INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is known to be a preferred mechanism for dispute resolution in comparison to court proceedings. One of the many reasons arbitration is preferred to court proceedings is its time efficiency. Arbitration stakeholders globally recognise the need for expedited outcomes and often advocate the necessity for further enhancing arbitration processes with newer expedited arbitration mechanisms. The 2025 QMUL Survey1 highlighted that 50% of the Survey Respondents were of the opinion that expedited or express arbitration procedures could most improve efficiency of arbitration. The need for an expedited outcome is attributable to industries in the centre of emerging trends such as Technology & IP, BFSI, Construction and Entertainment, although the landmark case in India viz. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v Future Retail Ltd (2022) 1 SCC 209, arose out of a dispute in the retail and e-commerce space. Parties in commercial disputes in India invariably tend to seek urgent interim protection even prior to constitution of arbitral tribunal by way of Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”). Urgent reliefs are typically sought on grounds of apprehension that assets may be dissipated, confidential information may be disclosed, contractual rights may be frustrated, or transactions may be completed in a manner that renders the arbitral process ineffective. However, the flipside to court proceedings is the concern over delay in hearings, increased costs, and obtaining orders which, owing to delay fail to meet the commercial expectation of parties.
Emergency Arbitration is an advanced method akin to obtaining ad-interim reliefs in India. It has enabled parties to seek urgent interim measures from an emergency arbitrator before the constitution of the main arbitral tribunal. While this mechanism has gained widespread acceptance internationally, its legal status in India is still evolving through judicial interpretation and there is no specific legislation on the subject. Although Legislative recognition of emergency arbitration is strong promoted and advocated in India.
The landmark decision of the Supreme Court of India in Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd2 clarified the Indian position by recognising the enforceability of an emergency arbitrator’s decision in an India-seated arbitration. Nevertheless, important questions remain regarding foreign-seated emergency arbitrations and the absence of a comprehensive statutory framework.
This article examines the concept of Emergency Arbitration, analyses the current legal position in India, evaluates important judicial decisions, and suggests reforms necessary for creating a coherent enforcement regime.
EMERGENCE OF EMERGENCY ARBITRATION
Emergency Arbitration refers to a procedure under institutional arbitration rules whereby a temporary arbitrator is appointed to decide applications for urgent conservatory or interim relief before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The emergency arbitrator’s mandate is limited to granting urgent protective reliefs and generally terminates once the regular tribunal is constituted. However, the resulting decision passed by the Emergency Arbitrator is binding on the parties. .
The concept of emergency arbitration originated as a direct response to a structural “vacuum” in early institutional frameworks. Historically, if a party was seeking an urgent asset freeze order or an order of injunction before a full tribunal was formally empanelled, they had no choice but to default to domestic state courts. This compromised the very core advantages of arbitration: confidentiality, specialized expertise, and freedom from localized judicial backlogs.
This structural gap meant that by the time a formal panel could be agreed upon, selected, and empanelled, the damage to the aggrieved party was often already done. Because this selection process frequently stretched over several weeks or months, the commercial community needed a bridge in the form of a stop-gap authority. This authority would be clothed with the immediate power of an arbitrator but specifically designed to operate on an expedited timeline. Emergency arbitration solved this crisis to a great extent by uncoupling urgent interim relief from the main merits of the dispute, ensuring that a specialist could step in within days to preserve the status quo without forcing parties into public courtrooms.
The initial, experimental seed of this concept was planted in 1990 when the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)3 introduced its Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules. However, this framework required parties to explicitly “opt-in” via a separate agreement, preventing it from gaining mass traction. The true turning point and baseline blueprint for modern emergency arbitration emerged in 2006, when the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)4, the international arm of the American Arbitration Association assimilated emergency procedures as an automatic, “opt-out” default provision in its rules.
Recognizing the commercial success of the ICDR model, a rapid wave of institutional adoption followed. Institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)5, Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC)6, London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)7, Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC)8 and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)9 have incorporated emergency arbitrator provisions into their rules.
Emergency Arbitration does not replace court intervention. Rather, it complements judicial remedies by providing a rapid, private, and specialised mechanism for urgent relief. Courts continue to play an important role where enforcement is required or where relief against third parties is sought.
