Court Of Appeal Summaries (December 22-29, 2025)

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Good afternoon.

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of December 22.

In Abbott v. London Health Sciences Centre, private oral surgeons challenged a hospital board's decision to stop allocating them free operating room time for private patient surgeries and canceling their related hospital privileges. This decision was made to prioritise hospital patients and comply with provincial funding requirements and a mandated scheduling system, without holding a hearing. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court and upheld the decision as reasonable under section 44 of the Public Hospitals Act, which permitted hospital boards to make such decisions internally without affording a hearing. Applying Vavilov, the Divisional Court was correct to limit its review to the board's reasons and record that was before it, and was not required to consider affidavits submitted by the oral surgeons that were not before the hospital board when it made its decision.

In Ratnasingam v. Balasubramaniam, the Court dismissed an appeal to set aside a final order that dismissed an action where the underlying settlement had not been approved by the court, in breach of Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that all settlements involving a party that lacked capacity be approved by the court. In this case, the appellants' lawyer had settled the case without authorization, misled them as to the status of their case and made off with the settlement funds. However, the respondent insurer could not be held responsible for that. The settlement was not unreasonable or unconscionable and the appellants were not in a position to repay the settlement amount. Accordingly, the settlement and companion dismissal order were upheld. The Court recognized the injustice done to the appellants and expressed the hope that they could obtain compensation elsewhere.

In Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), the Court of Appeal managed a complex Charter appeal arising from municipal encampment evictions by carefully controlling third-party participation, granting leave only to interveners who could offer distinct and useful legal perspectives.

In Hugginson v. Hugginson, the Court dismissed an appeal concerning a disputed $400,000 transfer from an estate, affirming the application judge's order to return the funds after finding no completed inter vivos gift and no continuing intention to gift that amount right up to the date of death.

In Van Aman v. Mugo, the Court dismissed the mother's appeal, upheld supervised parenting time under s. 16 of the Divorce Act and refused to vary child support.

Other topics covered this week included stay pending appeal from the striking of a defence for failure to comply with an order to deliver a proper sworn affidavit of documents, striking pleadings for disclosing no reasonable cause of action in a breach of duty of good faith MVA insurance claim where the plaintiff was alleging harassment by the surveillance firm hired by the insurer and setting aside a dismissal of an appeal for delay in a municipal by-law enforcement case.

Wishing everyone a happy New Year!

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Civil Decisions

Adjala-Tosorontio (Township) v. Saunders, 2025 ONCA 906

Keywords: Real Property, Municipal Law, By-Laws, Enforcement, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Dismissal for Delay, Setting Aside, Perfection, Extension of Time, Building Code Act, 1991, S.O. 1992, C. 23, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. r. 61.16(5), Guillaume v. Ontario (Animal Review Board), 2024 ONCA 851, Graff v. Network North Reporting and Mediation, 2020 ONCA 319, Langer v. Yorkton Securities Inc. (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 555, Sickinger v. Sickinger, 2017 ONCA 760, Caledon (Town) v. Darzi Holdings Ltd., 2022 ONCA 455, Kudrocova v. Kronberger, 2021 ONCA 563, Philbert v. Graham, 2022 ONCA 488, Jewish Foundation of Greater Toronto (Re), 2022 ONCA 581, Hoffelner v. Whiteley, 2024 ONCA 753, Continental Imperial Exploration Ltd. v. Ontario (Environment, Conservation and Parks), 2024 ONCA 328

Abbott v. London Health Sciences Centre, 2025 ONCA 895

Keywords: Administrative Law, Health Law, Hospitals, Procedural Fairness, Statutory Interpretation, Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40, ss. 1, 32, 37(3) – 37(7), 38 – 44, 44(1), 44(1.1), 44(1.2), 44(2), 44(3), 44(4), 44(5), Hospital Management, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 965, s. 1.1(1), Medicine Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 30, ss. 9(1), 9(2), 9(3), Thales DIS Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Transportation), 2023 ONCA 866, leave to appeal refused, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 58, Turkiewicz (Tomasz Turkiewicz Custom Masonry Homes) v. Bricklayers, Masons Independent Union of Canada, Local 1, 2022 ONCA 780, leave to appeal refused [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 131, Canadian Federation of Students v. Ontario (Colleges and Universities), 2021 ONCA 553, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, Givogue v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 186, leave to appeal refused, [2025] S.C.C.A. No. 30, Tazehkand v. Bank of Canada, 2023 FCA 208, Beattie v. Women's College Hospital, 2018 ONCA 872, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 524, Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817

Derenzis v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 893

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Duty of Good Faith, Torts, Negligence, MVA, Battery, Breach of Privacy (Intrusion Upon Seclusion), Abuse of Process, Vicarious Liability, Charter Claims, Human Rights, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Abuse of Process, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 8, and 15, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 280, 268(1), Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, O. Reg. 34/10, ss. 19(3), 55(2), Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, ss. 16(1)(h.2), (1.3), Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sched. G, s. 5.1(4), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21, Kang v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2013 ONCA 118, Darmar Farms Inc. v. Syngenta Canada Inc., 2019 ONCA 789, Owsianik v. Equifax Canada Co., 2022 ONCA 813, Harris v. Glaxosmithkline Inc., 2010 ONCA 872, Dunford v. Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, 2025 ONCA 438, Aba-Alkhail v. University of Ottawa, 2013 ONCA 633, Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 14, McCreight v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONCA 483, Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 30, Stegenga v. Economical Mutual Insurance Co., 2019 ONCA 615, Warwick v. Gore Mutual Insurance Co. (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 76 (C.A.), Yang v. Cooperators General Insurance Company, 2021 ONSC 1540

Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2025 ONCA 904

Keywords: Public Law, Constitutional Law, Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person, Equality Rights, Charter Remedies, Damages, Municipal Law, By-Laws, Enforcement, Poverty Law, Real Property, Housing, Civil Procedure, Interveners, Friends of the Court, Stare Decisis, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 and 15, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 13.02, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, National Housing Strategy Act, S.C. 2019, c. 29, s. 313, Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.), Canadian Federation of Students v. Ontario (Colleges and Universities), 2020 ONCA 842, Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 147 O.A.C. 355 (C.A.), Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 669, Bhajan v. Ontario (Children's Lawyer), 2010 ONCA 560, Fair Voting BC v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 619, Solmar Inc. v. Hall, 2025 ONCA 570, The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained, 2023 ONSC 670, 164 O.R. (3d) 177, The Corporation of the City of Kingston v. Doe, 2023 ONSC 6662, 541 C.R.R. (2d) 255.

Hugginson v. Hugginson, 2025 ONCA 902

Keywords: Wills and Estates, Estate Administration, Estate Trustees, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Hearsay, Business Records, Admissibility, Costs, Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23 s. 35, R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, Jackson v. Rosenberg, 2024 ONCA 875, Bruno v. Dacosta, 2020 ONCA 602, Gumbley v. Vasiliou, 2025 ONCA 851, O'Brien v. Shantz (1998), 113 O.A.C. 346 (C.A.) Carvalho v. Verma, 2024 ONSC 1183, Setak Computer Services Corporation Ltd. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. et. al. (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 750, Strong v. Bird, [1871] L.R. 18 Eq. 315

Ratnasingam v. Balasubramaniam, 2025 ONCA 898

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Settlements, Incapacity, Court Approval, Orders, Setting Aside, Fraud, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 7.08, 7.09, 59.06(2), Book v. Cociardi, 2022 ONSC 3125, E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388, Tsaoussis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Baetz (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.)

Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc., 2025 ONCA 903

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Promissory Notes, Guarantees, Civil Procedure, Documentary Discovery, Affidavits of Documents, Orders, Enforcement, Striking Pleadings, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Epireon Capital Limited, 2025 ONCA 559, 2642948 Ontario Inc. v. Jonny's Antiques Ltd., 2025 ONCA 381, Zafar v. Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919, Carvalho Estate v. Verma, 2024 ONCA 222, Advanced Farm Technologies-J.A. v. Yung Soon Farm Inc., 2021 ONCA 569, Falcon Lumber Limited v. 2480375 Ontario Inc. (GN Mouldings and Doors), 2020 ONCA 310, Blench v. Cheng, 2024 ABCA 73, Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 415

Van Aman v. Mugo, 2025 ONCA 886

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Support, Variation, Review, Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 16, S.H. v. D.K., 2022 ONSC 1203 (Div. Ct.)

Short Civil Decisions

Chaly v. Structured Restoration Inc., 2025 ONCA 901

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Construction, Enforcement, Liens, Validity, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30, ss. 1(1), 14(1), 47(1), 71(1), Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 110(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 20, Villa Verde L.M. Masonry Ltd. v. Pier One Masonry Inc. (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 76 (C.A.), MGW-Homes Design Inc. v. Pasqualino, 2024 ONCA 422, Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. v. Avison Young Real Estate Management Services LP, 2024 ONCA 251

Curtis v. Toronto Police Service Board, 2025 ONCA 896

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Appeals, Abandonment, Costs, Panel Reviews, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.14(3), Machado v. Ontario Hockey Association, 2019 ONCA 210, Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827, Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364, 31 Kingsbury Inc. v. Delta Elevator Company Limited, 2021 ONCA 656, Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 415, Canada (Attorney General) v. Mennes, 2014 ONCA 690, Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp. (1984), 47 O.R. (2d) 225 (Div. Ct.), Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9

Jaymat Limited v. Trichilo, 2025 ONCA 900

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Presumption of Consideration, Forbearance, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment, Procedural and Natural Justice, Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4, s. 52(1)(b))

CIVIL DECISIONS

Adjala-Tosorontio (Township) v. Saunders, 2025 ONCA 906

[Roberts J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

A. L, acting in person, and for T.S.
J.J. Feehely, T. Webster and D. Anderson, for the Corporation of the Township of Adjala-Tosorontio
M. Seddigh, appearing as amicus curiae, Pro Bono Ontario

facts:

The proceedings arose out of the Township's over seven-year efforts to enforce its Property Standards By-Law (the "By-Law") and compel the moving parties, A.L. and T.S. to clean up their property. The Township's efforts and the moving parties' steadfast resistance to the orders to comply culminated in the application judge's December 9, 2024 order granting the Township a permanent injunction to clear the property of abandoned vehicles, tires, trailers and debris littered throughout the property, in compliance with the By-Law. On May 13, 2025, the Registrar dismissed for delay the moving parties' appeal of the application judge's order. The moving parties sought to set aside the Registrar's order and an extension of time to perfect their appeal.

