The foundation of democracy in any country is seen in the observance of the rule of law. Consequently, the issues of fundamental rights enforcement have continued to feature prominently in our courts as there is increasing consciousness in Nigeria of the sanctity and need to protect fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are rights that have constitutional backing and which upon an actual breach or threat of breach are enforceable in court. Due to the constitutional nature of these rights, they are placed on a higher pedestal than ordinary civil matters in which a claim for damages resulting from a proven injury has to be made specifically and proved. They are considered as being claims of their own distinct kind (sui generis) and therefore enjoy distinct procedural rules and fast-tracked time frame for litigation.
This paper examines the various challenges in the enforcement of fundamental rights and provide a critique on the identified challenges and clarifies the actual position of the law and how same can best be addressed.
The Law and Jurisdiction
For the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights, the principal source of practice and procedure is the Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 ("FREP Rules"), which repealed the 1979 Rules. The rules are made pursuant to Section 46(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
By virtue of Order II, Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, "any person who alleges that any of the fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution and to which he is entitled, has been, is being or is likely to be infringed may, apply to the court1 in the state where the infringement occurs or is likely to occur for redress2". The 2009 FREP Rules3 abolished the requirement for leave of court before now contained in the 1979 FREP Rules. Consequently, an Applicant may approach the court for the enforcement of fundamental human right using any originating process accepted by the court without obtaining leave of court.
On the issue of jurisdiction over Fundamental Rights Action, generally any High Court (Federal or State) has jurisdiction to entertain fundamental rights action. In Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P. Rivers State ,4 it was held that by virtue of the provision of section 46(2) of the 1999 constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provision of the section and may make such order, issue such writs and give directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that state of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled. Thus, where a person's fundamental right is breached, being breached or about to be breached, that person may apply under section 46(1) to the Judicial division of the Federal High Court in the State or the High Court of the State or that of the Federal Capital Territory in which the breach occurred or is occurring or about to occur. This is irrespective of whether the right involved comes within the legislative competence of the Federation or the State or the Federal Capital Territory5.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has in a few cases qualified and more precisely stated that the exercise of this jurisdiction by the Federal High Court is where the fundamental right threatened or breached falls within the enumerated matters on which that court has jurisdiction. Thus, fundamental rights arising from matters outside its jurisdiction cannot be enforced by the Federal High Court6. Equally, a High Court of a State shall lack jurisdiction to entertain matters of fundamental rights, although brought pursuant to section 46(2) of the Constitution where the alleged breach of such matters arose from a transaction or subject matter which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as provided by Section 251 of the Constitution.7
Joint Application to Enforce Fundamental Rights
Fundamental rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution are viewed as inhering in every human being and exalted above any other rights available to human beings. Accordingly, they are recognized in individual countries as well as global institutions like the United Nations through charter. Kayode Eso, JSC in Ransome-Kuti vs. The Attorney General Federation (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 6) 211, said: "... It is a right which stands above the ordinary laws of the land and which in fact is antecedent to the political society itself. It is a primary condition to a civilized existence".
In an application for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the applicant may include the following8;
- Anyone acting in his own interest;
- Anyone acting on behalf of another person;
- Anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of a group or class of persons;
- Anyone acting in the public interest; and
- Association acting in the interest of his members or other individuals or groups.
Notwithstanding the above, the law is remarkably settled that action for the enforcement of fundamental rights, cannot be jointly maintained. They are very personal in nature. In Udo v. Robson & Ors9, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents were the applicants for the enforcement of their fundamental rights and that their story clearly showed that the violation of their rights allegedly took place in one place at the same time and in the same circumstance. The Court stated that here the act complained of is the arrest and detention without bail and without an arraignment in Court for any known offence. The Court held that ". I still believe that in the circumstance that the Court in the interest of justice and convenience can allow the parties to file their complaint together for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. However, since this provision is not in the rules, the Court are having difficulty in taking it up". The Court in Udo's case based its decision on the case of Kporharor & Anor. V. Yedi & Ors10 where the Court of Appeal relying on the wordings of Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution, stated that the use of the word "any" denotes singular and does not admit pluralities of any form. It was thus held that fundamental rights are individual rights and not collective rights and any application filed by more than one person to enforce a right under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is incompetent and liable to be struck out. Also, in the case of Rtftcin v. Ikwechegh11, it was held among others that "if an individual feels that his Fundamental Rights or Human Rights has been violated, he should take out action personally for the alleged infraction as right of one differs in content and degree from the complaint of the other".
