Court Of Appeal Summaries (April 24, 2023 – April 28, 2023) - Civil Law - Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

Good afternoon.

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal for the week of April 24, 2023.

The decisions this week were all procedural in nature. Topics covered this week included an appeal from a refusal to grant a garnishment order where there was no appeal from a related plan of arrangement, extension of time to appeal in a receivership matter, leave to appeal a decision pursuant to theCompanies Creditors' Arrangement Act, a motion to review the partial lifting of a stay pending appeal that provided for a partial payment by husband to wife for shares, a review of a refusal to grant a stay pending appeal in a guardianship matter, stay pending an appeal from a dismissal of a request for intervenor status by patients whose medical records would be reviewed by the College in a doctor's disciplinary matter, summary judgment dismissing a mortgage enforcement action on the basis that the ten-year limitation period had expired, a priority dispute between the husband's judgment creditor and the wife over her half of the proceeds of sale of a jointly owned matrimonial home (the wife won), and security for costs in a family case.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953Email

Ines Ferreira
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953Email

Civil Decisions

U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), 2023 ONCA 277

Keywords:Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Civil Procedure, Leave to Appeal,Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 11, c. C-36,Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13,Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 6(1)(b),Nortel Networks Corporation (Re), 2016 ONCA 332,Urbancorp Toronto Management Inc. (Re), 2022 ONCA 181,Lucas v. 1858793 Ontario Inc. (Howard Park), 2021 ONCA 52

Comfort Capital Inc. v. Yeretsian, 2023 ONCA 282

Keywords:Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Receiverships, Claims Process, Civil Procedure, Approval Orders, Appeals, Extension of Time,Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. B-3,Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43,Construction Lien Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30,Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5,Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 3.02(1),Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules, C.R.C., c.368,2363523 Ontario Inc. v. Nowack, 2018 ONCA 286,Denomme v. McArthur, 2013ONCA 694; 36 R.F.L. (7th) 273,Oliveira v. Oliveira, 2022 ONCA 218,Correct Building Corporation v. Lehman, 2022 ONCA 723,Duca Community Credit Union Ltd. v. Giovannoli(2001), 142 O.A.C. 146 (C.A.),40 Park Lane Circle v. Aiello, 2019ONCA 451,2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Ltd., 2016 ONCA 225,Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364,MNP Ltd. v. Wilkes, 2020 SKCA 66, 449 D.L.R. (4th) 439,Ontario Wealth Management Corp. v. Sica Masonry and General Contracting Ltd., 2014 ONCA 500,Comfort Capital Inc. v. Yeretsian, 2019 ONCA 1017

College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Kilian, 2023 ONCA 281

Keywords:Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Regulated Health Professions, Professional Discipline, Doctors, Constitutional Law,CharterRights, Unreasonable Search and Seizure, Civil Procedure, Intervenors,CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms, s.8,Health Professions Procedural Code, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 87 and s. 36,RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311,Haudenosaunee Development Institute v. Metrolinx, 2023 ONCA 122,Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145,Sazant v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2012 ONCA 727,Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425,Gore v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2009 ONCA 546,College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia v. Bishop(1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 164 (S.C.),College of Physicians and Surgeons v. SJO, 2020 ONSC 1047,College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Kayilasanathan, 2019 ONSC 4350 (Div. Ct.)

Gefen v. Gefen, 2023 ONCA 287

Keywords:Wills and Estates, Guardianship, Capacity, Civil Procedure, Litigation Guardians, Appeals, Stay Pending Appeal, Costs, Costs Against Solicitor, Removal of Counsel,Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 57.07,Iqbal v. Mansoor, 2022 ONCA 198,Salisbury v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 2013 ONCA 182

Senthillmohan v. Senthillmohan, 2023 ONCA 280

Keywords:Family Law, Real Property, Joint Tenancies, Severance, Tenancies in Common, Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Civil Procedure, Default Judgments, Enforcement, Writs of Seizure and Sale, Priority,Execution Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.24, s. 9(1) and s. 10(6),TheReal Property Act, C.C.S.M. c. R30, s. 136(3),Zeligs v. Janes, 2016 BCCA 280,Royal & SunAlliance Insurance Co. v. Muir, 2011 ONSC 2273,Arnold Bros. Transport Ltd. v. Murphy, 2013 MBQB 137,Power v. Grace, [1932] O.R. 357 (Ont. C.A.).,Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70

Karatzoglou v. Commisso, 2023 ONCA 295

Keywords:Family Law, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Security for Costs,Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 61.06(1),Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, r. 38(26),Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONCA 827,FoodInvest Limited v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2019 ONCA 728,Froehlich-Fivey v. Fivey, 2016 ONCA 833,Grimm v. Ontario (Children's Lawyer), 2023ONCA161,Groia & Company Professional Corporation v. Cardillo, 2019 ONCA 165,Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33,Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518,Morris v. Nicolaidis, 2021 ONSC 2957,Pickard v. London Police Services Board, 2010 ONCA 643,Schmidt v. Toronto-Dominion Bank(1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.),McKee v. Di Battista, Gambin Developments Ltd.(1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 700 (C.A.)

Hrvoic v. Hrvoic, 2023 ONCA 288

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Appeals, Reviews, Orders, Partial Lifting of Stay Pending Appeal, Family Law, Property Division, Corporations,Rules of Civil Procedure,r. 63.01(1),Hillmount Capital Inc.v.Pizale, 2021 ONCA 364,Health Genetic Center Corp. (Health Genetic Center) v. New Scientist Magazine, 2019 ONCA 576,SFC Litigation Trust v. Chan,2018 ONCA 710,Digiammatteov.Leblanc(1989), 71 O.R. (2d) 130 (C.A.)