issues:

Should the motion judge set aside the Registrar's order and grant an extension of time to perfect the appeal?

holding:

Motions dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court applied the test for setting aside the Registrar's dismissal order for delay under r. 61.16(5). The Court was not persuaded that the justice of this case warranted setting aside the Registrar's dismissal order. The delay in perfecting the appeal remained inadequately explained. The deficiencies outlined by the court office were not trivial and the moving parties did not explain their lackluster efforts to comply with them in a timely manner. The moving parties' delay in perfecting their appeal and moving to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order repeated their pattern of delay and unreasonable behaviour in the underlying proceedings. The moving parties' proposed appeal was frivolous, vexatious and without any apparent merit and was designed to further delay their compliance with the order requiring them to clean up their property.

The Court also held that the application judge correctly rejected the moving parties' limitation period defence as inapplicable because the Township's application was brought under s. 15.1 of the Building Code Act, not s. 36, as the moving parties argued. Finally, the Court found there was continued prejudice to the Township and to the public interest by the moving parties' ongoing resistance to their obligations under the By-law and the orders to comply.

Abbott v. London Health Sciences Centre, 2025 ONCA 895

[Roberts, Miller and Zarnett JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N. M. Abramson and M. P. Falco, for the appellants
A. E. Reid, L. Mishra and S. Livshits, for the respondent

facts:

For many years, the appellants, a group of private practice dental surgeons, were granted access to operating room ("OR") time and resources at the respondent hospital, London Health Sciences Centre ("LHSC"), to perform oral surgeries on their private practice patients. In late 2023, the LHSC's board of directors (the "Board") decided to i) cease providing the appellants with OR time and reassigned that time to high priority surgeries for hospital patients, and ii) cancel the appellants' hospital privileges, including revoking their staff appointments related to using OR time for their own patients.

As a public hospital, LHSC is subject to a Hospital Service Accountability Agreement ("HSAA") with Ontario Health, which sets out how provincial funding can be used and requires LHSC to implement a specific patient prioritization and scheduling system, the Wait Time Information System (the "WTIS"). The LHSC's Office of Capacity Management had reviewed its accountabilities for funding under the HSAA and concluded that the practice of providing OR space to private practice oral surgeons was not in line with HSAA obligations and needed to end. The LHSC's Strategic Redevelopment Committee (the "Committee") thus recommended that the Board take action to cease the appellants' access to the OR and cancel their associated privileges and appointments. A Briefing Note summarized the Committee's recommendations to the Board, including the reasons for the decision, history of the issue and information from the Office. Although permitting OR access to these private dentists provided some benefits to the community, benefits to LHSC were limited, especially since the private practice dentists were not required to treat hospital patients and did not reimburse LHSC for their use of the OR, staff or equipment. Freeing up OR time for high priority hospital surgical cases could reduce waiting times and increase LHSC's funding. Moreover, the appellants' surgery booking policy was inconsistent with the WTIS and distinct from the prioritization of all other LHSC surgical services and thus was misaligned with required provincial standards.

On November 29, 2023, the Board approved the Committee's recommendations but decided to give the private practice dentists at least 30 days' notice of the impending changes, eventually choosing January 31, 2024 as the effective date. Throughout this decision-making process the appellants were not afforded a hearing and affidavits they submitted were not reviewed.

The appellants applied for judicial review of the Board's decision. In dismissing the application, the Divisional Court reviewed the decision on a reasonableness standard, finding that the Board was entitled to proceed as it had because of s. 44 of the Public Hospitals Act ("PHA"). PHA section 44 states that where a hospital's board determines that the hospital will cease to provide a "service", it may revoke the appointment of any "physician" and cancel their related hospital privileges. Moreover, s. 44(3) provides that certain decisions contemplated by s. 44 may be made without a hearing. The Board's decision to cancel the OR access qualified as a decision to cease a service under the PHA. The Divisional Court also concluded that LHSC's actions were in good faith, as required by PHA s. 44(5), since they were taken to comply with HSAA obligations.

On appeal, the dental surgeons challenged the Divisional Court's application of the reasonableness standard when interpreting PHA s. 44, as well as the factual basis used by the Divisional Court in conducting its review.

issues:

Did the Board adopt an unreasonable interpretation of PHA s.44?
Did the Divisional Court err in assessing reasonableness based only on the record the Board considered?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The appellants conceded that the Divisional Court correctly identified reasonableness as the applicable standard of review but submitted that it applied the standard incorrectly. Per Vavilov, when conducting a reasonableness review, a court does not engage in a de novo analysis of the underlying dispute. Instead, a court should assess the administrative decision-maker's reasons, asking whether the decision was tenable in light of relevant factual and legal constraints, including the text, context and purpose of applicable statutory provisions. Here, as the Board gave no formal reasons and adopted the Committee's recommendations from its Briefing Note, the Divisional Court assessed the Briefing Note as the administrative reasons. The Court of Appeal saw no error in this approach, which was not disputed by the appellants.