However, whilst joint claim is unavailable, the same cannot be said for consolidation of separate actions. Order VII of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules empowers the Court to consolidate several applications and determine them jointly and/or severally in the consolidated suits where the applications relate to the infringement of a particular fundamental right in respect of the same subject matter and on the same grounds although they may be pending against several persons. It must be noted that consolidation can only take place on the application of the applicant12 and not the respondent. The effect of consolidating suits can be seen in the decision of the Court in Alaribe v Nwankpa & Ors13 where it was held that "two or more suits on consolidation assume a new character, giving the trial judge the power to treat them together and be seised of the issue involved in the consolidated action". This provision on consolidation aids to cure the defect of the lack of provision on joinder for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under the 2009 rules. This helps applicants suffering from the same infringement to be heard in the same suit. It does not per se cure what may be assessed as multiplicity of suits on purportedly same subject matter but it does improve administrative efficiency, case management and speed in adjudication through hearing of same by one judge. It further averts circumstances of conflicting decisions by courts of coordinate jurisdictions, bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances that such fundamental actions arose from the same set of transactions and circumstances: this does not in any way contradict the requirement for courts to look into peculiarities of each case on their facts. The effect of this provision would in our view be similar to the effect of the doctrine of stare decisis (binding judicial precedents) which posit that appellate case law or decisions or principles or pronouncements reached on transactions, dispute on same or similar sets of facts would be binding on subsequent inferior courts for similar facts and the lower court is not allowed to depart from or not apply such judicial precedent except the facts and circumstances are different.14
Enforcement of Fundamental Rights by Corporate Entities
Corporate Entities have the right to sue and be sued in their corporate name. This right to sue does not exclude Fundamental rights action. A company in Nigeria is a proper party in an action for Enforcement of Fundamental rights. Just like natural persons, a company may commence an action for enforcement of fundamental right by using any originating process which is accepted by that court. The application shall, subject to the Rules, lie without leave of the court. Such originating process shall be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant and the relief sought and the grounds upon which the relief is sought. An affidavit setting out the facts upon which the application is made and a written address15.
The Court in the case of Kelvin Peterside V Imb,16 held that it is a long-settled issue that a company could be liable for infraction of fundamental rights and can also enforce same. Also, in the case of Onyekwuluye V Benue State Government17, it was held that a limited liability company is a persona ficta- a juristic personality which conducts its affairs through its agents like the managing director, directors and others and as such, it will not be correct to say that fundamental rights do not apply to artificial person. Interestingly, the above case law was developed and applicable under the old FREP Rules of 1979. In Concord Press Nigeria Limited V Ag Federation & Ors18; the applicant challenged the closure of their business premises under the 1979 FREP Rules. The Federal High Court upheld the contention of the applicant that the Federal Military Government violated their fundamental right to freedom of expression. Apart from ordering the reopening of the companies' premises, the court awarded exemplary damages against the respondents.
However, in F.B.N. Plc & Ors v. A.G. Federation19, being a case brought under the 2009 FREP Rules, the Court in considering whether an artificial person can sue for violation of its fundamental human rights held that "an artificial person cannot maintain an action for violation of its fundamental rights. Thus, in the instant case, the 1st appellant being an artificial person was incapable of being arrested and detained. The 2nd - 5th appellants, being natural persons, were the ones who could institute an action for the enforcement of their fundamental human rights. The 1st appellant not being a person capable of being arrested and detained was not entitled to damages in this case although it may have its remedy elsewhere".