Entes Industrial Plants Construction & Erection Contracting Co.
Inc. v. Centerra Gold Inc., 2023 ONCA 294

Keywords:Corporations, Plans of Arrangement, Civil Procedure, Orders, Enforcement, Garnishment, ,Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44, r. 14.05(2), s. 192,Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 14.05(2), r. 60.08(1),Waxman v. Waxman(2006), 216 O.A.C. 379,Toronto Street Holdings Ltd. v. Coffee, Tea or Me Bakeries Inc.(2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 360,Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City), 2006 SCC 5,Annapolis Group Inc. v. Halifax Regional Municipality, 2022 SCC 36

Maxwell v. Altberg, 2023 ONCA 305

Keywords:Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Civil Procedure, Limitation Periods, Summary Judgment, No Genuine Issue Requiring Trial,Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O.1990, c. L.15, s. 23(1),Rules of Civil Procedure, r.20.04(2.1),Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7,Findlay v. Holmes, (1998), 111 O.A.C. 319 (C.A.),Noddle v. The Ontario Ministry of Health, 2019ONSC7337,Soper v. Southcott(1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.)

Short Civil Decisions

Fockler v. Speigel, 2023 ONCA 284

Keywords:Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Costs

Shanghai Lianyin Investment Co. Ltd. v. Lu, 2023 ONCA 285

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory,Paulpillai Estate v.Yousef, 2020 ONCA 655,Xela Enterprises Ltd. v. Castillo, 2014 ONCA 275

7120761 Canada Inc. v. AGA Global Investments Inc., 2023 ONCA 286

Keywords:Corporations, Corporate Veil, Personal Liability, Corporate Separateness Rule, Breach of Contract,Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2018 ONCA 472

1758704 Ontario Inc. v. Priest, 2023 ONCA 283

Keywords:Breach of Contract, Damages, Mitigation, Costs

Avedian v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc., 2023 ONCA 289

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Delay, Non-Compensable Prejudice,Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 26.01, 48.04,1588444 Ontario Ltd. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 2017 ONCA 42, Marks v. Ottawa (City), 2011 ONCA 248,Tran v. Bloorston Farms Ltd., 2020 ONCA 440,Brookfield Financial Real Estate Group Ltd. v. Azorim Canada (Adelaide Street) Inc., 2012 ONSC 3818

McWhirter v. Lorza, 2023 ONCA 301

Keywords:Family Law, Custody and Access, Relocation, Child Abduction, Civil Procedure, Quashing Appeals, Frivolous, Vexatious, Abuse of Process,Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 40,Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35,Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.1.01(1),Ontario (Attorney General) v. Paul Magder Furs Ltd. (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 46 (C.A.),Ontario (Attorney General) v. Paul Magder Furs Ltd. (1991), 6 O.R. (3d) 188 (C.A.)

CIVIL DECISIONS

U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), 2023 ONCA 277

[van Rensburg, Huscroft and George JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

G.R. Hall, J. D. Gage, and B. Kain, for the moving party Stelco Inc.

R.B. Swan, R. Sahni, and D. Afroz, for responding party Ernst & Young Inc.

R.B. Bell, E. Y. Fan, L. Sun, R. Jaipargas, and X. Yan, for the responding party DGAP Investments Ltd.

FACTS:

Stelco Inc. (“Stelco”), the moving party, sought leave to appeal from an order requiring it to complete the severance of a parcel of land (the “Reconveyance Parcel”) and to convey it to the nominee of Legacy Lands Limited Partnership (“LandCo”), in accordance with a 2018 reconveyance agreement between Stelco and LandCo. Ernst & Young Inc. (“E&Y”), one of the responding parties, opposed the motion in its capacity as court-appointed monitor of Stelco in a proceeding under theCompanies Creditors' Arrangement Act(“CCAA”) and in its capacity as the court-appointed interim Land Restructuring Officer of LandCo and related entities (the “Land Vehicle”) – an appointment made in the context of theCCAAproceeding.

DGAP Investments Ltd. (“DGAP”), the remaining responding party, also opposed Stelco's leave motion. DGAP entered into an agreement with LandCo's nominee to purchase a number of parcels of land in Haldimand County, including the Reconveyance Parcel.

In 2018, Stelco Inc. (“Stelco”) and a nominee of Legacy Lands Limited Partnership (“LandCo”) entered into a transaction whereby Stelco reacquired some of the transferred land from LandCo. However, more land had to be conveyed (the “Reconveyance Parcel”) to Stelco than Stelco intended to acquire, because consents necessary to sever the land parcels had not yet been obtained. As a result, Stelco and LandCo entered into the Reconveyance Agreement, which provided that Stelco would apply for severance consents under thePlanning Act, and, upon receiving consent, would reconvey the “Planning Act Lands” back to LandCo. The Reconveyance Agreement included a provision whereby the parties agreed to use “commercially reasonable efforts” to obtain severance consent and a further provision that required Stelco to pay an additional purchase price to acquire the Planning Act Lands in the event severance consents could not be acquired.

In February 2021, LandCo's nominee agreed to sell 14 parcels of land to DGAP, including the Reconveyance Parcel, which had still yet to be reconveyed. DGAP purchased the land on behalf of its parent company, which intended to build a new residential community of up to 15,000 homes. In March 2021, the Monitorsought and obtained approval for the DGAP sale agreement. Stelco did not oppose that motion and continued to take steps with respect to the severance of the Reconveyance Parcel. In February 2022, Stelco learned of the intent to build a new development on the Reconveyance Parcel and saw the intended construction next to its operations as an “existential threat”. Stelco then took the position, for the first time, that it no longer had an obligation to reconvey the Reconveyance Parcel, and could instead purchase the Planning Act Lands, including the Reconveyance Parcel. E&Y brought a motion, with DGAP's support, seeking an order directing Stelco to abide by the Reconveyance Agreement. Stelco opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion regarding its entitlement to purchase the land.

The motion judge granted E&Y's motion and dismissed Stelco's cross-motion, concluding that: (1) theCCAAcontinued to apply even though Stelco emerged fromCCAAprotection prior to entering into the Reconveyance Agreement; (2) Stelco breached the Reconveyance Agreement; and (3) LandCo could waive the requirement for Ministry consent to assign the Environmental Framework Agreement as required under the Reconveyance Agreement. The motion judge further concluded that specific performance was the appropriate remedy pursuant to theCCAA.

ISSUES:

Did the motion judge err by in concluding that theCCAAapplied?
Was the test for granting leave to appeal met?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

Stelco argued that the matter was an ordinary contract dispute rather than aCCAAmatter, that it has an appeal as of right under s. 6(1)(b) of theCourts of Justice Actand that, consequently, a modified leave test should be applied (an “interests of justice” test). The Court found that the motion judge had not erred in concluding that theCCAAapplied and held that the usual test for granting leave under theCCAAapplied.

