The Law & Politics Of Presidential Pardon: A Jurisprudential Inquiry Into Mercy, Finality, And Power.

ABSTRACT

The power of executive clemency, particularly the presidential pardon, is among the most profound and controversial powers in a constitutional democracy. It is a sovereign power, inherited from monarchical traditions, that sits uneasily within a modern framework governed by the separation of powers and the rule of law. This article explores the complex legal and political jurisprudence of the presidential pardon, drawing a comparative analysis between the United States of America and Nigeria. It specifically interrogates the inherent constitutional tension in Nigeria between the President's power of mercy under Section 175 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) and the finality of the Supreme Court's judgments under Section 235. Through an examination of case law, constitutional provisions, and political philosophy, this article analyses whether clemency is a legal remedy or a political tool, its justiciability, and its theological-philosophical underpinnings, as illustrated by the strange case of United States v. Wilson. It argues that while the pardon does not legally undermine judicial finality, its political misuse can fatally erode public faith in the very concept of justice. Ultimately, the pardon power remains a double-edged sword: a necessary constitutional safety valve for mercy, yet a perpetual instrument of political discretion that tests the boundaries of law itself.

1. INTRODUCTION

In any system of ordered liberty, the final judgment of its highest court is intended to be precisely that: final. It is the 'full stop' at the end of a legal sentence, the point where res judicata becomes absolute and the authority of the law is made manifest. In Nigeria, this principle is enshrined in Section 235 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) ("the Constitution"), which states that "No appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Court."¹ Yet, the same Constitution, in Section 175, grants the President a quasi-monarchical power, the prerogative of mercy, to pardon, reprieve, or commute the sentences of those convicted of federal offences.² This juxtaposition creates a profound constitutional paradox: How can a judgment be "final" if an executive, through an act of grace, can nullify its consequences?

This paradox is not unique to Nigeria. In the United States, the President's 'Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons' under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution is similarly broad and, by tradition, almost entirely insulated from judicial or legislative review.³ This power of clemency, a relic of the divine right of kings, forces a confrontation between two fundamental, yet often contradictory, virtues: Justice and Mercy. When a president pardons persons convicted by competent courts, whether it be President Joe Biden's pardon of his son, Hunter Biden, in the US, or the 2022 pardon of former governors Joshua Dariye and Jolly Nyame by President Muhammed Buhari in Nigeria, the public is forced to ask: Is this an act of profound wisdom and national healing, or a cynical political transaction that holds the rule of law in contempt? It is instructive to note that a president's power to grant pardon is not only in respect of persons already convicted of offences, but also includes persons concerned or connected with offences. Sequel to the resignation of the United States' President Richard Nixon from office effective on 9th August, 1974, as a result of the 'watergate' scandal, his successor, President Gerald Ford, by Proclamation 4311 made on 8th September, 1974, granted him a full and unconditionalpardon for any crimes that he might have committed against theUnited Statesas president.⁴ In May 1982, President Shehu Shagari granted a full pardon to Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, which enabled him to return as a free citizen to Nigeria from exile in Cote d'Ivoire more than twelve years after the Nigerian civil war.

This article delves into the law and politics of this extraordinary power. It first clarifies the conceptual distinctions between clemency and pardon before analysing the constitutional framework in Nigeria and the US. The central inquiry will focus on the six critical questions as follows:

1. The tension between mercy (S. 175) and finality (S. 235).
2. Clemency as a legal remedy versus a political tool.
3. The philosophical implications of refusing a pardon, as seen in United States v. Wilson.
4. The theological and monarchical roots of this secular power.
5. The justiciability, or lack thereof, of the pardon power.
6. The societal effect of clemency on public faith in the judiciary.

This article argues that the pardon power, while philosophically essential for a humane legal system, operates almost entirely in the realm of political prerogative. It is a constitutional construct that does not legally reverse a court's finding of guilt but politically forgives it, leaving its legitimacy not to the courts but to the judgment of history and the electorate.⁵ It is most likely that the pardon granted to his predecessor was a major factor in President Gerald Ford's loss of the presidential election in 1976 to the then little-known Governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter.

2. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS: CLEMENCY AND PARDON

To analyse the power, one must first define its terms. Often used interchangeably, "clemency" and "pardon" have distinct legal meanings.