It is important to note in line with the principles regarding stare decisis aforementioned, that this authority of the Apex Court is an authority for what it says and does not extend to a general conclusion that artificial person cannot apply for enforcement of fundamental rights. The Apex Court refused to entertain a FHR action brought by a company complaining of arrest and detention, which the Supreme Court essentially concluded was factually impossible, not being a bodied person for which this breach is caused. However, an artificial person can sue for the protection of its fundamental right to dignity, freedom of expression, not to be harassed, intimidated, etc. It suffices to say pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in F.B.N Plc 7 Ors. v. A.G. Federation (supra) that whilst artificial persons are afforded the right to approach the court through their officials for the enforcement of fundamental rights, it is not every violation of such rights that can be enforced by Corporate entities. Thus, the Court held that it was physically impossible for the first appellant, a bank, to be arrested and detained and that the Court of Appeal was therefore right when it refused to award damages to the 1st appellant for the unlawful arrest and detention of the 2nd to 5th appellants.
Fundamental Right Enforcement involving the Federal Government or any of its Agencies
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) has conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in a matter in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is involved20. In Inegbedion v. Selo-Ojemen & Anor21 the Apex Court held that "the effect of Paragraphs (p), (q) and (r) of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution is to vest exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over all civil causes and matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. See Nepa v. Edegbero (2002) 103 LRCN 2280 at 2281 - 2282. The provision to Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution does not in any way detract from the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 251 (1) (p), (q) and (r). Consequently, the proviso cannot apply.22"
The Supreme Court in Inegbedion's case went further to state pursuant to Section 251 (1) (p), (q), (r) of the Constitution that where in a matter, one of the parties is the Federal Government or any of its Agencies, it is only the Federal High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction as a State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such a matter23. In Adebileje v. NEPA24, the Kaduna Division of this court, held that, by section 230(1), (q) of the Constitution (suspension and modification) Decree 107 of 1993, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies. In University of Agriculture, Makurdi v. Jack25, the Supreme Court also interpreted the proviso to section 230(1) and held that the proviso by no means confers State High Court with any jurisdiction in matters provided for under section 230(1). Rather, it only expands the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, where the action is against the Federal Government or any of its agencies is for damages, injunction or specific performance, and the action is founded on some enactment, law or equity.
In the case of Iheme v. Chief Of Defence Staff & Ors26, it was contended by the 4th Respondent counsel that the Federal High Court rightly declined jurisdiction on the ground that the claims of assault, battery or vicarious liabilities being tortious in nature does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The Court of Appeal reviewed the decision of the supreme Court in Adetona v. I. G. Enterprises (supra) and considered the propriety of same when viewed without regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as to what becomes the fate of a party (like the Appellant) who by reason of the fact that the alleged violation of his fundamental human right under Section 34 (1) of the Constitution has tortious related subject matter, in which case the subject matter jurisdiction vests on the State High Court but equally has party jurisdiction which is exclusive to the Federal High Court in that the Respondents are Federal government agencies?
In response to the above, the Court of Appeal noted that the Appellant will not have any Court of law to seek redress for the alleged violation of his fundamental right because while the subject matter jurisdiction of his action abides the High Court of a State, the party jurisdiction is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in which case the straight jacket interpretation of the decision of the apex court will oust the jurisdiction of both Courts; which definitely cannot be the intendment of both the Apex Court and the law makers in view of the common law principle that where there is a wrong there must be a remedy. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal was premised on the more recent Supreme Court decision in Adegbite & Anor. v. Amosu27; wherein it was held that: "The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) has conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in a matter in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is involved (Section 251(1) (p), (q), (r) and (s)."
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided in NEPA v. Edegbenro,28 that where a party to civil action is the Federal Government or any of its agencies, and the issue settled concerns or touches the administration, or management and control of the government or any of its agencies, the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction. It is so, notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the civil action. Also, in Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd.29 the court held that a close examination of the additional jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court in the section and by the 1979 Constitution clearly shows that the court was not conferred with jurisdiction to entertain claims founded on contract as in the instant case. Since disputes founded on contracts are not among those included in the additional jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court, that court therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's claim. The lower court, therefore, acted rightly in its decision that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Misuse of Fundamental Right Procedure - Use of Fundamental Right Action to Pursue Non-Fundamental Right Issues
In an application for the enforcement of fundamental rights, it is a condition precedent that the enforcement of the fundamental right should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. Where the main or principal claim is not the enforcement or securing the enforcement of a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be properly invoked, and the suit would be incompetent. Where the main or principal claim is not the enforcement or protection of a fundamental right, the fundamental right procedure is not appropriate30.
