Canada's Nuclear Energy Strategy: From Federal Platform To Project Execution

On June 22, 2026, Natural Resources Canada published the Nuclear Energy Strategy for Canada. The Strategy is a significant federal statement of direction for Canada’s nuclear sector.

It supports nuclear energy as a source of reliable, low-carbon electricity. But it also does something broader: it frames nuclear as a national industrial capability tied to energy security, trade diversification, export leadership, sovereign technology, workforce development, innovation and long-term economic growth.

That broader frame matters. Canada is not entering the global nuclear market as a new participant. It has one of the world’s most complete nuclear value chains, including uranium production, CANDU reactor technology, Crown-owned reactor intellectual property, a deep research and development ecosystem, a mature regulator, a domestic supply chain, and decades of operating, refurbishment and export experience.

The Strategy recognizes those advantages and seeks to organize them into a coordinated national platform.

The importance of the Strategy is not only that it confirms nuclear’s role in Canada’s clean-energy future, but that it begins to answer a harder question: how Canada can convert its nuclear inheritance into a coordinated program of project execution, industrial growth and international competitiveness.

The Strategy sets the national direction. The next test is whether Canada can build the federal-provincial, regulatory, financial, supply-chain and workforce machinery required to deliver it.

What the Strategy actually establishes

The Strategy is organized around four pillars:

1. enabling new builds across Canada;
2. positioning Canada as a global supplier and exporter of choice;
3. expanding uranium production and nuclear fuel opportunities while supporting long-term nuclear waste management; and
4. developing new Canadian nuclear innovations, including fission and fusion.

Within those pillars, the Strategy establishes several concrete ambitions and workstreams.

Domestically, it calls for a modernized, cost-competitive CANDU design to be available by 2030. It aims to enable construction of up to 10 new large-scale reactors in Canada, with two under construction by 2035 and five more planned or under development by 2040. It also targets at least one nuclear deployment outside Ontario by 2035 and a Canadian microreactor demonstration by 2035.

The climate context is important. Canada is a signatory to the COP28 Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, which calls for global nuclear energy capacity to triple by 2050 in support of net-zero objectives. The Strategy’s domestic new-build targets and export ambitions should be read as Canada’s contribution to that broader direction of travel. Canada is not only trying to decarbonize at home. It is positioning itself to help other countries do the same.

On financing and project delivery, the Strategy commits to a draft federal financing policy for new nuclear power projects by April 2027. That policy is expected to outline preconditions for federal support and available financing instruments, including green bonds, Canada Infrastructure Bank participation and loan guarantees. It is also expected to address financial risk-sharing with provinces and private partners.

On Crown-owned IP, the Strategy commits the federal government to reviewing the management and exploitation of Crown-owned IP, including consideration of an IP management approach aligned with the Strategy’s objectives and intended to secure best value for Canadians from historic government investments.

On supply chain and workforce, the Strategy calls for assessment of new-build requirements, including domestic heavy water production, heavy forgings and nuclear-grade materials. It also targets a doubling of Canada’s nuclear workforce through sustained government programs, investment in the Canadian Nuclear Learning Centre, support for academic and training programs, and coordination of professional training and experiential learning at Chalk River Laboratories, developed in partnership with provinces, territories, academia, industry, unions, utilities and Indigenous peoples.

On exports, the Strategy adopts a Team Canada posture. It sets targets to secure CANDU technology in at least four new international markets by 2040, engage six to 10 new nuclear entrant markets over a 15-year horizon, and capture significant Canadian supply-chain participation in at least five international non-CANDU large reactor and SMR projects by 2040.

On fuel, the Strategy highlights Canada’s position as the world’s second-largest uranium producer, its high-grade uranium deposits in Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin, and CANDU’s natural-uranium fuel advantage. It also recognizes that enriched fuel supply for non-CANDU technologies requires deliberate planning with trusted allies, while the longer-term question of whether Canada should develop domestic enrichment capability remains under assessment.

On innovation, the Strategy identifies priorities including private-sector nuclear R&D, fusion fuel-cycle leadership, a Canadian-controlled Generation IV microreactor, research infrastructure, a possible large-scale research reactor replacement and a comprehensive Radioisotope Strategy.

That is a substantial agenda. It is not a single-project announcement. It is a federal platform for nuclear growth across domestic deployment, exports, fuel security, workforce, supply chains, IP management and innovation.

