The Limits Of The "Inevitable Accident" Argument: Case Comment On Zapata, Et Al. v. Reid, Et Al.

Earlier this year, the Superior Court of Ontario released its decision in Zapata, et al. v. Reid, et al., dismissing the plaintiffs' personal injury claim on a summary judgment motion from the defendants.¹ This case addresses the burden of proof and standard of care in negligence claims involving the inevitable accident principle and highlights the utility of summary judgment motions.

Background

In July 2017, the defendant driver suffered a seizure and lost control of his vehicle while driving home from work. He struck two other vehicles before colliding with the vehicle carrying the plaintiffs.

The defendant was undergoing treatment for brain cancer at the time. His license had been suspended by the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario in 2016 due to an earlier seizure; however, his license was reinstated later that year upon his doctor's recommendation that he was fit to drive. At the time of the accident, he was taking anti-seizure medication per his doctor's recommendations, and had been seizure free for eighteen months.

Five months after the accident, the defendant died of brain cancer.

The plaintiffs brought a personal injury action for damages arising from the accident and the defendant's alleged negligence in continuing to drive with his history of seizures. The defendant's estate brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the claim, claiming that no trial is needed to prove the circumstances of the accident or the defendant's efforts to prevent the seizure. As the defendant took reasonable care in the circumstances, he was not negligent and the claim should be dismissed. The plaintiffs opposed the motion and argued that, as the accident was an "inevitable accident," the burden to disprove negligence rests on the estate, and that a trial court could find that the defendant ought to have eliminated the risk of a seizure by not driving.

Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 20.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedures, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial based on the evidence available. If necessary, the judge may also utilize the three fact-finding powers in Rule 20.04(2.1): weighing the evidence, evaluating the credibility of a deponent, and drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.

The Court determined that this was an appropriate case for summary judgment. The disposition of the action depended on the interpretation of the applicable law; the only live factual dispute was whether the defendant's doctors ought to have taken steps to prevent the accident in giving the defendant different advice about driving and not reinstating his suspended license.

The Court identified three possible outcomes for the motion:²

1. If the governing law is general negligence, as the defendants suggested, the motion could dismiss the action without using the additional fact-finding powers under r. 20.04(2.1). Both parties' experts agreed that it was reasonable for the defendant to have followed medical advice and continued to drive while taking seizure medication.
2. If the inevitable accident principle requires a departure from ordinary negligence law and requires the defendant to bear the burden to disprove negligence:
   1. The Court could dismiss the motion and consider whether to resume the hearing with the additional fact-finding powers under r. 20.04(2.1) or send the matter to trial to determine whether the defendant should have stopped driving to eliminate the risk of a seizure. However, the only live factual dispute was whether the defendant's doctors should have given him different advice regarding driving, which would not impact the outcome of the trial.
   2. The Court could grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs, if it determined that that the law required the defendant to abstain from driving entirely while on medication for seizures.

The "Inevitable Accident" Principle

The case turned on the proper application of the "inevitable accident" principle.

The plaintiffs suggested that establishing an "inevitable accident" places an affirmative defence obligation on the defendant, requiring him to establish that he had done the utmost to prevent the accident. This heightened standard of care required the defendant to stop driving if some risk of a seizure remained.³

In contrast, the estate interpreted the Supreme Court decision of Rintoul v. X-Ray and Radium Industries Ltd.⁴ as concluding that, where a prima facie case of negligence is established, the defendant can discharge their burden of proving that the accident was not caused by their negligence by showing that the accident was inevitable. In other words, that the accident could not have been prevented despite the defendant exercising reasonable care.⁵

The Court confirmed that Rintoul was the leading authority on the inevitable accident principle; however, the inevitable accident principle was not an affirmative defence or a requirement to disprove negligence, but simply a denial of negligence.⁶

The estate's plea of inevitable accident, based on the approach in Rintoul, raised three subsidiary issues: the defendant's burden of proof, the applicable standard of care, and the application of the burden of proof and standard of care.

1. Defendant's Burden of Proof

The Court noted that Rintoul should not be interpreted as transferring the legal burden of proving negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant when inevitable accident is plead. The burden of proof in negligence does not shift to the defendant absent statutory provisions or legal presumptions. For instance, in rear-end collisions, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to disprove negligence from the presumption that the driver followed too closely and from a positive obligation to not follow other cars too closely under s. 158(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.⁷ In this case, there is no legal ground to reverse the burden of proof to the defendant; the onus remains on the plaintiff to show that the defendant was negligent.

The Court also emphasized that the "inevitable accident" principle is not a legal defence, but a defence to an inference that the court is free to draw from the plaintiffs' case. If the inference of negligence is strong (i.e. in cases involving rear-end collisions) or if the risk was serious (i.e. the sudden incapacitation of a driver), the defendant has an evidentiary burden to rebut the court's inference that they were negligent in the circumstances.⁸

2. Applicable Standard of Care

The standard of care in negligence is the exercise of reasonable care. As negligence law does not require a defendant to eliminate all potential risk, a defendant will not be liable simply because more could have been done than what was objectively reasonable. An "inevitable accident" is not a special category of negligence with an elevated standard of care; the defendant's driving is subject to the same reasonable care standard.⁹ Specifically, the Court held that a driver losing consciousness and control of their vehicle due to an involuntary medical event does not have a higher standard of care than those whose conscious decisions and risk-taking cause accidents.¹⁰

3. Application of the Burden of Proof and Standard of Care

In this case, the plaintiffs were unable to prove that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and that his decision to drive, despite the risk of seizures, was unreasonable:

• The defendant's license had been reinstated;
• He was able to work full-time in construction and live independently;
• He was 18 months seizure-free at the time of the accident;
• His doctors were aware that he drove and did not advise him against it;
• His neurologist assessed him as seizure-free while on medication ten days prior to the accident;
• He was fully compliant with all medical recommendations, and did not drive when his license was suspended in 2016; and
• None of his medications increased his risks of seizures or counter-acted his seizure medication.¹¹

The medical evidence indicates that the defendant's seizure occurred, despite reasonable precautions being taken. The fact that a reasonable person knows or ought to know that medications can stop working does not make it unreasonable to drive with that risk; to impose liability on such drivers would effectively impose a strict liability regime. There was nothing the defendant could have reasonably done to prevent the accident, short of refraining from driving. As the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was not negligent, there is no defence evidentiary burden and the defendants do not have to disprove the defendant's negligence.¹²

Conclusions

This case brought some much needed clarity with respect to the "inevitable accident" principle in negligence claims. Despite conflicting case law, an inevitable accident does not reverse the burden of disproving negligence to the defendant; the law of regular negligence applies and the burden remains with the plaintiff to show that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care.

This decision also highlights the utility of summary judgment motions, particularly when matters in dispute are of a legal and not factual nature.

Footnotes

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.