Nuclear Waste Needs A Global Fix

Nuclear power remains a major source of electricity worldwide, and it is growing. The United States remains the world’s largest producer as of 2024, having generated 781.9 terawatt-hours in one year alone. Meanwhile, other countries are expanding rapidly. China now operates 57 reactors and has 29 more under construction. Worldwide, more than 60 reactors were under construction as of March 2026, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expects global nuclear capacity to double by 2050. 

One of the biggest trends is the growing interest in small modular reactors, or SMRs. The IAEA reports that nearly 70 SMR designs are in development globally, and its first international SMR conference in October 2024 drew 97 member states and 18 international organizations. Domestically, some states are beginning to position themselves to take advantage of this trend. Illinois, which has long generated a significant portion of its electricity from nuclear power, recently signaled renewed interest in future nuclear development by allowing for new nuclear capacity, including SMRs. 

That growth also means more nuclear waste, which can generally be classified into three categories based on radioactivity and risk. High-level waste, which includes spent nuclear fuel, is the most dangerous and tightly regulated category. Although high-level waste constitutes a small volume of total nuclear waste, it accounts for approximately 95% of the total radioactivity generated. Because it can remain hazardous for thousands—or even millions—of years, it poses the hardest technical, political, and regulatory challenge. Intermediate-level waste includes reactor components and reprocessing byproducts. It is less radioactive than high-level waste but still requires careful handling and engineered disposal. Low-level waste includes lightly contaminated tools, clothing, and other materials used in nuclear facilities. It presents the least immediate danger but still must be disposed of safely. 

As nuclear power expands—through both traditional reactors and SMRs—it will produce more of all three waste types. And as more countries pursue nuclear energy for growth and decarbonization, pressure is building for workable long-term disposal solutions. 

The United States has long favored a permanent geologic repository for high-level waste, but it has failed to build one. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 envisioned a federal system for managing spent fuel, and a 1987 amendment named Yucca Mountain as the sole repository site. But after decades of study and billions in spending, funding for the site ended in 2011, effectively halting further development. The Government Accountability Office later concluded the project was stopped for political reasons rather than technical or safety ones. 

The consequences of this failure are significant: the United States has accumulated more than 90,000 metric tons of spent fuel from commercial reactors without a permanent repository. Much of it remains at reactor sites in temporary storage never meant for the long term. At the same time, renewed interest in nuclear power has revived legal and policy debates over what comes next. 

One example is Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas, in which the U.S. Supreme Court was asked whether the NRC could authorize private off-site storage of spent nuclear fuel. The Court resolved the case on judicial review grounds rather than on the merits, but both the majority and dissent dedicated portions of their opinions to the issue. Given that private storage could play a role in the future, this unresolved question is likely to receive further consideration. 

Congress has also shown renewed interest in addressing the nuclear waste impasse. The bipartisan Nuclear Waste Administration Act of 2024 would create an independent federal agency focused solely on managing the nation’s nuclear waste, shifting that role away from the U.S. Department of Energy. The bill would also require a consent-based siting process, responding to one of Yucca Mountain’s central failures. Supporters argue that a single-purpose entity with dedicated leadership and funding could provide the institutional stability and focus needed to resolve the decades-long stalemate. Whether it succeeds or not, the proposal suggests a potential shift in the political calculus surrounding nuclear waste policy in the United States. 

Other countries are testing different approaches. Some focus on permanent geologic repositories like the United States; others use reprocessing, despite its cost and plutonium byproduct proliferation concerns. Brazil, for example, is advancing the Centena Project, which will be Latin America’s first nuclear waste repository (for low- and medium-level waste only). Construction is expected to begin in 2026 with completion targeted for 2030. In Europe, Spain has been collaborating with the IAEA’s Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning, and Remediation (ARTEMIS) for over a decade and has developed a strategy for the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste and a roadmap for creating a deep geological repository. 

International cooperation is also expanding. Brazil and China signed a memorandum of understanding on radioactive waste treatment and disposal in November 2025. Swedish company SKB International signed an agreement with the Korea Radioactive Waste Agency for information exchange and collaboration on current and future projects. And a joint venture led by U.S.-based Amentum was recently awarded a $112 million contract by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre to remediate nuclear research sites across Europe. Additionally, the Association for Multinational Radioactive Waste Solutions (ERDO) was created in 2021 to advance regional disposal solutions. ERDO continues to promote shared disposal strategies, particularly for countries that lack the resources to build their own repositories. 

These efforts show growing recognition of the problem, but they still fall short. Nuclear waste will remain dangerous for millennia, and that demands more than piecemeal domestic fixes or ad hoc partnerships. It calls for durable international agreements built for the long term. The case for international agreements is strong: 

• Nuclear waste lasts longer than any political cycle. Domestic plans, however well designed, can be derailed by shifting priorities—as Yucca Mountain shows. International agreements can provide greater continuity by embedding obligations in broader legal and diplomatic frameworks.
• Nuclear waste also creates cross-border environmental and health risks. Contamination can move through groundwater, oceans, and air, making international minimum safety standards both logical and necessary.
• International agreements also create external accountability. They cannot erase politics, but they can attach diplomatic consequences to inaction in ways domestic systems often cannot.
• Disposal is technically complex and expensive. International agreements allow countries to share burdens based on geology, technical expertise, and financial capacity.
• And unlike many global problems, nuclear waste is a clearly shared risk—giving countries a stronger basis for meaningful cooperation. 

Countries should not wait for the nuclear waste problem to become unmanageable. Existing bilateral and regional efforts should be expanded now into stronger international frameworks, while nuclear momentum and political attention remain high. The waste’s longevity, its risks to health and the environment, and the repeated failure of domestic solutions all argue for action sooner rather than later. 

If nuclear energy is to remain a credible decarbonization tool, the world must confront the waste problem together. That will require difficult negotiations and sustained political will. But with global interest in nuclear power rising again, this is the moment to build a serious international response. 

Originally published by Environmental Law Institute .