Court Of Appeal Summaries (July 14-18, 2025)

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Good afternoon.
Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of July 14-18, 2025. It was a full week that highlighted decisions in family and estates law.

Ontario Inc. v. Savannah Wells Holdings Inc. discusses the statutory right to rescind a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act, as well exemptions from franchise disclosure. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the exemption claimed was not applicable in this case. The Court therefore upheld the trial judge's finding that the franchise agreement had been properly rescinded, and the franchisee was entitled to rescission damages under the Act.

In Ahmed v. Abdelmoaein, the Court held that the application judge misapplied the article 13(a) exception in the Hague Convention regarding consent or acquiescence to a child's retention. The Court clarified that consent or acquiescence must relate specifically to the wrongful retention at the relevant time. The appellant's general consent to future travel or relocation to Ontario did not amount to consent or acquiescence to the child's wrongful retention in Ontario. The Court allowed the appeal and ordered the child's return to the UK.

Muscat v. Muscat Estate involved the removal of estate trustees due to a conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty. The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the motion judge's decision to remove the trustees and order personal costs against them because their actions in attempting to sell the business owned by the estate over the objections of one of the beneficiaries were unreasonable and contrary to the best interests of the beneficiary. The estate trustees had recommended the sale of the business in the face of evidence produced by the beneficiary that the business was worth many times more, they had conducted no investigations of their own into the value of the business, and one of the estate trustees had an intimate relationship to whom they wished to sell the business.

In Di Nardo v. Nagy, an estate trustee was found in contempt of court and warrant of committal was issued against her. She did not appeal that order, which was stayed pending the determination of her application to pass her accounts. Two years later, her application to pass her accounts was also dismissed.. The Court stayed the contempt order and warrant for committal pending a pending motion to the Superior Court to stay that order pending the outcome of the appeal from the dismissal of the application to pass accounts.

In 2708959 Ontario Inc. v. Stratford (City), the appellant bought a property in 2019 and later applied to re-zone it. The city discovered four encroachments onto municipal land, which had not been clearly identified in the original 1998 building plans and had not been approved by the city. The city required an encroachment agreement under a 2006 policy regarding encroachments. The appellant's appeal from the finding that they were subject to the 2006 policy was dismissed. However, the Court suggested the city exercise some leniency on the terms it imposed given that the appellant was innocent of any wrongdoing and the encroachments were minor.

In Alami v. Haddad, the Court dismissed the appeal from an order that found the respondent had a 50% beneficial interest in the former matrimonial home by way of a resulting trust. The Court also confirmed the appellant's sole liability for post‑separation refinancing.

Janic v. Janic is a family law decision where the father's appeal from an order for support and imputing income to him was dismissed.

Mullin v. Sherlock involved an appeal from an order awarding spousal support and damages for unjust enrichment in respect of a joint family venture following a long cohabitation and brief marriage. The Court dismissed the appeal.

In Peoples Trust Company v. PSP Services Inc., the Court partially lifted the automatic stay of a contempt order that was partly under appeal that required the responding party to pay $1,998,612.07 into court pending the completion of an audit. The appellant acknowledged that its ability to proceed with its appeal would not be affected by the payment into court of this amount.

In Hordo v. CAA Insurance Company, the Court granted the appellants' motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal.

Other topics included the refusal to set aside the administrative dismissal of an appeal for delay.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

Civil Decisions

2355305 Ontario Inc. v. Savannah Wells Holdings Inc., 2025 ONCA 505

Keywords: Contracts, Franchise Agreements, Franchise Disclosure, Exemptions, Remedies, Rescission, Damages, Civil Procedure, Offers to Settle, Substantial Indemnity Costs, Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000, c.3, ss. 5(1), 5(1.1), 5(7), 5(8) and 6(6), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 49.10, 2189205 Ontario Inc. v. Springdale Pizza Depot Ltd., 2011 ONCA 467, 2256306 Ontario Inc. v. Dakin News Systems Inc., 2016 ONCA 74, Brad-Jay Investments Ltd. v. Szijjarto (2006), 218 O.A.C. 315 (C.A.)

Ahmed v. Abdelmoaein, 2025 ONCA 508

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Relocation, Child Abduction, Best Interests of the Child, Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35, Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 46, Office of the Children's Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, Leigh v. Rubio, 2022 ONCA 582, Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, Katsigiannis v. Kottick-Katsigiannis (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 456 (C.A.), Unger v. Unger, 2017 ONCA 270, Hammerschmidt v. Hammerschmidt, 2013 ONCA 227, Jackson v. Graczyk, 2007 ONCA 388, F. v. N., 2022 SCC 51

Muscat v. Muscat Estate, 2025 ONCA 518

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Estate Administration, Estate Trustees, Removal, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Conflict of Interest, Civil Procedure, Costs, Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, s. 35(1), Chambers Estate v. Chambers, 2013 ONCA 511, Westover Estate v. Jolicouer, 2024 ONCA 81, Salter v. Salter Estate (2009), 50 E.T.R. (3d) 227 (Ont. S.C.), Johnson v. Johnson, 2022 ONCA 682

Di Nardo v. Nagy, 2025 ONCA 523

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Civil Procedure, Contempt, Warrants of Committal, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Courts of Justice, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134(2), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 60.11(8), 63.01(1), Abuzour v. Heydary, 2015 ONCA 249, Waxman v. Waxman, [2003] O.J. No. 73 (C.A.), Ahani v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 155 O.A.C. 1 (C.A.), Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 161, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199

2708959 Ontario Inc. v. Stratford (City), 2025 ONCA 512

Keywords: Real Property, Encroachments, Municipal Law, Land Use Planning, Zoning, Road Allowances, Statutory Interpretation, Retroactivity, Oro-Medonte (Township) v. Warkentin, 2013 ONSC 1416, Visnjic v. Town of LaSalle, 2017 ONSC 2082

Alami v. Haddad, 2025 ONCA 527

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Matrimonial Home, Resulting Trusts, Equalization of Net Family Property, Post-Separation Adjustments, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss. 5(6), 10(1), 14, Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578, Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, Belokon v. Krygyz Republic, 2016 ONCA 981, Entes Industrial Plants Construction & Erection Contracting Co. v. Kyrgyz Republic, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 74, Qu v. Zhang, 2025 ONCA 391

