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INTRODUCTION:
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of India in Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 29972/2015, 26876/2014 and 11139/2020, dated 24.04.2026, addresses a long‑standing controversy under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”). The central legal issue is whether, at the post‑award stage, a party that has lost in the arbitral proceedings and has no enforceable award in its favour can maintain a petition under Section 9 of the Act for interim measures or not.
Section 9 of the Act allows a party to seek interim measures before, during, or after the arbitral proceedings but prior to enforcement of the award. The question before the Court is whether this expression “a party” includes an unsuccessful party at the post‑award stage, or whether, at that stage, interim protection under Section 9 is conceptually confined to the winner seeking to secure the fruits of the award.
DIVERGENT HIGH COURT APPROACHES:
The controversy has been sharpened by conflicting lines of authority across several High Courts. On one side, the Bombay High Court in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd1., the Delhi High Court in Nussli Switzerland Ltd. vs. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games 20102 and National Highways Authority of India vs. Punjab National Bank3, as well as the Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court in Smt Padma Mahadev and others vs. M/s Sierra Constructions Private Limited 4, have held that a losing party in arbitration cannot maintain a Section 9 petition at the post‑award stage. On the other side, the Telangana High Court in M/s Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management5, the Gujarat High Court in GAIL (India) Ltd. v. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd6., and the Punjab & Haryana High Court in M/s DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. M/s Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.7 have adopted the opposite view, holding that even an unsuccessful party may invoke Section 9 post‑award.8
This entrenched divergence made it necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of Section 9, particularly the reach of the term “a party” at the post‑award stage and its relationship with Sections 34 and 36 of the Act.
SUBMISSIONS SUPPORTING MAINTAINABILITY BY THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY:
The “Fruits of the Award” Theory
In Dirk India (supra), the Bombay High Court had reasoned that post‑award interim measures under Section 9 are designed only to safeguard the “fruits of arbitral proceedings”, and that because an unsuccessful party has no fruits of the award to protect, it cannot maintain a Section 9 petition after the award. The appellants characterized this interpretation as unduly restrictive and out of sync with the overall statutory scheme.
Revival of Rights on Setting Aside the Award
With an award being set aside‚ the parties have to essentially re-arbitrate and reaffirm their contractual rights․ One argument was that the unsuccessful party was left without any interim relief during the course of the extended Section 34 process․ However‚ the legislation anticipated that the parties might be required to do this if the award was set aside․
The appellants went on to rely upon section 43(4) of the Act which provides that time spent in separate proceedings for purposes of limitation will not count towards the time limits‚ and submitted that this shows that it is the intention of the legislature that arbitration should recommence upon the setting aside of an award and issues be re-agitated․ It was suggested therefore‚ that a party whose claims were rejected in the first arbitration should not be deprived of interim relief in respect of the subject matter of the dispute whilst the Section 34 challenge is pending․
The appellants also relied upon the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, to contend that once an arbitral award is passed, the arbitral tribunal no longer retains jurisdiction to grant interim measures. In such a situation, the Court exercising powers under Section 9 becomes the only authority capable of granting interim protection after the award stage.
In support of this argument, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited9, where the Court recognised that arbitral awards may, in limited situations, be partially modified by sustaining severable portions while setting aside the invalid part. This development weakens the reasoning adopted in Dirk India, which proceeded on the assumption that a Court hearing a Section 34 challenge could only either uphold or entirely set aside an award. They therefore argued that interim protection after the award stage cannot be viewed solely as a mechanism to preserve the “fruits of the award” for the successful party.
Interpretation of the Expression “Party”
The appellants further placed strong reliance on the language of Section 2(h) of the Act, which defines a “party” simply as a party to an arbitration agreement, without drawing any distinction between a successful or unsuccessful litigant. In this context, reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja10, where the Court had clarified that the right to seek relief under Section 9 flows from the existence of an arbitration agreement itself and not from the existence of an enforceable award.
Scope of Section 9 Compared to Section 36
Another important aspect of the appellants’ submissions concerned the distinction between Sections 9 and 36 of the Act. It was argued that while Section 36 primarily deals with enforcement and stay of arbitral awards, Section 9 confers a much wider power upon Courts to grant interim measures that are “just and convenient.” According to the Appellants, the broad wording of Section 9 reflects the legislative intention to permit Courts to craft protective measures depending on the facts of each case, including in favour of a party challenging the award.
SUBMISSIONS OPPOSING MAINTAINABILITY OF SECTION 9 BY AN UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY:
The Respondent contended that the parties‚ prior to award‚ stand on an equal footing and are both in a position to independently establish prima facie case under the criteria for interim relief․ After the arbitral tribunal has finally disposed of the claims and counterclaims‚ only the successful party will be entitled to seek protection of the "fruits of the award"․ A losing party with no award in its favour cannot claim the benefit of Section 9 interim measures after the award has been made without disturbing the discipline and finality of the arbitral process․ In support of this position, reliance was placed upon the Bombay High Court’s decision in Dirk India (supra), where it was held that post award interim measures are intended only to preserve the benefits arising from a successful arbitral award. It was therefore argued that a party whose claims have already been rejected cannot invoke Section 9 merely to reopen or indirectly secure relief contrary to the award.
