakings’ total turnover—the traditional basis for fine rates. Instead, considering the nature of the infringement—practices restricting competition in the labour market—it calculated the fine base by considering the proportion of employee costs within overall turnover. This is particularly noteworthy, given that some undertakings in the same case opted for settlement, resulting in the investigation being concluded at an earlier stage for those parties. Their fines, however, were calculated on the basis of their total turnover.

With this decision, the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the applicable turnover base in the Board’s labour market investigations persists. The issue, already a source of debate in previous cases, remains unresolved.² Indeed, the Board appears to have maintained its differentiated approach: while applying fines based on total turnover for undertakings that opted for settlement,³ it calculated fines for non-settling parties based on a reduced turnover figure, reflecting the share of employee costs. This divergence continues to raise important questions for both practitioners and undertakings navigating settlement strategies.

2. Gun-jumping or legitimate pre-closing conduct? The TCA draws the line

The Board recently assessed gun-jumping allegations concerning the acquisition of sole control over Provision, a financial technologies company, by another fintech company, DgpaysIT. The allegations centered on DgpaysIT’s involvement—prior to approval—in Provision’s card acquiring services, including participation in sales and marketing processes, submission of customer offers, and public statements allegedly implying a transfer of control. The Board ultimately concluded that no de facto transfer of control had taken place prior to clearance and, therefore, no administrative fine was warranted.⁴

In its assessment, the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of pre-closing communications and based its finding of no infringement on the following criteria:

• Investor communications: Data exchanges were limited to historical performance and investor-level information.
• Cooperation vs. integration: Interactions reflected project-based coordination for complementary technical solutions offered to the same clients.
• Transaction preparations: Information flows regarding employees and operations remained within the scope of technical alignment and deal preparation.
• No evidence of control: There was no evidence of influence over commercial strategy or exchange of competitively sensitive information.
• Closing intent: The parties explicitly acknowledged the need for Board approval and acted consistently with a delayed closing timeline.

This decision sends a clear message: not every pre-closing interaction amounts to gun-jumping. The Board recognises that investor communications, technical integration efforts, and transaction preparations may constitute legitimate conduct—provided they do not result in a de facto change of control. At the same time, the decision offers valuable practical guidance by clarifying the boundaries of permissible conduct in the pre-closing phase, an area that continues to draw close scrutiny in merger control practice.

3. “Killer acquisition” test under Turkish competition law: Volue/Smartpulse decision

In its decision approving the acquisition of Smartpulse, a cloud-based software provider supporting short-term electricity trading operations, by Volue, a global supplier of energy market software and services, the Board provided guiding assessments on whether the transaction constituted a “killer acquisition”.⁵ The Board concluded that the transaction does not raise killer acquisition concerns and based its assessment on the following key factors:

• No horizontal overlap: The parties’ activities do not directly overlap in the same market, indicating a limited risk of eliminating competition.
• Presence of alternative players: Competitors with similar technology, such as VTC, TeslaWare, and Presify, continue to operate in Smartpulse’s sector, making the exclusion of the technology from the market post-acquisition unlikely.
• Target’s development potential: Smartpulse’s R&D activities are expected to be supported by Volue’s financial strength and scale, suggesting the transaction strengthens rather than diminishes innovative capacity.
• Purpose and economic rationale of the transaction: The primary aim of the acquisition is to facilitate Smartpulse’s access to the European market and create complementary synergies between the parties.

Accordingly, the Board concluded that the transaction does not warrant intervention under the “killer acquisition” theory and, on the contrary, could lead to efficiency gains and support innovative capacity through the combination of complementary technologies.

4. Individual liability is back: The TCA targets executives again

The Board has dusted off a long-dormant enforcement tool, imposing a personal administrative fine on a company executive under the Regulation on Fines. This provision—which allows for fines of up to 5% of the entity’s penalty to be levied against managers or employees with a “decisive influence” on an infringement—has rarely been utilised until now.

The decision stems from the TCA’s 2025 investigation into motor vehicle driving schools in Aydın, Türkiye. While 38 undertakings opted for settlement and admitted to price-fixing cartel regarding driving license training fees,⁶ the investigation continued for those who did not settle, namely True Özel Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Tic. San. Ltd. Şti.⁷

What makes the decision particularly noteworthy is the extension of liability to the individual level after a long hiatus in the use of such powers. The Board found that company executive Serdar Kaplanoğlu played a decisive role in the formation and implementation of the infringement. According to the findings, he:

• pressured undertakings to join the price-fixing arrangement;
• conducted monitoring activities to ensure compliance with agreed prices;
• received payments linked to the enforcement of the cartel (as evidenced by bank records);
• played a central role in organising and sustaining the system, as reflected in onsite inspection findings and protocols.

Based on this evidence, the Board concluded that he exercised decisive influence over both the establishment and continuation of the infringement and imposed a personal administrative fine. This decision sends a strong signal: individual accountability in Turkish competition law enforcement is not merely theoretical. The Board appears ready to actively use its powers to hold executives personally responsible where they play a key role in anticompetitive conduct.