The federal role: Enabling, de-risking and coordinating

The Strategy is careful about the federal role. It recognizes that electricity generation is primarily provincial and territorial jurisdiction. The federal government’s role is described as complementary and enabling: bringing capabilities that individual jurisdictions cannot replicate at scale.

Those capabilities include de-risking capital investment, modernizing federal regulatory processes, supporting pan-Canadian R&D and advancing unified export promotion through a Team Canada approach.

That matters because nuclear execution in Canada will not be delivered by federal ambition alone. Provinces and utilities will make technology-selection, procurement, siting and rate-recovery decisions. Regulators will determine licensing, environmental assessment and cost-recovery treatment. Indigenous communities will be partners in consultation, equity participation, workforce development and long-term project legitimacy. Industry and investors will decide whether the project pipeline is credible enough to justify early investment in labour, manufacturing and delivery capacity.

The Strategy therefore should not be read as the final execution plan for Canada’s nuclear buildout. It is better understood as a strong federal platform around which the rest of the ecosystem can organize.

Nuclear as industrial strategy, not only energy policy

One of the Strategy’s most important contributions is that it treats nuclear as more than electricity generation. It describes nuclear as both an energy plan and an economic one: a means to accelerate nation-building projects, strengthen the domestic value chain, enhance energy security, and cultivate a high-value innovation ecosystem.

That is the correct framing. Nuclear projects are not ordinary generation assets. They are multi-decade infrastructure commitments that shape supply chains, skilled labour, Indigenous economic participation, export credibility, regulatory capacity, domestic manufacturing and national technology strategy.

This broader frame also fits the current economic moment. Canada is facing a more volatile trade environment, increased concern about supply-chain dependence, and a renewed focus on building domestic capacity in strategic sectors. In that setting, nuclear is not only a climate asset. It is a resilience asset.

The Strategy’s ambition is therefore not only to build reactors, but to sustain and grow the national ecosystem required to finance, license, construct, operate, maintain, refurbish, export and innovate around nuclear technology over decades.

CANDU, Crown-owned IP and public value

The Strategy places renewed emphasis on Canada’s sovereign nuclear technology position. It notes that approximately 13 per cent of Canada’s electricity is generated by nuclear energy using the homegrown CANDU reactor, and that the Government of Canada retains ownership of CANDU IP through Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, with AtkinsRéalis serving as the exclusive licensee for CANDU.

That is a major policy signal. The Strategy also commits the federal government to reviewing the management and exploitation of Crown-owned IP, including consideration of an IP management approach aligned with the Strategy’s objectives and designed to ensure best value for Canadians from historic government investments.

This will be one of the most important execution files to watch. If Canada is serious about modernizing and sustaining CANDU technology, winning export markets, and maximizing Canadian supply-chain participation, then IP governance cannot be an afterthought. It must support commercial deployment, protect public value, preserve Canadian strategic interests, and provide sufficient clarity for project developers, utilities, suppliers, investors and export customers.

At the same time, the Strategy is not a single-technology document. It recognizes CANDU as Canada’s sovereign reactor technology while also positioning Canadian firms to participate in SMR and large light-water reactor projects globally. That includes supply-chain opportunities associated with platforms such as GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 and Westinghouse’s AP1000.

That balance is important. Canada’s nuclear advantage is not limited to one project or one technology. It includes Crown-owned reactor IP, domestic uranium, a mature regulator, high-skill labour, research infrastructure, isotope production, refurbishment expertise and supply-chain capabilities that can serve multiple technologies in Canada and abroad.

From federal ambition to provincial execution

The Strategy properly recognizes that provinces hold jurisdiction over technology selection for electricity generation, and that provincial choices carry direct implications for how Canada benefits from its nuclear sector. It also says the federal government will work with provinces to maximize use of Canadian IP and supply-chain capability wherever feasible.

This is where execution becomes complex. The federal government can provide financing tools, export support, regulatory modernization, IP stewardship, supply-chain coordination and national ambition. But provinces, utilities and regulators will decide what gets built, where, when, by whom, under what procurement model, and with what cost-recovery framework.

That is not a weakness in the Strategy. It is the nature of nuclear nation-building in a federation. The Strategy is a strong federal step. It now needs partners to step up alongside it.

Ontario as an execution test case

The Strategy is national, but Ontario will be one of the first places where its execution logic is tested.