Also, in Ihenacho v N.P.F31, the court held that for a claim to qualify as falling under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, it must be clear that the principal relief sought by the applicant is for the enforcement of a fundamental right and not to redress a grievance that is ancillary to the principal relief which is not itself ipso facto a claim of fundamental right. When an application is brought under the rules, a condition precedent to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction is that the enforcement of fundamental rights should be the main claim and not an accessory claim.
Debt Recovery - Fundamental Right Issues Arising
Fundamental right issues can also be seen in cases of debt recovery. This is normally seen where parties to a contract employ the use of force to recover debts owed to them. In such situations, there is bound to be an infringement on the rights of one party, usually the debtor. The Court in Okafor & Anor v. AIG Police Zone II Onikan & Ors32, held that the resort to the police by parties for recovery of debts, outstanding under contractual relationship, has been repeatedly deprecated by the courts - "I believe that the EFCC rather than advising the 1st Respondent to use legal means to recover the alleged debt, allowed its coercive powers to be used by the 1st Respondent to harass, intimidate and brutalize the Appellant in a purely business relationship. By so doing, Appellant's fundamental rights were violated, and the trial court was wrong to justify the breaches". Also, the Court has a duty to protect the fundamental rights of citizens and must not permit any violation for whatever reason, unless as stipulated by law33.
In EFCC v. Diamond Bank Plc34, it was held that the powers conferred on the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to receive complaints and prevent and/or fight financial crimes in Nigeria pursuant to section 6(b) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act does not extend to investigation and/or resolution of disputes arising or resulting from simple contracts or civil transactions as in this case. Also, the Court stated that the EFCC, the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies are not debt recovery agencies and should refrain from being used as such. The court also stated that the Appellant's action constituted an infringement of fundamental right and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents rightly commenced their suit for enforcement of their fundamental right.
Post-Judgment Issues with Fundamental Right Cases - Consent of AG to Enforce Against Government Entities
By virtue of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, where money liable to be attached by garnishee proceedings is in the custody or under the control of a public officer in his official capacity, the order nisi shall not be made unless consent to such attachment is first obtained from the appropriate officer in the case of money in the custody or control of a public officer or of the court in the case of money in custodial legis, as the case may be.
In CBN v. Hydro Air Property Limited35, It was held that the prior consent of the Attorney-General under section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act is necessary and mandatory before the judgment of a court can be properly enforced against the state. Obtaining such a fiat is a condition precedent which must be complied with before a judgment creditor can enforce a judgment against the state, and the failure of a judgment creditor to obtain same robs the court of the jurisdiction over the judgment enforcement proceedings, and renders the proceedings a nullity.
In FGN v. Interstella Communications Limited36, it was held that the import of section 84 of SCPA is to avoid embarrassment of not knowing that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt which the government may not know anything about.
From the above cases, it can be deduced that the consent of the Attorney-General is a pre-condition for the enforcement of Fundamental Right Judgment against Government entities.
It should be noted that a recourse is available to a litigant through a distinct mandamus procedure to go after the office of the AG who deliberately seeks to evade enforcement against a Government entity. The litigant can establish that it has a right to demand for the performance of the public duty by the public authority who has refused to act, then an order of mandamus may lie to secure the performance of that public duty. It follows therefore that where the public authority or the individual is under a duty to act, he is obliged to act as such. It is the law that the mere show by the litigant that its rights and obligations have been or is in danger of being infringed suffices as sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute.37 Failure to act entitles the applicant to seek relief under the writ of mandamus. On the application for the order of mandamus, the applicant must equivocally establish that it has a legal right to the performance by the respondent of some duty of public nature. This is because section 287(3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that; "the decisions of the Federal High Court, the High Court and all other Courts established by this constitution shall be enforced in any part of the federation by all authorities and persons, and by other courts of law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, a High Court and those other courts, respectively".
