The TCA’s On-Site Inspection Authority: An Assessment From The Normative Framework To Practical Application

Across modern competition regimes, on-site inspections occupy a central place among the investigative tools of competition authorities and the Turkish Competition Authority (the “TCA”) is no exception, having been entrusted with broad powers to carry out such inspections to detect covert infringements of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”). Although the scope of these powers has attracted constitutional debate in the legal literature, the TCA’s consistent decisional practice has, in practice, led to the crystallisation of generally accepted standards. Recent constitutional case-law, however, suggests that a distinction may be emerging between the formal validity of these powers and the constitutional limits governing their application in practice.

Within this framework, this article addresses the TCA’s on-site inspection authority regulated under Article 15 of Law No. 4054, first outlining the statutory framework including the recent legislative amendments and subsequently analysing the principles that emerge from the Turkish Competition Board’s (the TCA’s decisive body, “TCB”) decisional practice.

I. The Scope of the TCA’s On-Site Inspection Authority

The TCA's on-site inspection authority is the product of a framework that has evolved considerably over time, shaped by legislative reform, constitutional jurisprudence, and regulatory guidance. This section examines that framework across two dimensions; it first outlines the statutory basis for on-site inspections under Article 15 of Law No. 4054, the key amendments that have expanded and clarified the scope of those powers, and the Guidelines on the Examination of Digital Data during On-Site Inspections (“Guidelines”), which constitute the primary operational framework governing the exercise of these powers in practice. It then turns to the constitutional dimension, tracing the line of authority from the Ford Otosan individual application decision to the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (“TCC”) November 2025 norm control ruling.

I.1. Legislative Framework and Amendments

Article 15 of Law No. 4054 stipulates that the TCA is granted with powers to conduct on-site inspections. These include the examination of all the books, data and documents in both physical and electronic form, the taking of copies of such material, and the requesting of verbal or written statements from the representatives and employees of undertakings. Historically, the TCB was not required to obtain a judicial warrant in order to exercise these powers. A decision of the criminal magistrate was envisaged only where an on-site inspection was hindered or was likely to be hindered.

The scope of Article 15 was further clarified and expanded by the 2020 amendment to Article 15(1)(a)¹, which expressly authorised the TCB to take copies and physical samples of electronic data and information systems. This amendment was subjected to abstract constitutional review by the TCC, which held that the power to obtain copies of documents and data during on-site inspections is a necessary and proportionate tool for the detection of competition law infringements and does not amount to a disproportionate interference with the right to the protection of personal data. In other words, the TCC confirmed the constitutional validity of the substantive power to copy and preserve digital evidence.²

In parallel with the 2020 amendment, the TCA adopted the Guidelines. Reflecting a regulatory approach aligning closely with the European Union counterpart, the Guidelines seeks to structure the examination of data held in electronic environments and information systems³; and authorises the case handlers to use forensic software and e-discovery tools to carry out targeted searches on servers, computers, cloud services and portable devices, and they allow an initial “quick review” of devices allocated for personal use in order to determine whether they contain business-related data. Where no such data is identified, the device must be excluded from the scope of the inspection. This framework is intended to reconcile the effective enforcement of competition law with the protection of privacy, although it continues to raise questions in the doctrine regarding the proportionality and the handling of personal devices.

I.2. Constitutional Developments: Ford Otosan and the November 2025 Decisions

The Ford Otosan decision addressed a different but closely related aspect of Article 15, namely the manner in which on-site inspections are carried out. In this case, the TCC held that an on-site inspection conducted solely on the basis of a TCB decision, without a prior judicial warrant, had violated the right to the inviolability of the domicile under Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye (“Constitution”). A key element of the ruling is the broad interpretation of “domicile”, which the TCC found to include certain non-public areas of workplaces, such as management offices, workrooms and administrative sections where professional activities are conducted. Entry into such areas for the purpose of searching or seizure, including the copying of digital data, constitutes an interference with the right to the inviolability of the domicile and, as a rule, requires a duly issued judicial decision. Thus, while the power to copy digital data as such was upheld in the abstract review, the Ford Otosan decision established that the exercise of this power is subject to the procedural safeguard of prior judicial authorisation where constitutionally protected premises are concerned. However, following this individual application decision, no legislative amendment has yet been enacted in respect of the relevant statutory provision, and the proposed legislative amendment remains pending before the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye.

The constitutional debate surrounding the TCA's on-site inspection powers was revisited in November 2025, when the TCC rendered a new decision⁴ through a procedurally distinct mechanism: norm control proceedings.⁵ The referral originated from two separate proceedings pending before the 13 ^th Chamber of the Council of State and the Ankara 11^th Administrative Court, both arising from administrative fines imposed by the TCB for the alleged obstruction of on-site inspections conducted without prior judicial authorisation.