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO EMERGENCY ARBITRATION
Different jurisdictions have adopted varying approaches towards recognising and enforcing emergency arbitrator decisions, moving steadily towards explicit statutory enforcement pathways.
Singapore
Singapore represents one of the most comprehensive models globally. Legislative amendments expressly include an emergency arbitrator within the definition of an arbitral tribunal. In CVG v. CVH, the Singapore High Court recognised and enforced a foreign emergency arbitrator award, demonstrating a clear legislative commitment towards supporting Emergency Arbitration.10
Hong Kong
Hong Kong has adopted a functional approach through Part 3A of its Arbitration Ordinance. Under this framework, emergency relief granted by an emergency arbitrator may be enforced with leave of the court as if it were a court order. This framework applies even to qualifying foreign emergency relief, removing enforcement bottlenecks for international commercial parties.11
England and Wales
The landscape in England and Wales was modernized significantly when the UK Arbitration Act, 2025 officially took effect on 1st August 2025. Amending the 1996 Act, this updated legislation strengthens London’s status as a premier dispute hub by explicitly empowering emergency arbitrators to issue enforceable peremptory orders12. These orders can be directly backed and executed through existing domestic court mechanisms, eliminating the historical ambiguity surrounding their legal teeth.
These jurisdictions stated above have already been named in the top 5 most preferred seat internationally by the QMUL Survey13. The legislative backing only demonstrates the effectiveness of Emergency Arbitration in these advanced jurisdictions and the willingness of these jurisdictions to embrace jurisprudential development.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK IN INDIA
The Act does not expressly recognise Emergency Arbitration. Section 2(1)(d) defines an arbitral tribunal as a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, without referring to emergency arbitrators. Similarly, Sections 9 and 17 govern interim measures but contain no specific provisions regarding Emergency Arbitration.
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 substantially strengthened Section 17 by making tribunal ordered interim measures enforceable in the same manner as court orders. However, Parliament did not adopt the recommendation of the 246th Law Commission Report14, which proposed expressly including emergency arbitrators within the definition of an arbitral tribunal. This omission created uncertainty regarding the legal status of emergency arbitrator decisions in India and necessitated judicial intervention.
THE AMAZON V. FUTURE RETAIL DECISION
The turning point in Indian Emergency Arbitration jurisprudence came with the Supreme Court’s decision in Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. The dispute arose from Amazon’s investment in Future Coupons Private Limited and the subsequent proposed transaction involving Future Retail Limited and the Reliance Group. Amazon initiated arbitration under the SIAC Rules and sought urgent interim relief from an emergency arbitrator before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The emergency arbitrator granted relief restraining the respondents from proceeding with the disputed transaction.
The crucial issue before the Supreme Court was whether an emergency arbitrator’s award issued under the SIAC Rules in an India-seated arbitration could be enforced under Section 17(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court answered this question affirmatively. It held that where parties have voluntarily adopted institutional rules providing for Emergency Arbitration, the emergency arbitrator’s order must be treated as an order under Section 17(1) and is therefore enforceable under Section 17(2).15
The Court emphasised:
- Party autonomy remains the cornerstone of arbitration.
- Institutional rules form part of the arbitration agreement.
- Nothing in the Act prohibits Emergency Arbitration.
- The 2015 amendments were intended to strengthen arbitral interim relief and reduce judicial intervention.
- The definition of an “arbitral tribunal” under Section 2(1)(d) is wide enough to encompass an emergency arbitrator, provided the chosen institutional rules permit it.
The judgment significantly enhanced the credibility of institutional arbitration in India by ensuring that emergency arbitrator decisions are not merely symbolic but practically enforceable.
LIMITS OF AMAZON: THE FOREIGN-SEATED ARBITRATION PROBLEM
Despite its importance, Amazon does not provide a complete solution. The Supreme Court’s ruling was confined to an India-seated arbitration. It did not create a mechanism for enforcing emergency arbitrator decisions arising from foreign-seated arbitrations.16 This limitation becomes evident when read alongside the Delhi High Court’s decision in Raffles Design International India Pvt Ltd v. Educomp Professional Education Ltd.17 In this case, the court considered an emergency arbitrator’s award issued in a Singapore-seated arbitration and held that Indian law contained no statutory mechanism for enforcing such an award. Although a party could seek interim relief under Section 9, the foreign emergency award itself could not be directly enforced. The reason lies in the territorial structure of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. While the proviso to Section 2(2) extends certain provisions, including Section 9, to foreign-seated international commercial arbitrations, Section 17 is not similarly extended. Consequently, the statutory basis used in Amazon is unavailable in foreign-seated cases.18 Therefore, parties involved in foreign-seated arbitrations must often initiate fresh proceedings under Section 9 rather than relying directly on the emergency arbitrator’s decision.
