INTRODUCTION
One Nation One Election (For Short- 'ONOE') is a proposal in India where election for theLok Sabha, that is Lower house (popularly known as the Peoples' House) of the Parliament of India, and all State legislative assemblies will be held at the same time. The idea, also known as simultaneouselections, proposes alignment or syncronisation of theelectioncycles of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies.
THE IDEA
The idea of "ONOE " refers to the concept of holding all major elections (such as national, state, and local) simultaneously across India. Currently, these elections are conducted at different times, leading to multiple electoral processes throughout the year. The main objective behind the idea of "One Nation, One Election" is to consolidate these elections into a single event, thus reducing the frequency of elections and the costs associated with them. It is not out of place to mention that South Africa, Sweden, Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, The Philippines, and Japan undertake simultaneous elections. Further, it is interesting to note that the simultaneous elections are not new to India. Elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies were conducted simultaneously from 1951 to 1967. The first general election to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies were held together in 1951-52, a practice that continued for three subsequent general elections in 1957, 1962, and then in 1967. But this cycle of simultaneous elections was disrupted thereafter due to the premature dissolution of some State Legislative Assemblies.
The argument in favour of ONOE is that i) it will make the election process cost effective as holding such elections at the same time will save substantial amount of taxpayers' money and the same can be directed towards more demanding and productive sectors of the economy such as education and health, ii) It is further averred by the proponents that ONOE is more likely to result in enhanced voter turnout, iii) Elections held every now and then hinder efficient governance where the government officials and elected representatives especially ministers in the government are most of the time preoccupied with their election campaigns across the States. iv) Under ONOE elected representatives will have a longer uninterrupted term in office so that they devote more time on policy formulation and development and resultantly there will be less frequency of election campaigns as such this can help bring longer term policy making rather than short term vote gaining strategies. v) Dissolution of state assembly before 5 years will act as a deterrent for the incumbent government as well as the party imposing President's rule as no party would like to go for re-election within a short span of time.
The Critics and Opposition argue that i) the bills undermine India's federal structure and raises concerns about autonomy of states. It is argued that federalism could be weakened as simultaneous elections might prioritise national issues over state-specific concerns, potentially diluting state autonomy and hence the idea of ONOE violates the basic structure of the Constitution of India (For short-'COI'). Every government, be it at the Centre and in the States, has a Constitutional right to complete its fixed term of five years and the fundamental flaw with the proposal is that if the government loses the confidence of the House, whether it is the Lok Sabha or a State Assembly, the election that would take place subsequently would be for the remaining period and not the fixed five-year term. In other words, if the government loses power after four years, the next government would be elected only for one year and this is contrary to the basic feature of the Constitution as how will people, in the course of one year, judge whether a government has performed or not. ii) It is further argued that the simultaneous elections from 1952-67 were a mere coincidence rather than a mandate of the Constitution and further that Simultaneous election will reduce democratic accountability as India is a big country with many states, each having its own needs and issues and holding all elections at the same time might not address the unique concerns of each state. iii) It is also a concern that there would be no debate on issues pertaining to a State, and national issues would take centre stage if the idea of ONOE was implemented.
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The key existing Constitutional and other statutory provisions relating to elections for the Lok Sabha (House of People), Vidhan Sabhas (State Legislative Assemblies), Panchayats and Municipalities:-
Constitutional Provisions
Articles 83(2)1 and 172(1)2 of the COI provide for the maximum duration of the House of the People and State Legislative Assemblies, respectively. These articles provide that unless sooner dissolved, Assemblies shall continue for five years from the date of their first meeting and no longer. The term of the House can be extended for a limited period only if a proclamation of emergency is in operation.
Part VIII, comprising Articles 239 to 242 of the COI, deals with 'The Union Territories'. Article 239-A 3 of the COI stipulates the creation of local Legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union Territories with special reference to the Union Territory of Puducherry. Article 239- AA 4 of the COI. is a special provision with respect to the National Capital Territory of Delhi ("NCT of Delhi"), which provides for the governance of the NCT of Delhi.