The referring courts challenged two elements of Article 15 of Law No. 4054. First, they argued that the phrase "where it deems necessary" in Article 15(1), which confers discretionary authority on the TCB to initiate on-site inspections, fails to define the conditions for its exercise with sufficient precision and does not provide for effective judicial oversight; and the second sentence of Article 15(3), which limits the requirement for a criminal magistrate judge order to cases where an inspection is obstructed or is likely to be obstructed. The TCC, by majority vote, upheld the constitutionality of the former, reasoning that the scope of the power is defined by reference to the TCB's statutory duties, that inspections are assessed on a case-by-case basis, and that the written authorisation requirement constitutes a sufficient safeguard against arbitrariness. The majority confined its analysis to Articles 2 and 167 of the Constitution and did not engage with Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the inviolability of domicile. The second sentence of Article 15(3) was not examined on the merits, as the TCC found it to be inapplicable to the underlying disputes⁶.

The November 2025 decision therefore needs to be read carefully against the backdrop of Ford Otosan. While these two decisions are not formally contradictory, Ford Otosan concerned the application of Article 15 in a specific case and found a violation of Article 21, whereas the November 2025 decision assessed the constitutionality of Article 15 in the abstract and confined its analysis to Articles 2 and 167. Having said that, the majority’s decision not to expressly address Article 21 is noteworthy, particularly in light of the TCC’s recent recognition in Ford Otosan that business premises may fall within the scope of “domicile”.

The distinction can be explained by the differing procedural contexts of the decisions, namely individual application and abstract norm control, which shape the scope and intensity of the TCC’s review in different ways. Taken together, the two decisions suggest that, while the statutory framework remains formally valid, its application in practice may still give rise to constitutional risks in cases involving constitutionally protected premises, particularly in the absence of prior judicial authorisation. In this respect, the emerging case-law effectively separates the formal validity of the legal framework from the constitutionality of its concrete application.

Notwithstanding these open questions, the November 2025 decision has immediate practical significance: it stabilises the enforcement environment by reaffirming the legal basis of the TCA’s long-standing inspection model, despite the constitutional concerns articulated in Ford Otosan. Accordingly, in the absence of legislative reform, and with a proposed amendment still pending before the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, the constitutional debate on on-site inspections is likely to persist.

II. Analysis of the TCB’s Approach Within the Framework of its Reasoned Decisions

Decision statistics for recent years illustrate the increasing importance attached by the TCB to the effective conduct of on-site inspections and to sanctions for conduct amounting to their hindrance or obstruction. Indeed, according to the TCA’s publicly available figures, a total amount of TRY 698,804,700⁷ in fines was imposed during the period from 2020 to the first half of 2025 due to the hindrance or obstruction of on-site inspections. In particular, the transition from 2020 to 2021, the year in which the amendment to Article 15(1)(a) entered into force and the Guidelines were adopted, alone reflects an increase of approximately forty-sevenfold. For 2025, the administrative monetary fines imposed as per Article 16/1(d) have been increased by approximately 150% compared to the previous year. Based on decisions concerning publicly listed companies, at least TRY 1,295,902,606.94 in fines has already been imposed on BİM⁸ and TRY 282,416,376.34 on Coca-Cola⁹ in 2025. According to the data available, it is evident that fines linked to on-site inspections now reach levels that rival, and in some instances exceed, the totals recorded in entire previous years.

Taking into account the share of fines imposed for conduct related to on-site inspections within the total amount of administrative fines, and the fact that, the TCB has rendered over 100 decisions to date concerning the hindrance or obstruction of on-site inspections, a clear pattern emerges. While such fines accounted for approximately 0.11% of the total fines in 2020, their share rose to 10.05% in 2023. Although the share declined to approximately 2.5% in 2024, the amount of fines imposed during this period (approximately TRY 7.5 billion) already exceeds the cumulative totals recorded in several previous years.

By 2025, these figures maintain their upward trajectory, with on-site inspection fines continuing to represent a significant portion of the total administrative monetary fines. In this respect, out of the approximately TRY 12.1 billion in total fines imposed in 2025, fines relating to on-site inspections accounted for TRY 478,385,166 corresponding to approximately 3.95% of the total. Taken together, these figures show that fines linked to on-site inspections have moved from the margins of the TCB’s enforcement practice to one of its most visible and costly instruments.