Janic v. Janic, 2025 ONCA 509

Keywords: Family Law, Child Support, Imputing Income, Variation, Material Change of Circumstances, Civil Procedure, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R./97-175., Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578, Bak v. Dobell, 2007 ONCA 304, Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, R. v. Esseghaier, 2021 ONCA 162, Director, Family Responsibility Office v. Janic, 2022 ONSC 3848

Mullin v. Sherlock, 2025 ONCA 510

Keywords: Family Law, Property, Equalization of Net Family Property, Unjust Enrichment, Joint Family Ventures, Damages, Spousal Support, Civil Procedure, Disclosure, Evidence, Adverse Inferences, Non-Disclosure, Courts of Justice Act s. 128(1), R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 128, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, Iredale v. Dougall, 2025 ONCA 266, Mullin v. Sherlock, 2018 ONCA 1063, Mullin v. Sherlock, 2017 ONSC 6762, Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, Lesko v. Lesko, 2021 ONCA 369, Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at para. 12, Cronier v. Cusack, 2023 ONCA 178, McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, Derakhshan v. Narula, 2018 ONSC 537, Meade v. Meade (2002), 31 R.F.L. (5th) 88 (Ont. S.C.), Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2008)

Peoples Trust Company v. PSP Services Inc., 2025 ONCA 524

Keywords: Contracts, Penalties, Civil Procedure, Contempt, Orders, Payment of Money, Appeals, Automatic Stay Pending Appeal, Lifting of Stay, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 63.01(5), Hrvoic v. Hrvoic, 2023 ONCA 288, Antunes v. Limen Structures Ltd., 2016 ONCA 61, SA Horeca Financial Services v. Light, 2014 ONCA 811, Digiammatteo v. Leblanc (1989), 71 O.R. (2d) 130 (C.A.), Stein v. Sandwich West (Township) (1994), 16 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), Susin v. Susin, 2014 ONCA 733, R. v. Elenzi, 2021 ONCA 834, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, Business Development Bank of Canada v. Cavalon Inc., 2017 ONCA 663

Hordo v. CAA Insurance Company, 2025 ONCA 529

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Extension of Time, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 6, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.03.1, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. v. Froese, 2013 ONCA 131, Liu v. Chan, 2024 ONCA 699, Robson v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONCA 709, Codina v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2020 ONCA 116

AST Trust Company (Canada) v. Joseph-Walker, 2025 ONCA 521

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Administrative Dismissal for Delay, Perfection, Extension of Time, Stay Pending Appeal, Sickinger v. Sickinger, 2017 ONCA 760, Langer v. Yorkton Securities Inc. (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 555 (C.A.), Codina v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2020 ONCA 116, Clancy v. Farid, 2024 ONCA 568, Devi Financial Inc. v. Everwood Place Ltd., 2022 ONCA 104, Earthco Soil Mixtures Inc. v. Pine Valley Enterprises Inc., 2024 SCC 20, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Callidus Capital Corporation v. McFarlane, 2017 ONCA 626

Short Civil Decisions

6971971 Canada Inc. v. Messica, 2025 ONCA 514

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Commercial Leases, Guarantees, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Breach of Contract, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 38.10, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, s. 4, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, 6791971 Canada Inc. v. Messica, 2020 ONSC 1642, Harvey v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 26

College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Yan, 2025 ONCA 520

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Stay Pending Appeal, Vexatious Litigants, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140(3), Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, Son v. Khan, 2018 ONCA 984, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Reyes, 2017 ONCA 613

Dhaliwal v. Richter International Ltd., 2025 ONCA 522

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Arbitrations, Arbitrators, Removal, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, ss. 13(1), 13(3)

Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 526

Keywords: Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Costs

Sidhu v. Jain, 2025 ONCA 528

Keywords: Real Property, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Limitation Periods, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory, Stay Pending Appeal, Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 23, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 6(1)(b), 19(1)(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Ball v. Donais (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 322 (C.A.), Charlebois v. Enterprises Normand Ravary Ltee (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 504 (C.A.), Khan v. Taji, 2020 ONSC 6704, R.S. v. R.H. (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 152 (C.A.)

James Bay Resources Limited v. Mak Mera Nigeria Limited, 2025 ONCA 530

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Contracts, Civil Procedure, Costs

CIVIL DECISIONS

2355305 Ontario Inc. v. Savannah Wells Holdings Inc., 2025 ONCA 505

[Thorburn, Copeland and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R.S., acting in person for both himself and corporate appellants

J. Mesiano-Crookston and N. Kanavas, for the respondents

Facts:

This was an appeal of a franchisee's action brought under the Arthur Wishart Act (the "Act") for damages following the rescission of a franchise agreement for non-disclosure.

The trial judge made a declaration that the franchise agreements related to a Wild Wing franchise were validly rescinded and awarded damages against the appellant franchisor, 2239214 Ontario Inc. and the franchisor's associates (the appellants, 1516081 Ontario Inc., Savannah Wells Holdings Inc. and R.S.).

Issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in holding that the exemption from disclosure claimed by the appellants did not apply?

2. Did the trial judge err in deciding that the respondents were entitled to statutory compensation pursuant to s. 6(6) of the Act?

3. Did the trial judge err in deciding that the respondents were entitled to costs on a substantial indemnity?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. No.

The Act is designed to address the power imbalance between the franchisor and the franchisee as well as to provide a remedy for the abuses resulting from this imbalance. This is done by mandating disclosure to prospective franchisees so that they can make informed decisions. While the Act provides certain exemptions to the disclosure requirement, these are to be narrowly construed. The appellants relied on the s. 5(7)(a) exemption. The trial judge found that the franchisor did not meet the criteria for this exemption, specifically 5(7)(a)(iv) which states, "the grant of the franchise is not effected by or through the franchisor".

The trial judge did not err in this finding because there was ample evidence to conclude that the grant of the franchise was effected through the franchisor. The trial judge also described two alternate bases for this conclusion that were consistent with other ONCA cases. The trial judge concluded that the franchise agreement signed by R.S. was authentic, meaning the appellants could not argue that a pre-existing franchise agreement would result in an exemption from the disclosure requirement. Rather, the trial judge considered email correspondence, the role of the franchisor, and the absence of testimony and relevant documents to make her decision.