In their submissions, the appellants raised three interrelated concerns with the reasonableness of the Divisional Court's interpretation of PHA s. 44. The Court did not accept any of them. First, the appellants' argument that the "no hearing" provision in s. 44(3) did not apply to the Board's threshold determination that LHSC would cease to provide a service was contradicted by the language of s. 44(3) itself. Th Divisional Court's interpretation was consistent with the reading of PHA s. 44(5) in Beattie. Any other reading of s. 44(3) would lead to unlikely interpretive consequences that the legislature could not have intended.

Second, regarding the appellants' submission that it was unreasonable to interpret "[ceasing] to provide a service" in s. 44(1.2) as anything less than terminating an entire service (i.e. all dentistry or oral surgery at LHSC), the Court held that nothing in the text, context or purpose of subsection 44(1.2), or in relevant case law, supported this view. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable to apply s. 44 to the Board's decision to terminate the private practice oral surgeons' OR access.

Third, the Board did not adopt an unreasonable interpretation of s. 44(2) by applying it to the appellants, though s. 44(2) refers to "physicians" and not dentists explicitly. The combined effect of regulations under the PHA and the Medicine Act extended the term "physician" to include oral surgeons.

2. No. The Divisional Court did not err in assessing the reasonableness of the Board's decision by looking only at the record before the Board, and not at the affidavits provided by the appellants. If the Board had been required to hold a hearing, it would have had to meaningfully account for the oral surgeons' concerns, including those expressed in the affidavits. However, since PHA s. 44 applied, the Board was not required to hold a hearing. The legislature chose to empower hospital boards to make these decisions without procedural protections like a hearing. If, on judicial review, the Divisional Court had to consider facts that the Board did not, this would go beyond a reasonableness review of the Board's decision. Thus, the Divisional Court was correct to limit its factual review to the factual matrix actually before the Board when determining whether the Board's decision was reasonable in light of relevant factual constraints.

Derenzis v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 893

[Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A. Ismail, for the appellants
R. Cookson and A. Ralph, for the respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario
A. Krajden, for the respondent, Rapid Interactive Disability Management Limited
A. Camporese, for the respondents, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, H.S., J.F., S.B., J.B., and K.J., by his litigation administrator, C.R. Jones

facts:

The appellant, LD was involved in a motor vehicle accident in which she suffered injuries. Following the accident, LD applied for and received statutory accident benefits from Gore Mutual Insurance Company ("Gore").

Rapid Interactive Disability Management Inc. ("Rapid"), was asked by Gore to arrange various independent medical assessments, including an assessment by an occupational therapist, RS, during which LD alleged she was forced to lift weights which caused a hernia injury and required multiple surgeries.

Whitehall Bureau of Canada Ltd. ("Whitehall") was asked by Gore to arrange surveillance. The appellant, JDS was the son-in-law of LD and claimed that he was struck by a vehicle driven by W, an investigator hired by Gore.

LD sued Gore and a number of Gore employees for accident benefits, alleging they engaged in tortious actions. She also made claims against, inter alia, Rapid and Whitehall and Ambleside Investigation Management Inc. ("Ambleside") arising from alleged harassment and intimidation.

The defendants brought motions under r. 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the claims against them. The motion judge declined to dismiss the action in its entirety but struck a number of the appellant's claims without leave to amend. The appellants appealed that order, arguing that the motion judge erred in her analysis of the claims and in her findings that the claims as pleaded had no chance of success.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in striking LD's claims for battery, breach of privacy, and abuse of process?
Did the motion judge err in striking JDS's claims?
Did the motion judge err in striking the constitutional and human rights challenges to the SABS?
Did the motion judge err in striking LD's claim for breach of good faith?

holding:

Appeal allowed in part.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found the motion judge correctly struck the claims without leave to amend. The actions of the occupational therapist who conducted the assessment of LD could not ground a claim in battery against Gore or its employees as she was not an employee of Gore, but rather a subcontractor hired by Rapid. Therefore, no vicarious liability could attach. The Court upheld the finding that the claim against Rapid was statute-barred. Although limitation periods do not run in cases of assault when the claimant is financially, emotionally, physically, or otherwise dependent on the defendant, there were no facts pleaded that could establish that LD was dependent on RS or Rapid.

Further, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion required an improper accessing of personal information. The Court found there were no facts pleaded to establish how surveillance conducted by Whitehall and Ambleside was unlawful or how Gore and its employees invaded or intruded upon the plaintiffs' private affairs or concerns without lawful excuse. Lastly, the Court concluded that the statement of claim did not plead that Gore, or its employees initiated a legal proceeding against the appellants. That was an essential element of the tort of abuse of process.

2. No. The Court upheld the motion judge's finding that JDS's claims against Gore and its employees and Rapid failed because there was no immediate connection between these parties and the intentional application of force on JDS. W was neither employed by Gore or its employees or Rapid nor assigned tasks by these corporations. Even if W were found negligent, given that he was employed by Whitehall, the appellants did not plead a sufficient basis to hold Gore or Rapid liable since they were separately incorporated entities.

3. No. The Court held the pleading of the claims in the Superior Court of Justice constituted an abuse of process and was properly struck without leave to amend. It was an abuse of process to attempt to relitigate matters that were determined or could have been determined before the administrative tribunal. The motion judge properly found that any challenge to those findings would need to be made to the Divisional Court.

