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Factual background:
On 6 January 2026, the Pretoria High Court handed down a judgment in a case pertaining to insurance living annuity. The dispute concerned the proceeds of a living annuity policy taken out by the deceased, with competing beneficiary nominations advanced shortly before his death. The plaintiff (the widow) relied on a nomination signed by the deceased on 25 June 2021 in her favour, asserting it was the last valid nomination. The first defendant (the deceased's daughter) lodged a nomination dated 15 July 2021 after the deceased's death, asserting it reflected the deceased's final intention to nominate her as beneficiary. The insurer (the second defendant) sought the court's decision given the uncertainty over the correct beneficiary.
The parties accepted that the deceased had executed multiple beneficiary forms over time, sometimes through the first defendant acting under a general power of attorney dated 9 September 2019. Material common cause facts included the policy purchase in 2012; the 2019 power of attorney in favour of the first defendant; alternating nominations between the plaintiff and first defendant in 2019–2021; the deceased's own signing of the 25 June 2021 form naming the plaintiff; and the first defendant's 15 July 2021 form naming herself, submitted after death. The insurer withheld payment pending a court order declaring the entitled beneficiary.
Issues for resolution:
The court had to determine the following issues: whether the first defendant had authority under the power of attorney to sign beneficiary nomination forms; whether an agent may lawfully nominate herself as beneficiary; whether the 15 July 2021 nomination involved a misrepresentation or fraudulent misrepresentation; and whether any post-death submission/effecting of the nomination invalidated it under the policy terms.
Law considered by the court:
On authority, the court interpreted the wide power of attorney as authorising the agent to execute instruments in writing, which encompassed the insurer's beneficiary nomination form. On an agent benefiting, the court applied fiduciary principles articulated in the relevant authorities, emphasising that an agent may not ordinarily place herself in conflict or make a secret profit, save where there is free, informed consent of the principal after full disclosure. The court distilled these two principles: an agent can benefit from transactions on behalf of the principal; and such benefit is lawful where the principal knows and consents.
On misrepresentation, the court set out the elements: a false and wrongful representation made negligently or knowingly, causing patrimonial loss. As to the policy regime, Clause 10 obligated the insurer to pay the investment value to the beneficiary nominated by the policyholder at death, and in the absence of a nomination, to the deceased estate. The policy did not prescribe a rigid nomination procedure, and the use of a form was an administrative choice by the insurer that did not alter the substantive requirement being the proof that the deceased nominated a beneficiary prior to death.
Court's finding and reasons:
The court held the power of attorney authorised the first defendant to sign beneficiary nomination forms on the deceased's behalf, treating the form as an "instrument in writing". On the fiduciary issue, the court found the deceased knew and instructed nominations that would benefit the first defendant; accordingly, the agent's self-benefit was lawful due to the principal's knowledge and direction.
The court rejected the misrepresentation argument. It concluded that the crucial question under Clause 10 was whether there was proof that the deceased had nominated a beneficiary prior to death, not whether a particular administrative form bore a specific date or was duplicated or amended. The court treated the duplicated and amended form as proof that, prior to death, the deceased had nominated the first defendant, satisfying the policy's substantive requirement. The fact that the insurer only effected or processed the change after death did not invalidate the nomination because the policy did not require effecting prior to death; it required only that the nomination occur prior to death.
Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to prove invalidity of the nomination in favour of the first defendant, and the claim was dismissed with costs.
Conclusion:
This judgment underscores that, for living annuity beneficiary nominations, the decisive inquiry is whether there is reliable proof that the policyholder nominated the beneficiary prior to death, consistent with the policy wording, even if the insurer administratively processes or effects the change later. It confirms that a broad power of attorney can authorise an agent to execute nomination instruments, and that an agent may validly nominate herself where the principal acts with knowledge and consent, thereby avoiding a fiduciary conflict. Claims of misrepresentation will fail absent cogent proof of a false, wrongful representation causing loss, particularly where the policy's substantive requirement—proof of nomination before death—is met.
The decision is important for insurers and intermediaries because it clarifies that administrative formalities do not trump the substantive nomination requirement in policy terms, guides the treatment of post-death processing, and emphasises the significance of evidence demonstrating the policyholder's intention and instruction—especially when nominations are executed via agents under powers of attorney.
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