2. No.

Since the exemption did not apply, the trial judge held that the franchisee rescinded the agreement in accordance with the statute and was thus entitled to damages under the Act. The Court agreed and found that the respondents were entitled to statutory compensation under s. 6(6) of the Act.

3. No

The Court did not find error in the costs awarded. The respondents were entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the date of their offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, as their damages award exceeded their settlement offer. There was no error in principle to the trial judge's approach to the costs award.

Ahmed v. Abdelmoaein, 2025 ONCA 508

[Simmons, Rouleau and Pepall JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Mehra, for the appellant

M. Zalev, for the respondent

Facts:

The appellant, T.A., and the respondent, R.A., had a child in December 2019 who was born in the UK and was a UK national. The parties and the child resided in London. In or around 2018 or 2019, the parties applied to become permanent Canadian residents, with the intention of relocating to Canada at some point in the future. The respondent's brother agreed to sponsor the parties' application.

In March 2023, the respondent's brother advised the parties that the family was required to visit Canada to activate their visas. The family arranged to travel to Canada on holiday and purchased return airline tickets, with a departure from London scheduled on September 15, 2023, and a return to London on October 8, 2023. When they arrived in Canada, the family was granted permanent residence status.

On September 28, 2023, the respondent advised the appellant that she did not wish to return to London, and that she and the child would be staying in Canada. The appellant was caught off guard by the respondent's pronouncement and was very upset. The appellant tried to persuade the respondent to change her mind so that they could return to their home in London. The respondent refused. The appellant accused the respondent of "kidnapping" the child and left.

The next day, the appellant reported the issue to the British High Commission in Ottawa. Upon his return to the UK, the appellant contacted Reunite International and was assisted in applying to the Central Authority, designated to assist in carrying out duties concerning the operation of the Hague Convention. On August 31, 2023, the Ontario Central Authority was contacted.

The appellant's Hague Convention application was issued on March 11, 2024. The application judge found that the child's habitual residence was in the UK but that the appellant, through his actions, had consented to or acquiesced in the child's retention in Canada. The application judge dismissed the application for the return of the child.

Issues:

1. Did the application judge err in applying the article 13(a) exception in the Hague Convention and concluding that she was not required to order the child's return?

2. If the child should be returned to London, U.K., what conditions, if any, should be imposed?

Holding:

Appeal allowed.

Reasoning:

1. Yes.

The Court found that the application judge's decision not to order the return of the parties' child was an error resulting from her improper interpretation and application of the terms "consent" and "acquiescence" in article 13(a) of the Hague Convention.

In determining whether a child should be returned from Ontario to their habitual residence under the Hague Convention, the two-step analysis required the Court to consider when the alleged wrongful removal or retention took place, and in which state the child was habitually resident immediately prior to that removal or retention. If the child is found to have habitual residence in Ontario at the time of the removal or retention, the Hague Convention does not apply. At the second stage of analysis, if Ontario was not the child's place of habitual residence at the time of the removal or retention, the court must order the return of the child unless one of the exceptions under articles 13 or 20 of the Hague Convention applies. The article 13(a) exception provides that a child's return is not required if it is established that the person, institution or other body having the care of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.

The Court held that to trigger article 13(a), there must be clear and cogent evidence of the left-behind party's subjective unequivocal consent or acquiescence, and the burden is on the party seeking to justify the wrongful removal or retention. The Court held that whether a parent consented to or acquiesced in a removal or retention is a factual determination and was therefore entitled to considerable deference on appeal, and the Court would not intervene absent a serious misapprehension of evidence or an error in law.

The Court held that the application judge erred in her analysis by conflating the concepts of consent to or acquiescence in retention with consent to relocation. The Court agreed with the application judge's factual findings that the child was wrongfully retained in Ontario, and the child's habitual residence was in the UK, and that the appellant consented to travel to Canada. However, the Court held that the appellant's consent to travelling to Canada did not constitute consent to retaining the child in Canada after the parties' 2023 trip.

The Court held that the application judge wrongly concluded that the parties' desire to eventually relocate to Canada and the steps they took to apply for the visa equated to consent or acquiescence to the relocation of the child. The parties' intention to move to Canada at a later date had no bearing on the article 13(a) analysis. The relevant legal question was whether the appellant consented to the retention as of September 28, 2023, or whether he acquiesced in the retention sometime after that date.

The Court found that the appellant did not consent or acquiesce to the retention on September 28, 2023, as the appellant objected and returned to the UK without the respondent and child and commenced the process of the Hague application, and since that date, sought the child's return through the Hague Convention process. The Court ordered the return of the child to the UK, which was the child's place of habitual residence.

2. Yes.

Considering the child's best interests, the Court ordered that the undertakings of the appellant's counsel would form part of the conditions of the return order. These undertakings related to the child's travel documents and schooling; payment for flights, monthly child support and assistance with housing; non-removal and parenting orders; and cooperation in obtaining a visa for the respondent.

Muscat v. Muscat Estate, 2025 ONCA 518

[Thorburn, Copeland and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D. Lobl and A. Chen, for the appellants

R. Haas, for the respondent

Facts:

The appellants, Mrs. A and Mr. T, appealed an order removing them as estate trustees for the estate of DK and sought leave to appeal a related costs order. The primary assets of the Estate were businesses and a property. The respondent was a minor when his father, DK, passed in 2022. His share of DK's estate was to be held in trust by the appellants, who were appointed the estate trustees under DK's Will, until the respondent turned 25.

In 2023, Mr. M, who was in a relationship with Mrs. A, offered to buy the DK's business. The respondent raised concerns about Mrs. A's apparent conflict of interest and requested her resignation. The estate's counsel denied any relevance to Ms. A's relationship with Mr. M and forwarded Mr. M's "final offer" with a 10-day deadline for acceptance, recommending it as the "best available option" for the greatest return.

The respondent requested more time to consider the offer, but this was refused. He then brought an application to remove the appellants as estate trustees. He later obtained his own valuations indicating the business could be worth nearly twice as much as the offer.