4. Yes. The Court found the motion judge erred in striking LD's claim for breach of the duty of good faith. Read generously in favour of the plaintiff with allowances for drafting deficiencies, it was clear that the appellants were claiming breaches of the contract of insurance. The motion judge's conclusion that the breach of good faith allegations could not stand in the absence of claims for breach of contract was therefore incorrect. Furthermore, an insurer had an independent contractual obligation to deal with all claims in good faith. The pleading, if amended to include particulars, would be sufficient to ground the claims against Gore rooted in alleged breaches of good faith.

Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2025 ONCA 904

[Favreau J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

S. Choudhry, S. Crowe and W. Poziomka, for the appellants
B. Shores, J. Diacur and J. King, for the respondent
T. Malik, for the proposed intervener British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
M. Flynn and P. Doe, for the proposed intervener Canadian Centre for Housing Rights
T. Yang and N. Greckol-Herlich, for the proposed intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association
M. Jackman, for the proposed interveners Charter Committee on Poverty Issues and the National Right to Housing Network
A. Reeson, for the proposed intervener the Corporation of the City of Kingston
F. Fischer, M. Brady and M. Lowson, for the proposed intervener the City of Toronto
A. Johnson and D. Tremblay, for the proposed interveners Clinique juridique itinerante and Niagara Community Legal Clinic
M. Perez, L. Leinveer, R. Nobleman and A. Merdzan, for the proposed interveners Income Security Advocacy Centre and Mental Health Legal Committee
E. Anschuetz and A. Biscaro, for the proposed intervener Women's Legal Education and Action Fund
R. Khawja and A. Krishna, for the proposed intervener Ontario Human Rights Commission
S. Badawi, for the intervener Ministry of the Attorney General

facts:

The appellants were individuals who were living in encampments in public parks in the City of Hamilton and were evicted between August 2021 and August 2023 pursuant to a municipal by-law prohibiting the erection of tents and overnight living in parks. They commenced a constitutional challenge alleging that the by-law and its enforcement violated their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought Charter damages. The application judge dismissed the Charter claims, finding that the by-law did not infringe the appellants' Charter rights.

The appellants appealed, and the appeal was scheduled to be heard in February 2026. Numerous public interest organizations and municipalities sought leave to intervene as friends of the court. The motion judge considered whether the proposed interveners would provide distinct and useful perspectives without expanding the scope of the appeal or duplicating the parties' submissions.

issues:

Should the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association be granted leave to intervene?
Should the Canadian Civil Liberties Association be granted leave to intervene?
Should the Canadian Centre for Housing Rights be granted leave to intervene?
Should the Ontario Human Rights Commission be granted leave to intervene?5. Should the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund be granted leave to intervene?
Should the City of Toronto be granted leave to intervene?
Should the Corporation of the City of Kingston be granted leave to intervene?
Should the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues be granted leave to intervene?
Should the National Right to Housing Network and Clinique juridique itinerante be granted leave to intervene?
Should the Income Security Advocacy Centre be granted leave to intervene?
Should the Mental Health Legal Committee be granted leave to intervene?

holding:

Motions by BCCLA, CCLA, CCHR, OHRC, LEAF, City of Toronto and City of Kingston (in part) granted. Motions by CCPI, NRHN, CJI, NCLC, ISAC and MHLC dismissed.

reasoning:

On a motion for leave to intervene, based on Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd., the Court asked whether the proposed intervener would provide a useful, distinct, and non-duplicative perspective on the legal issues raised by parties, without expanding the scope of the appeal or requiring new facts. In applying this test, the court looks for interventions that will assist on points of law within the existing record.

Yes. The BCCLA was granted leave because it offered a distinct and focused perspective on the threshold for obtaining Charter damages arising from unconstitutional municipal by-laws, an issue not fully addressed by the parties.
Yes. The CCLA was granted leave to address how international human rights instruments and the National Housing Strategy Act inform the interpretation of s. 7 Charter rights, providing a unique legal framework relevant to the appeal.
Yes. The CCHR was granted leave to contribute expertise on the relevance of international human rights norms to the s. 15 equality analysis, particularly regarding the discriminatory impact of evictions on people experiencing homelessness.
Yes. The OHRC was granted leave due to its statutory mandate and experience in equality-rights litigation, offering a distinct perspective on ss. 7 and 15 Charter analysis in the context of homelessness, disability, sex, race, and indigeneity.
Yes. LEAF was granted leave to address the adverse-impact discrimination under s.15, including the gendered and intersectional impacts of homelessness, which were not otherwise fully developed by the parties.
Yes. The City of Toronto was granted leave because of its operational responsibility for Canada's largest shelter system and its ability to provide a municipal perspective on how available resources and services bear on the s. 7 analysis.
Yes, in part. The City of Kingston was granted leave only on the issue of municipal immunity for actions taken under by-laws, where it had a distinct interest and experience. Leave was refused on horizontal stare decisis, as that issue fell squarely within the Court's expertise and did not require intervener assistance.
No. The CCPI was refused leave because it sought to advance arguments that would expand the scope of the appeal, including the recognition of positive obligations under s. 7 of the Charter relating to homelessness. These issues were not raised by the parties and were not grounded in the evidentiary record before the Court.
No. The NRHN was refused leave because it proposed to argue that homelessness should be recognized as an analogous ground under s. 15, an issue not pleaded or argued by the appellants. The CJI proposed submissions on gross disproportionality under s. 7, which largely duplicated arguments already advanced by the appellants. Its additional submissions on horizontal stare decisis did not warrant intervention, as that issue fell within the Court's institutional expertise and did not require assistance from an intervener.
No. ISAC was refused leave because tits proposed submissions focused on alleged errors in the application judge's assessment of evidence, including claims of reliance on stereotypes. The Court found these arguments duplicated the appellants' position and did not offer a sufficiently distinct or useful perspective.
No. The MHLC was refused leave because it similarly sought to challenge the application judge's treatment of the evidence, including the handling of mental health impacts of homelessness. The Court concluded that these submissions would not add meaningful assistance, as evaluating evidentiary reasoning and factual findings was squarely within the appellate court's role.