Clemency is the genus, the broad, overarching term for the executive's power to grant mercy. It is the umbrella concept that encompasses all forms of executive leniency.⁶

Pardon is the most comprehensive species of clemency. A full pardon is an act of grace that completely forgives the crime. Its effect, as famously described in the US Supreme Court case Ex parte Garland, is that 'it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence.'⁷ While modern jurisprudence has retreated from this absolute "blotting out" concept (a pardon does not, for instance, erase the fact of the conviction, which can still be considered in other proceedings), it does restore all civil rights lost as a result of the conviction, such as the right to vote or hold public office.

In the case of Okongwu v. State,⁸ Akpata, JCA (as he then was) made a profound pronouncement on the effect of pardon on a convicted person as follows:

"It must be noted that what has been confiscated from a person as a result of his conviction for the offence committed by him will not necessarily be returned to him by reason of the pardon. For instance, if a person is found guilty of embezzlement of public funds and certain immovable and or movable properties allegedly acquired by him with the ill-gotten gains and confiscated by the Government, such properties will not be returned to him because of the pardon. It will be wrong therefore to deny such a person the opportunity of proving his innocence by way of an appeal, so that if he succeeds, it is not only his innocence that will be restored, the properties seized will also be returned to him. Pardon unlike an acquittal is not total. In effect a person who has been convicted and granted a pardon is still at liberty to appeal against such a conviction.

That the appellant in this case was convicted is true, regardless of the pardon. It is an antithesis of truth to indulge in the fiction that pardon wipes out the offence or conviction. What pardon does is, in my view, to wipe away the stigma of the conviction and not the conviction itself. It contains no notion that the person to whom the pardon is extended never had in fact committed the offence. It is a matter of forgiveness. If, indeed, the fiction of pardon blotting out the offence or conviction is valid, this fiction should not prevent the appellant from having his conviction 'blotted out' in reality by a competent court.

Other forms of clemency include:⁹

1. Commutation: A reduction of a sentence (e.g., from death to life imprisonment, or from 20 years to 10).¹⁰ It does not forgive the crime or restore civil rights.
2. Reprieve: A temporary postponement of the execution of a sentence, most commonly used in death penalty cases to allow for further appeals or review.
3. Remission: A reduction or cancellation of a financial penalty (a fine).¹¹

In both Nigeria (S. 175) and the US (Art. II), the executive is vested with the full spectrum of these clemency powers. The pardon, however, remains the most absolute and, therefore, the most politically potent.

3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLASH: MERCY (S. 175) VS. JUDICIAL FINALITY (S. 235)

The primary constitutional dilemma in Nigeria is the apparent conflict between Sections 175 and 235 of the Constitution. Does the President's power of mercy constitute an exception to judicial finality, or does it fatally undermine it?

Section 235 (Judicial Finality): 'No appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any determination of the Supreme Court.' Section 175 (Presidential Pardon): 'The President may... (a) grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions...'

The jurisprudential answer is that the two sections do not conflict because they operate in different spheres. This is a crucial distinction.

1. Judicial Power vs. Executive Power: Section 235 secures the judicial power. It means that within the judicial branch, and in terms of law, the Supreme Court's declaration of guilt and its interpretation of the law are final. No other court, tribunal, or administrative body can review or overturn that judgment. The pardon power under Section 175 is an executive power. It does not sit as a "higher court of appeal."
2. Challenging Guilt vs. Forgiving Consequences: A pardon does not "reverse" the Supreme Court's judgment in the way an appeal would. It does not declare the convict "not guilty" or that the Supreme Court was wrong in law. On the contrary, a pardon proceeds from the assumption of guilt (or at least, the finality of the conviction). It is an act of grace that forgives the consequences of that guilt. As US Chief Justice William H. Taft (a former President)¹² noted, a pardon 'is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.'¹³
3. Separation of Powers: This is the separation of powers in action. The Judiciary's role is to adjudicate ("This person is guilty"). The Executive's role is to enforce the law and its penalties ("This person must be punished"). The power of clemency is a constitutionally prescribed check on the executive's own function of enforcement. The President, in granting a pardon, is essentially deciding not to enforce the penalty that the judiciary has imposed.