Challenge of Enforcement of Decision of ECOWAS Court of Justice on Fundamental Rights
Pursuant to Section 12 of the 1999 Constitution, until a treaty is domesticated (enacted as law) in Nigeria it has no force of law. Also, in General Sani Abacha & Ors v. Fawehinmi38, the Court held that 'an international Treaty entered into by the government of Nigeria does not become binding until enacted into law by the National Assembly.
By the provision of Article 10 of the Supplementary Protocol of the ECOWAS Court adopted in January 2005 by the Authority of Heads of State and Government, individuals, corporate bodies and governmental organizations have access to the court for the enforcement of human rights. The judgments of the Court are binding on all member states, the institutions of the community, individuals and corporate bodies. On enforceability of the judgment of ECOWAS Community Court, Article 19(2) of the Protocol (A/P1/91) on the Community Court of Justice provides that the decisions of the Court are final and immediately enforceable.
Article 24(2) and (3) of the Supplementary Protocol of the ECOWAS Court provides that the "execution of any judgment of the Court shall be in the form of a writ of execution, which shall be submitted by the Registrar of the Court to the relevant member states for execution according to the rules of civil procedure of that member state. Upon verification by the appointed authority of the recipient member state that the writ is from the Court, the writ shall be enforced".
Article 22(3) of the Protocol and Article 5(2) of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty mandates member states, in accordance with their constitutional provisions to immediately take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination of such legislative and statutory texts as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty including the execution of the decisions of the court. This provision mandates member states to ratify and domesticate the ECOWAS Treaty, protocol and other legal instruments for the effective enforcement of the judgment of the Court.
Irrespective of the above provisions, enforcement of judgments of the ECOWAS Court has been a major problem and this relates to the fact that neither the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Supplementary Protocols or other legal instruments makes provision regarding the means of enforcing the issued writ of execution where member states fail to voluntarily comply with the terms of the judgment of the Court. Nigerian Courts are reluctant to enforce the judgments of ECOWAS Court and this poses a difficult challenge for the judgment creditor to reap the fruits of the judgment.
A typical illustration of this can be seen in the case of SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor39. Here, the ECOWAS Court ruled that the Federal Government of Nigeria should provide free and compulsory basic education to every Nigerian child but it has not been enforced by the Government though it was a judgment gotten in 2010. Maybe the reason for the reluctance of the Court in enforcing the judgment of ECOWAS Court in Nigeria is anchored on the statement of the Supreme Court in the case of General Sani Abacha & Ors v. Fawehinmi. The court held that an international treaty entered by the government of Nigeria does not become binding until enacted into law by the National Assembly. Thus, enforcement of the judgment of ECOWAS Court may be challenging if treaties relating to the ECOWAS have not been expressly ratified
Challenges to Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights
As noted above, there are a lot of challenges limiting the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. These challenges operate as clog in the wheel of administration of justice in fundamental rights claims, which are otherwise meant to enjoy accelerated procedures and hearing and as such continue to lead the conversation on the drawbacks to enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria.
Aside from the technical challenges which have been reviewed within, there is the lingering problem of absence of a strong civic knowledge and culture regarding fundamental rights and its enforcement, which deficiency is exacerbated by a still regrettably great level of illiteracy in the society. A good number of Nigerians do not have access to education, particularly good civic education that would enable them to be fully abreast of their rights, obligations and duties as citizens, and as a result, they do not properly appreciate or understand the rights they have. On the other hand, the few that are well informed use such knowledge, might or clout in an abusive manner, including for instance the use of law enforcement agencies as instruments of harassment, threat to right to liberty and freedom of movement and debt recovery. The political elite of the country appear to be included in this trend much as are corporate and individual bodies whose motives are primarily based on economic consideration. In many cases of infringement of fundamental rights, people resort to self-help and more often than not, the perpetuators of fundamental right abuses go unpunished.
Poverty is also another challenge to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. A good percentage of Nigerians are living in abject poverty and thus unable to afford the basic necessities of life. These indigent Nigerians though victims of fundamental right abuses, are unable to enforce their rights due to extreme poverty culminating in their inability to afford legal representation. NGOs have consistently risen to the challenge in this regard but there is a limit to which they can go considering the massive population of the citizenry and limited funding at the disposal of many NGOs.
