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The Turkish Competition Authority's Sector Inquiry into Handheld Terminals: Key Findings and Implications
In late 2024, the Turkish Competition Authority ("TCA") initiated a sector inquiry into the use of handheld terminals in the fast-moving consumer goods ("FMCG") sector, culminating in the publication of the "Sector Inquiry Report on Practices Concerning Handheld Terminals and Similar Devices" ("Report") on January 12, 20261. In the Report, handheld terminals are defined as portable devices capable of data transfer that enable the digital management of various operational processes from production to sale. The Report specifies that these devices play a significant role in inventory tracking, warehouse management, and field sales operations, particularly within the FMCG market.
However, according to the Report, in addition to the operational advantages provided by these devices, anti-competitive risks emerge in cases where suppliers manage the digital infrastructure of these devices exclusively or where they hold a dominant position. To identify these potential issues, the TCA conducted a comprehensive sector inquiry involving manufacturers, distributors, and software providers. This inquiry focused specifically on the FMCG market instead of all areas where handheld terminals are used. The sector inquiry concludes that handheld terminals may trigger competition law concerns regarding three specific issues: resale price maintenance ("RPM"), territory and customer allocation, and rebate systems. The Report offers recommendations to address and eliminate these concerns. The Report's findings have important implications for suppliers, distributors, and technology providers operating in Turkey's FMCG market and may signal increased enforcement activity in this area.
Handheld Terminals and the FMCG Market
The Report contains information regarding the definition, types, and areas of use for handheld terminals, as well as their physical and software components. It also includes explanations about the general structure of the FMCG market, data on its development, product distribution channels, and the procurement processes within these channels. In this framework, it is emphasized that the total FMCG retail market size exceeded USD 61 billion in 2024, with the organized retail channel accounting for approximately 60% of the total share.
Touching upon the operational advantages created by handheld terminals in the FMCG market, the Report positions these devices as an indispensable necessity for undertakings in a fast-moving market like FMCG, covering a wide range of activities from order management to inventory tracking and field inspections. Accordingly, handheld terminals have become a crucial tool providing operational efficiency and supply chain transparency in the FMCG market, creating a common language by working in an integrated manner across different layers of the supply chain.
Today, these devices have expanding application ecosystems through the integration of operating systems such as Android and iOS. Although they offer similar software infrastructures to consumer-grade tablets and phones, they continue to differentiate themselves through industrial durability and specialized scanning hardware. The Report includes detailed examples of screenshots which are obtained from undertakings, such as displays for inventory tracking, order creation, and field visits on the relevant devices.
Handheld Terminals in the Context of Competition Law
Following the explanations regarding handheld terminals and the FMCG market, the Report touches upon that, in addition to their advantages, these devices possess technical capabilities that may facilitate competition law violations. The TCA draws attention to the risk that the commercial independence of resellers may be undermined in scenarios where handheld terminals are under the control of the manufacturer or supplier and a common software infrastructure is utilized. Within this scope, the devices are characterized as potential technological tools for violations such as (i) RPM, (ii) territorial or customer restrictions, and (iii) the exclusion of competitors through rebate systems.
Resale Price Maintenance
According to the Report, the most prominent competitive risk of handheld terminals is that they enable manufacturers/suppliers to monitor and intervene in resellers' prices in real time.
The Report underlines that an RPM violation may arise if suppliers prevent their resellers from freely determining their own sales prices via handheld terminals. Additionally, resellers may be pressured through handheld terminal systems by the regular monitoring of their compliance with sales prices set by the supplier. In cases of non-compliance, actions such as halting orders, refusing product supply, or limiting supply may be used to exert pressure. Under these circumstances, handheld terminals may become a tool used within the scope of an RPM violation. Based on the information obtained from manufacturers of handheld terminal hardware and software, the Report finds that these devices are technologically capable of enabling the monitoring of resale prices; however, it also emphasizes that not all suppliers collect price information through handheld terminals.
The Report addresses shelf price information collected indirectly for market intelligence purposes without direct and systematic monitoring. Although it is noted that such activities can be justified as gaining market intelligence, monitoring promotional effectiveness, or developing competitive strategies rather than for the purpose of RPM, the Report cites specific precedents. Decisions such as Seher Gıda2, Duracell3, and the UK Competition and Markets Authority's Roland4 decision are referenced to indicate that the regular photographing and uploading of shelf prices under the guise of market intelligence will be considered an element that facilitates RPM.
Consequently, it is emphasized that the examination of handheld terminals, their connected systems, and the data collected is critical within the scope of files involving RPM allegations.
