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28 October 2025

An Unusual Partnership: DOJ Antitrust Division Launches Joint Whistleblower Rewards Program With The Postal Service

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Ropes & Gray LLP

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On July 8, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Antitrust Division (the "Division") announced a new Whistleblower Rewards Program (the "Program") in collaboration with two unlikely partners...
United States Antitrust/Competition Law
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On July 8, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Antitrust Division (the "Division") announced a new Whistleblower Rewards Program (the "Program") in collaboration with two unlikely partners: the United States Postal Service, and the United States Postal Service Office of Inspector General (collectively the "Postal Service"). The Program creates, for the first time in U.S. antitrust enforcement history, a monetary incentive for individuals to report criminal antitrust violations that result in monetary recovery or fines of over $1 million. In recent remarks from September 2025, Deputy Assistant Attorney General ("DAAG") for Criminal Enforcement Omeed Assefi reiterated the Division's more aggressive approach to criminal antitrust enforcement, signaling it as a priority area for antitrust enforcement.

The Program also serves as a continuation of two broader enforcement trends both in the DOJ holistically and at the Division specifically. First, it serves as just the latest example of the DOJ's expansion of whistleblower awards to supercharge detection of criminal misconduct that was first announced in August 2024, then expanded in May 2025. Second, within the Division, it continues the focus of using antitrust enforcement to combat crimes and related schemes impacting the U.S. government that started in 2020 with the establishment of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force ("PCSF").

What Alleged Conduct Does the Program Target?

The Program only covers what it calls allegations of an "Eligible Criminal Violation"—which include criminal violations of Sherman Act §§ 1–3, as well as federal crimes that effectuate, facilitate, or conceal Sherman Act violations; target or affect public procurement; or target or affect federal competition investigations or proceedings. In practice, the kinds of misconduct that the Division is targeting include price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation schemes. However, importantly, the allegation must also "reasonably articulate 'violations of law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property."' While the Program provides no information regarding how substantial that affect must be, given the Division's signal that it intends to ramp up criminal enforcement, one should assume that even a de minimis impact could be enough to qualify as affecting the Postal Service.

Why Is the Postal Service Involved?

The Division currently has no independent mechanism to pay whistleblowers monetary rewards. It is therefore relying on the Postal Service's statutory authority to collect fines and penalties and pay those who report violations that affect the Postal Service.

Are All Whistleblowers Eligible for a Reward?

In short, no. Even if a whistleblower's escalation alleges an Eligible Criminal Violation that affects the Postal Service, the whistleblower would only qualify for a reward if the report is made "voluntarily," and provides "original" information about the alleged offense. For a report to be voluntary, it must be provided before a specific demand for information is made, such as, for example, receipt of a subpoena. Original information is that which is derived by independent knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing. Reports are not original where they only provide information (i) already known to the Division/Postal Service; (ii) derived through public sources (including judicial documents or government reports); (iii) already supplied before the Program's establishment; or (iv) from legally privileged sources or through the company's compliance process.

Importantly, corporate officers, directors, and most compliance personnel cannot supply "original" information and are therefore expressly excluded from being whistleblowers, unless certain conditions are met. These categories of employees can only serve as a whistleblower if (i) the escalation is of a very serious nature (such as impacting national security or causing harm to patients); (ii) there is reason to believe the subject of the complaint would interfere with an investigation; or (iii) they previously raised the matter through internal company reporting channels and 120 days have passed since the time of escalation.

What Rewards Can Whistleblowers Expect?

Whistleblowers whose report checks all the above-mentioned boxes and leads to monetary recovery in excess of $1 million can receive up to 30% of the total amount recovered. In determining the payment amount, the Division evaluates 10 factors, such as, for example, how impactful the information provided was, the whistleblower's cooperation, and the whistleblower's involvement in the misconduct. In short, these factors appear designed to give the Division a high degree of discretion and flexibility in adjusting a reward upwards or downwards.

How Does the Program Impact Existing Processes, Like the Corporate Leniency Policy?

The Program complements rather than replaces the Division's existing Corporate Leniency Policy, which still provides incentives for corporations to voluntarily disclose criminal antitrust violations and cooperate in investigations in exchange for certain protections and benefits. Leniency therefore remains the primary path for companies (and qualifying individuals) to potentially avoid criminal prosecution for Sherman Act offenses by being first in the door, promptly self reporting upon discovery, and providing full, ongoing cooperation. The Program, by contrast, is available only to individuals, not corporations, and offers financial awards but no shield from prosecution.

The Program may, however, change corporate incentives and how companies approach the decision about whether to affirmatively self-disclose misconduct that they become aware of. Individuals are now incentivized to report alleged misconduct in exchange for a potential payday, which can foreclose a company's ability to enjoy the maximum benefits of the Corporate Leniency Policy.

How Can Companies Respond?

  • Refresh Compliance Programs. Companies should re-evaluate whether their compliance infrastructure is sufficiently equipped to respond to this new Program. Evaluations should be conducted against guideposts that the Division uses to assess a compliance program's effectiveness in the context of criminal antitrust violations.
  • Train Employees. Consider whether employees have been sufficiently trained on antitrust topics, like bid-rigging, market allocation, and price fixing and are aware of common antitrust pitfalls, like interactions with competitors during industry events or trade association meetings. Proactive measures like trainings can help prevent an issue from arising in the first instance.
  • Whistleblower Protections. Given the likelihood that this new monetary incentive could cause an increase in the number of whistleblowers, companies should consider whether their internal processes afford sufficient protections to those who report conduct and that employees are adequately acquainted with anti-retaliation standards.
  • Robust Investigative Function. A process for receiving, escalating, and investigating internal complaints is a hallmark of a well-functioning compliance program. The Program puts a premium on the ability to conduct prompt and thorough internal investigations and companies should ensure that these mechanisms are functioning properly as a result.
  • Race to Report. The Program creates an incentive for whistleblowers to report misconduct where none existed before. This factor compresses timelines for investigation and voluntary disclosure decision-making.
  • Special Consideration for Health Care: While corporate officers, directors, and most compliance personnel cannot be a whistleblower under the Program, there is an express exemption if there is "a reasonable basis to believe that disclosure of the information is necessary to prevent the relevant individual or entity from engaging in criminal conduct that is likely to . . . result in imminent harm to patients in connection with health care." The explicit mention of health care-related impacts could lead to a larger number of whistleblower complaints and ensuing investigations in that industry.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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