The Court held that leave was not warranted as the proposed appeal was notprima faciemeritorious, nor did it raise issues of significance to the insolvency practice.

The test to grant leave under theCCAArequired the Court to consider whether the proposed appeal isprima faciemeritorious or frivolous in considering whether (a) the points on the proposed appeal are of significance to the practice; (b) the points on the proposed appeal are of significance to the action; and (c) it will unduly hinder the progress of the action.

The Court found that Stelco had not made an arguable case for interfering with the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant specific performance and that the motion judge's decision was rooted firmly in the facts of the case. The Court also held that the issues argued by Stelco would have no significance to the practice of insolvency law. Although the Court found that the matter in dispute was significant to the action, it held that that factor was insufficient to warrant granting leave. The Court noted that had it granted leave, further delay would have ensued and that even if the issues raised were of significance to the action, it would nevertheless not have been a sufficient basis to grant leave.

Comfort Capital Inc. v. Yeretsian, 2023 ONCA 282

[van Rensburg J.A. (Motion Judge)]

COUNSEL:

J. Goldblatt, P. Smiley, and M. McKenna, for the moving party Money Gate Corporation

J. Zibarras and C. Mills, for the responding parties 2399029 Ontario Inc. and World Corporation Inc.

E. Karp, for the responding party Curah Capital Corporation

Eric Golden and Chad Kopach, for the responding party Rosen Goldberg Inc., in its capacity as court-appointed receiver of 2399029 Ontario Inc. and World Corporation Inc.

FACTS:

The judgment under appeal resulted from the receivership of World Corporation Inc. and 2399029 Ontario Inc. (“029”). Rosen Goldberg Inc. was appointed as receiver and manager of the assets, undertaking and property of the debtors. The receiver did not take a position. 029 was the owner of a commercial property on Malmo Court in Vaughan, Ontario (the “Malmo Property”). A claims process was established to determine entitlements arising under the receiver's sale of the debtors' assets.

Money Gate Corporation (“MGC”) brought a motion in the receivership proceeding seeking payment of the sum of $1,159,517.66, plus interest, from the proceeds of sale of the Malmo Property. MGC asserted that, as a trustee for private investors, it was the owner by assignment of the second mortgage registered on title to the property. 029 and Curah Capital Corp. (“Curah”), which held the third and fourth charges on the Malmo Property, opposed the motion.

On November 24, 2022, the motion judge dismissed MGC's motion. He observed that the receiver had given an opinion that the second mortgage constituted a legal, valid and binding obligation of 029. The motion judge drew an adverse inference from MGC's refusal to provide responsive answers to certain questions asked by 029.

The motion judge also addressed an alternative argument made by Curah. He held that, because MGC was not registered as owner of the second mortgage on the register of title to the Malmo Property, under s. 101(5) of theLand Titles Act, the four holders of the registered second mortgage were deemed to remain the owners of the second mortgage.

On December 2, 2022, MGC served a notice of motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court before concluding that its appeal lay to the Court. It served a notice of appeal on December 13, 2022. The notice of appeal claimed a number of things, including an order declaring MGC the owner of the second mortgage and an order authorizing the receiver to make the distribution.

On January 20, 2023, MGC served a notice of motion for an order extending the time to file its appeal, a declaration that the appeal is as of right under s. 193(c) of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act(“BIA”), and an alternative request for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of theBIA. Both responding parties sought to have the appeal quashed.

ISSUES:

Is MGC permitted to have an extension of time to file its notice of appeal under theBIA?
Does MCG have a right to appeal the order of the motion judge under s.193(c) of theBIA?

HOLDING:

Motion to extend time to appeal granted. Motions to quash appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

Yes.

The Court held that the test for an extension of time is whether it is in the interests of justice that the extension be granted. The Court noted that relevant factors included: whether the appellant intended to appeal within the relevant period; the length of and explanation for the delay; prejudice to the opposing party from extending the time; and the merits of the appeal. The enumerated factors are not exhaustive and may vary in importance depending on the circumstances. The Court held that the overriding consideration is whether the justice of the case requires an extension.

The Court reasoned that 029's opposition to the extension of time was ill-conceived. As the Court observed inCorrect Building Corporation v. Lehman, the merits factor will traditionally “be used to support granting an extension when the other factors do not favour the applicant, but because there may be some potential merit to the case, it is still in the interests of justice that the applicant's right of appeal not be removed, just because of lateness”. The Court noted that the question was whether there was “so little merit in the proposed appeal that the appellant should be denied its important right of appeal”, and further, that “even where it is difficult to see the merits of a proposed appeal, a party is entitled to appeal and should not be deprived of that entitlement where there is no real prejudice to the other side”.

The Court concluded that an extension of time was in the interests of justice. The Court did not regard MGC's grounds of appeal as frivolous. Further, the Court was not persuaded that the appeal had so little merit that MGC should lose its right of appeal by filing its notice of appeal a few days late, after having proceeded, on notice to the responding parties, in the wrong court. In the circumstances, the Court held that there was no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Yes.

The Court noted that in2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Ltd., Brown J.A. concluded that s. 193(c) of theBIAdoes not provide a right of appeal from orders that: (i) are procedural in nature; (ii) do not bring into play the value of the debtor's property; or (iii) do not result in a gain or loss (in the sense of involving “some element of a final determination of the economic interests of a claimant in the debtor”).

The Court held that the primary task when examining whether an automatic right of appeal exists under s. 193(c) is to “determine whether the property involved in the appeal exceeds $10,000”, which may be determined by comparing the order appealed against the remedy sought in the notice of appeal. Therefore, the Court held that the focus of the inquiry is the amount of money at stake.

The responding parties sought to characterize the motion judge's decision in this case as the determination of a priorities dispute that would not fall under s. 193(c) of theBIA. However, the Court held that the reason the appellant is not entitled to a payment in the receivership is due to the order under appeal, and not because of an insufficiency of assets.

