On June 5, the U.S. Supreme Court published a decision in Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services that clarifies the burden of proof necessary in a "majority group" discrimination claim under Title VII. Majority group discrimination (or reverse discrimination) involves discrimination by a minority group against someone who is not in the minority group. The decision in Ames resolves a circuit split with respect to the applicability of the "background circumstances" rule and expressly rejects the rule. This rule required majority group employees to provide additional evidence – i.e., certain background circumstances – to support their Title VII discrimination claims. Going forward, majority group discrimination claims will be analyzed under the same legal framework as minority group discrimination claims.
In Ames, the plaintiff alleged that she was denied a promotion and subsequently demoted in favor of an LGBTQ+ co-worker and new hire because she was not, herself, LGBTQ+. While the plaintiff was able to meet the prima facie elements of a Title VII sex discrimination claim, the trial court held that the plaintiff was required to come forward with additional "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." When the plaintiff failed to proffer these additional "background circumstances," the trial court awarded summary judgment to the employer. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, following precedent from four other circuit courts.
The plaintiff argued to the Supreme Court that Title VII presents a level playing field. It does not favor minority or majority employees and candidates. The Supreme Court agreed in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Brown Jackson. First, the court framed the issue in the context of the very longstanding McDonnell Douglas framework that lays out the order of presentation and ultimately proof to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. The court held that the "background circumstances" rule for majority plaintiffs does not belong in that framework. Second, the court addressed its prior precedents, all of which confirm that the "background circumstances" rule runs directly contrary to Title VII's language and purpose.
Practically, Ames levels the playing field for majority plaintiffs. With a significant rise in majority plaintiff cases, this will certainly affect employers involved in such suits. However, Ames may flag additional practical concerns. First, it does not address whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies only to pleading a claim or also to summary judgment adjudication. Some courts have questioned the ongoing validity of McDonnell Douglas in the summary judgment context, so this question deserves an answer – an answer that Ames intentionally punted. Second, does Ames affect in any way other informal rules of proof, such as the "same actor"/ "same age" defense? The same actor defense presumes that the person who hires or promotes an individual, regardless of their protected class, is unlikely to discriminate against them based on that same protected class.
Based on the statutory language, Title VII does not differentiate between individuals who are in the majority group versus those in the minority group with respect to the burdens that must be met to prove a discrimination claim. While there are several unanswered questions that may be addressed in future cases, for now, Taft expects to see a continued increase in the number of majority group / reverse discrimination claims.
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