Statutory Provisions
Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, elections to a House can be held anytime within six months preceding the date of the scheduled dissolution on completion of the five-year term. Amendments in this Act are required to alter the fixed term of assemblies and align election schedules.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS: Key amendments proposed in the Constitution Amendment Bill for ONOE:
One Nation, One Election 'The Constitution 129th Amendment Bill 2024': The first bill proposes adding Article 82A (1-6) to the COI to align the terms of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies for holding simultaneous elections.
Under Article 82A (1), the President will have the power to enforce the proposed changes on the first sitting of the Lok Sabha.
Article82A (2) states that after the appointed date, the terms of all state assemblies will end alongside the Lok Sabha's five-year term. This means that some state assemblies may see their terms curtailed to enable synchronised elections.
Article 82A (3) will empower the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct general elections to the Lok Sabha and all legislative assemblies simultaneously.
Article 82A (4) defines simultaneous elections as those conducted for both the Lok Sabha and all state assemblies together.
Article 82A (5) in special circumstances, allows the Election commission of India to defer an assembly election if holding it alongside Lok Sabha elections is deemed impractical. The Election Commission can recommend this to the President, who may then declare a separate date for that particular state assembly election.
Article 82A (6), states that if an assembly election is deferred, the new term of that assembly will still align with the end of the Lok Sabha's full term.
The second bill, One Nation, One Election,The Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2024, brings necessary changes to laws governing Union Territories as UTs operate under a governance structure distinct from states, requiring separate provisions to ensure their elections can also align with the proposed simultaneous electoral system.
Article 83 of the Constitution of India deals with the duration of Houses of Parliament, specifically stating that the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) is not subject to dissolution, while the House of the People (Lok Sabha) has a term of five years. The Parliament can extend the period by law for up to one year at a time during a Proclamation of Emergency, but this extension cannot exceed six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.
The aforesaid Constitutional Amendments proposed under Article 3685 of the Constitution, would require a special majority in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. This entails at that least half the total membership of each House must vote in favor of the amendment; of those present and voting, at least two-thirds must support the amendments.
In the proposal for ONOE the Municipal and local body elections have been excluded at this stage to simplify the process. Their inclusion would have necessitated ratification by at least half of all state legislatures.
The question that arises is as to what happens if a government falls before completing its five-year tenure? The solution is proposed by amending Article 83 of the Constitution, which governs the term of Parliament. Currently, the Lok Sabha's term is fixed at five years unless dissolved earlier, unlike the Rajya Sabha, where members retire in phases. The new proposal introduces a key change: if the Lok Sabha is dissolved mid-term, the next Lok Sabha will only serve the remaining, unexpired term of the previous House. For example, if the Lok Sabha dissolves after three years, the new House elected will function for just two years, completing the original five-year term and new Lok Sabha will not be considered a continuation of the previous one. This would ensure that pending bills and unfinished legislative business will not automatically lapse.
The Bill also proposes changes to Article 3726 of the COI, extending Parliament's powers to specifically include the "conduct of simultaneous elections" in the relevant Statutes.
Similarly, the same principles are extended to State Assemblies through amendments to Article 1727 of the COI, which governs their duration. If a State Assembly is dissolved mid-term, fresh elections would be held, but the newly elected Assembly would serve only the remaining period of the original five-year term.
THE ANALYSIS: The 129th Constitutional Amendment seeks to enforce ONOE proposal. Being a Constitutional Amendment, the criticism and the challenge will have to be examined by considering the constitutional validity of the said Amendment.
The criticisms and challenge are primarily that it violates the concept of Federalism. As outlined above the said challenge is premised on the argument that the curtailment of State Assembly terms compromises the autonomy of the State governments. There are concerns about centralization of power, suggesting that the reform prioritises uniformity over the diverse electoral needs of India's states. Further, it is opposed on the ground that there would be unequal battle between national and regional parties and that simultaneous elections will homogenise political narratives that would result in overshadowing regional and local issues under the weight of national campaigns and that ONOE may lead to regional issues getting undermined as national parties will ride on the back of national achievements to garner political support even at the state level.
It is important to note that a Constitutional Amendment can be primarily assailed on the ground that whether it in any manner violates the Basic Structure Doctrine and some of the main features of the Doctrine of Basic Structure of the Constitution is the Federal Structure of India and Fundamental rights. Hence, the issue that arises is whether this Constitutional Amendment in any manner violates the Basic Structure Doctrine?