Therefore, Section 175 constitutes a constitutional exception to the consequences of judicial finality, not an undermining of its authority. The judgment of guilt stands as a final historical and legal fact; its sting (the punishment) is merely drawn by an act of sovereign grace. The tension is not a legal contradiction but a deliberate constitutional design, a "safety valve" to allow mercy to temper the rigid finality of justice.

4. PARDON AS A LEGAL REMEDY OR POLITICAL INSTRUMENT?

If the pardon is a constitutional tool, what is its purpose? Is it a high-minded legal remedy to correct injustice, or a base political instrument for dispensing patronage? The answer, as demonstrated by history, is that it is fundamentally both.

As a Constitutional Safeguard (The Ideal): Philosophically, the pardon power exists as the final safeguard against the fallibility of the justice system. The law, in its quest for universal application, can be a blunt instrument. As Aristotle argued in Nicomachean Ethics, "equity" (epieikeia) is required to correct the law where it is defective due to its universality.¹⁴ Clemency is the ultimate expression of this equity. It is intended to be used in cases such as:

1. Miscarriages of Justice: Where new evidence proves innocence, but all judicial appeals have been exhausted.
2. Disproportionate Sentencing: Where the "letter of the law" has produced a sentence that is morally unconscionable.
3. Post-Conviction Rehabilitation: To recognise an individual's profound transformation and service to society after conviction.
4. National Reconciliation: As seen in President Ford's pardon of Nixon, the stated aim was to end the "long national nightmare" of Watergate and allow the country to move forward.¹⁵ Also, President Shehu Shagari granted a full pardon to Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, more than 12 years after the bloody and bitter Nigerian civil war.

As a Political Tool (The Reality): In practice, the pardon power is one of the most political and discretionary powers a president wields. It is often exercised not for justice, but for political ends.

In the US: President Bill Clinton's 11th-hour pardon of financier Marc Rich, whose ex-wife, Denise Rich, was a major Democratic Party donor, was widely condemned as a potential quid pro quo.¹⁶ The pardon was issued on Clinton's last day in office, against the strong advice of the Justice Department, which was still actively pursuing Rich.¹⁷ This raises a core question: If the pardon power is absolute, does the president's motive matter? And if that motive is corrupt, does the Constitution offer any remedy for a "legal" act performed for an "illegal" or "unethical" reason?

President Donald Trump on the other hand, used the pardon power extensively for political allies, particularly those convicted in connection with investigations into his own administration. Pardons for figures like Roger Stone, Paul Manafort, and Michael Flynn who had refused to cooperate with investigators, raised a more severe question: Can the pardon power be used to obstruct justice? Does it create a moral hazard, allowing a president to reward loyalty and silence potential witnesses, thereby insulating himself from investigation?¹⁸ This use transforms the pardon from a tool of mercy into a shield for the executive and a weapon against co-equal branches of government.

In Nigeria: The power has been used with similar controversy. The 2013 pardon of former Bayelsa State Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha by President Goodluck Jonathan was seen as a blatant act of political patronage for his former boss. More recently, the 2022 pardon of former Governors Joshua Dariye (Plateau) and Jolly Nyame (Taraba), both convicted of multi-billion-naira frauds by President Muhammadu Buhari, on the advice of the Council of State, was met with widespread outrage.¹⁹ These men were pardoned while their cases were still part of the anti-corruption crusade championed by the same administration.

This dual-nature is the power's original sin. Because it is a discretionary act of mercy, it is inherently unequal. Justice is supposed to be blind; mercy is necessarily selective. When that selection appears to align perfectly with the President's political interests, it ceases to look like mercy and appears, as the philosopher Kant might argue, as an affront to the very idea of law, undermining the "categorical imperative" that justice be applied universally. ²⁰

5. THE STRANGE CASE OF REFUSAL: UNITED STATES V. WILSON

The deep philosophical nature of the pardon is most brilliantly illuminated by the "strange case of George Wilson," which culminated in the 1833 US Supreme Court decision in United States v. Wilson.²¹ Wilson was convicted of robbery and sentenced to death. President Andrew Jackson issued a full pardon, but Wilson refused to accept it.

The court was faced with a bizarre question: Can a pardon, an act of sovereign grace, be forced upon an unwilling recipient?