This procedural bypass introduces an additional layer of uncertainty, an ongoing judicial divergence regarding how Indian High Courts treat foreign emergency findings during subsequent Section 9 hearings. Benches are split between a strict de novo approach i.e. re-examining the entire dispute from scratch as if no emergency proceedings ever occurred and a deferential approach. Benches favouring the deferential standard treat the foreign emergency arbitrator’s detailed findings as highly persuasive evidence that satisfies the prima facie threshold required for Section 9 relief. This operational inconsistency leaves cross-border litigants facing unpredictable timelines and redundant litigation costs.
CURRENT LEGAL POSITION IN INDIA
At present, the legal landscape governing emergency arbitration in India functions as a dual regime. Following the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Amazon, emergency arbitration is firmly recognized and interpreted by Indian courts based on the existing language of Section 17, making emergency orders in India-seated arbitrations directly enforceable under Section 17(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. However, this framework remains fundamentally incomplete because the Act still lacks any express statutory definition or recognition of an emergency arbitrator and emergency arbitration. There is also no dedicated statutory mechanism to enforce emergency awards originating from foreign-seated arbitrations. As a result, parties in foreign-seated disputes cannot directly enforce their emergency relief and must instead undergo the redundant and time-consuming process of filing fresh applications for interim measures before domestic courts under Section 9
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Judicial recognition alone cannot substitute for legislative clarity. The current framework leaves important questions unresolved and creates uncertainty in cross-border disputes.
A comprehensive reform package should include:
Express Recognition of Emergency Arbitrators
Section 2(1)(d) should be amended to expressly include emergency arbitrators within the definition of an arbitral tribunal, as originally recommended by the 246th Law Commission Report.
Clarification under Section 17
The Act should expressly state that orders, directions, or awards issued by emergency arbitrators in India-seated arbitrations are enforceable under Section 17(2).
Creation of a Foreign Enforcement Mechanism
India should adopt a statutory framework similar to Hong Kong’s model by creating a dedicated mechanism for recognising and enforcing foreign emergency relief. Such a framework may permit enforcement with leave of the court while preserving safeguards relating to jurisdiction, public policy, and due process.19
Statutory Codification via Proposed Section 9A (The 2024 Draft Bill)
This critical gap is directly addressed by the Draft Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 202420, which followed the comprehensive recommendations of the Dr. T.K. Viswanathan Expert Committee21. The Draft Bill officially proposes the insertion of a new Section 9A to grant express statutory footing to emergency arbitration in institutional setups for the first time. Under this proposed framework, orders passed by an emergency arbitrator would be enforceable like a regular tribunal’s order under Section 17(2).To make this statutory addition truly water-tight, it must explicitly incorporate ex parte interim powers. Providing a clear ex parte window ensures that non-compliant parties cannot deliberately dissipate assets, destroy crucial evidence, or rush to complete frustrating transactions the moment they receive notice of an impending emergency application, thereby preserving the essential element of surprise required for effective interim protection.
However, a deeper analytical reading of the Draft Bill reveals a significant structural defect because it fails to explicitly bridge the cross-border enforcement gap exposed by Raffles Design. While Section 9A successfully formalizes emergency mechanisms for India-seated institutional disputes, it leaves the enforcement of foreign-seated emergency awards in statutory limbo. It is however important to note that as of 2026, this text remains a consultation draft and has not yet been enacted into law. If the Bill passes in its current iteration without an explicit mechanism for foreign awards akin to Hong Kong’s Part 3A, cross-border litigants will remain trapped in the inefficient cycle of de novo re-litigation under Section 9, severely compromising India’s goal of becoming a competitive global hub.