The application judge cited Chambers Estate v. Chambers and acknowledged that the test for removal is high. However, the judge found removal necessary to protect the respondent's interests. Mrs. A was in a conflict of interest, and the appellants failed to undertake any due diligence or ascertain fair market value, breaching their fiduciary duties. The appellants were removed and ordered to pay the respondent's costs but were exempted from personal liability under s. 35(1) of the Trustee Act.

Issues:

Did the application judge make palpable and overriding errors in removing the appellants as estate trustees based on erroneous findings of fact?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

No.

The application judge correctly found that Mrs. A was in a conflict of interest because of her romantic relationship with Mr. M, since she stood to benefit if his offer to purchase the business was accepted. When the respondent asked her to resign, she refused, incorrectly maintaining that the relationship was irrelevant. Her claim that there was no conflict because the respondent knew about the relationship was unfounded. The trustees never disclosed the relationship, and a fiduciary's breach cannot be excused by the beneficiary becoming aware of it and requesting resignation.

The appellants could not claim they had no duty to assess the reasonableness of Mr. M's offer. A trustee's duty of loyalty requires that they manage trust assets with honesty and integrity and in the best interests of the beneficiaries. A trustee cannot abdicate that duty by purporting to require the beneficiary to approve an offer that puts the trustee's interests ahead of the beneficiaries. The appellants did not passively convey the offer, but they recommended acceptance as the "best available option," without warrant, as they failed to undertake any due diligence or investigate alternatives.

The application judge did not err in concluding that removal was necessary to ensure proper management of the trust. Nor did the judge err in ordering the appellants to pay costs personally. A trustee may be ordered to pay costs where they act unreasonably or for their own benefit. Leave to appeal costs was therefore denied.

Di Nardo v. Nagy, 2025 ONCA 523

[Roberts J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

S.D.N., acting in person

No one appearing for the respondents, although duly served

L. Rennie and C. Muir, appearing as duty counsel

Facts:

S.D. and her two siblings have engaged in highly contentious estate proceedings arising out of the administration of their late father's estate. Due to the failure to pass her accounts by a March 2017 court order, S.D. has been the subject of three contempt orders and two incarceration orders.

On April 18, 2023, Dietrich J. made an order that S.D. spend a further 30 days' incarceration and issued a warrant of committal but stayed that order pending the disposition of the estate applications, including S.D.'s application to pass her accounts. The warrant of committal has not yet been executed, nor was it appealed from. However, a motion to stay the order to the Superior Court is to be heard on November 19, 2025.

Two years later, on April 17, 2025, Dietrich J dismissed S.D.'s application to pass her accounts and allowed her siblings' claim for payment of their equal shares of the estate that S.D. had not distributed to them. S.D. was also ordered to pay her siblings costs. S.D. appealed from that order. In her notice of appeal, she requested that "all findings of contempt, costs, and personal liability be vacated".

S.D. brought this motion for an order to stay the 2025 order pending the disposition of her appeal.

Issues:

Should the April 18, 2023, contempt order and warrant of committal be stayed pending the appeal from the April 2025 order dismissing the passing of accounts application?

Holding:

Motion granted.

Reasoning:

Yes.

Under Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice of appeal automatically stayed the damages and costs provisions of the April 17, 2025, judgment dismissing the appellant's passing of accounts application. However, regarding the April 2023 contempt order and warrant for committal, because it was not under appeal, the Court had no jurisdiction to stay it under r. 63.02(1)(b) or to set it aside, vary it or give directions under r. 60.11(8).

However, section 134(2) of the CJA provided broad-based jurisdiction to make interim orders pending appeal. This section addresses situations where no specific remedy has been provided by the CJA or the Rules, and "some form of judicial intervention is necessary to prevent prejudice to a party to the appeal." It prevents situations from arising where an appellant is successful on appeal but, in the meantime, the subject matter of the proceeding has disappeared, and its ultimate result has been rendered nugatory. Where the order sought under s. 134(2) is analogous to an order imposing a stay, the principles applicable to that remedy should play a central role in deciding whether any remedy should be granted under s. 134(2).

S.D. met the criteria for a stay of the April 2023 contempt order and warrant for committal. She raised an arguable issue about the effect of the dismissal of her application to pass accounts on the April 2023 contempt order and warrant of committal. She could suffer from irreparable harm if the stay was not granted.

The balance of convenience also favoured a stay. Given that S.D. has brought a motion to stay the April 2023 contempt order and warrant of committal to the Superior Court, it was not appropriate for the Court to pre-empt that motion and stay the April 2023 contempt order and warrant of committal pending the appeal. That order was therefore only stayed pending the determination of the motion to stay it in the Superior Court to be heard in November 2025. Depending on the outcome of that motion, S.D. could return to the Court to request further relief.

2708959 Ontario Inc. v. Stratford (City), 2025 ONCA 512

[Lauwers, George and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A.B. Dryer and O. Kahane-Rapport, for the appellant

P. Lombardi, for the respondent

Facts:

The appellant owns a property where the building encroaches on a road allowance owned by the respondent municipality. The building was erected between 1998 and 2001 by the appellant's predecessor in title.

In 1998, the City approved the site plan agreement and the building permit drawing. All four (4) encroachments were featured on the drawing. On October 1, 2001, the City issued an occupancy and compliance permit certifying that the lands were being used in accordance with the zoning by-law, and that the building was constructed in accordance with the zoning by-laws. In 2019, in response to an inquiry by the appellant, the City confirmed that its records showed there were no outstanding work orders against the property. The appellant then bought the property and applied to the City in 2021 to re-zone it. It is currently used as part of a boutique inn.

The respondent objected to the encroachments for the first time in late 2021 and insisted that the appellant enter into an encroachment agreement under a City policy that came into force in 2006. This policy requires that a property owner seek permission from the City to encroach onto a road allowance or municipal property, subject to Council approval, and where an unapproved encroachment existed, to remove the encroachment at the owner's expense or seek permission to remain. The policy expressly excludes from its operation encroachments that were approved by the City before the policy came to force. The appellant refused to accept the respondent's terms and brought the application underlying this appeal. The application judge dismissed the application.

Issues:

Did the application judge make a palpable and overriding error of fact when he found that the municipality did not approve the encroaching structures when the building and site plan drawings were approved in 1998?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

No.