The Court stated that the core determination made by the motion judge's use of s. 101(5) of theLand Titles Actwas to find that, as a result of the failure of registration, the four holders of the registered second mortgage were deemed to remain the owners of the second mortgage. In other words, the motion judge did not determine a priorities dispute. He did not determine that the third and fourth charges had priority over the second mortgage. Rather, he determined that MGC was not the right party to be making the claim. The decision under appeal resulted in a loss when it finally determined the economic interests of MGC in the proceeds of sale of the Malmo Property.

College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Kilian, 2023 ONCA 281

[Harvison Young J.A. (Motion Judge)]

COUNSEL:

A. Sherazee, for the moving parties/proposed intervenors/appellants

P. Wardle and E. Rankin, for the responding party/applicant/respondent

P. Slansky,for the responding party/respondent/respondent

FACTS:

This was a motion for a stay pending appeal of the dismissal of the appellant's application for leave to intervene in the underlying application of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (“College”) for an order requiring the cooperation of the respondent Dr. K under s. 87 of theHealth Professions Procedural Code(“Code”). The underlying investigation of Dr. K arose in relation to medical exemptions she provided for COVID-19 vaccines. The complainants do not include the patients.

The approximately 40 applicants were allegedly patients of Dr. K. They asserted that without permitting them to intervene, their s. 8Charterrights risked being violated because a s. 87 order would of necessity require the disclosure to the College of their medical information, with respect to which they had a legitimate expectation of privacy.

The College had no objection to anonymizing the names of the proposed intervenor patients (whose identities had not been revealed during the application and related litigation to date). It did not agree, however, that their identities should not be divulged to the College because that could impede its ability to pursue an investigation if, following the resolution of the s. 87 application, such an investigation resulted.

ISSUE:

Should there be a stay pending appeal?

HOLDING:

Motion dismissed.

REASONING:

No.

The applicants argued the case raised a serious issue and that without their presence as intervenors, there would be no opportunity for them to contest the release of their private medical information to the College. They submitted that the present case was novel and distinguishable because the complaints that triggered the investigation of Dr. K were not made by patients or pursuant to a doctor's duty to report. They argued that in this context, the patients' reasonable expectation of privacy was not subject to the same limits. The respondent College submitted that the issues raised were not novel but were based on fundamental principles of constitutional and administrative law that had been settled for some time.

The essence of the claim rested on characterization of the patients' privacy interests and whether they were placed at risk by the s. 87 proceeding against Dr. K. Section 8 of theCharterprotects against unreasonable search and seizure. The applicants and Dr. K argued that the absence of individual pre‑authorization of any individual breach of a privacy interest rendered the intrusion unreasonable, relying heavily on criminal case law. Without the right to intervene, they submitted, there would be no way of challenging the reasonableness of the search.

The Court disagreed and said this was not the law as it applied in this case. The applicants' position rested on the premise that the patients of a physician have a reasonable expectation of privacy in health records which can be asserted as against a regulator seeking access to those records for purposes of investigating the physician. If this were true, no health regulator could ever access patient records for purposes of an investigation without patient notification and consent. It would stymie regulation of health professionals.

In such a regulatory context, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure lies not in the requirement for individual warrant or pre-authorization, but rather within the context of the regulatory scheme which was there with the primary purpose of the protection of the public. The framework includes strong confidentiality protections for individual medical information contained in patient files disclosed to the College during any proceedings. Section 36 of theRegulated Health Professions Actsets out the broad duty of confidentiality of investigators in relation to the information that comes within their knowledge in the course of their duties. The applicants' position failed to take account of the long-established law that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy varied depending on the context.

InThomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), the Court found a “less strenuous and more flexible standard of reasonableness” applied to regulatory searches, and one's reasonable expectation of privacy must be considered within the investigative scope of the Act. In the regulated professional environment context, this subjected the patients' expectation of privacy in their medical records to “the higher need to maintain appropriate standards in the profession”.

The fact that the patients did not initiate the complaints against Dr. K did not change that reality or render the intrusion unreasonable. The authority to override concerns about patient confidentiality is broad. The fact that the applicants were not the target of any investigation by the College was also relevant to the assessment of the reasonableness of any intrusion into their privacy interests. At this point, the only issue in the application was whether Dr. K could be required to cooperate by providing patient files.

The Court did not find the Divisional Court erred by “grafting” the ruling of the Divisional Court judicial review application, which dealt with s. 75 of theCode, onto the s. 87 application. The Divisional Court found that the patients did not have a direct legal interest in the proceedings between the CPSO and Dr. K just because their medical records may be examined during an investigation. It emphasized that investigations of members by a professional regulator could involve some intrusion into physician-patient confidentiality and that the College could obtain all relevant evidence despite patient objections.

The Court agreed with the respondent College that the s. 8Charterrights of the applicants would not be contravened by the denial of intervenor status. The applicants' claim rested on the faulty premise that, as far as the s. 87 application was concerned, their privacy interests were at risk and that they therefore had the right to intervene to ensure that any intrusions were pre-authorized. This did not raise a serious issue on appeal.

Gefen v. Gefen, 2023 ONCA 287

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

B. Salsberg, for the moving party

R.B. Moldaver, K.C., for the moving party, H.G.

A. Fishman, for the responding party

A. Rabinowitz and S. Blydorp, for S.E, the litigation guardian and guardian of property of H.G.

C. Graham, for the responding party, the Estate of Y.G.

FACTS:

The moving parties asked the Court to review George J.A.'s dismissal of their motions to stay the order of the motion judge under appeal. Among other things, the motion judge declared H.G, who was 100 years old, to be incapable of managing her property and instructing counsel. The motion judge appointed a litigation guardian and guardian of property on her behalf.

ISSUES:

Did George J.A. err in applying too stringent a threshold for the “serious issue” branch of the stay pending appeal analysis?
Should partial indemnity costs be awarded directly against counsel for H.G.?
Should the panel make an order confirming the motion judge's order that H.G.'s counsel was precluded from acting for H.G.?

HOLDING:

Review motions dismissed, order to go accordingly.