Human rights are inalienable rights that accrue to every citizen of a country and one that deserves the maximum protection possible and unhindered protection from infringement. This is so because human beings are said to be naturally brutish and selfish and yet cannot exhibit these conducts in democratic society.
The Nigerian Constitution has endorsed the above by outlining the reverenced provisions under Chapter 4 and preventing variation thereof except as provided for in Constitution. The adoption into domestic law of the African Charter of Human Rights, and amendments made in the FREP Rules in 2009 also attest to this will. The drafters of the 2009 FREP Rules made commendable attempt towards jettisoning many of the bottleneck provisions in the 1979 Rules that militated against access to justice by victims of fundamental right abuses albeit, as have been discussed above, novel technical challenges are still been encountered by litigants in a bid to access the courts for the enforcement of their fundamental rights.
However, mere rules or paper are not sufficient to ensure maximum protection of Fundamental rights: the Judiciary, the Executive and the citizenry must be held accountable and be custodian of the protection that is afforded by the Constitution. The judiciary through the bar, the bench and advocacy groups are key to this constant struggle for protection and enforcement of inalienable human rights.
Legal practitioners must be seen to be at the top of their game in their representation of litigants. The Courts must also be willing to water down technicalities in a bid to do justice. The merits of each case must be considered on its own peculiarities. Borrowing a hint from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Iheme v. Chief Of Defence Staff & Ors (supra), "a situation where an applicant will not have any Court of law to seek redress for the violation of his fundamental right definitely cannot be the intendment of the law makers in view of the common law principle that where there is a wrong there must be a remedy."
1. "Court" means the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja
2. Provided that where the infringement occurs in a State which has no Division of the Federal High Court, the Division of the Federal High Court administratively responsible for the State shall have jurisdiction.
3. Order II Rule 2 of the 2009 FREP Rules
4. (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt.1350) S.C 225
5. See the case of Minister of Internal Affairs v. Shugaba (1982) 3 NCLR 915
6. See Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 3 NSCC 225
7. Adetona & Ors V. Igele General Enterprises Ltd (2011) 7 NWLR
8. Udo v. Robson & Ors (2018) LPELR-45183 (CA)
9. (2018) LPELR-45183 (CA)
10. (2017) LPELR 42418 (CA)
11. (2000) 13 NWLR Pt. 683 at Page 1
12. Gbenga Komolafe V AGF 1 NPILR 407
13. (1999) LPELR-6742 (CA)
14. Clement v. Iwuanyanwu (1989) NWLR (Pt. 107) 39
15. Order II Rule 3 FREP Rules 2009
16.(1993) 2 NWLR (PT. 278) 710
17.(2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 28) 614
18. (1994) FHCLR 144
19. (2018) 7 NWLR, Pt. 1617, S.C 121
20. See Adegbite & Anor. v. Amosu (2016) LPELR 40655 (SC); Section 251(1) (p), (q), (r) and (s)
21. (2013) LPELR - 19769 (SC)
22. Per Stanley Shenko Alagoa, J.S.C. (Pp 13 -14 para F - B)
23. National Electric Power Authority v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (part 789) 79
24. (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt.577) 219
25. (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt.679) 658
26. (2018) LPELR-45354(CA)
27. (2016) LPELR 40655 (SC)
28. (2003) FWLR pt. 139, p 1556
29. (2005) 6 NWLR (PT.921)393
30. Emeka v Okoroafor (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1577) SC 410.
31. (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1580) C.A 424
32. (2019) LPELR-46505(CA)
33. See Enukeme v. Mazi (2014) LPELR - 23540 (CA)
34. (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt.1620) S.C. 61
35. (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt.1434) C.A 482
36. (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463) C.A 1
37. Chijiuka v. Maduewesi (2011) 16 NWLR Pt. 1272, Pg. 181
38. (2000) NWLR (pt.660) p.247
39. SERAP v. Nigeria, Judgment, ECW/CCJ/APP/12/07; ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10 (ECOWAS, Nov. 30, 2010)
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.