5. TCA takes action in the seed market

The TCA has concluded its investigation into undertakings active in the markets for hybrid industrial gherkin seeds and hybrid vegetable and fruit seeds, focusing on allegations of exchange of competitively sensitive information and, for certain undertakings, price-fixing. Within the scope of the investigation, 12 undertakings⁸ opted for settlement by admitting to the exchange of competitively sensitive information, as well as allegations that Nunhems Tohumculuk AŞ and Rijk Zwaan Tarım Ticaret Ltd. Şti. jointly determined their sales prices. For the four undertakings that did not settle, the Board imposed administrative fines totalling TRY 49 million (approx. EUR 936,573)⁹ at the end of the investigation process.¹⁰ Overall, including the settling parties, the total amount of administrative fines imposed in the case reached TRY 189 million (approx. EUR 3.6 million).

New Investigations and Sector Inquiries Announced

New Investigations:

• Google’s billing practices under investigation:¹¹ The TCA opened an investigation into Google’s billing practices and commercial operations for advertisers and advertising agency clients within its online advertising services. The investigation focuses on the fact that advertisers and agencies billed through Google Ireland are subject to withholding tax under Turkish tax law, whereas those billed through Türkiye are not. The TCA will assess whether this international billing structure and associated tax obligations create differential cost effects for certain undertakings within the same classification and whether these practices result in discriminatory outcomes that may constitute abuse of dominance. The investigation will examine in detail how Google classifies its advertiser and agency clients, whether such classifications are objective, how they are reflected in billing practices, and whether they produce any cost impacts or other discriminatory behaviour toward the classified clients.
• Haribo faces probe:¹² The TCA launched an investigation into Haribo, the producer of soft candies and gummies, over allegations that it abused its dominant position in the soft candy market by restricting competition, excluding rivals through de facto exclusivity practices, and interfering with resale prices at sales points.
• Competition investigation into health insurance market:¹³ The TCA opened an investigation into 19 undertakings operating in the health insurance market over allegations that they colluded to jointly set, increase, or maintain insurance premiums (prices); engaged in customer, geographic, or product allocation; shared competitively sensitive information such as prices, costs, or risk data; and potentially concluded exclusive agreements with health service providers.
• Independent audit and accounting sector investigation:¹⁴ Following a review of independent audit and accounting firms, including the so-called “Big Four”, and the association of undertakings to which they belong, the TCA has launched an investigation into 65 undertakings and association of undertakings over allegations of price-fixing and customer allocation in service (output) markets; agreements on employee recruitment and remuneration in labour (input) markets; information exchanges in both input and output markets; and adopting decisions with anti-competitive effects that restrict competition.

Sector Inquiries:

• Comprehensive sector inquiry into the cement industry:¹⁵ The TCA has initiated a sectoral inquiry into the cement industry to enable a more comprehensive analysis of market structure and firm conduct. The inquiry aims to identify factors affecting market structure, assess the competitive dynamics from both economic and legal perspectives, and support the protection and sustainability of competition. The findings will inform policy development and guide constructive actions in the sector.
• Sector inquiry into AI ecosystem:¹⁶ Recognising that technological developments and increased use of AI are shaping competition rules and market operations in new ways, and that mergers and acquisitions in AI are increasingly critical from a concentration control perspective, the TCA has launched a detailed inquiry of the AI ecosystem. The inquiry will analyse how the AI ecosystem is structured around foundational models, relationships across value chain layers, access to critical inputs, interactions between large tech companies and innovative start-ups, and the impact of data and computing power on competition. The aim is to identify structural trends and potential anti-competitive risks at an early stage and to guide policy-making and interventions to preserve a competitive environment.

Footnotes

^{1 Pharmaceutical Sector Labour Market (11.09.2025, 25-34/810-474).
2 Labour Market – I (26.07.2023, 23-34/649-218), Labour Market – II (27.02.2024, 24-10/170-66).
3 Abdi İbrahim (28.03.2024, 24-15/319-131), Bilim (15.08.2024, 24-33/782-329), Drogsan (15.08.2024, 24-33/807-341), Genveon (31.10.2024, 24-44/1029-439), Menarini (31.10.2024, 24-44/1030-440).
4 DgpaysIT/Provision (04.12.2025, 25-45/1123-631).
5 Volue/Smartpulse (02.10.2025, 25-37/885-520).
6 Aydın Driving Schools Settlement (24.07.2025, 25-27/652-399).
7 True Danışmanlık (06.11.2025, 25-41/1016-582).
8 (1) Bayer Tohumculuk ve Tarım Ltd. Şti., (2) Hazera Tohumculuk ve Ticaret AŞ, (3) HMCLAUSE Tohumculuk Tarım Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, (4) Multi Tohum Tarım Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, (5) Nunhems Tohumculuk AŞ, (6) Rijk Zwaan Tarım Ticaret Ltd. Şti., (7) Sakata Tarım Ürünleri ve Tohumculuk San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti., (8) Semillas Fito Tarım Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, (9) Syngenta Tarım Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, (10) Vilmorin Mikado Tohumculuk AŞ, (11) Yüksel Tohum Tarım Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, (12) Ticaret AŞ ve Rito Tohum AŞ.
9 For the purposes of this document, the exchange rate of EUR 1 = TRY 52.37 has been applied.}

^{10. Seed Sector (16.03.2026, 26-10/325-125).}

^{11 Google Billing Practices (05.03.2026, 26-08/233-M).
12 Haribo (05.03.2026, 26-08/238-M).
13 Health Insurance Market (16.03.2026, 26-10/298-M).
14 Independent Audit and Accounting Sector (29.01.2026, 26-03/91-M).
15 Cement Sector Inquiry (25.12.2025, 25-49/1219-M).
16  Artificial Intelligence Ecosystem Sector Inquiry (07.04.2026).}

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