Hugginson v. Hugginson, 2025 ONCA 902

[Roberts, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. Collings and T. Morris, for the appellant

A. Beney, for the respondent

facts:

This appeal arose out of a disputed transfer of $400,000 by the appellant to herself from the estate of the parties' late stepfather. The application judge found that there was evidence to demonstrate that the stepfather had the requisite, continuing intention during his lifetime to gift $400,000 to the appellant. The appellant was the stepfather's power of attorney and then estate trustee. Relying on her affidavit evidence and the file notes and correspondence of her stepfather's investment advisor, she maintained that her stepfather intended during his lifetime to gift her $400,000, but died before he could do so. The respondent is the appellant's sister and beneficiary under the stepfather's will. She brought an application and successfully challenged the transfer to the appellant.

The application judge determined that the appellant had "not satisfied the onus on her to provide clear, convincing and cogent evidence" that her stepfather had a clear, continuing intention up to the time of his death to make the $400,000 gift to her or that delivery of the gift was complete during his lifetime. The application judge ordered the appellant to return the $400,000 to her stepfather's estate and granted costs of $16,000 to the respondent.

issues:

Did the application judge fail to consider salient evidence and misapply the test for the admission of evidence under s. 35 of the Evidence Act?
Did the application judge misapply the principle from Strong v. Bird that an imperfect gift can be perfected by the appointment of the intended recipient as the donor's estate trustee?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The Court found that the application judge made no error in his assessment of the evidence. The appellant's first two grounds of appeal essentially took issue with the application judge's weighing of the evidence and his findings that the stepfather did not intend to gift her $400,000 and that the gift was not complete. The Court found that those factual findings were entitled deference. The Court disagreed that the application judge ignored or misstated relevant evidence or that he erred in his finding that there was no evidence that the stepfather had formed the specific intent to gift $400,000 to the appellant before his death.

The Court outlined that a party seeking admission of documents must prove the two preconditions to admissibility of business records: (1) that the records were made in the usual and ordinary course of business and (2) that it was in the ordinary course of business to make such records at or reasonably close to the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event referenced in the records. The Court outlined that the appellant did not call the investment advisor who wrote the notes, nor anyone else who could attest to the preconditions to their admissibility under the Evidence Act. Accordingly, the Court found that the application judge made no error in declining to admit the notes as business records.

2. No. The Court found that the application judge correctly stated the rule derived from Strong v. Bird. Based on the application judge's findings concerning the stepfather's lack of intention to make a specific gift to the appellant right up to the date of his death, he concluded that Strong v. Bird was inapplicable.

Ratnasingam v. Balasubramaniam, 2025 ONCA 898

[Trotter, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

R.G. Plate, for the appellants
S. Dewart and P. Yaniszewski, for the respondents

facts:

In 2010, A.R., was seriously injured as a passenger in a car accident. He and his family members retained B.D. to sue the respondents, with the tort action being defended by the motor vehicle's insurer, TD Insurance. The action was settled in 2013, where A.R. was to receive 80 percent of the settlement proceeds, his family members would receive nothing, and the other 20 percent of the proceeds was payable to the plaintiffs in the second tort action. The appellants' lawyer, B.D., settled the appellants' action without their knowledge or consent, forged at least one signature and kept the funds for his own use. He also took out a consent dismissal order without the appellants' knowledge or consent and misrepresented for years that the tort litigation was ongoing until the appellants discovered the settlement, the dismissal and the misappropriation in 2020 after hiring another lawyer. B.D. later died in 2021.

In 2024, the appellants brought a motion to set aside the 2014 consent dismissal order as well as the underlying settlement, and to appoint a litigation guardian for A.R. The motion judge dismissed the motion, relying primarily on the five-factor analytical framework in Book. The motion judge found that A.R. was a person under disability due to his injuries. As a result, he should have been represented by a litigation guardian in the action, and the settlement with the respondents should have been subject to the court's review and approval under r. 7.08 of the Rules. The motion judge also found that the appellants could not repay the settlement funds and that they had not delayed unduly in bringing their motion after discovering the settlement. However, the motion judge found that the two remaining factors set out in Book weighed against granting the appellants' motion. TD Insurance had no knowledge of the disability and acted in good faith when reaching the settlement, and the settlement was neither improvident nor unreasonable. The motion judge concluded that the settlement was neither improvident nor unconscionable. The motion judge declined to determine whether the order should be set aside based on fraud under r. 59.06(2), because this would leave the settlement agreement intact. She also declined to appoint a litigation guardian for A.R. since no proceedings were ongoing.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in refusing to set aside the settlement and consent dismissal order?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The Court determined the motion judge applied the correct legal principles and committed no reviewable error in deciding the motion. She correctly found that the motion to set aside the consent dismissal order and settlement based on non-compliance with r. 7.08 should be assessed based on the Book factors. It was open to her to find, on the record before her, that the respondents acted in good faith and without knowledge of A.R.'s incapacity, and that the settlement was neither unreasonable nor unconscionable.