A thorough review of the TCB’s previous decisions indicates that, notwithstanding certain exceptions, the TCB has developed a largely consistent line of case-law amounting to the obstruction or hindrance of on-site inspections. In particular; its practice regarding data deletion, delays in the conduct of the inspection, failures to grant access to electronic systems or devices, and the provision of incomplete, inaccurate or misleading information, shows how specific forms of behaviour are directly classified within this scope. The TCB’s approach to such conduct is examined in more detail in the following subsections.

II.1. Deletion of Data

The destruction or deletion of information or documents, whether in physical form (such as notebooks, hard-copy documents or contracts) or in electronic form (such as e-mails, files or personal messages exchanged via instant messaging applications such as WhatsApp), following the commencement of an on-site inspection is regarded as the destruction of evidence and may give rise to an administrative monetary fine. It should be noted that such fines are imposed where the deletion occurs after the case handlers have commenced the inspection. Indeed, with the exception of the recent and exceptional Samsung¹⁰ decision, as discussed below, the TCB has consistently held that the act of deletion in itself constitutes the hindrance or obstruction of an on-site inspection without taking into account whether the deleted data can be recovered or whether its content relates to a competition law infringement¹¹. This assessment applies regardless of the possibility of obtaining the deleted material from an alternative source¹².

In this regard, in its Softtech¹³ decision, the TCB treated an internal reminder to employees not to delete any data as an internal matter of the undertaking and focused instead on the deletion acts themselves. It held that data deletion, irrespective of whether the deleted content could be recovered, constituted the hindrance or obstruction of an on-site inspection. In the Coca-Cola decision, the TCB determined that data had been deleted during the on-site inspection. Although, based on the data that could be retrieved, it was observed that the deleted content appeared to consist of private correspondence, it could not be conclusively demonstrated that all deleted data was limited to such correspondence. The TCB further noted that, due to the inability to fully recover the deleted data, data integrity had been compromised. On this basis, the TCB concluded that the conduct in question amounted to the obstruction and/or hindrance of the on-site inspection and imposed an administrative monetary fine on the undertaking. Similarly, in its Natura Gıda¹⁴ decision, the TCB held that the deletion of data, including draft e-mails, may fall within the scope of conduct amounting to the hindrance or obstruction of an on-site inspection. On the other hand, in the İşbir¹⁵ decision, where no fine was ultimately imposed, the TCB ruled that although an employee informed an employee of another undertaking about the ongoing on-site inspection and the reply was subsequently deleted, this fact alone was insufficient to establish that the inspection had been hindered or obstructed.

There are also decisions in which the TCB concluded that the on-site inspection had not been obstructed or hindered, on the grounds that it was unable to determine, based on log records, the timing of the deletion act¹⁶ or whether the relevant action constituted deletion or archiving¹⁷. These cases illustrate the relatively high evidentiary standard applied by the TCB when assessing whether specific conduct amounts to the hindrance or obstruction of an on-site inspection. However, they remain the exception rather than the rule: taken as a whole, the TCB’s decisional practice reveals a predominantly strict approach, under which any deletion of data after the commencement of the inspection is, in principle, treated as obstructive conduct.

Against this background, the recent Samsung decision occupies a particular place. In that case, after the case handlers entered the undertaking’s premises, certain employees exited WhatsApp groups of which they were members, thereby deleting past messages from their devices. The TCB nevertheless concluded that this conduct did not constitute the obstruction or hindrance of the on-site inspection, reasoning that the communications in question could be accessed via the mobile devices of other group members and that no findings or documents relating to the subject matter of the inspection were identified in those communications¹⁸. This approach departs from the TCB’s previously established case-law under which the act of deletion has been regarded, in and of itself, as constituting the obstruction or hindrance of an on-site inspection; irrespective of the nature of the deleted data, its recoverability, or the possibility of accessing it from alternative sources. This inconsistency with earlier decisions was also highlighted in the dissenting opinion.