REASONING:

The Court held that George J.A. had carefully reviewed the motion judge's reasons and applied the correct legal criteria for a stay pending appeal. The Court agreed with George J.A.'s decision to decline to stay any aspect of the motion judge's order.

The Court also stated that a panel review was not ade novohearing, but one that focusses on whether the motion judge's decision reflects legal error or misapprehension of material facts. The Court found that no such reversible error occurred in this case.

The responding party requested that partial indemnity costs, in the amount of $6,625.22, be awarded jointly and severally against H.G.'s counsel personally, as well as on the other moving party. The Court noted that the rationale for the requested costs award against H.G.'s counsel was that the continued insistence of H.G.'s counsel that he acts for H.G., notwithstanding that she had been declared incapable and despite being explicitly barred from acting as her counsel in this matter, was highly improper.

The Court, in determining the amount of costs that was fair, reasonable, and proportionate for the losing parties to pay, fixed the responding party's costs at $5,000. The Court then considered whether any costs order should be made personally against H.G.'s counsel. In the result, the Court held that this was not an appropriate case for costs to be levied against H.G.'s counsel. The Court made such a finding based on the fact that H.G.'s counsel did not add undue delay or expense to the responding party.

However, the Court did bar H.G.'s counsel from charging H.G. for the costs of the motion on the basis that he did not have authorization to act for H.G. at the time. In the result, the Court held that H.G., due to the finding that she was incapable of instructing counsel, should be immunized from all costs of the review motion brought by her counsel.

The responding party asked the Court to make an order confirming the motion judge's order that H.G.'s counsel be precluded from acting for H.G. on the appeal. The Court held that this issue would be more properly raised before the panel hearing the appeal of the order.

Senthillmohan v. Senthillmohan, 2023 ONCA 280

[van Rensburg, Huscroft and George JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

M.U. Peters and Melanie Battaglia, for the appellant

M.J. Stangarone, S.P. Kirby and Y. Satheaswaran, for the respondent SS

S. S., acting in person

FACTS:

The respondents, SS (“wife”) and SS (“husband”), were married but are now separated. In January 2020 the wife commenced an application seeking an unequal division of the parties' net family property or, in the alternative, an equalization of net family property and sale of their matrimonial home. The respondents owned the matrimonial home as joint tenants. On January 28, 2021, the court granted an order directing a sale of the matrimonial home and that the net proceeds of the sale be held in trust pending further agreement between the parties or court order.

The appellant, 2401242 Ontario Inc., a third-party creditor, had obtained default judgment against the husband in a civil action, and a writ was filed in September 2021. The details of the civil action are not relevant to this appeal.

In October 2021, the respondents entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to sell the matrimonial home. The appellant agreed to temporarily lift the writ to facilitate the sale. In November 2021, the wife brought an urgent motion in the family action to sever the joint tenancy in the matrimonial home. On consent, Jarvis J. granted the motion such that title was now held by each respondent as tenants in common. However, this order was silent on the effective date of the severance and did not address the appellant nor its default judgment against the husband.

In February 2022, the wife brought a motion for the release of her 50% share of the net sale proceeds, which led to the order under appeal. On the day of the hearing the appellant's agent counsel sought an adjournment as its usual counsel was on vacation, which the motion judge denied. The appellant's agent counsel also argued that the Superior Court of Justice (Family Branch) did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter, which was rejected by the motion judge.

Relying on Jarvis J.'s order, the appellant argued that the respondents were joint tenants when default judgment was obtained and when the writ was filed, and that it therefore had priority over the wife's interest in the proceeds of sale. The motion judge found that the joint tenancy had been severed by the time the appellant obtained the default judgment against the husband, because: (1) when he made his order, Jarvis J. was aware that the appellant was a creditor of the husband, and (2) the respondents were already separated when the husband entered a creditor-debtor relationship with the appellant. The motion judge explained that “there's absolutely no way that that could somehow defeat the interests of the wife in the matrimonial home”. The wife was therefore entitled to her amount from the net sale proceeds, which also took into account the husband's outstanding obligations to the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”).

ISSUES:

Did the motion judge err in concluding that the joint tenancy of the matrimonial home was retroactively severed by Jarvis J.'s order?
Did the motion judge err in determining that the wife had priority entitlement over the appellant's writ?
Did the motion judge err by failing to consider that the writ attached to the full proceeds of a voluntary sale of the jointly owned home?
Did the motion judge have jurisdiction to determine the priority entitlement?
Did the motion judge err by refusing to grant an adjournment?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

The Court found that the appellant's position fundamentally misunderstood the law of creditors' remedies against jointly-held property where only one of the owners guaranteed the debt. Accordingly, the Court concluded it was not necessary to consider the appellants' arguments about the date of severance.

The Court held that the motion judge did not err in determining that the wife had priority over the appellant's writ. The Court clarified that it is the natural corollary of the generally accepted and commonly cited proposition that an execution creditor can execute against the debtor's interest in jointly held property. The Court found that to accept the appellant's position would render meaningless the use of the words “the debtor's interest in”.

The Court found that the motion judge did not err by failing to consider that the writ attached to the full proceeds of a voluntary sale of the jointly owned home. Relying on s. 9(1) and s. 10 of theEvidence Act, the Court held that where a writ is filed against jointly held land before the debtor joint tenant's death, it does not continue to bind the surviving non-debtor's complete interest in the property acquired through their right of survivorship.

Yes.

The Court rejected the appellant's position on jurisdiction because the motion clearly concerned the proceeds of the matrimonial home.

The Court held that the motion judge did not err by refusing to grant an adjournment where the appellant was represented by agent counsel. The Court found the decision discretionary, which is owed deference on appeal, and was reasonable in the circumstances.

Karatzoglou v. Commisso, 2023 ONCA 295

[Harvison Young J.A. (Motion Judge)]

COUNSEL:

J. Teitel, for the moving party

E. Birnboim, for the responding party

J. Grossman, for the respondent PK

FACTS:

The appellant, RC, and the respondent, PK, are former spouses. The respondent and moving party, EK, is PK's mother and RC's former mother-in-law. RC and PK married in 1997 and separated in 2014. PK commenced a divorce application in 2017 and RC filed a reply in which she made a number of claims for corollary relief. One of the claims RC advanced was a trust claim against EK in which she asserted that PK was the beneficial owner of a house owned by EK during the marriage and that its value thus had to be included in the net family property for the purposes of equalization. RC also advanced claims for an interest in the business that PK developed in the course of the marriage, including the business premises owned by EK, as well as for spousal support.