The Court found that no palpable and overriding errors of fact were made in the application judge's analysis and accordingly deferred to his findings. The Court agreed with the application judge that none of the City's actions formed a sufficient basis on which to conclude that the City expressly approved the encroachments.

The application judge found that in the site plan, the encroachments were not clearly identified as encroachments on municipal property, but were only visible upon significant investigation or interpretation of the site and building permit plans. Accordingly, he held there was no evidence that the City specifically, or tacitly, authorized the encroachments. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the finding that it was likely that the encroachments only came to light in 2021.

The application judge also noted that there was no evidence that the original owner or the architect had made any effort to draw the City's attention to the encroaching structures when it processed the building permit plans and the occupancy agreement. While no formal policy or by-law had been put in place, it was still common practice in the municipality to require encroachment agreements where appropriate. The lack of a formal policy and by-law did not mean all encroachments were therefore lawful. Further, it was noted by a witness that before the passage of the 2006 policy, the City would expressly approve encroachments and would have entered into an encroachment agreement to be registered on title if it had done so. Accordingly, the Court held that an encroachment agreement was necessary and dismissed the appeal.

The Court did comment, however, that the city may want to consider leniency on the terms it may wish to impose on the appellant in the encroachment agreement due to the fact that: (1) both sides were innocent in the original situation; (2) it was not the proponent who encroached but a successor in title who innocently relied on the City's compliance certificate; (3) the encroachments were not burdensome on the municipality or users of the road or sidewalk, and; (4) the law generally resists retroactivity, and this may create a basic fairness issue.

Alami v. Haddad, 2025 ONCA 527

[Coroza, Madsen and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.H.A., acting in person

C. Baker, for the respondent

Facts:

The parties were married in 1995, separated in 2017 and divorced in 2018. The former matrimonial home was in the appellant's name solely. The home was refinanced by the appellant three times without the respondent's knowledge or consent, twice during the marriage (the "First Mortgage") and once after separation (the "Second Mortgage").

The appellant commenced the underlying proceedings in 2016. The respondent did not claim a resulting trust interest in the home until 2020, after the parties were divorced. Throughout the course of the proceedings, numerous temporary orders were made. In 2022, the appellant's pleadings were struck in relation to the valuation date for her failure to abide by numerous court orders and directions. Her appeal of that order was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The trial judge released a comprehensive judgment addressing all issues arising from the parties' separation. The trial judge ordered that, among other things, the appellant owned the matrimonial home upon a 50% resulting trust for the respondent, the home should be sold, neither would owe the other an equalization payment, and the appellant was to be solely responsible for the mortgage registered by her after the date of separation. The appellant appealed all aspects of the judgment. In oral argument, only the grounds related to the home were pursued.

Issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in finding that the respondent had a beneficial interest in the former matrimonial home pursuant to the doctrine of resulting trust?

2. Did the trial judge err in relying on section 5(6) of the Family Law Act to order the appellant responsible for the portion of the current mortgage attributable to the second mortgage?

3. Did the trial judge err elsewhere in her findings?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. No

The Court turned to section 10(1) of the Family Law Act, which authorizes the court to determine questions of title between spouses, including the question of whether legal title actually reflects beneficial ownership. The general rule for gratuitous transfers is that the rebuttable presumption of resulting trust applies. This rebuttable presumption flows from the principle that equity presumes bargains and not gifts, and the onus is on the transferee to rebut, on a balance of probabilities by evidence, that the transferor intended the transfer to be a gift.

The Court upheld the trial judge's findings, that it was highly improbable that the appellant had funded the purchase of the first or second home alone, given her modest income and primary responsibility of childcare at that time.

2. No.

The appellant argued that, having found no equalization payment was owing, the trial judge erred in invoking section 5(6). Although the Court disagreed with the trial judge's approach of the issue, through the unequal division "lens", it found that the trial judge ultimately and correctly treated the mortgage as a post-separation adjustment in the respondent's favour, as it was solely the appellant's responsibility that the post-separation debt was incurred.

3. No.

The Court found that none the appellant's other allegations of the trial judge's errors were sufficiently substantiated.

Janic v. Janic, 2025 ONCA 509

[Thorburn, Copeland and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M.J., acting in person

M. Milczarczyk, for the respondent

Facts:

The parties physically separated on February 25, 2019, and a Final Order dealing with parenting, expense sharing and support issues was issued on January 6, 2021. The Final Order uses February 1, 2019, as the starting date for the payment of child support. Having paid no child support as at the date of the Final Order, the appellant's arrears were fixed at $32,106 for February 2019 to December 2022. The appellant did not appeal the Final Order.

The appellant brought a motion to vary the Final Order, focusing on three aspects of it: (i) ongoing child support; (ii) arrears of child support; and (iii) division of children's expenses. The appellant sought to vary the apportionment of section 7 expenses to "more accurately reflect the parties' respective and actual income amounts."

Issues:

1. Did the motion judge err in her treatment of financial evidence and failing to recognize fraud in the respondent mother's financial disclosure?

2. Did the motion judge err in imputing income to him without properly reviewing and considering the financial and medical evidence about his psychiatric condition and consequent inability to work?

3. Did the motion judge err in presiding over the motion for change when she was in a conflict of interest, having presided over prior enforcement proceedings related to the Final Order?

4. Did the motion judge err in making an order that contravened federal law?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. No.

The Court did not see an error in the motion judge's finding. The appellant claimed that the respondent filed false financial disclosure and perjured herself to the court and the CRA when she failed to include the sums that she withdrew from her corporate account in 2018 in her income calculation.

The motion judge attributed the amount the respondent withdrew from the account to her income for 2018. The motion judge found that, while the respondent could have provided more timely disclosure regarding the corporate account withdrawal, she did not intentionally mislead the court. The motion judge was entitled to accept that the respondent forgot the corporate account withdrawals that took place before the separation.

2. No.

The appellant submitted the motion judge wrongly dismissed psychiatric reports and expert opinion evidence regarding his mental health and ability to earn income, denying him procedural fairness. Therefore, the motion judge erred in refusing to retroactively change his income figures for 2019 through 2021. The appellant claimed he quit his employment due to stress in 2018 and admitted himself into a rehabilitation program in September 2021. He argued that the Final Order should be amended to reflect his earnings.

