On 2 June 2025, the European Commission ("EC") imposed fines totaling €329 million on Delivery Hero (Germany) and Glovo (Spain) for participating in a cartel in the online food delivery sector. The EC found that, from July 2018 to July 2022, the two companies engaged in a series of anti-competitive practices that restricted competition across the European Economic Area ("EEA"). This decision marks two significant firsts in EU antitrust enforcement: it is the first cartel case focused on labour markets and the first to sanction anti-competitive conduct facilitated through a minority shareholding in a competitor.
Delivery Hero and Glovo are the two biggest companies in the European food delivery market, operating across several countries through mobile apps and websites. In July 2018, Delivery Hero acquired a minority (non-controlling) stake in Glovo. While this investment did not grant it full control, it established a financial connection between the two. Over time, Delivery Hero increased its ownership and fully acquired Glovo by July 2022.
During the period between the initial investment and the full acquisition, the EC found that the two companies stopped competing independently. Instead, they engaged in coordinated conduct in ways that violated EU competition rules.
This included a no-poach agreement, the exchange of commercially sensitive information, and the allocation of geographic markets.
No-Poach Agreement
The EC found that the two companies initially included a no-hire clause for certain employees in their shareholder agreement, which was soon broadened into a wider no-poach arrangement. This meant they agreed not to recruit each other's staff actively, thereby reducing competition in the labour market. The EC stressed that such conduct limited job opportunities for workers and hindered the natural competition for skilled labour. These agreements are harmful because they directly suppress wages and restrict employee mobility, preventing workers from pursuing better opportunities. Beyond the harm to individual workers, such arrangements can negatively affect the entire sector by restricting the flow of talent, reducing productivity, and stifling innovation, ultimately weakening the broader economy.
In May 2024, the European Commission published a Policy Brief highlighting that enforcement of competition rules in labour markets had become a priority for competition authorities world-wide and highlighting no-poach and wage-fixing agreements as anti-competitive by object. It also referenced the EC's Horizontal Agreement Guidelines in noting that any exceptions would be limited to such an agreement being considered an ancillary restraint (objectively necessary for the main non—restrictive transaction) under strict conditions or in the unlikely scenario of the agreement benefitting under an Article 101(3) TFEU exception by providing pro-competitive effects.
Exchange of Commercially Sensitive Information
The second key infringement identified by the EC concerns the systematic exchange of commercially sensitive information between Delivery Hero and Glovo. This unlawful coordination was facilitated by the close ties that developed between the companies' executive teams following Delivery Hero's minority investment in Glovo in 2018. While minority shareholdings can justify a certain level of oversight for investment purposes, the relationship between the firms extended well beyond standard investor monitoring.
According to the EC, the companies shared internal documents, including strategic plans and pricing data, and held meetings to align on business decisions. The information exchanged covered current and future pricing strategies, upcoming commercial offers, and broader competitive tactics. These exchanges were not unilateral; both parties actively engaged in sharing and receiving information.
This level of coordination removed the natural uncertainty that should exist between independent competitors. By exchanging such sensitive information, Delivery Hero and Glovo reduced competitive pressure and aligned their conduct, rather than competing to outperform one another. As a result, consumers were deprived of the typical benefits of market rivalry, such as better quality, innovation, and lower prices. This kind of behaviour constitutes a core competition law violation, as it undermines independent decision-making.
Allocation of Geographic Markets
The third major infringement identified by the EC involved market allocation, a serious form of anticompetitive conduct in which competitors agree not to compete in specific geographic areas. In this case, Delivery Hero and Glovo were found to have divided national markets for online food delivery across the EEA.
Delivery Hero used its position as a shareholder in Glovo to push for such market-sharing arrangements. This influence was exerted in two ways: directly, by threatening to use its approval rights over strategic decisions, and indirectly, by swaying other Glovo shareholders to align with its market allocation strategy.
The EC's investigation revealed that the two companies coordinated their expansion and presence across the EEA in several ways. They agreed in advance which company would enter new national markets where neither was active, effectively aligning their growth strategies to avoid head-to-head competition. In addition, they refrained from entering markets where the other was already established, thereby preserving each other's dominance in specific territories. To reinforce this market division, they also eliminated geographic overlaps by selling operations to one another in certain countries, ensuring that only one of them operated in each market.
The result was a lack of competition across several EEA countries. In these markets, consumers were left with only one of the two platforms — either Glovo or Delivery Hero — and had no opportunity to compare pricing, promotions, or services between the two. This reduced consumer choice, undermining the fundamental principles of a competitive market.
Such market allocation agreements are deemed particularly harmful under EU competition law because they directly restrict competition between firms, allowing them to maintain higher prices or lower service quality without the risk of being outperformed.
Penalties and Settlement
The EC concluded that the three forms of anticompetitive conduct constituted a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, with the object of restricting competition. The EC found that these intertwined practices systematically weakened competitive pressure between Delivery Hero and Glovo, fundamentally distorting market dynamics in the fast-growing online food delivery sector.
As a result of this finding, the EC imposed significant fines: approximately €223 million on Delivery Hero and €106 million on Glovo. Both undertakings acknowledged their participation and settled under the EC's cartel settlement procedure. In return, each received a 10% reduction in their fine, in accordance with the settlement procedure introduced in 2008 under Regulation 1/2003.
Key Takeaways for Companies
- Companies should be mindful that labour-related collusion, even through shareholder agreements, can violate EU (or national) competition laws. In cases where a no-poach clause is deemed necessary for a main transaction to proceed, this should be subject to a competitive assessment under applicable competition rules. Companies should ensure that employees, particularly those in HR, are trained to identify and avoid any language or conduct that could resemble a no-poach agreement.
- Companies should generally have clear safeguards in place to ensure that commercially sensitive information is not shared with any competing entities. This EC decision highlights the importance of caution where any minority shareholdings are held in competing entities, to ensure this does not lead to the sharing of information which could inadvertently lead to a breach of competition rules.
- The EC operates an anonymous whistleblower tool, a secure system that enables individuals and companies to report anticompetitive behaviour while maintaining confidentiality. Through the EC's eLeniency tool it is also possible for companies to report participation in a cartel voluntarily in exchange for full immunity or substantial reductions in fines.
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