In United States v Wilson (supra), Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, ruled that "A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it on him."²² The reasoning of Chief Justice John Marshall was rooted in English common law, conceptualising a pardon not as a public proclamation but as a private deed. This was reaffirmed in Burdick v. United States, where the Court held that a witness could refuse a pardon (which would have nullified his right to plead the Fifth Amendment) because accepting it would carry an "imputation of guilt."²³ The US position, therefore, upholds individual autonomy: the state cannot force a person to be forgiven.

The Nigerian Context: An Open Question. The Constitution is silent on the question of acceptance. If a convict on death row at the Supreme Court's final order (per S. 235) were to refuse a presidential pardon (per S. 175), what would happen?

Nigerian courts would likely look to common law and comparative jurisprudence, facing a choice between two competing views:

1. The Wilson View (Pardon as a Private Act): A court could adopt Marshall's reasoning, holding that a pardon is a "deed" or "gift" that requires acceptance. In this sense, the dignity and autonomy of the individual are paramount. The convict, like George Wilson, retains the ultimate power to choose his fate. In this scenario, the refusal of the pardon simply means the executive's "offer" is void, and the final order of the Supreme Court under S. 235 stands.
2. The Perovich View (Pardon as a Public Act): A later US Supreme Court case, Biddle v. Perovich, offered a different philosophy. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in a case about a commutation (which the prisoner also rejected), argued that a pardon is not a "private act of grace" but a public act of state.²⁴ It is a "determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by" a different outcome. In this view, the "private consent of the convict is not material." If a Nigerian court adopted this "public act" theory, it could rule that a pardon is a sovereign proclamation that takes effect regardless of the convict's wishes.

The Wilson case and the religious tract based on it expose the philosophical core: Is mercy a transaction or a proclamation? The US view holds it as a transaction, requiring two parties. This preserves individual autonomy, but as the tract implies, it also gives the individual the "foolish" power to reject salvation. The "public act" view sees it as a sovereign proclamation, an exercise of state power for the public good, to which individual consent is irrelevant.

6. THE THEOLOGICAL ECHO: DIVINE AUTHORITY OR SECULAR CONSTRUCT?

The historical and philosophical roots of the Prerogative of Mercy are deeply intertwined with the concept of divine forgiveness. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the sovereign's power to pardon was seen as a terrestrial reflection of God's power to forgive sins, a concept known as the fountain of mercy. The very case of George Wilson inspired a well-known religious tract that makes this parallel explicit, drawing a direct line between the rejection of the presidential pardon and the rejection of God's pardon through Jesus Christ.

This religious interpretation posits that just as George Wilson was a 'fool' for rejecting a pardon that saved his human life, so too is the person who rejects God's pardon and risks eternal separation. This moral and religious framing raises a profound question for secular constitutional law: Can mercy in a secular constitution truly be secular, or does it unconsciously mimic divine forgiveness?

The constitutional power to grant pardon, particularly in the US, is a secular construct of state sovereignty, yet its function, to grant forgiveness and restore, mirrors the theological concept of grace. While the US Constitution explicitly bars religious tests for office, the very idea of a single executive possessing the power to forgive, independent of the judiciary, suggests a continuation of a moral authority that transcends mere legal construct. The political jurisprudence of clemency, therefore, is perpetually shadowed by its theological ancestry, serving as a reminder that the power to pardon is not just about legal technicality, but about the moral and political legitimacy of the state to offer redemption.

7. THE QUESTION OF JUSTICIABILITY: AN UNFETTERED POWER?

If pardons can be so politically motivated, can they be challenged in court? Is the misuse of S. 175 reviewable, or is it, like S. 235's finality, insulated from judicial scrutiny?

The US Position: A "Political Question" In the United States, the pardon power is one of the most impregnable "political questions." The Supreme Court, from Ex parte Garland onwards, has held the power to be "unlimited," "plenary," and not subject to legislative or judicial control.²⁵ The only limit specified in the Constitution is that it cannot be used in cases of impeachment.

While some scholars have argued for limited review, for instance, if a pardon violated the Bill of Rights (e.g., a "whites only" pardon)²⁶ or was procured through bribery. The courts have almost universally refused to intervene. The check on the pardon power in the US is not legal; it is political (impeachment, or the judgment of the voters).

The Nigerian Position: A Crack in the Armour? Nigeria's S. 175(1) grants the power, but S. 175(2) adds a procedural layer not present in the US Constitution:

'The powers of the President under subsection (1) of this section shall be exercised by him after consultation with the Council of State.'