The Court also did not accept the appellants' argument faulting the motion judge for dismissing the motion given that the settlement would not have been approved had it been the subject of a r. 7.08 motion. The procedural requirements for a r. 7.08 motion did not apply on a motion to set aside a final order, even where the basis for the motion was the absence of compliance with r. 7.08.

The Court held the motion judge also did not err in finding r. 59.06(2) could not meaningfully assist the appellants, which rule permits an order to be set aside based on fraud. The Court agreed that it did no good to the appellants to set aside only the order. The entire settlement must be set aside for them to pursue TD Insurance.

Finally, the Court found that the motion judge's reasons showed that she was aware of the scope of the Court's parens patriae jurisdiction and its interplay with the Rules. Even though she did not explicitly refer to this jurisdiction, her decision balanced the Court's role in the context of claims by parties lacking capacity and the principle that final orders can be set aside only in exceptional circumstances. The motion judge's analysis was consistent with the principles set out in Tsaoussis. She correctly proceeded from the presumption that the dismissal order was final. The motion judge was aware that the procedural safeguards in r. 7, which codify in part the parens patriae jurisdiction, had not been respected. She was aware that A.R. had received no benefit from the settlement. The Court held that this reasoning revealed no error.

Finally, the Court commented that this was a tragic case. A.R. had been injured twice over: first, by suffering terrible injuries in the 2010 car accident and, second, by having the compensation for his injuries stolen by his lawyer. However, TD Insurance was not responsible for the loss arising out of the lawyer's conduct. The Court expressed hope that A.R. might be entitled to obtain compensation elsewhere.

Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc., 2025 ONCA 903

[Roberts J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

G. Harper and C. Shokar, for the moving parties/appellants
M. E. Day, for the responding party/respondent

facts:

These proceedings arose from the respondent's efforts to collect $600,000 in unpaid amounts plus interest under unconditionally guaranteed promissory notes dated September 14 and 15, 2023. The respondent issued a statement of claim on September 27, 2024. The appellants delivered a notice of intent to defend on October 25, 2024, and a statement of defence on November 25, 2024.

The respondent served its affidavit of documents on May 1, 2025 and, after unanswered inquiries, moved to strike the defence for failure to serve proper affidavits of documents. On July 10 and 17, 2025, the appellants served unsworn affidavits of documents. The respondent described the disclosure as "woefully inadequate," noting missing proofs of payment, communications, financial statements, and disclosure documents. The respondent agreed to an adjournment but refused to timetable discoveries given the ongoing disclosure deficiencies.

On August 28, 2025, McArthur J. ordered the appellants to serve affidavits of documents "as required by the rules" by September 12, 2025. The order provided that the defence would be struck if they failed to comply. The judge also awarded $1,000 in costs. On September 12, 2025, only R.H. served a sworn affidavit. On September 15, 2025, the respondent asserted breach of the August 28 order and further deficiencies in Mr. H's affidavit. On September 16, 2025, the appellants responded that Mr. H would sign for the corporations, that no financial documentation would be produced, and that only the contracts were relevant. The remaining affidavits were served on September 23, 2025, after the deadline, and they were identical.

On October 16, 2025, the motion judge found the affidavits deficient and, applying Advanced Farm Technologies, struck the statement of defence. The appellants appealed and sought a stay pending appeal, arguing that less drastic measures were available. The respondent opposed this motion.

issues:

Did the motion judge err by prematurely striking the appellants' statement of defence when less draconian measures would have sufficed to secure compliance with the August 28, 2025 order?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

No. The motion judge did not err by prematurely striking the appellants' statement of defence. The relevant criteria for a stay sought under r. 63.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure was not controversial. The overarching consideration was whether the justice of the case warranted the requested stay. Informing that consideration are the following factors that the moving party had to satisfy on a balance of probabilities: 1) the appeal raised a serious issue; 2) the moving party would likely suffer irreparable harm; and 3) the balance of convenience favoured the granting of the requested stay: Hermina Developments Inc. v. Epireon Capital Limited.

The appeal was arguable but weak. The deferential standard governing discretionary case-management orders under rr. 30.08 and 60.12 left limited room for intervention. The August 28, 2025 conditional order was clear and required enforcement. The motion judge applied Advanced Farm Technologies and Falcon Lumber to the appellants' persistent and material defaults. The affidavits did not comply with r. 30.03 because they failed to list all documents relevant to issues the appellants themselves put in play, so the likelihood of success was low and weighed only minimally for a stay. The Court therefore found it difficult to identify error in the motion judge's conclusion that the served affidavits of documents were insufficient. Such a decision would be subject to considerable appellate deference.