II.2. Other Forms of Infringement

The hindrance or obstruction of an on-site inspection may also arise through conduct other than the deletion of data. Indeed, the TCB’s decisional practice shows that undertakings are under an obligation to provide active assistance to the case handlers and to ensure that the inspection can be carried out promptly, continuously and effectively. Against this background, the TCB has found that on-site inspections were hindered or obstructed in a number of cases, including:

• the failure to ensure remote access to employees’ electronic mail in Groupe SEB¹⁹ decision;
• delaying of the inspection in Unilever²⁰, A.B. Gıda, Disamed and Girişim Elektrik decisions²¹;
• refusal to provide all mobile devices requested by the case handlers in Asbeton, Koçak Baklava, Panagro Tarım and Ceyhan Beton decisions²²;
• failure to resolve issues within the electronic mail system, along with requests for the termination of the inspection in Toros Et²³ decision;
• the provision of inconsistent, false or misleading information in Armtek and Naos Kozmetik decisions²⁴ and;
• other forms of conduct including the removal of an undertaking’s ledger from the premises in N11, refusing to allow the conduct of an on-site inspection in Çözüm Dergisi, failure to attend the undertaking’s premises in Beta Enerji, and engaging in acts that hinder or obstruct the case handlers in the performance of their duties²⁵.
• refusal to provide access to personnel relevant to the inspection, including individuals located abroad who manage or influence the Turkish market in the Spotify²⁶

The TCB’s very recent Spotify decision, is particularly relevant for undertakings managing or directing their Turkish-market activities from abroad. Indeed, during a preliminary investigation and the related on-site inspection, it was established that Spotify had closed its office in Türkiye in 2022 and transferred its operational management to regional offices (e.g. Milan/Italy), while a dedicated team continued to operate in relation to the Turkish market. The case handlers identified five individuals deemed critical for the inspection. However, Spotify argued that these individuals fell outside the scope of the inspection and ultimately refused access to them and to their e-mail accounts after approximately eight hours of waiting, resulting in the termination of the inspection. In its assessment, the TCB underlined that conducting activities affecting the Turkish market from abroad cannot serve as a means of escaping regulatory scrutiny. It is stated that the existence of a locally incorporated entity does not limit the scope of an on-site inspection where the actual commercial conduct is carried out by units or individuals located abroad. Accordingly, the TCB confirmed that it may examine not only the local subsidiary but also foreign-based teams and individuals actively managing or influencing the Turkish market.

The TCB therefore concluded that Spotify had prevented the on-site inspection by refusing the examination of persons actively involved in the conduct of its activities in the Turkish market and imposed an administrative monetary fine amounting to 0.5% of its 2024 gross revenues. Additionally, due to the continuing nature of the obstruction, the TCB imposed a daily administrative monetary fine amounting to TRY 27,630,373.57 which corresponds to 0.05% of the same revenue until the completion of the inspection²⁷. The decision demonstrates that foreign-based management structures cannot shield undertakings from the TCA’s investigative powers where the Turkish market is affected.

III. Conclusion

An assessment of the TCB’s decisions rendered over the past five years in relation to the obstruction or hindrance of on-site inspections, read together with the applicable legislative framework, indicates that the TCB has gradually developed a largely consistent and robust line of reasoning. In this context, the Ford Otosan decision may be seen as reflecting a more cautious approach to the conditions under which on-site inspections are conducted, without, however, having been followed by any corresponding legislative amendment to date.

Notwithstanding the ongoing discussions concerning these constitutional implications, the TCA’s authority to conduct on-site inspections and to impose administrative fines continues in practice to operate as a central, robust and increasingly assertive enforcement tool. While exceptional decisions may occasionally emerge, such as the Samsung decision, these currently appear to remain isolated examples and do not, at this stage, call into question the overall strictness of the TCB’s approach to conduct characterised as hindrance or obstruction.

In any event, it is beyond doubt that undertakings are expected to (i) refrain from any deletion or alteration of data, in any form, during on-site inspections, (ii) take all necessary measures to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the inspection process, (iii) avoid any conduct that may hinder the case handlers in the performance of their duties, and (iv) provide all the requested information and documents fully, accurately and without being misleading. It is equally important that undertakings duly inform and raise awareness among their employees regarding these obligations, including through internal training and compliance programmes, in line with the TCB’s case law, so as to minimise the risk of conduct being characterised as hindrance or obstruction in the course of an on-site inspection.

Footnotes

1 Law No. 7246 on the Amendment of the Law on the Protection of Competition.

2 The Constitutional Court’s decision dated 23.03.2023 with number 2019/40991.

3 Paragraph 3 of the Guidelines states that “the authorised personnel are entitled to conduct examinations of information systems belonging to the undertaking, such as servers, desktop or laptop computers and portable devices, as well as storage tools such as CDs, DVDs, USB drives, external hard disks, back-up records and cloud services” thereby listing, by way of example, the media capable of containing digital data.

4 The Constitutional Court’s decision dated 06.11.2025 with number E. 2023/174, K. 2025/224.

5 Unlike the individual application procedure under which the Ford Otosan decision was delivered, which produces binding effects only as between the parties and does not result in the annulment of statutory provisions, norm control proceedings assess the constitutionality of legislation in the abstract and may lead to annulment with erga omnes effect.