The motion judge recognized that there was a material change in the father's circumstances when he attended rehabilitation. However, the motion judge did not find that he was incapable of any kind of work. The medical documentation and physician notes were based on the appellants self-reporting, he filed no reports or affidavits that could be cross-examined upon, none of the documents provided an assessment of his employment capacity, and he received money from his family to meet his living expenses.

The motion judge adjusted the appellant's imputed income for 2022 to 2024 to account for changing tax policies and regular, substantial monetary gifts from his family. The respondent's contribution to additional child-related expenses under section 7 was set to increase slightly each year.

The Court saw no merit in the appellant's argument that the motion judge denied him procedural fairness by dismissing his reports and documents, no error in the motion judge's refusal to change the imputed income for 2019 to 2021 and no reason to overturn the imputed income determination.

3. No.

In 2022, the motion judge heard a motion brought by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office for a Temporary Default Order requiring the appellant to make monthly payments toward ongoing child support and arrears. The appellant submitted that this gave rise to a conflict of interest when she subsequently heard the motion for change. As judges are presumed to be impartial, a strict test is applied to rebut this presumption. The test asks what an "informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – [would] conclude". This strict test was not satisfied in these circumstances.

4. No.

The Court dismissed the appellant's argument that the motion judge's order conflicted with federal law, specifically the Divorce Act, the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the Criminal Code and the Income Tax Act. The motion judge's order referred to and was consistent with the Divorce Act and the Federal Child Support Guidelines. The Criminal Code and the Income Tax Act had no application to this proceeding.

Mullin v. Sherlock, 2025 ONCA 510

[Huscroft, Harvison Young and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

H. Hansen and Z. Martin, for the appellant

R. Halpern and J. Brown, for the respondent

Facts:

This appeal challenged the result of a trial in a family law dispute that dealt with claims for unjust enrichment arising out of a joint family venture and spousal support. Further, this appeal raised the issue of the relationship between unjust enrichment and equalization.

The parties lived together for twelve years prior to marriage. During the relationship, Ms. M worked exclusively for Mr. S's business, GS Medical Packaging Inc. Her salary steadily decreased before she was laid off, but she continued working full-time without compensation for over a year. Mr. S acquired full ownership of GS Medical during their cohabitation. Although Ms. M commenced her claim shortly after separation, trial was delayed due to Mr. S's failure to provide full and proper disclosure, particularly regarding the value of his business interests. His pleadings were eventually struck for repeated non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The Court granted him limited participatory rights at trial, but he did not provide any further financial disclosure, which significantly bore on the trial judge's findings. Ms. M did not seek equalization of net family property, but rather monetary damages for unjust enrichment. The trial judge awarded Ms. M $3,000,000 in monetary damages for unjust enrichment, $365,624 as lump sum spousal support and costs.

Issues:

1. Did the trial judge err in law in his unjust enrichment analysis?

2. Did the trial judge err in mixed fact and law in his conclusion and analysis on the joint family venture finding?

3. Did the trial judge err in mixed fact and law in accepting incomplete evidence about the value of GS Medical?

4. Did the trial judge err by equalizing the value of GS Medical, creating an inconsistent result with the current jurisprudence?

5. Did the trial judge err in his application of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines ("SSAGs")?

Holding:

Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning:

1. No.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's application of the Kerr v. Baranow framework. First, the trial judge found that Ms. M gave Mr. S a benefit which could be restored in specie or in money by working constantly in GS Medical from 2001 to 2012, accepting a salary reduction, and working full-time without pay. She also ran the household, maintained the home, cared for their dogs, and more. Second, the trial judge found that Ms. M had suffered a corresponding deprivation by giving up her architectural career, providing underpaid and unpaid labour, and performing unpaid domestic services. Third, the trial judge found there was no juristic reason for the benefit conferred on Mr. S and deprivation suffered by Ms. M, as both parties had agreed to build GS Medical to finance their retirement. The Court found Mr. S's arguments regarding lack of evidence and Ms. M's qualifications to be without merit. The Court concluded that the trial judge's analysis was thorough, and his conclusions are owed deference on appeal.

2. No.

Mr. S did not dispute the legal test for a joint family venture but argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence. The Court rejected this, finding the trial judge was alive to all four Kerr factors (1) mutual effort of the parties, (2) economic integration of the parties' finances, (3) actual intent of the parties, and (4) priority of the family. He argued the trial judge erred because there was insufficient evidence about a substantial and direct link between Ms. M's efforts and GS Medical's success.

The Court rejected this argument. The trial judge was alive to the four pillars from Kerr v. Baranow and found they were met based on Ms. M's evidence. The parties' joint goal was to build GS Medical to fund their retirement, and both contributed toward that. The trial judge's findings were grounded in the record and entitled to deference, particularly given Mr. S's failure to provide disclosure, which caused the evidentiary gaps he now relied on.

3. No.

Mr. S submitted that even if the unjust enrichment and joint family venture findings were correct, the trial judge erred in valuing GS Medical and awarding Ms. M 50%. He claimed this figure was arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence, and that any award should have been based on a quantum meruit or "value received" basis.

The Court disagreed. The trial judge found that there was a joint family venture, and the monetary awards are properly assessed on a "value survived" basis, by reference to the overall increase in the couple's wealth during the relationship. The trial judge found there was a joint family venture and no bars to such a remedy and reasonably concluded that Ms. M's contributions, both domestic and non-domestic, justified a "value survived" measure.

As for the award, there was little evidence before the trial judge that could have assisted him in coming to a lesser or more precise amount. The only evidence he had as to the value of Mr. S's interest in GS Medical was two mortgage applications signed by Mr. S and opinion evidence from Ms. M's expert. Given Mr. S's failure to disclose financial information, the trial judge was entitled to draw inferences in Ms. M's favour, relying on the limited available evidence.

4. No.

The Court rejected Mr. S's argument that the trial judge improperly applied an equalization regime. The Family Law Act regime did not apply to the parties' lengthy cohabitation period, and the short marriage would not have resulted in a fair equalization. The trial judge appropriately relied on unjust enrichment principles and the "value survived" approach given the circumstances.