On irreparable harm, the appellants' assertion of reputational injury was bald and unsupported. Any prejudice pending appeal was financial only. Default steps could be unwound if the appeal succeeded. There was no evidence the respondent could not repay any amounts it collected before the appeal is decided. Irreparable harm was therefore not established.

On the balance of convenience, any inconvenience to the appellants from unwinding enforcement was outweighed by the prejudice to the respondent from further delay. This was a straightforward collection action. The appeal was weak.

As an equitable remedy, a stay required clean hands: Blench v. Cheng. The appellants did not meet that standard. They breached the August 28, 2025 order by serving late and defective affidavits. They failed to pay the $1,000 costs. They did not move to set aside the order. They continued to resist proper disclosure. Their compliance record was poor and did not inspire confidence in adherence to further terms. The Court was not persuaded that the justice of the case warranted the requested stay.

Against that backdrop, the argument that lesser measures would have sufficed was unpersuasive. The appeal was "arguable but weak." It did not justify a stay, particularly where the appellants did not come with clean hands.

Van Aman v. Mugo, 2025 ONCA 886

[Simmons, Miller and Wilson JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Tweyman, for the appellant

R. Reid, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Parenting, Child Support, Variation, Review, Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 16, S.H. v. D.K., 2022 ONSC 1203 (Div. Ct.)

facts:

The parties were parents of two children (born in 2012 and 2015) who separated in 2018. After a 2019 temporary order barred removal from Ontario, the appellant twice took the children to Kenya. In March 2021, final orders directed the children's immediate return to the respondent, set no parenting time for the appellant and required her to pay support based on the imputed income of $109,817. She later obtained virtual and professionally supervised in‑person time. In October 2024, the appellant mother was convicted of two counts of child abduction and received a one‑year conditional sentence and two years' probation.

The appellant appealed from an order dated January 21, 2025, stipulating that she had specified virtual, professionally supervised in-person parenting time with her two children and dismissing her change motion regarding child support.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in continuing supervised parenting time and refusing to vary child support, including treating the 2021 support as imputed income and proceeding by change motion rather than review?

holding:

Appeal dismissed, subject to one minor variation of the motion judge's order.

reasoning:

No. The Court rejected the appellant's submissions on parenting time. The motion judge properly adverted to and applied the best interests factors under s. 16 of the Divorce Act. These included stability, child-care plans, the ability and willingness to meet the children's needs, the impact of family violence and relevant criminal orders. The motion judge reasonably characterized the appellant's prior abductions as part of a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour. That conduct exposed the children to harm. The judge also relied on the appellant's lack of a cogent, realistic and workable plan for expanded parenting time. These findings justified maintaining the status quo of virtual and professionally supervised in-person parenting time.

Although positive reports of the appellant's supervised interactions existed, the motion judge was entitled to maintain supervision given the appellant's past abductions, absence of a residential address beyond a post office box, lack of identified suitable non‑professional supervisors and missing particulars for any graduated relaxation of supervision.

The Court also rejected the child-support appeal. The appellant bore the evidentiary onus and provided no reliable proof of a licence suspension, job loss caused by the charges, unsuccessful job applications or actual or potential earnings. As a result, the motion judge's refusal to vary support was unassailable. The contention that the March 2021 support order was based on declared rather than imputed income also failed. The trial judge expressly imputed income of $109,817. The appellant had resigned from her nursing position before leaving for Kenya.

The new argument raised on appeal, that the matter should have proceeded as a review rather than a change motion, did not assist the appellant. The Court acknowledged that a change motion required the moving party to demonstrate a material change of circumstances. However, whether as part of a change motion or a review motion, the onus was on the moving party to file evidence to establish their income or support negative inferences about imputed income. The appellant failed to do either.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Chaly v. Structured Restoration Inc., 2025 ONCA 901

[Roberts, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

A.C., acting in person
S. Tangri, for the respondent

Curtis v. Toronto Police Service Board, 2025 ONCA 896

[Roberts, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

G.C. and T. R., acting in person
C. Davies, for the respondent/responding party

Jaymat Limited v. Trichilo, 2025 ONCA 900

[Trotter, Copeland and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L.E. Lung, for the appellants
K. Sherkin and M. A. De Sanctis, for the respondent

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be ought about your specific circumstances.

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Court Of Appeal Summaries (December 22-29, 2025)

Contributor

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Adjala-Tosorontio (Township) v. Saunders, 2025 ONCA 906

Abbott v. London Health Sciences Centre, 2025 ONCA 895

Derenzis v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 893

Heegsma v. Hamilton (City), 2025 ONCA 904

Hugginson v. Hugginson, 2025 ONCA 902

Ratnasingam v. Balasubramaniam, 2025 ONCA 898

Royce Presidential Investments Inc. v. Valour Group Inc., 2025 ONCA 903

Van Aman v. Mugo, 2025 ONCA 886

CIVIL DECISIONS

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

Contributor

Canada

Court Of Appeal Summaries (December 22-29, 2025)

Contributor

John Polyzogopoulos Blaney McMurtry LLP 416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

CIVIL DECISIONS

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

Contributor

Canada

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email