Procedural Safeguards
To ensure fairness and efficacy, any legislative reform package must embed rigorous procedural safeguards within its framework. These essential protections should begin with requiring strict proof of a valid arbitration agreement alongside the guaranteed provision of proper notice and an opportunity to be heard for all parties involved. Furthermore, the regime must mandate judicial scrutiny regarding matters of jurisdiction and proportionality while simultaneously maintaining strictly limited grounds for court refusal. Finally, the statutory text must explicitly preserve the main arbitral tribunal’s inherent power to modify or entirely revoke any emergency measures once it is formally constituted. Incorporating such systematic safeguards would significantly strengthen India’s position as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction, ultimately aligning its domestic framework with the best practices of leading international arbitration centres.22 Such reforms would strengthen India’s position as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction and align it with leading international arbitration centres.
CONCLUSION
Emergency Arbitration has emerged as an indispensable mechanism for preserving rights during critical period before the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. It is also a remedy which is evolving but is bound to stay. India’s legal landscape has evolved substantially through the Supreme Court’s decision in Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd, which recognised the enforceability of emergency arbitrator decisions in India-seated arbitrations, however statutory recognition remains uncertain.
While domestic Emergency Arbitration enjoys judicial support, foreign-seated emergency awards continue to face significant enforcement challenges due to the absence of a dedicated statutory mechanism. Raffles Design International India Pvt Ltd v. Educomp Professional Education Ltd continues to highlight this gap.
The next stage of India’s arbitration reform should therefore focus on legislative recognition of emergency arbitrators and the creation of a clear enforcement regime for foreign emergency relief. Alongside these surgical legislative amendments, institutional arbitration must be promoted extensively across the Indian legal ecosystem. Transitioning away from deep-seated ad-hoc arbitration habits toward a robust institutional preference will naturally standardize emergency procedures, reduce backlogs in court dockets, and provide commercial parties with predictable, rules-based dispute management. Such reforms would transform the gains achieved through judicial interpretation into a coherent and internationally competitive statutory framework capable of supporting India’s aspiration to become a leading global arbitration hub.
Footnotes
1. 2025 International Arbitration Survey: ‘The Path Forward: Realities and Opportunities in Arbitration’, conducted by the School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London in collaboration with White & Case LLP
2. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v Future Retail Ltd (2022) 1 SCC 209
3. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Pre-Arbitral Referee Rules, 1990.
4. International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) International Arbitration Rules, 2006, art 7
5. ICC Arbitration Rules, art 29
6. Singapore International Arbitration Act 1994, Section 2(1); SIAC Arbitration Rules 2025, r 12.1 and sch 1
7. LCIA Arbitration Rules 2020, art 9B
8. HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules 2024, art 23 and sch 4
9. SCC Arbitration Rules, Appendix II, art 1
10.International Arbitration Act 1994 (Singapore), ss 2(1), 12 and 29; CVG v CVH [2022] SGHC 249.
11.Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) (Hong Kong), Part 3A, ss 22A–22B.
12.Arbitration Act 1996, ss 41A, 42 and 44, as amended by Arbitration Act 2025, s 8; Arbitration Act 2025 (Commencement No 1) Regulations 2025.
13. 2025 International Arbitration Survey: ‘The Path Forward: Realities and Opportunities in Arbitration’, conducted by the School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London in collaboration with White & Case LLP
14.Law Commission of India, Report No 246, Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (August 2014) 16–17 and proposed amendment to s 2(1)(d); Report of the High-Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India (30 July 2017) para 16.
15.Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, ss 2(1)(c), 17; Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v Future Retail Ltd (2022) 1 SCC 209, paras 31–36.
16.Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v Future Retail Ltd (2022) 1 SCC 209, paras 28–30.
17.Raffles Design International India Pvt Ltd v Educomp Professional Education Ltd 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5521, paras 96–100.
18.Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 2(2) proviso.
19.Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) (Hong Kong), ss 22A–22B; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, arts 17H–17I.
20. The Draft Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024, Clause 4 (Proposing the insertion of Section 9A).
21. Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, Report of the Expert Committee to Examine the Working of the Arbitration Law and Recommend Reforms (Chaired by Dr. T.K. Viswanathan), February 2024
22.UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, arts 17B–17I; HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules 2024, sch 4.
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