EK brought a motion for summary judgment, seeking the dismissal of RC's trust claims against her. The motion was granted. RC appealed from that order and EK sought an order for security for costs of the appeal.

ISSUE:

Should security for costs be ordered?

HOLDING:

Motion granted.

REASONING:

Yes.

The Court noted that to succeed on a motion for security for costs, the moving party must satisfy the court, on a balance of probabilities, that there is good reason to believe that (1) the appellant is impecunious (ie. has insufficient assets in Ontario), and (2) the appeal is frivolous and vexatious. Subrule 38(26) of theFamily Law Rulesprovides helpful guidance with respect to the second condition in the context of family proceedings by framing “frivolous” and “vexatious” appeals as a “waste of time”, “nuisance”, or “abuse of the court process”.

In applying this test, the Court first held that the appellant was impecunious. As such, there was little prospect for the respondents to recover their costs in the event that the appeal is resolved in their favour.

Second, while the bar was a high one, the Court held that there was good reason to believe that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious. The Court noted that the appeal did not raise errors of law and was instead likely to turn on challenges to findings of fact made by the judge below.

Third, the summary motion judge's findings of fact were dispositive of the express trust claim. The central issue on the motion for summary judgment was whether EK held her house and the business premises in trust for PK. The summary judgment motion judge rejected the argument that there was an express trust, not because he preferred EK's evidence but because there was no evidence advanced by RC that supported that position. The Court held that these findings were open to the trial judge. Many of them were based on uncontested evidence. They were dispositive of the express trust claim.

In a related argument, the Court held that the motion for summary judgment did not turn on issues of credibility that should have required a trial. This was not a “he said/she said” case. Rather, it was a case in which RC made allegations that the summary motion judge found to have been entirely unsupported by any evidence. Accordingly, partial summary judgment was appropriate. The Court held that the litigation had been protracted and the issue of a trust relating to the house and business premises was readily extricable from RC's claim that she had an interest in PK's business. The summary judgment motion judge did not err in observing that any claim to a trust over the real property was extricable from the question of any value of PK's business to be included in the net family property.

The Court concluded that the assessment of the merits of a proposed appeal (or lack thereof) on a security for costs motion does not require the court to make an affirmative finding or actually determine that the appeal is frivolous or vexatious and that the appellant lacks sufficient Ontario assets to pay the appeal costs. Rather, “good reason to believe” suggests a tentative conclusion of absence of merit and assets.

Hrvoic v. Hrvoic, 2023 ONCA 288

[Feldman, Gillese and Huscroft JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

G.M. Sidlofsky, for the moving party

D. Taub and S. Mosonyi, for the responding party

FACTS:

Inthe underlying action, the appellant sought to compel his estranged wife, the respondent, to sell her shares in the parties' technology business. The trial judge determined that the respondent owned a 50% interest in the business, and ordered the appellant to pay $5,400,000 to purchase the shares.

The appellant appealed. Pursuant to r. 63.01(1), the trial judgment was automatically stayed. The respondent then brought a motion asking that the stay be partially lifted, pending appeal, in respect of $2,686,437.31. On the stay motion, counsel for the respondent accepted that payment of the money should be subject to a transfer of some of the shares in the company.

Before the chambers judge, the appellant submitted that the respondent had not provided evidence of financial hardship nor had she sworn that she was suffering financial hardship. The chambers judge rejected that submission. Thechambers judge granted the motion and lifted the stay to the extent of $1,874,400.The appellant moved for a review of the order.

ISSUE:

Did the chambers judge err in granting a partial lifting of the automatic stay by making findings about the respondent's financial circumstances without evidence the respondent asserting she was in financial difficulty?

HOLDING:

Motion dismissed.

REASONING:

No.

The Court noted that, given the breadth of discretion conferred on the chambers judge by r.63.01(5), the reviewing panel must accord his order a high degree of deference. The Court held that it may only interfere where the chambers judge failed to identify the applicable principles, erred in principle, or reached an unreasonable result.

The Court held that the chambers judge identified the applicable legal principles, and found no error with the chamber judge's approach to the matter of financial hardship. The Court found that it was proper for the chambers judge to rely on the respondent's affidavit, which set out unchallenged evidence that: she was dismissed from her job with the parties' company on March 1, 2020; she had difficulties finding new employment in the COVID-19 pandemic; and, she had no employment income for over two years.

The Court also noted that the trial judge had made similar findings of financial hardship. The Court also found that the chambers judge had correctly referred to the “demonstrable and unusual hardship” test inSFC Litigation Trust v. Chan,when he assessed the respondent's financial need.

In the result, the Court found that it would be most unjust if the respondent were to receive nothing by way of compensation until the appeal process is complete. In such circumstances, the Court found that the only question for the chambers judge was to quantify the amount by which the stay should be lifted. He used the appellant's “best case” figure to quantify that amount.While the chambers judge did not discount the appellant's best-case figure to allow for possible costs awards in his favour, the Court did not view that as an error in principle and found the chambers judge's order to be reasonable.

Entes Industrial Plants Construction & Erection Contracting Co. Inc. v. Centerra Gold Inc., 2023 ONCA 294

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

R. Gilliland and C. Groper, for the appellant

A.D. Rose, E.N. Kolers, and Z. Smith, for the respondent

FACTS:

The appellant appeals from the dismissal of its garnishment motion, which was heard at the same time as the application brought by CGI for approval of its plan of arrangement. The appellant is a substantial creditor of the Kyrgyz Republic (“the Republic”). It seeks to garnish a $50 million intercompany payment, made by CGI, to its subsidiary, KGC, pursuant to the court-approved plan of arrangement under s. 192 of theCanadian Business Corporations Act(“CBCA”).