6 The decision attracted five separate dissenting opinions, which are notable for the directness of their criticism. The dissenting judges argued that the majority's analysis was constitutionally incomplete in that it omitted any engagement with Article 21, departing from the TCC's own reasoning in Ford Otosan. In their view, the functional nature of on-site inspections, which involve entry into non-public areas of business premises and the examination and copying of data, renders them materially equivalent to a search, and accordingly subject to the procedural safeguards applicable to interferences with the inviolability of domicile. The dissenters further emphasised that an undertaking's acquiescence to an inspection cannot be treated as voluntary consent where refusal carries the threat of significant administrative fines under Articles 16 and 17 of Law No. 4054.

7 The TCB has imposed TRY 2,550,980 for 2020, TRY 121,038,512 for 2021, TRY 115,268,236 for 2022, TRY 267,887,916 for 2023, TRY 191,891,583 for 2024 and TRY 479,395,001 for 2025 pursuant to Article 16/1(d). See: 2025 Yıllık Rapor.

8 https://www.kap.org.tr/tr/Bildirim/1394259

9 https://www.kap.org.tr/tr/Bildirim/1519065; The TCB’s Coca-Cola decision dated 20.11.2025 with number 25-43/1058-605.

10 The TCB’s Samsung decision dated 10.04.2025 with number 25-14/330-157.

11 The TCB’s Vitelco decision dated 15.09.2022 with number 22-42/615-259; N11 decision dated 27.05.2021 with number 21-27/354-172.

12 The TCB’s Vatan Bilgisayar decision dated 28.04.2023 with number 23-19/363-125.

13 The TCB’s Softtech decision dated 15.09.2022 with number 22-42/614-258

14 The TCB’s Natura Gıda decision dated 08.09.2022 with number 22-41/599-250.

15 The TCB’s İşbir decision dated 15.12.2022 with number 22-55/854-353.

16 The TCB’s A101 decision dated 23.06.2022 with number 22-28/464-187; Canatanlar İnşaat decision dated 17.08.2023 with number 23-39/744-258; Biofarma decision dated 28.11.2024 with number 24-50/1144-493.

17 The TCB’s Unmaş decision dated 09.01.2025 with number 25-01/11-8.

18  ibid, para. 21: “(…) as a result of the examination carried out on the mobile devices of other employees who were members of the relevant groups, access was obtained to the communications within those groups and no findings and/or documents relating to the subject matter of the inspection were identified in such communications. For this reason, it was concluded that the actions examined could not be regarded as constituting the obstruction or hindrance of the on-site inspection”.

19 The TCB’s Groupe SEB decision dated 09.01.2020 with number 20-03/31-14.

20 The court of first instance had considered a six-hour delay to be reasonable on the basis that approval needed to be obtained from its headquarters abroad. However, this finding was overturned by the Regional Administrative Court, which held that an undertaking operating in Türkiye is expected, in line with the principles of prudent merchant conduct and foreseeability, to organise its internal processes in a way that does not hinder its ability to carry out its operations. Accordingly, the delay was found to be unjustified. This judgment was subsequently upheld by the Council of State (13th Chamber, Decision No. E. 2022/1993, K. 2022/2819).

21 The TCB’s Unilever decision dated 07.11.2019 with number 19-38/584-250; A.B Gıda decision dated 09.06.2022 with number 22-26/426-175; Disamed decision dated 08.09.2022 with number 22-41/573-234; Girişim Elektrik decision dated 04.06.2024 with number 24-24/568-240.

22 The TCB’s Asbeton decision dated 17.08.2023 with number 23-39/741-255; Koçak Baklava decision dated 15.08.2024 with number 24-33/772-322; Panagro Tarım decision dated 30.04.2024 with number 25-17/407-188; Ceyhan Beton decision dated 26.01.2023 with number 23-06/73-22.

23 The TCB’s Toros Et decision dated 04.06.2024 with number 24-24/584-243.

24 The TCB’s Armtek decision dated 04.06.2024 with number 24-24/566-238; Naos Kozmetik decision dated 06.10.2022 with number 22-45/659-283.

25 The TCB’s N11 decision dated 27.05.2021 with number 21-27/354-172; Çözüm Dergisi dated 22.12.2022 with number 22-56/878-363; dated 7.09.2023 with number 23-41/788-277; dated 19.10.2023 with number 23-49/943-335.

26 The TCB’s Spotify decision dated 26.06.2025 with number 25-23/570-M.

27 The TCB’s decision dated 28.08.2025 with number 25-32/759-450.

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