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Lamont v The Royal Women’s Hospital (No 3) [2026] VSC 490 (Lamont) is a decision which was handed down in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 31 July 2026.
Background
Barbara Lamont (the Plaintiff) commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria against The Royal Women’s Hospital and Uniting (Victoria and Tasmania) Limited (the Defendants).
The Plaintiff fell pregnant at 16, and her stepmother and grandmother, opposed to her keeping the baby, expressed this through verbal and physical harassment. She was thereafter admitted to Girls Memorial Home in Fairfield (the Girls Home) where she remained for the duration of her pregnancy, attending regular antenatal clinicals at The Royal Women’s Hospital (the Hospital). Evidence was given of a meeting between the Plaintiff and a social worker on 9 October 1968. Whether that meeting occurred, and what was discussed, was in issue.
The Plaintiff was admitted to the Hospital on 10 November 1968 and gave birth to her son, Derek. After delivery, she alleged that she was not permitted to see or touch Derek and could only observe him through the nursery glass.
Derek was admitted to the Methodist Babies Home in South Yarra (the Babies Home) on 18 November 1968. The Plaintiff subsequently returned to the Girls Home and attended a meeting with a social worker to give formal consent to the adoption of Derek. Who attended that meeting, and what occurred at it, was in issue.
The Plaintiff gave evidence of lifelong mental health challenges, including anxiety, and that the adoption remained a source of grief and distress.
Adoption of Children Act 1964 (Vic)
Judd J considered the provisions of the Adoption of Children Act 1964 (Vic) (the Adoption Act), including section 26(1) which provided for the revocation of consent within 30 days and section 28(2) which provided for the requirement for medical certification or other adequate evidence where consent was to be given within 5 days of birth.
Judd J rejected the argument that consent could not be given at all within that 5-day window, noting instead that the requisite certification simply had to accompany it. Her Honour was satisfied the Plaintiff had indicated an intention to relinquish Derek at the meeting on 9 October 1968 and gave formal consent on 19 November 1968.
Counterfactual
The Plaintiff argued that, but for the alleged coercion, she would have kept Derek by living with a friend, working 50 hours per week, employing someone to care for the baby, and potentially obtaining support from Derek’s father who lived on Thursday Island.
Judd J found this optimistic and unrealistic, given the lack of family support and the practical difficulties of combining full-time work with full-time care.
Alleged Lack of Consent
The consent form was purportedly signed by the Plaintiff on 19 November 1968, witnessed by a social worker employed by Uniting (Victoria and Tasmania) Limited, who later provided an affidavit stating she was present when it was signed and that it was read and explained to the Plaintiff in accordance with usual practice at the time.
The Plaintiff initially denied signing it, then conceded during oral evidence that she had but argued that she had not signed it in the presence of the social worker and had not been told of alternatives to adoption or her right to revoke. The social worker, though lacking independent recollection of the Plaintiff, gave evidence of her usual practice which included meeting mothers alone, not coercing them, and advising them of the cooling-off period.
Judd J accepted that the Plaintiff’s memory, while understandably not precisely accurate after almost 60 years, was unreliable and required caution when assessing her evidence. Her Honour accepted the social worker’s evidence, and found consent was not brought about by coercion or force.
Hospital Policies and Practices
The Plaintiff argued that Derek’s removal to the Babies Home before her formal consent was unlawful, and that she retained a legal right to him until consent was given or the 30-day revocation period expired. Judd J accepted the social worker’s evidence that, once a mother indicated an intention to relinquish, the usual practice was to tell her the baby would be discharged to the Babies Home pending placement, and rejected the Plaintiff’s present recollection, almost 60 years later, that she was not told that. Given the finding that the Plaintiff indicated that intention on 9 October 1968, the transfer was consistent with practice at the time.
The “A” (adoption) file notation did not mean the baby would be forcibly removed or automatically placed for adoption, but reflected the anticipated separation where adoption was contemplated.
Judd J also accepted that the Hospital had, before the Plaintiff’s admission, already received information consistent with her planning to relinquish Derek, and did not regard the transfer as tantamount to abduction.
Duty of Care
The Hospital admitted a non-delegable duty of care limited to medical treatment. Uniting (Victoria and Tasmania) Limited admitted a general duty to take reasonable care in obtaining consent, but denied any duty to encourage the Plaintiff to keep her child.
Judd J emphasised that breach is assessed prospectively, by 1968 standards, in an era of limited government support and stigma attached to unmarried pregnancy.
Hospital’s and Babies Home’s Actions
Judd J found that the prevailing 1968 view was that non-contact was more compassionate than contact before adoption, and that neither the Hospital or Uniting (Victoria and Tasmania) Limited had an obligation to encourage mothers to keep their children, nor any policy of coercion. Their later apologies (the Hospital’s in 2023 and the Uniting (Victoria and Tasmania) Limited’s in 2012) were not admissions of liability. The social worker was entitled to hold the view that adoption was in a child’s best interests absent family support without that amounting to negligence, and Her Honour was not satisfied the Plaintiff would not have proceeded with the adoption.
Conclusion
The following key principles arise from Lamont:
- Duty of care is assessed prospectively, by reference to the era’s standards.
- Institutions had no obligation to encourage or persuade mothers against adoption or provide advice concerning alternatives to adoption.
- Usual-practice evidence from a social worker or other person involved in the adoption process, even without specific recollection of the particular adoption, may carry significant weight.
- Executed consent documents will not be readily overturned, and the Plaintiff bears the relevant onus.
- Consent given within 5 days of birth is valid provided certification requirements are met.
- A formal apology does not amount to evidence of admission of liability.
Judd J ultimately ordered that the proceeding be dismissed.
You can read the full decision here.
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