CGI is a Canadian-based mining company. Prior to the implementation of the plan of arrangement, it owned 100% of the shares of KGC, whose major asset is the Kumtor gold mine, located in the Kyrgyz Republic (the “Republic”). KZN, a company wholly owned by the Republic, was CGI's largest shareholder; it owned 26.1% of CGI's shares and had two representatives on CGI's Board.

CGI's relationship with the Republic became increasingly acrimonious. The Republic attempted to gain control of the Kumtor gold mine, instigating numerous civil and criminal proceedings against CGI, as well as its employees and directors, and appointing an external manager over the gold mine. After lengthy negotiations within an international arbitration proceeding, CGI, KZN, and the Republic entered into a Global Arrangement Agreement (“GAA”), by which CGI would sever all ties with the Kumtor gold mine, KZN, KGC, and the Republic and extricate itself from billions of dollars of claims. CGI brought an application for approval of a plan of arrangement under s. 192 of theCanadian Business Corporations Act(“CBCA”) in order to obtain approval of the GAA.

The application judge heard CGI's application for approval of the plan of arrangement at the same time as the appellant's garnishment motion. On July 28, 2022, she approved the plan of arrangement and dismissed the appellant's motion. She expressly rejected the appellant's suggestion that the plan of arrangement was done secretly or for the purpose of preventing the appellant from collecting on its judgment against the Republic. The appellant did not appeal the order approving the plan of arrangement, nor did it seek a stay of its implementation.

On July 29, 2022, the plan of arrangement was implemented. Among other terms, at the same time as CGI transferred $50 million as an intercompany payment to KGC and its shares of KGC to KZN, KZN returned its shares in CGI for cancellation. CGI also received a global release, including of billions of dollars worth of claims against CGI, its employees, and its directors that were before the Republic's courts, as well as of any claim by any person in relation to the $50 million payment to KGC.

The appellant did not appeal the order approving the plan of arrangement and thus was bound by the findings of the application judge with respect to the plan of arrangement, which were also made in the context of the garnishment motion. CGI maintained that the appellant's appeal was effectively moot because the $50 million payment that the appellant sought to garnish has already been paid, and all claims against that payment had been released pursuant to a final court order. However, the appellant submitted that, in dismissing its garnishment motion, the application judge made several extricable reversible errors that were independent from her findings on the plan of arrangement application.

ISSUE:

Did the application judge err in failing to find that the Republic is effectively the alter ego of KGC because of itsde factoappropriation of KGC and its assets?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

No.

The Court held that the application judge did not err in failing to find that the Republic is effectively the alter ego of KGC because of itsde factoappropriation of KGC and its assets. The Court found that the application judge's findings were open to her to make on the record. When her reasons from July 28 and August 17, 2022, are read in their entirety, the Court found that they demonstrate that she was alive to the distinction betweende jureandde factocontrol, as well as the extent of the Republic's intrusion into KGC's affairs. The evidence before the application judge did not support the appellant's argument that CGI had effectively lost all control over KGC and was deprived of all economic benefits flowing from the mine. Moreover, although KGC paid fines and taxes to the Republic, there was no evidence that all of KGC's income from the gold mine flowed directly to the Republic. The Court further noted that CGI paid the $50 million intercompany payment that the appellant sought to garnish to KGC, a separate corporate entity from KZN and the Republic.

Maxwell v. Altberg, 2023 ONCA 305

[Hoy, Zarnett and Sossin JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

J. Contini, for the appellant

J. D. Keith, for the respondent

FACTS:

The appellant appealed a summary judgment discharging a mortgage granted by the respondent in favour of the appellant, and dismissing her counterclaim for payment of amounts that remain unpaid under the mortgage.

The issue before the motion judge turned on whether enforcement of the mortgage was precluded by s. 23(1) of theReal Property Limitations Act. The section provided that no action to enforce a mortgage may be brought more than 10 years after the mortgage went into default, unless in the meantime there had been a payment made or a written acknowledgment of the indebtedness, in which case the limitation period was 10 years from the payment or acknowledgment.

The mortgage in question was registered on December 22, 1995. It collaterally secured indebtedness under a promissory note. The note was due on December 28, 1998. According to the respondent, he last made a payment in respect of the mortgage debt in 2005.

The respondent's position was that enforcement of the mortgage was statute-barred, as legal proceedings concerning the mortgage were not started until 2018. The appellant's position was that the limitation period had not expired because a payment of $4,000 toward the mortgage indebtedness was made by the respondent on May 28, 2010, meaning that the limitation period ran from that date, which was within ten years of the commencement of proceedings. The respondent denied that he made any such payment.

The appellant and her spouse deposed that the 2010 payment had been made. The motion judge considered them to be generally credible witnesses. But he noted that the appellant's evidence about the payment was completely derivative of his spouse's evidence, and that she had no independent recollection of the payment. Her evidence that there had been a payment was solely based on a notation in her bank book of a $4,000 receipt in May 2010. The notation was ambiguous about who made the payment and to what it pertained. The respondent and his spouse gave evidence that he had not made a payment in May 2010. The motion judge noted various problems with that evidence, and with the respondent's credibility and reliability.

The motion judge concluded that he was unable to say whether the $4,000 payment was made. He noted that although in most instances the inability to make findings on central facts in dispute on a summary judgment motion would support the conclusion that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial, that result did not follow in this case.

The motion judge reasoned the quality of the evidence was not going to improve if the matter was referred to a mini-trial or a trial. Therefore, the matter could be decided on a motion for summary judgment. The question was what the result would be where the court, regardless of the fact-finding forum, could not be satisfied that the 2010 payment was made against the loan. In his view, the onus was on the appellant to establish that enforcement of the mortgage was not statute-barred, which meant establishing that the May 2010 payment was made by the respondent in respect of the mortgage debt. Because the evidence did not establish this, the appellant had not met her onus.

ISSUES:

Did the motion judge err in not directing a minitrial or a trial?
Did the motion judge make a legal error that resulted in a reversal of the onus of proof?

HOLDING:

Appeal dismissed.