To assess the validity of a constitutional amendment the Courts apply the Basic Structure Doctrine by the Supreme Court of India in H HKesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,8 for determining if the amendment violates or alters fundamental, core principles of the Constitution, such as federalism, fundamental rights, democracy, separation of powers propounded. The Supreme Court, in Kesavananda Bharati (supra), established the Basic Structure Doctrine, which holds that certain fundamental features of the Constitution are so important that they cannot be altered, even by a parliamentary majority.The Supreme Court recognised federalism as one of these fundamental features, meaning thereby that it is an integral part of the Constitution's core identity.This landmark ruling reinforced the principle that federalism is not merely an administrative arrangement but a crucial feature that fortifies India's democratic and constitutional identity. Further, in catena of judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an amendment to the constitution are open to judicial review if they violate the basic structure of the constitution.
Now let's examine the question of the validity of the Constitutional Amendment proposing ONOE on the touchstone of the basic structure doctrine and the aforesaid tests laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme.
1. Nature of India's Federal Structure
India's federal system is designed to allow for a division of powers between the Central Government and the State Governments, as defined by the Constitution of India. The federal structure provides the states with a certain degree of autonomy in areas that are under their jurisdiction.
However, the Indian Constitution is not a purely federal structure like that of the United States, where states enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Instead, India follows a quasi-federal model, where the central government is often seen as being more powerful, and it can influence state governance in various ways.
2. Legislative Powers under the Indian Constitution
Under the Constitution of India, the Central Government and State Governments are governed by a three-tier system of governance— Union, State, and Local. The separation of powers is outlined through three distinct lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution:
- Union List (for matters under central jurisdiction),
- State List (for matters under state jurisdiction),
- Concurrent List (for matters where both the centre and states can legislate).
Despite this division, the Constitution allows for flexibility in governance, and the central government has significant powers in areas such as law and order, defense, foreign affairs, and the economy, among others.
3. One Nation, One Election and the Federal Balance
The argument that ONOE would violate the federal structure usually centres on the apprehension that it would undermine the autonomy of State governments. However, I am of the opinion that there are several reasons why ONOE does not inherently violate the federal structure:
- Constitutional Provisions: The Constitution of India does not prohibit simultaneous elections at different levels of government. In fact, it provides for the synchronization of elections through the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which allows for adjustments and amendments to the election process.
- State Autonomy and ONOE: While the Constitution does provide states with the autonomy to run their own affairs, it also envisions the central government as the ultimate authority in certain aspects of governance. The ONOE concept does not take away state autonomy; it merely proposes a way to hold elections at the same time. The election process remains in the hands of the Election Commission of India, which is an autonomous body, and states will continue to exercise their powers in other areas such as policy-making, law-making, and governance.
- Temporary Suspension of Elections: In cases of early dissolution of state assemblies, the ONOE system would require that elections for the state assembly be held at the same time as the general elections and in the interregnum the elections would be held for the remaining period of the state assembly. The constitutional amendments are being introduced for this, but it does not alter the structure of federalism itself. States will still have the autonomy to manage their internal affairs and will at all times have its own Assembly and right to governance.
- Political Representation: The concept of ONOE does not negate the fact that each state has its own distinct legislative body and government. The state legislature continues to represent the interests of its people, and ONOE simply streamlines the timing of elections. The political balance of power remains within the state structure, with the Chief Minister of the State and the State legislative bodies retaining their authority.
- Historical Precedents: As stated in the foregoing paras, India has previously had simultaneous elections. Prior to 1967, general elections for the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies were held together. The practice was disrupted due to factors like the dissolution of certain state assemblies and the need for mid-term elections. However, these historical precedents show that it is not unconstitutional or impossible to have simultaneous elections.
4. Flexibility and Adaptation of Federalism
The federal system of India is designed to be flexible and adaptable. It allows for cooperative federalism, where the central government and states can work together to achieve national goals. ONOE, when implemented, would not change the fundamental federal balance; it would simply be a reform in the electoral system. In this sense, ONOE can be seen as an administrative reform rather than a fundamental shift in the federal structure. It would likely strengthen the overall functioning of the Indian democracy by reducing election fatigue, costs and ensuring that governance remains focused on long-term development and policy making.