The Darlington New Nuclear Project, based on GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300 small modular reactor, is already serving as an early execution case for new nuclear in Canada. It tests practical questions that every future nuclear build will face: licensing, procurement, financing, supply-chain readiness, construction planning and public confidence.

Ontario has begun adapting its regulatory and financing frameworks for new nuclear. That is encouraging. It means the Strategy is not landing in a vacuum. Governments, regulators and market participants are already beginning to test how new nuclear construction can be financed, regulated and delivered.

But the framework is still developing. Important questions around risk allocation, cost recovery and scalability to future projects remain live. The more accurate point is that DNNP is helping Canada learn what new-build execution architecture requires.

That is not a criticism of Ontario’s regulatory process. It is the nature of moving from refurbishment to new build. Refurbishment projects are complex, but they generally involve existing sites, existing assets, known technologies and a more controlled risk profile. New build is different. It requires regulatory and financing models capable of supporting long development horizons, construction risk, supply-chain scale-up, Indigenous participation, federal and provincial risk sharing, and private capital formation.

Ontario’s DNNP experience may therefore become nationally important. If Canada is to move from one project to a fleet-based buildout, the regulatory and financing tools tested in Ontario will need to become scalable, investable and durable.

Qualified capacity: Speed, scale and safety

The Strategy recognizes that Canada’s nuclear opportunity will be limited by execution capacity. It commits the federal government to assess supply-chain requirements for new builds, including domestic heavy water production, heavy forgings and nuclear-grade materials. It also targets a doubling of Canada’s nuclear workforce through coordinated training, academic programs and experiential learning at Chalk River Laboratories.

Ontario’s planning work shows what that means in practice. The IESO’s Pathways to Decarbonization analysis found that one decarbonized-grid scenario would likely require an additional 69,000 MW of non-emitting supply and $375–$425 billion in bulk-system investment by 2050. The same analysis noted that large infrastructure such as nuclear facilities and transmission can take 10 to 15 years to build, meaning preparatory work must begin well before the capacity is needed.

The labour implications are just as important. The IESO analysis identified the potential need for a significant increase in the workforce required to build electricity infrastructure. That is consistent with the Strategy’s own focus on workforce expansion, training and experiential learning.

The question, however, is not simply whether Canada can increase headcount or supplier numbers. Nuclear delivery depends on qualified capacity: certified suppliers, experienced constructors, nuclear-grade quality assurance, project controls, engineering depth, regulatory familiarity, and a safety culture strong enough to withstand rapid growth.

A supply chain that expands too slowly becomes a schedule and cost risk. A supply chain that expands too quickly without the necessary discipline can become a delivery and safety risk.

That is why the Strategy’s workforce and supply-chain commitments should be understood as central to execution, not as supporting measures. The climate and electrification time horizon is urgent, but nuclear projects can only deliver climate value if they can be executed predictably, safely and at scale. Speed matters. So does the strength of the institutions, people and suppliers being asked to move faster.

The lesson for the national Strategy is clear: Canada does not need only a project pipeline; it needs a qualified capacity pipeline. Utilities, suppliers, constructors, unions, colleges, universities, Indigenous institutions, provincial governments, regulators and federal agencies will need to build the workforce, manufacturing depth and transmission infrastructure required to deliver the projects the Strategy makes possible.

The limiting question is therefore not whether Canada wants nuclear. It is whether Canada can expand qualified delivery capacity fast enough—and safely enough—for nuclear to meet the climate, electrification and economic-resilience role now being assigned to it.

Nuclear as Canadian economic resilience

The Strategy’s economic framing is one of its most important features. It treats nuclear not only as clean electricity, but as a platform for domestic value creation, trade diversification, export leadership, innovation and energy security. That matters in a world where tariffs, supply-chain dependence and economic coercion have become live policy risks.

Canada is unusually well positioned because its nuclear advantage spans much of the value chain: uranium, CANDU technology, AECL-owned IP, Chalk River, a mature regulator, a substantial domestic supply chain, a high-skill workforce, isotope production, export experience and long-term operating capability.

Nuclear investment produces value across a broad industrial base: engineering, construction, precision manufacturing, fuel, maintenance, research, isotopes, digital systems, project finance and professional services.