REASONING:

The Court rejected this argument stating that absent an error of law, the exercise of powers under the summary judgment rule were entitled to deference on appeal; this includes when a judge determines there is no genuine issue requiring a trial after comparing the evidence on the summary judgment motion to what would be expected at a mini-trial or a trial. The motion judge was entitled to find that the quality of the evidence at trial would not be different than what was before him, and that little would turn on an opportunity to observe demeanour. He was accordingly permitted to conclude that he could reach a fair and just determination on the merits on the summary judgment motion.

The appellant submitted that the motion judge erroneously relied onFindlay v. Holmes, for the proposition that where a limitation defence was pleaded the person seeking to enforce a right has the onus of showing that the action was brought within the limitation period. According to the appellant, that proposition applied at trial. She argued that on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bore the onus of showing there was no genuine issue for trial regarding a limitation period defence.

In the Court's view, the motion judge did not lose sight of the proposition that on a motion for summary judgment, the legal burden was on the moving party to establish that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial. In determining whether that burden was met, the motion judge was entitled to consider who would bear the onus at trial to prove any contested fact. The appellant did not dispute that, if the matter proceeded to trial, she would bear the burden of proving that the respondent made the 2010 payment in respect of the mortgage debt. Considering this, it was open to the motion judge to consider that the evidence adduced by the appellant was insufficient to prove the 2010 payment and that no evidence adduced at a mini-trial or trial would assist her in discharging this onus. Accordingly, he was entitled to conclude that the moving party had met his burden of proving there was no genuine issue requiring a trial about the limitation period defence.

As the Court stated inSoper v. Southcott(1998), if the person relying on the limitation period moved for summary judgment and satisfied the Court that there was no issue of fact requiring a trial for its resolution, the limitation defence would have been made out, and summary judgment would be appropriate.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Fockler v. Speigel, 2023 ONCA 284

[Zarnett, Thorburn and Copeland JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

R.F. and L. C., acting in person

K. Preston, for the respondents JS and Lawyers' Professional Indemnity Company

B. Martin, for the respondent GB

Keywords:Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Costs

Shanghai Lianyin Investment Co. Ltd. v. Lu, 2023 ONCA 285

[Doherty, Zarnett and Sossin JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

L. Caylor, N.J. Shaheen and S.P. Tolani, for the appellant

I.C. Matthews and S. Khalfan, for the respondent

Keywords:Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Final or Interlocutory,Paulpillai Estate v.Yousef, 2020 ONCA 655,Xela Enterprises Ltd. v. Castillo, 2014 ONCA 275

7120761 Canada Inc. v. AGA Global Investments Inc., 2023 ONCA 286

[Doherty, Zarnett and Sossin JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

P. Fauteux, for the Plaintiffs (Respondents/Appellants by cross-appeal)

P. Smiley, for the Defendants (Appellants/Respondents by cross-appeal)

Keywords:Corporations, Corporate Veil, Personal Liability, Corporate Separateness Rule, Breach of Contract,Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2018 ONCA 472

1758704 Ontario Inc. v. Priest, 2023 ONCA 283

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Lauwers and Miller JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

S.R. Hawryliw, for the appellants, MD, 1758704 Ontario Inc. and 1191305 Ontario Inc.

M. Zemel, for the respondents, CP and 1737161 Ontario Limited

Keywords:Breach of Contract, Damages, Mitigation, Costs

Avedian v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc, 2023 ONCA 289

[Pepall, Trotter and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

C.G. Carter, for the appellants

C.K. Boggs and J. O'Dell, for the respondents Alpha Delta Heating Contractor Inc. and AD, and as agent for counsel for the respondents TQB Heating and Air Conditioning and BB

D. Reiter and B. Chung, for the respondents Enbridge Solutions Inc. operating as Enbridge Energy Solutions and Enbridge Inc.

J.G. Norton, for the respondents Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. operating as Enbridge Gas Distribution and Lakeside Performance Gas Services Ltd. operating as Lakeside Gas Services

McWhirter v. Lorza, 2023 ONCA 301

[Pepall, Trotter and Nordheimer JJ.A.]

COUNSEL:

S.P. Kirby, for the respondent/moving party

AL, acting in person

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be ought about your specific circumstances.

Court Of Appeal Summaries (April 24, 2023 – April 28, 2023)

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Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), 2023 ONCA 277

Comfort Capital Inc. v. Yeretsian, 2023 ONCA 282

College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Kilian, 2023 ONCA 281

Gefen v. Gefen, 2023 ONCA 287

Senthillmohan v. Senthillmohan, 2023 ONCA 280

Karatzoglou v. Commisso, 2023 ONCA 295

Hrvoic v. Hrvoic, 2023 ONCA 288

Entes Industrial Plants Construction & Erection Contracting Co.
Inc. v. Centerra Gold Inc., 2023 ONCA 294

Maxwell v. Altberg, 2023 ONCA 305

Short Civil Decisions

Fockler v. Speigel, 2023 ONCA 284

Shanghai Lianyin Investment Co. Ltd. v. Lu, 2023 ONCA 285

7120761 Canada Inc. v. AGA Global Investments Inc., 2023 ONCA 286

1758704 Ontario Inc. v. Priest, 2023 ONCA 283

Avedian v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc., 2023 ONCA 289

McWhirter v. Lorza, 2023 ONCA 301

CIVIL DECISIONS

U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), 2023 ONCA 277

Comfort Capital Inc. v. Yeretsian, 2023 ONCA 282

College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Kilian, 2023 ONCA 281

Gefen v. Gefen, 2023 ONCA 287

Senthillmohan v. Senthillmohan, 2023 ONCA 280

Karatzoglou v. Commisso, 2023 ONCA 295

Hrvoic v. Hrvoic, 2023 ONCA 288

Entes Industrial Plants Construction & Erection Contracting Co. Inc. v. Centerra Gold Inc., 2023 ONCA 294

Maxwell v. Altberg, 2023 ONCA 305

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Fockler v. Speigel, 2023 ONCA 284

Shanghai Lianyin Investment Co. Ltd. v. Lu, 2023 ONCA 285

7120761 Canada Inc. v. AGA Global Investments Inc., 2023 ONCA 286

1758704 Ontario Inc. v. Priest, 2023 ONCA 283

Avedian v. Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc, 2023 ONCA 289

McWhirter v. Lorza, 2023 ONCA 301

Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

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Canada