This "consultation" clause is the only potential avenue for judicial review.

1. Review of Procedure Review of Merit: A Nigerian court would almost certainly refuse to review the merit of a pardon (i.e., whether the convict "deserved" it). This is a classic political question. However, a court might be willing to review the procedure. If it could be proven that the President did not consult the Council of State at all, a court could theoretically declare the pardon void for failing to meet a constitutional procedural requirement. In the case of Obidike v. State²⁷ Olagunju, JCA (as he then was) held that "The rationale behind granting pardon to a convict of capital offence while his appeal against his conviction is pending does not betray an acquaintance with the law and raises serious moral and legal issues which do not fall to be canvassed within the scope of this appeal."
2. What is "Consultation"? The courts have generally interpreted "consultation" as non-binding. The President must ask for advice, but he is not required to follow ²⁸ Thus, even if the Council of State unanimously advised against the pardons of Dariye and Nyame, the President was constitutionally not bound by the advice and, therefore, was free to ignore the same. This makes the check extremely weak. However, public sentiment over presidential pardons is seemingly shaping an unofficial, consultative framework. A compelling illustration is Nigeria's recent revision of its presidential pardon list. ²⁹ Initially comprising 175 individuals, the list underwent significant modification following widespread public and institutional scrutiny and condemnation. ³⁰ President Tinubu's adviser, Bayo Onanuga, confirmed that individuals convicted of serious crimes were removed from the pardon list, while others had their sentences commuted. ³¹ The executive's response under the Bola Tinubu administration signals a recalibration influenced not by formal advisory/consultative panels, but by the force of collective reasoning and civic engagement. This presents a de facto consultation process, where public discourse operates to pressure the executive toward greater prudence.

Ultimately, in Nigeria as in the US, the president's power to grant a pardon is almost entirely insulated from judicial review. It is not Section 235 of the Constitution that insulates the pardon; it is the nature of the power itself as a discretionary executive function under Section 175 of the Constitution. This is where the political reality legal theory. The power is "political" in the truest sense: its exercise is governed by political will, and its only check is the political process.

8. SOCIETAL IMPACT: DOES MERCY ERODE THE RULE OF LAW?

This brings us to the final and most critical question. When the public sees high-profile, politically-connected individuals, convicted of corruption after years of litigation culminating in a final Supreme Court judgment-walk free due to a presidential pardon, what is the effect?

It is corrosive. This is where the legal distinction between "forgiving a sentence" and "overturning a judgment" collapses in the public mind.

1. Erosion of Judicial Legitimacy: To the layperson, the "finality" of S. 235 is The message sent is that the Supreme Court is merely the penultimate step for the poor, while the final step for the powerful is a political appeal to the President.
2. Weakening Deterrence: The pardon of Dariye and Nyame, for example, was seen as a devastating blow to Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies. It signals that even if they succeed in the long, arduous process of prosecution, their work can be undone with the stroke of a pen for political reasons.
3. Public Cynicism: It reinforces the perception of a two-tiered justice system: one for the rich and connected, and the other for everyone else. This breeds cynicism and contempt for the rule of law.

This is the ultimate paradox. The pardon power is intended to provide a humane "safety valve" that bolsters the law's legitimacy by preventing it from becoming an instrument of cold, unfeeling rigidity. But when it is wielded not for the exceptionally deserving but for the exceptionally connected, it achieves the precise opposite. It makes the law itself seem like a foolish, arbitrary game.

The philosophical dilemma is this: Law without mercy loses its humanity, but mercy without justice loses its legitimacy. A system of pure, rigid law (as Kant might prefer) is brittle and can be tyrannical. But a system where mercy is perceived as a purchasable commodity is not a system of law at all; it is a system of power.

9. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the presidential pardon power stands as one of the most puzzling and consequential features of constitutional governance. This article has unpacked its legal, philosophical, and political dimensions, revealing a power that is both ancient in origin and deeply modern in its implications. While clemency offers a vital counterbalance to the rigidity of legal finality, it remains largely insulated from judicial oversight and driven by executive discretion. The six questions explored, ranging from mercy versus finality, to the societal trust in judicial outcomes, highlight the complex terrain this power occupies. Ultimately, the pardon does not erase guilt in the eyes of the law; it reframes it in the language of "political forgiveness." Its legitimacy, therefore, is not anchored in legal doctrine but in public perception, historical reflection, and democratic accountability. As societies evolve and demand greater transparency from their leaders, the exercise of clemency must also adapt to clamours by critics alluding to encouragement of crime, or protection of the rich from the reach of the law, or erosion of the rule of law. Whether viewed as a moral necessity or a political indulgence, the power to grant pardon will continue to provoke debate, challenge assumptions, and test the boundaries between law and leadership.