5. No.

The trial judge awarded a lump sum in spousal support. Mr. S argued the judge misapplied the SSAGs, but the Court found no merit in this claim. The judge found Ms. M was entitled to both compensatory and non-compensatory support, having given up her career for the family and GS Medical. The parties lived a privileged lifestyle, including luxury homes, sailing, golf and travel. Mr. S claimed the property award was not considered when considering the amount of spousal support awarded. The Court disagreed. The trial judge's support analysis of the unjust enrichment and joint family venture claims preceded his analysis of the spousal support claim in his reasons, and they formed a clear backdrop to them.

Peoples Trust Company v. PSP Services Inc., 2025 ONCA 524

[Madsen J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

I.C. Matthews and L. Thistle, for the moving party, Peoples Trust Company

G. Gryguc, for the responding party, PSP Services Inc.

Facts:

People Trust Company ("PTC") and PSP Services Inc. ("PSP") had a contract under which PSP allowed PTC to perform an on-site inspection at any time to verify PSP's compliance with the contract. In February 2024, PSP gave notice that it was terminating the contract.

PTC later invoked an audit which PSP did not permit, taking the position that PTC lost audit rights after the termination. In May 2024, an order was made compelling PSP to submit to the audit, which PSP did not appeal. However, PSP also did not cooperate with the audit process. Three further orders were made directing the progress and completion of the audit, but PSP did not appeal or cooperate with those orders either.

PTC brought a motion for contempt, which was divided into liability and penalty phases. PSP initially agreed to the audit before the contempt motion was to be heard but then continued to thwart the audit, so the contempt motion was brought back on. Chalmers J. heard the liability phase of the contempt motion and found PSP in contempt of four court orders made in respect of the audit process, giving PSP two months to purge its contempt, which PSP did not do. During the penalty phase, Chalmers J. ordered the appointment of an investigative receiver to enable the completion of the audit, that PSP pay into court the sum of $1,998,612.07 pending the completion of the audit and $500,000 in costs (the "Penalty Order"). The motion judge noted PSP's repeated acts of contempt and failure to comply with court orders despite being given ample time, and its financial gain by doing so.

PSP appealed the financial sanctions of the Penalty Order, but not the contempt finding or the appointment of the receiver. PTC brought a motion seeking an order to partially lift the automatic stay of Chalmer J.'s order requiring PSP to pay $1,998,612.07 into court.

Issues:

Should the automatic stay of the Penalty Order be lifted?

Holding:

Motion granted.

Reasoning:

Yes.

The Court emphasized that an order to lift an automatic stay is discretionary and involves consideration of contextual factors set out in Antunes v. Limen Structures Ltd.: the grounds of appeal; the parties' position at trial; what has happened since the trial; the general circumstances of the case, including the trial judge's reasons; and the probable but uncontrollable delay between trial and appeal. In determining whether to grant an order to partially lift the stay, the Court applied the test from SA Horeca Financial Services v. Light, which requires the consideration of the following principal factors: (1) the financial hardship to the respondent if the stay is not lifted; (2) the ability of the respondent to repay or provide security for the amount paid; and (3) the merits of the appeal.

The Court found that the first Horeca factor weighed in favour of partially lifting the stay. In consideration of PSP's history of disobeying court orders, if the stay was not partially lifted, PTC would risk uncertainty of recovery if it were determined to be the successful party on appeal. Such uncertainty would be lessened by having PSP pay funds into court.

The Court also found that the second Horeca factor weighed in favour of partially lifting the stay. The typical concern that justifies an automatic stay involves the uncertainty of recovery if the appellant had to pay the judgment and then succeeded on appeal. That was not the case here.

Regarding the third Horeca factor, the Court found the merits of the appeal to appear weak, emphasizing the broad discretion judges have to craft penalties on a finding of contempt of court. Absent an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence or demonstrably unfit sentence, the Court will not intervene. The Court deferred to the trial judge's penalty decision, especially since PSP did not assert that the penalty was demonstrably unfit nor any specific error(s).

The Court further noted that partially lifting the stay would not prejudice PSP, as PSP acknowledged that there were no concerns with respect to its ability to fund its appeal even if the stay was partially lifted.

Hordo v. CAA Insurance Company, 2025 ONCA 529

[Lauwers J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

D.H. and M.H., acting in person

P. Kazdan, for the respondent/responding party

Facts:

The appellants, D.H. and M.H., wanted to appeal the Divisional Court's decision dated December 6, 2024, which was released to the parties on December 16, 2024, to set aside the lower Court's decision for errors of law and fact.

Rule 61.03.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that parties making motions for leave to appeal in writing shall be served within 15 days after the making of the order or decision from which leave to appeal is sought. Therefore, the appellants' deadline to appeal the decision would have been at the earliest, December 23, 2024, and at the latest (counting from the date it was released), on December 31, 2024. The appellants did not submit any documentation to the Court until February 18, 2025, and had since been unable or unwilling to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issues:

Should the appellants be permitted to proceed with their motion for leave to appeal even though it was long out of time?

Holding:

Motion granted.

Reasoning:

Yes.

The Court granted the appellants' motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal. The Court found that in their filed material, the appellants did not actually seek leave to appeal, although the motion could be deemed to do so. However, the Court held that due to the provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the Court could not grant any of the relief sought in the Notice of Motion and that the appellants required leave from a panel of the Court if the appeal was to proceed.

The Court held that the overarching consideration for extension of time is whether the justice of the case requires that an extension be given. Each case depends on its own circumstances, but the Court is to consider all relevant considerations, including: 1) whether the moving party formed a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period; 2) the length of and explanation for the delay in filing; 3) any prejudice to the responding parties due to the delay; and 4) the merits of the proposed appeal. The merits factor is the most important factor and can be determinative alone in denying an extension of time.

The Court held that the appellants always intended to appeal, and while they did not offer a real explanation for the delay, the appellants had an inability to prepare and provide necessary documentation, often "uselessly" adding parties not properly added, and including irrelevant causes of action. The Court also noted that the appellants were "ungovernable", due to their exchanges with Court staff, demonstrating that they were not compliant with the Court's requirements for the filings process. The Court found that the respondents, CAA Insurance Company, would not be substantially prejudiced by an extension order.