5. Fundamental rights and ONOE:
Article 149 of the Constitution guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. It ensures that all persons are treated equally, and no discrimination can occur unless there is a reasonable classification that justifies the discrimination. The proposal does not create an unequal or discriminatory situation. The primary goal is to bring uniformity and efficiency to the electoral process. It is argued that the same electoral process, with the same rules for all elections, will apply to all states and the central government. The rationale behind ONOE is that it will reduce the burden on voters and political parties by limiting election cycles and the associated costs. It also aims to improve governance by reducing the electoral "distractions" and focusing on development. The classification made by holding elections for national and state legislatures at the same time does not discriminate but rather ensures logistical and financial efficiency, which can be seen as a reasonable classification. Further, I am of the opinion that it cannot be said that there is anything unreasonable or manifestly arbitrary in the proposed synchronisation in the election process, to be in any manner in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Article 1910 of the Indian Constitution guarantees fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement.These freedoms are essential to a democratic society.One of the key concerns about ONOE is that it could limit the opportunities for political parties to campaign and present their views. While ONOE could affect the frequency of elections, it doesn't inherently limit the rights of political parties or voters to express themselves. The argument is that having simultaneous elections would not unduly curtail the political expression of any party or individual. In fact, it could lead to more organised and focused campaigns, potentially enhancing the democratic process. Political expression and competition would still be possible; the only difference would be the scheduling and logistics of the campaigns. Political parties will still be able to hold rallies, publish manifestos, and engage in discussions, but within a fixed time frame.
Conclusion
I would conclude that the idea of One Nation, One Election does not violate the federal structure of India and therefore does not violate Basic Structure of the Constitution. Rather, it seeks to streamline the electoral process to make governance more efficient. The Constitution allows for flexibility in electoral matters, and the proposal of ONOE can be implemented without infringing on the autonomy of states. States will continue to function within the federal framework, with their legislative bodies and governments maintaining their powers, while facilitating a more efficient, cost-effective, and unified election process. Furthermore, as discussed, the amendments for ONOE do not fall foul of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
Footnotes
1. 83 (2) The House of the People, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the House: Provided that the said period may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, be extended by Parliament by law for a period not exceeding one year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.
2. 172 (1) Every Legislative Assembly of every State, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the Assembly: Provided that the said period may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, be extended by Parliament by law for a period not exceeding one year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.
3. 239A Creation of local Legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union territories.
4. Special provisions with respect to Delhi
5. 368. Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor
6. 372. Continuance in force of existing laws and their adaptation- ( 1 ) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority.( 2 ) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law.( 3 ) Nothing in clause ( 2 ) shall be deemed -- (a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or modification of any law after the expiration ofthree years from the commencement of this Constitutions; or(b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause. Explanation I.--The expression 'law in force' in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may no! be then in operation either at all or in particular areas. Explanation II.--Any law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution had extra-territorial effect as well as effect in the territory of India shall, subject to any such adaptations and modifications as aforesaid, continue to have such extra-territorial effect. Explanation III.--Nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing any temporary law in force beyond the date fixed for its expiration or the date on which it would have expired if this Constitution had not come into force. Explanation IV.--An Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of a Province under section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935 , and in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, unless "withdrawn by the Governor of the corresponding State earlier, cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the first meeting after such commencement of the Legislative Assembly of that State functioning under clause ( 1 ) of article 382 , and nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing any such Ordinance in force beyond the said period.
7. 172. Duration of State Legislatures.
- (1) Every Legislative Assembly of every State, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the Assembly: Provided that the said period may, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, be extended by Parliament by law for a period not exceeding one year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate.
- (2) The Legislative Council of a State shall not be subject to dissolution, but as nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof shall retire as soon as may be on the expiration of every second year in accordance with the provisions made in that behalf by Parliament by law.
8.(1973) 4 SCC 225
9. 14 Equality before law-The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
10. (1)All citizens shall have the right- (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions or co-operative societies;(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
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