Customer and Territorial Restrictions
The second competitive concern mentioned in the Report is the potential use of handheld terminals for customer and territorial restrictions between resellers. According to the Report, there is a possibility that suppliers may, through the system connected to the handheld terminals, determine the customers and territories to which resellers are allowed to sell. This prevents dealers or distributors from making active or passive sales outside their assigned areas. According to the Report, this situation can manifest as the supplier playing an active role in both vertical agreements (between supplier and reseller) and horizontal agreements (between resellers). The TCA states that such practices will negatively affect competition at the reseller level, subject to certain exceptions regarding vertical agreements. In conclusion, the Report points out that territorial and customer restrictions can indeed be implemented or facilitated through handheld terminals.
Rebate Systems
The final competitive concern highlighted in the Report involves the exclusion of competing suppliers from final points of sale by dominant suppliers. The Report states that a dominant supplier can collect data regarding its own sales prices, sales volumes, and rebates at the final point of sale via handheld terminals. This data allows the dominant undertaking to closely monitor its own sales conditions and market performance. Ultimately, the Report evaluates that using this data within the scope of rebate systems may create anti-competitive effects by making it difficult for competing suppliers to sell at those points.
While the Report provides detailed evaluations of these three concerns, it also emphasizes that the competitive risks arising through handheld terminals may not be limited to these issues as technology continues to evolve.
Turkish Competition Board's Case Law
Before presenting its recommendations regarding the relevant concerns, the Report summarizes past decisions of the Turkish Competition Board. According to this, the Turkish Competition Board has issued an opinion in the Frito decision5 stating that the handheld terminal system restricted competition by preventing the distributor's freedom to determine its own sales prices and requested its termination. In contrast, in the Gillette decision6, the Turkish Competition Board decided that no full-fledged investigation was necessary because the system allowed distributors to define rebates and add new customers without requiring the supplier's approval. Therefore, the existence of freedom for the distributor regarding pricing or the customers to be served has been the decisive factor in determining whether handheld terminals lead to a violation. This 'freedom test' has become the central analytical framework in Turkish competition law for assessing whether digital distribution systems violate competition rules. Similarly, in the Mey İçki and Red Bull decisions78 where the distributor's freedom to set prices was maintained, individual exemptions were granted and no administrative fines were imposed. Conversely, in the Nestlé decision9, a violation was found and an administrative fine was imposed. In that case, it was determined that distributors' sales movements were monitored through the system, and distributors who sold to other regions or deviated from the prices transmitted in the system were identified and subjected to sanctions.
Recommendations Provided by the Report
To minimize the competition law risks identified in the Report, the TCA recommends several technical and organizational safeguards. In order to minimize the competition law risks highlighted, the Report recommends that data be transferred to the center in an aggregated format rather than on an individual basis (anonymization), thereby preventing the identification of individual reseller pricing decisions, that access to sensitive data be restricted to authorized personnel, and that digital systems be supported by automatic warning mechanisms. Furthermore, the Report states that training field employees on competition law and designing software in accordance with these legal sensitivities are of critical importance for preventing potential violations. These recommendations reflect a 'compliance by design' philosophy that is increasingly prevalent in competition law enforcement globally.
Regarding recommendations for the future work of the TCA, legislative updates come to the forefront. It is specifically suggested that clear provisions be added to the Vertical Guidelines and the Guidelines on Dominance to prevent unlawful acts such as resale price maintenance, territorial or customer restrictions, or the exclusion of competitors through handheld terminals. Additionally, it has been evaluated that an in-depth examination of the technical details of handheld terminal systems used by undertakings will play a decisive role in detecting competition violations during future preliminary investigations and full-fledged investigations.
Footnotes
1. The original version of the report can be accessed here. (Last Access Date: 13.01.2026)
2. Turkish Competition Board's decision dated 30.11.2023 and numbered 23-55/1078-382.
3. Turkish Competition Board's decision dated 08.02.2024 and numbered 24-07/117-49.
5. Turkish Competition Board's decision dated 11.01.2007 and numbered 07-01/12-7.
6. Turkish Competition Board's decision dated 20.03.2008 and numbered 08-25/261-88.
7. Turkish Competition Board's decision dated 19.09.2018 and numbered 18-33/547-270.
8. Turkish Competition Board's decision dated 19.12.2019 and numbered 19-45/767-329.
9. Turkish Competition Board's decision dated 15.02.2024 and numbered 24-08/149-61.
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