Public economic-impact work by the Conference Board of Canada for Ontario Power Generation illustrates the scale of the opportunity. In one technology-agnostic assessment of a potential large nuclear facility at Wesleyville, the Conference Board estimated hundreds of billions of dollars in GDP contribution over the project life, significant tax revenues and sustained employment benefits. The precise figures depend on project size, technology and modelling assumptions, but the larger point is clear: nuclear projects are not ordinary power plants. They are long-duration industrial platforms.

The export dimension makes this even more important. Where Canada owns or controls the underlying technology and supply chain, more of the long-term value can remain in Canada through engineering, manufacturing, fuel, services, IP, operations, refurbishments and export support. Even where Canadian firms are participating in non-CANDU projects, there is still substantial value in qualified supply-chain participation, engineering services, manufacturing, project delivery, operations and lifecycle support.

If executed well, the Strategy can help Canada do more than build reactors. It can help Canada build durable Canadian-controlled economic capacity.

Export strategy and the Team Canada nuclear offer

The Strategy’s export pillar is among its strongest elements. It calls for a shift from fragmented, firm-by-firm international engagement to a coordinated Team Canada posture. It sets targets to secure CANDU technology in at least four new international markets by 2040 and engage six to ten new nuclear entrant markets over a 15-year horizon.

The Strategy also proposes a Nuclear Export Working Group, CANDU Technology Dialogues, a Canada Nuclear Partnership Initiative, and a Canadian Nuclear Export Financing and Commercial Framework using federal tools including the Strategic Exports Office, Export Development Canada and the Canadian Commercial Corporation.

That is important because nuclear exports are not ordinary sales. They create multi-decade relationships involving fuel, technology, regulation, financing, training, operations, waste management and geopolitical alignment. A coherent Canadian nuclear export offer must therefore combine government support, private-sector capability, financing, regulatory credibility, Indigenous and community engagement experience, long-term operating support and trusted supply chains.

It must also be broad enough to reflect market reality. CANDU is central to Canada’s sovereign technology story. But Canada’s nuclear supply chain can also compete globally in non-CANDU projects, including SMRs and large light-water reactors. The Strategy recognizes both dimensions. That is a strength.

Fuel security, innovation and the next generation

The Strategy also connects nuclear growth to fuel security and innovation. It highlights Canada’s position as the world’s second-largest uranium producer, its high-grade uranium deposits in Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin, and the fact that Canada is capable of producing sufficient uranium to supply its entire domestic reactor fleet.

This is a major energy-security point. Because CANDU reactors operate on natural rather than enriched uranium, Canada’s CANDU fuel supply chain is almost entirely domestic. That insulates Canada and other CANDU operators from some of the volatility associated with foreign enrichment markets.

At the same time, Canada’s deployment of non-CANDU technologies will require deliberate fuel-supply planning with trusted allies. The Strategy recognizes that the longer-term question of whether Canada should develop domestic enrichment capability remains under assessment, and identifies the Nuclear Fuels Table as a primary forum for tracking supply-chain analysis and exploring the scope of an alliance with trusted partners.

On innovation, the Strategy identifies priorities including private-sector nuclear R&D, fusion fuel-cycle leadership, a Canadian-controlled Generation IV microreactor, flagship research infrastructure, a possible large-scale research reactor replacement, and a comprehensive Radioisotope Strategy.

These are not side issues. They are what will determine whether Canada remains a technology leader or becomes primarily a technology adopter. Research reactors, isotope infrastructure, tritium expertise, microreactors, fusion fuel-cycle capability and advanced materials are all part of the same strategic question: can Canada sustain the technical base that makes nuclear leadership possible?

What industry should do now

The Strategy creates a clear signal, but signals do not build projects. Industry participants should now be asking practical execution questions.

What role can they play in a fleet-based deployment model? What supply-chain investments are required? What skilled labour partnerships need to be formed? What Indigenous equity and participation structures are appropriate? What regulatory and cost-recovery issues need to be addressed early? What IP, licensing and technology rights are necessary for domestic and export projects? What financing structures can attract private capital while properly allocating risk? What export partnerships should be built before competitors lock in relationships?

Canada’s nuclear opportunity is real. The federal government has now set out a serious platform for action. The task for the broader ecosystem is to turn that platform into projects, supply chains, jobs, exports, innovation and long-term public value.

The Strategy closes with C.D. Howe’s famous phrase: “Okay, let’s go.”

The challenge now is to mean it.

If you would like to discuss the Strategy and what it may mean for your organization, please contact a member of Gowling WLG's Nuclear Group.

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