Regarding the merit factor, the Court found that the appellant's reasonable apprehension of bias allegation might have some merit on appeal, and as a result, the Court could not conclude that the appeal was utterly without merit.

The Court granted the appellants' motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, with the leave to appeal deemed to be perfected and referred to the Court's ordinary process for addressing a motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

AST Trust Company (Canada) v. Joseph-Walker, 2025 ONCA 521

[Roberts J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

O. Hoque, for the moving party/appellant

C.J. Staples, for the responding party/respondent

Facts:

In August 2021, the responding party, AST Trust Company (Canada) ("AST"), advanced a $2,304,000 mortgage to the moving party, J.J.W., secured against her Richmond Hill property. J.J.W. was in payment default under the mortgage since March 2022, and made no payments thereafter.

AST's motion for summary judgment and leave to issue a writ of possession was granted. J.J.W. delivered a notice of appeal on July 17, 2024. No further appeal materials were delivered. The Court's Registrar sent a notice of intention to dismiss the appeal for delay on October 4, 2024, advising that an extension of time for the perfection of the appeal could be obtained by the filing of the consent of the parties or by order of a judge of the Court before the deadline on October 28, 2024. J.J.W. took no steps to extend the time for perfection of the appeal. On December 12, 2024, the Registrar dismissed the appeal for delay.

On May 1, 2025, a writ of possession was issued and filed with the sheriff's office, and an eviction was scheduled for July 10, 2025. J.J.W. brought an urgent motion to the Court seeking an order: 1) setting aside the Registrar's administrative dismissal of her appeal; 2) extending the time for the perfection of her appeal; and 3) staying the writ of possession and the scheduled eviction.

Issues:

Should J.J.W.'s motion for an order setting aside the Registrar's administrative dismissal of her appeal, extending the time for the perfection of her appeal, and staying the writ or possession and scheduled eviction be granted?

Holding:

Motion dismissed.

Reasoning:

No.

The Court dismissed J.J.W.'s motion, finding that the justice of the case did not warrant reinstating J.J.W.'s appeal. The overarching consideration for setting aside administrative dismissals and extending time for the perfection of appeals is whether the justice of the case requires such orders to be granted considering: 1) a continuing intention to appeal; 2) the length of and explanation for the delay; 3) prejudice to the respondent; and 4) the merits of the appeal.

The Court found that while J.J.W.'s timely notice of appeal evidenced an initial intention to appeal, her failure to take further steps advancing the appeal until more than a month after receiving the notice to vacate clearly belied a continuing intention to appeal. She failed to adequately explain the lengthy delay, the reasons for the delay, and her failure to take the requisite steps to advance and then reinstate the appeal.

The Court found that J.J.W. also did not meet the relatively low bar for the merits of appeal factor. J.J.W. argued that the motion judge erred by 1) concluding that the mortgage agreement provided for a three-month interest bonus on default, and 2) in finding that the mortgage agreement allowed for an escalation in the interest rate. The Court concluded that neither ground of appeal had any chance of success. As for the first ground, the motions judge found that the three-month interest bonus on default was an enforceable term of the mortgage, and this interpretation was reasonable and reflected its plain language. There was no error displacing the deference owed on appeal to the motion judge's contractual interpretation of the mortgage agreement. Regarding the second ground, the motion judge correctly stated the current mortgage interest rate charged by AST, and there was no escalation of the interest rate.

The Court concluded that while AST did not allege any specific prejudice from J.J.W.'s delay in advancing the appeal, AST nevertheless suffered prejudice. AST had advanced funds to J.J.W. under the mortgage four years ago, which she did not pay back. Further, J.J.W. was in default for over three years, and was in even further default under the mortgage by registering six subsequent mortgages on title without notice to AST.

While it was not necessary to formally address the stay issue given the Court's determination not to set aside the administrative dismissal of the appeal, the Court commented that it was not persuaded that J.J.W. would suffer irreparable prejudice, as the eviction from her property was caused by her payment default and failure to take the requisite steps to proceed with the appeal, and she was aware of the potential eviction for some time. Further, there was no evidence that J.J.W. did not have the means to move to other premises, and there was evidence that she secured alternate funding, paid out subsequent mortgages, and had tenants who paid rent.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

6971971 Canada Inc. v. Messica, 2025 ONCA 514

[Coroza, Madsen and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P.S. Wadhwa, for the appellant

O. Hoque, for the respondents

College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario v. Yan, 2025 ONCA 520

[Thorburn, Copeland and Monahan JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N.X.Y.Y., acting in person

P.A. Wright, for the respondent/responding party College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario

A. Windsor, for the respondent/responding party M.B.

Dhaliwal v. Richter International Ltd., 2025 ONCA 522

[Copeland, Wilson and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

T. Danson, for the appellants

D. Hamson and S.R. Ramesh, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Arbitrations, Arbitrators, Removal, Procedural and Natural Justice, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, ss. 13(1), 13(3)

Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 526

[Gillese, Roberts and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Rouben, for the respondents/moving parties A.U.V., S.H.R.S., M.A.R.Q., Q.N.G.S., P.B., and A.H.A.

G. Ko and F. Nasca, for the respondents/moving parties A.I.A., H.K., N.D.O., I.T., and F.Z.

J. Haylock, for the respondent/moving party S.S.

S. Dewart and T. Gleason, for the appellant/responding party

Keywords: Regulated Professions, Lawyers, Costs

Sidhu v. Jain, 2025 ONCA 528

[Lauwers J.A. (Motions Judge)]

Counsel:

J. Zibarras and E. Craddock, for the appellants/moving parties S.J. and Soneil Lincoln Inc.

H. Dhaliwal, for the respondent/responding party S.P.K.S.

E. Moore, for the respondent/responding party N.S.

James Bay Resources Limited v. Mak Mera Nigeria Limited, 2025 ONCA 530

[Gillese, Roberts and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

D.A. Cruz and A.-A. Delage, for the appellants

H. Book and W. McLennan, for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Contracts, Civil Procedure, Costs

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be ought about your specific circumstances.

Court Of Appeal Summaries (July 14-18, 2025)

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