This article examines HCC Decision 758/2021, where the Hellenic Competition Commission (the "HCC") assessed whether a rule in a professional association's statute could violate competition law, even if it is never put into effect. The case concerned a clause in the statute of the "Association of Elevator Installers and Maintainers of Northern Greece" ("SYSEVE") which allowed the Board of Directors to set minimum remuneration rates for its members. Even though the clause was never applied in practice, the HCC found that its mere existence amounted to a "decision of an association of undertakings" and an automatic restriction of competition under Article 1 of Law no. 3959/2011 on the Protection of Free Competition ("Law no. 3959/2011") (national equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and restriction of competition by object). The HCC also considered the infringement to be ongoing as long as the clause remained in place. This article summarizes the ruling and highlights the key points of the decision.
This question is not new at the EU level. In EU practice, the relationship between professional associations and competition law has been a recurring issue. Minimum fee schemes adopted by professional associations have been under scrutiny for more than a decade. National bars and notarial bodies in Cyprus and Romania have already been required to abolish such schemes, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the "CJEU") has taken a clear stance in several recent cases. In CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria (C-427/16) and Em Akaunt BG (C-438/22), the CJEU held that professional organizations qualify as "associations of undertakings" when they adopt binding fee rules, and that these rules amount to a restriction of competition "by object." The CJEU reached the same conclusion for notaries in C-128/21, confirming that fee-setting mechanisms by professional bodies constitute prohibited price fixing. The trend illustrated by these decisions is clear: professional associations may not set or influence minimum remuneration, even if the rules are not enforced. HCC Decision 758/2021 aligns fully with this approach.
In addition to these CJEU judgments, several recent national enforcement actions across Europe reinforce the same principle. The Czech Competition Authority (ÚOHS) has conducted multiple ex officio reviews of association statutes and ethical codes, identifying provisions that could unify members' commercial conduct, particularly in relation to no-poaching rules and mandatory use of non-compete clauses. Although the Czech cases (AOP/APPS; Czech Travel Agencies; Used Car Dealers) ended without sanctions, ÚOHS emphasized that association rules must not interfere with labour-market competition or coordinate employers' behaviour.
SYSEVE, a professional organization whose members provide installation, maintenance and related services for elevators in the northern part of the country. SYSEVE operates as a typical trade association: it represents its members' interests, participates in discussions on regulation and safety standards, and coordinates certain sectoral issues.
The issue at hand was a clause in SYSEVE's statute granting its Board of Directors the power to set minimum remuneration rates for members' services, with potential disciplinary consequences for non-compliance. In practice, SYSEVE did not adopt or publish specific minimum-price lists under this clause and argued that the provision had never been used. The HCC examined the provision during an ex-officio investigation into the sector. During the proceedings, SYSEVE amended its statute to remove the clause, but the HCC assessed the period during which it was in effect.
HCC Decision 758/2021 was assessed under Article 1 of Law no. 3959/2011, the Greek equivalent of Article 101(1) TFEU. Both articles prohibit agreements and decisions of associations of undertakings that restrict competition. Professional associations fall within this category when their internal rules have the potential to influence the commercial behaviour of their members.
On this basis, the HCC focused on the function and effect of the clause within the association's statute. Even though SYSEVE argued that the provision had never been used, the HCC considered that giving the Board the power to set minimum remuneration was enough to influence how members might behave. A rule connected to price-setting, especially one tied to the association's disciplinary framework, creates an internal expectation that members should align with the association's pricing position. The HCC stressed that a rule placed in an association's statute carries weight on its own, regardless of its actual application.
EU and Greek practice treat pricing rules adopted by professional bodies as particularly sensitive, and the HCC followed this approach by classifying the provision as a restriction of competition by object. Minimum price-setting is considered inherently harmful to competition, meaning that the HCC did not need to show actual effects or conduct a detailed market analysis. The existence of the clause in the statute was sufficient to establish the infringement.
Comparable findings have also emerged from the Romanian Competition Council's ongoing investigation (January 2025) into the Romanian College of Dentists. The authority is examining potential minimum-fee practices, no-poach arrangements between dental practices, and restrictions on discounts or patient incentives. Although the case is still pending, the Council's preliminary observations suggest a strict approach toward professional bodies whose internal rules may distort competition—mirroring the logic of SYSEVE and recent CJEU case law.
The HCC also looked at the structure the clause created. By placing pricing authority in the hands of the Board, the statute established a centralised mechanism capable of coordinating members' commercial decisions. For the HCC, this type of governance structure is incompatible with the principle that each undertaking must set its prices independently.
Another important element of the decision was the finding that the infringement continued for as long as the clause remained in the statute. The fact that SYSEVE later removed the provision did not change the assessment of the earlier period. The HCC's view was that a rule with anticompetitive potential restricts competition simply by being in force, even if it is never applied.
Finally, the HCC rejected arguments relating to the sector's technical regulation. Although elevator installation and maintenance are carefully regulated for safety reasons, these rules do not allow professional bodies to interfere with pricing. As a result, the HCC assessed the clause purely on the basis of its competitive implications.
The ruling demonstrates that the HCC considers minimum-price provisions to be incompatible with competition law even if they remain unused. By classifying the clause as a restriction by object, the HCC highlighted that internal rules capable of coordinating pricing are sufficient to trigger an infringement. This aligns Greek practice with recent European case law on professional bodies.
This conclusion is also consistent with the preventive, non-punitive measures imposed in the Czech "soft enforcement" cases. In the Czech investigations, associations voluntarily removed problematic clauses before formal proceedings, while in the SYSEVE case, the HCC required corrective measures such as mandatory notifications to members, public announcements, and competition-law training seminars. These remedies highlight a broader European trend toward requiring associations to proactively review their statutes and compliance frameworks.
While the HCC ultimately did not impose a fine, this outcome was based on exceptional circumstances, including the association's voluntary amendment of its statute. Instead, the HCC ordered corrective measures to reinforce compliance. The decision therefore serves as both a warning and a guide: associations must review their internal rules carefully, as dormant provisions can still result in liability.
The SYSEVE ruling brings Greek practice firmly in line with EU case law by treating pricing-related statutory provisions as inherently anticompetitive, even when they remain unused. It also shows that competition law focuses not only on what an association does in practice, but on what it can do. For professional bodies, the message is straightforward: statutes and internal regulations must be reviewed carefully, because even inactive clauses can amount to an infringement.
In light of the Czech, Greek, and Romanian cases, it is evident that national authorities increasingly scrutinize association statutes, codes of ethics, and internal regulations—not just actual conduct. This broader enforcement landscape reinforces the need for continuous compliance monitoring and systematic review of governing documents by all professional and sectoral associations.
Although the absence of a fine reflects the association's cooperation, the decision signals that authorities expect proactive oversight of statutes and internal rules to prevent similar risks in the future.
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