Footnotes

1 Theophilus Ochonogor is a Partner at Alliance Law Firm, Lagos, Nigeria, while Joshua Olewu and Daniel Anagu are Associates in the same law firm.

2 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (CFRN 1999), s 235.

3 US Constitution, Art II, s 2, cl

4 Pardon_of_Richard_Nixon, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0238/1126646.pdf accessed on 14th November, 2015.

5 It is widely believed that the pardon granted his predecessor was a major factor in President Gerald Ford's loss of the presidential election in 1976 to the then little-known Governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter.

6 Andrew Novak, 'Transparency and Comparative Executive Clemency: Global Lessons for Pardon Reform in the United States' (2016) 49 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 817, pg 819.

7 Ex parte Garland 71 US (4 Wall) 333 (1866), 380.

8 (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 44) 721, 736.

9 Andrew Novak, 'Transparency and Comparative Executive Clemency: Global Lessons for Pardon Reform in the United States' (2016) 49 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 817, pg 819.

10 Section 175(c), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended).

11 Section 175(d), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended).

12 William Howard Taft, EBSCO https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/william-howard-taft accessed 29 October 2025.

13 Ex parte Grossman 267 US 87, 120 (1925) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/267/87/#p120 accessed 29 October 2025.

14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Book V, Ch 10).

15 Gerald R Ford, 'Presidential Proclamation 4311, Granting a Pardon to Richard Nixon' (8 September 1974).

16 Margaret Colgate Love, 'The Twilight of the Pardon Power' (2001) 100(3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1169 https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?params=/context/jclc/article/7372/&path_info=1003_1169.Love.pdf accessed 29 October 2025.

17 See 'Clinton's Last-Day Clemency:' The Washington Post (Washington, 15 February 2001) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/01/21/clintons-last-day-clemency-benefits-176/d7e3ed9b-853f-4cdd-a5d4-4f9037f832c3/ accessed 29 October 2025.

18 Protect Democracy, Checking the Pardon Power: Constitutional Limitations and Options for Preventing Abuse (Grant Tudor & Justin Florence, April 2024) https://protectdemocracy.org/wp content/uploads/2024/04/Checking-Pardons-040924.pdf accessed 29 October 2025.

19 The Street Journal, 'FG releases list of 162 convicts pardoned by Buhari' https://thestreetjournal.org/fg-releases-list-of-162-convicts-pardoned-by-buhari/ accessed 29 October 2025.

20 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press 1996) 6:331-337 (arguing that the 'right to pardon' is the 'most slippery' of all, as it implies that justice itself is not an overriding duty).

21 United States v Wilson 32 US (7 Pet) 150 (1833).

22 United States v. Wilson (1883) https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep032/usrep032150/usrep032150.pdf

23 Burdick v United States 236 US 79 (1915). See also Burdick v. United State (1915) 236 U.S. 79. Available at https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep236/usrep236079/usrep236079.pdf

24 Biddle v Perovich 274 US 480 (1927), 486.

25 Ex parte Garland (n 4) 380.

26 Schick v Reed 419 US 256 (1974), 266 (noting the power cannot be exercised 'in a manner that would otherwise be unconstitutional').

27 (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 743) 601 at 642A-B.

28 See Plateau State v A G Federation (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt 967) 346, where the Supreme Court discussed the nature of 'consultation' in other contexts, generally holding it to mean advice is not binding.

29 The State House, Abuja, 'Details of the Presidential Pardon and Clemency' (11 October 2025) https://statehouse.gov.ng/details-of-the-presidential-pardon-and-clemency/ accessed 3 November 2025.

30 Stephen Angbulu and others, 'Tinubu revokes pardon for Sanda, 140 high-profile inmates' Punch (30 October 2025) https://punchng.com/tinubu-revokes-pardon-for-sanda-140-high-profile-inmates/?amp accessed 3 November 2025

31 Ibid.

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