Sections 34 and 36 as the Appropriate Remedies
It was further contended that once an arbitral award has been passed, the remedy available to the unsuccessful party is confined to Sections 34 and 36 of the Act. In other words, the losing party can challenge the award under Section 34 and, where necessary, seek a stay on its enforcement under Section 36 by showing that the award suffers from defects recognised under the law.
It was also argued that Section 36 itself provides sufficient safeguards, as it allows the Court to balance the interests of both parties by imposing appropriate conditions while granting a stay of enforcement. On the other hand, Section 9 does not contain any specific safeguards governing post-award relief sought by an unsuccessful party. Therefore, permitting a losing party to seek protection or security under Section 9 could potentially result in granting a broader form of relief than what is otherwise contemplated while deciding a challenge under Section 34 of the Act.
Concern Regarding Judicial Intervention and Multiplicity of Proceedings
Another significant concern that was argued by the Respondent was the possibility of excessive judicial intervention. Referring to Section 5 of the Act, which embodies the principle of minimal judicial interference in arbitration matters, it was argued that allowing unsuccessful parties to routinely invoke Section 9 after an award could lead to unnecessary satellite litigation and delay enforcement proceedings. Since orders under Section 9 are appealable under Section 37, such an interpretation could multiply proceedings and weaken the efficiency and finality which arbitration seeks to achieve.
THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION:
In approaching this controversy, the Court began by reiterating a well‑settled principle, where statutory language is clear, plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to the ordinary meaning of the words and should not engage in adding or subtracting words based on perceived legislative intention. The judgment cites classic formulations of this rule, by Lord Parker C.J.’s observation in R. v. Oakes11.
Applying this principle, the Court noted that Section 9 begins with the expression “a party may,” while Section 2(h) defines “party” simply as a party to an arbitration agreement. Neither provision distinguishes between a successful and unsuccessful party. The Court observed that where the legislature itself has provided a clear statutory definition, the same must ordinarily govern unless the statute expressly indicates otherwise. Therefore, the Court has clearly held that an unsuccessful party cannot be denied any opportunity to apply for reliefs available under Section 9 of the Act.
The Court further explained that Section 9 allows parties to seek interim measures at three different stages, before arbitration, during arbitration, and after the award but before enforcement under Section 36. The legislature consciously expanded the scope of Section 9 beyond the UNCITRAL Model Law by specifically permitting post-award interim relief. Significantly, while granting this broader remedy, Parliament did not restrict the remedy only to successful parties. The Court therefore concluded that the object of Section 9 is to ensure that parties continue to have access to interim protection until the judicial process reaches its final conclusion.
Another important aspect considered by the Court was the relationship between Sections 9, 34, and 36 of the Act. The Court clarified that these provisions operate in separate fields. Section 34 concerns challenge to the award, while Section 36 deals with stay of enforcement. In contrast, Section 9 is intended to preserve the subject matter of the dispute or protect the amount in controversy. The Court noted that if an unsuccessful party is denied relief under Section 9, it may be left without any effective remedy even in situations where the award is subsequently set aside or modified
The Supreme Court carefully examined the conflicting approaches adopted by different High Courts, the rival submissions advanced by both sides, and the broader scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Court indicated that the central issue would ultimately depend on whether the expression “a party” in Section 9 could legitimately be restricted only to successful parties at the post-award stage, despite the absence of such limitation in the statutory text itself.
CONCLUSION:
The decision reflects an interpretation of interim protection under Section 9 by recognising that disputes may continue even after an arbitral award is passed, especially during proceedings under Sections 34 and 36 of the Act. Further, the Court has reiterated the principle of interpretation of statute holding that were any expressions stated in the statute are clear, categorical, and leave no room for doubt, then the Court must refrain from resorting to contextual or purposive construction.
The Court observed that in certain situations, denying interim relief to an unsuccessful party could result in prejudice if the award is later modified or set aside. At the same time, the judgment also acknowledges concerns relating to misuse of interim remedies and therefore clarifies that a higher threshold would apply when such relief is sought by an unsuccessful party.
The judgment also highlights the distinction between the remedies available under Sections 9, 34, and 36 of the Act. While Sections 34 and 36 deal with challenge and enforcement of awards, Section 9 is intended to preserve the subject matter of the dispute or protect the amount in controversy. By recognising that these provisions operate in separate spheres, the Court has clarified the understanding of post-award interim relief within the arbitration framework, so as to make it applicable even to the unsuccessful party of the arbitral proceedings.
Overall, the ruling settles the conflicting views previously taken by various High Courts and provides greater clarity on the maintainability of post-award Section 9 petitions. The judgment will have a significant impact on arbitral proceedings in India by defining the extent to which interim protection may remain available even after an arbitral award has been rendered.
Footnotes
1. 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481.
2. 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834.
3. 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4810.
4. COMAP No. 2 / 2021 dated 22.03.2021.
5. 2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765.
6. 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836.
7. Fao-Carb 51-2024 (O&M) dated 21.02.2025.
9. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986.
10. (2004) 3 SCC 155.
11. (1959) 2 Q.B. 350.
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