Abstract
Garnishee proceedings occupy a unique position within Nigeria's judgment enforcement framework. Unlike ordinary civil actions founded on pleadings, they constitute a special statutory procedure regulated principally by the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act1 (“SCPA”), designed to provide a swift and efficient means of enforcing monetary judgments. The summary character of garnishee proceedings has increasingly generated procedural questions regarding the extent to which general rules of civil procedure may be imported into the process, particularly where the governing statute is silent.
One such question concerns the propriety of deploying interrogatories as a means of compelling an alleged garnishee to disclose information relating to funds said to belong to a judgment debtor. While interrogatories have long been recognised within Nigerian civil procedure as a discovery mechanism intended to narrow issues for trial, prevent surprise and facilitate the fair determination of disputes founded on pleadings2, their compatibility with the statutory framework governing garnishee proceedings remains doubtful.
This article critically examines that question through the decisions of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Nigeria v. Ochife (2025)3 (“CBN v. Ochife”) and Abubakar v. Yar’Adua (2008)4(“Abubakar v Yar’Adua”). It argues that the omission of interrogatories from the SCPA is neither accidental nor inconsequential. Rather, when read alongside the summary nature of garnishee proceedings and the dispute-resolution mechanisms provided under sections 87 and 88 of the Act, it reflects a deliberate legislative intention to confine disputes concerning garnishee liability to affidavit evidence and, where necessary, a trial of issues or reference to a referee. The article concludes that permitting interrogatories in garnishee proceedings would introduce a pleadings-based discovery procedure into a statutory execution process, thereby undermining the speed, efficiency and limited scope that the legislature intended to preserve.
Introduction
The enforcement of a judgment is as significant as the judgment itself. A successful litigant derives little practical benefit from a favourable judgment unless the law provides an effective mechanism for securing its enforcement5. Among the recognised methods of enforcing monetary judgments under Nigerian law, garnishee proceedings remain the most frequently invoked because they enable a judgment creditor to attach debts due or accruing to the judgment debtor in the hands of a third party, commonly a bank or other financial institutions6.
Unlike ordinary civil proceedings commenced for the determination of substantive rights, garnishee proceedings are post-judgment execution proceedings. They are separate and distinct from the action that culminated in the judgment sought to be enforced and are governed principally by the provisions of the SCPA. The appellate courts have consistently described garnishee proceedings as sui generis, emphasising that they constitute a special statutory procedure intended to provide a speedy and efficient means of enforcing monetary judgments. Consequently, courts have repeatedly insisted on strict compliance with the procedure prescribed by the Act7.
The Equitable Origins of Interrogatories and Discovery
Interrogatories were historically embedded in the bill in equity for claimant’s bill to set out questions directed towards obtaining admissions or facts relevant to the claimant's case from the defendant8. The modern law of discovery is principally traceable to the English Court of Chancery and the jurisdiction of equity9. At common law, a party generally could not compel his opponent to disclose evidence or documents before trial10. Equity developed discovery as a means of overcoming that procedural limitation. It was an equitable proceeding brought to compel a person to disclose facts or documents material to an existing or contemplated legal proceeding so as to obtain information relevant to the applicant's case where that information was within the knowledge or possession of another person. Both procedures were originally equitable and discretionary. It is instructive that common law initially resisted both, but the advent of the Judicature Acts of 1873–1875 substantially fused the administration of common law and equity11. The historical pedigree of interrogatories demonstrates that they are creatures of adjudicatory procedure, developed to facilitate the ascertainment of facts and admissions in litigation. Their subsequent incorporation into common-law procedure and eventual integration into modern civil procedure did not transform them into an inherent incident of every form of judicial proceeding. Their applicability remains dependent upon the nature and statutory architecture of the proceedings in which they are sought to be employed.
Properly employed, interrogatories assist in narrowing issues for trial12, obtaining fact-in-issue and other information from opposing parties in the suit, thereby preventing surprise and reducing unnecessary expense. Their function is therefore intrinsically connected with proceedings founded upon pleadings and contested issues of fact, during pre-trial or hearing settings.
The increasing resort to garnishee proceedings, particularly against financial institutions and public institutions, has, however, raised a novel procedural question. Where a judgment creditor is uncertain whether an alleged garnishee holds funds belonging to the judgment debtor, can the judgment creditor invoke interrogatories to compel the garnishee to disclose such information before liability is determined? Put differently, does the silence of the SCPA on interrogatories permit the application of the general rules governing discovery, or does the special statutory character of garnishee proceedings exclude their operation?
This question has assumed renewed significance following the Supreme Court’s decision in CBN v. Ochife, which reaffirmed the summary and statutebound nature of garnishee proceedings and emphasised the evidential burden resting upon a garnishee who disputes liability. When considered alongside the Supreme Court’s exposition of the nature and purpose of interrogatories in Abubakar v. Yar’Adua, where the apex Court observed that:
“The main aim of interrogatories is to uphold the case of the party interrogating and destroy that of his opponent. Interrogatories elicit admissions from the opponent and admissions are most valuable for determining liability… Although interrogatories which meet with positive answers save the burden of proof placed on the plaintiff, a plaintiff cannot by sheer craftiness or artifice in administering the process of interrogatories, shift the burden of proof on the defendant. That will be reversing the trend of our adjectival law in section 136, 137 and 139 of the Evidence Act.”13
A principled basis emerges for determining whether interrogatories have any legitimate role within garnishee proceedings.
This article contends that they do not. It argues that interrogatories are fundamentally incompatible with, and structurally asymmetric to, the statutory framework governing garnishee proceedings. The SCPA provides a self-contained mechanism for resolving disputes relating to garnishee liability through affidavit evidence and, where necessary, the trial of issues or reference to a referee under sections 87 and 88 of the Act. Importing interrogatories into that statutory framework would do more than merely alter the procedure: it would impermissibly enlarge the scope of judgment execution beyond the limits contemplated by the legislature, while simultaneously subverting the expeditious character that is intrinsic to, and indispensable for, the effective operation of garnishee proceedings.
Footnotes
1 Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA), Cap. S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004.
2 See Famuyide v. R.C. Irving & Co. Ltd. (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt.256) 639 where court held that in essence, an interrogatory is aimed at ascertaining the real issue, so as to prevent surprise. It also enables the person interrogating to reveal the case of the person interrogated, or to elicit facts in support of the case of the person interrogating.
3 12 NWLR (Pt. 2000) 1
4 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1
5 See Uzo v. Nnalimo (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 237 where the Court of Appeal held that the court will not deprive a judgment creditor of the fruit of his judgment.
6 See GTB Plc v. Innoson Nig Ltd (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1591) 181.
7 See United Bank for Africa Plc v. Ubokolo (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1210) 67; Central Bank of Nigeria v. Okef Nigeria Ltd. (2014) LPELR-23162(CA); Heritage Bank Ltd. v. Interlagos Oil Ltd. (2018) LPELR-44801(CA); Sterling Bank Plc v. Gamau (2019) LPELR47067(CA).
8 Equity and Law: Fusion and Fission (Cambridge University Press 2019) 280.
9 William S Holdsworth, A History of English Law 6 (vol V, Methuen 1924) 278-28
10 William S Holdsworth, A History of English Law (vol IX, Methuen 1926) 347-350
11 FH Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (University of Michigan Press 1953) 79-80.
12 See Tewogbade v. Agbabiaka (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt. 705) 38 where the Court of Appeal held that Interrogatories are generally directed to the evidence by which the party interrogating desires to establish such facts at the trial.
13 (Pp. 161, paras. A-E; 162, paras. A-B)
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