A Review Of The Scope Of The Investigative Functions Of The National Assembly

Introduction

The doctrine of separation of powers remains a foundational principle of Nigeria’s constitutional democracy. Under this doctrine, governmental powers are distributed among three distinct arms of government, namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (“the Constitution”) embodies this principle, as stated by Honourable Justice E.A Agim JSC,¹ who pronounced that “Our Constitution in Sections 4, 5 and 6 has entrenched a separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers of government and vested each in an arm of government.”

Under this compartmentalisation, the legislative arm of government, the national assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the “National Assembly”), is vested with the authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good governance of the Federation.² While law making constitutes its primary constitutional function, the Constitution also grants the National assembly certain investigative and oversight powers. These powers permit the legislature to conduct inquiries and public hearings into matters within its legislative competence, including the activities of ministries, departments, agencies and in certain circumstances, private entities operating under federal legislation.

This paper examines the constitutional scope and limitations of the investigative powers of the National Assembly. It further considers the extent to which the legislature may legitimately broaden its oversight role without violating constitutional principles, particularly the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Primary Legislative Function of the National Assembly.

Section 4 of the Constitution vests legislative authority in the National Assembly. This authority extends to matters contained within the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists. Accordingly, the principal duty of the National Assembly is the enactment, amendment and repeal of laws for the governance of the Federation. The Supreme Court in Attorney General Abia State v Attorney General of the Federation.³ recognized law making as the central constitutional mandate of the legislature. However, the performance of this function necessarily requires mechanisms for supervision and accountability. It is within this context that the constitution confers investigative powers on the legislature.

Oversight and Investigative Powers of the National Assembly

Sections 88 and 89 of the Constitution empowers the National Assembly to conduct investigations into matters within its legislative competence. Section 88(2) provides that such investigations may be undertaken for two principal purposes:

1. to enable the legislature, make laws or correct defects in the existing laws; and
2. to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws and in the disbursement of funds appropriated by the legislature.

These provisions establish that the investigative powers of the national assembly are not independent or unlimited powers. Rather, they are ancillary to its legislative responsibilities. Consequently, investigations conducted by the legislature must remain connected to legislative reform, accountability, or the exposure of administrative abuse.

The Constitutional Limits of Legislative Investigations

Despite the constitutional basis for legislative investigations, there has been a growing tendency for legislative committees to exceed the boundaries of their constitutional authority. In several instances, committees of the National Assembly have purported to issue binding directives, imposing obligations or determining disputes between parties. Such actions raise serious constitutional concerns because they encroach upon the adjudicatory powers reserved exclusively for the courts.

A notable illustration is the case of House of Representatives v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited.⁴ In that case, the House of Representatives, sought to investigate the allegations relating to the proposed siting of a hazardous waste management facility by Shell in Rivers State. The petitioners requested the House to order the discontinuance of the project, compel relocation of the facility and direct remedial measures in favour of affected communities.

The Court of Appeal held that the National Assembly lacked constitutional authority to adjudicate upon disputes or grant remedies between parties. The court emphasized that while the legislature may investigate matters connected to law making or public accountability, it cannot assume judicial powers by determining civil rights or imposing enforceable directives.

Similarly, in NLNG vs. Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Ors.⁵ The Senate investigated allegations concerning the alleged failure of NLNG to fulfil corporate social responsibilities to host communities. Following its investigation, the Senate adopted recommendations directing NLNG to pay over N18 Billion in compensation within sixty (60) days.

The federal high court held that the Senate had acted ultra vires its constitutional powers. The court reiterated that the legislature possesses no adjudicatory authority and cannot compel payment of damages or enforce private rights. Such powers belong exclusively to the judiciary under Section 6 of the constitution.

Judicial Protection of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers

The decisions in the foregoing cases underscore the judiciary’s commitment to preserving the doctrine of separation of powers. Nigerian courts have consistently maintained that legislative powers must remain within the narrow purposes outlined in Section 88 (2) of the constitution.

Thus, the national assembly may investigate matters for the purpose of legislative reform or exposure of corruption and administrative abuse. However, it cannot transform itself into a tribunal for the settlement of disputes or enforcement of legal rights. Any attempt to exercise judicial authority under the guise of oversight functions will invariably be struck down by the courts.

Rethinking the oversight role of the national assembly

Although the constitutional limitations imposed on the national assembly are legally sound, they often create practical difficulties in addressing matters of significant public concern. In many cases, complaints brought before legislative committees involve issues affecting public safety, environmental protection or administrative injustice.

For example, in House of Representatives v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited, the grievances raised by affected communities regarding environmental hazards were genuine concerns deserving public attention. Nonetheless, the constitutional framework prevents the legislature from granting substantive relief.

This reality raises an important policy question: how can the State effectively respond to public grievances without violating constitutional boundaries? One viable solution lies in strengthening the institutional framework of the Public Complaints Commission, otherwise known as the “Nigerian Ombudsman”.

The Public Complaints Commission as an Institutional Alternative

The Public Complaints Commission was established under the Public Complaints Commission Act (hereinafter referred to as “PPCA”) 1975. The Commission was designed to investigate complaints against public institutions and certain private entities operating within Nigeria.

A notable feature of the Commission is its institutional independence from the executive arm of government. Commissioners are appointed and removeable by the National Assembly, thereby ensuring a measure of accountability to the legislature while preserving operational autonomy.

The Commission is empowered to investigate complaints against ministries, departments, agencies, statutory corporations, and even private companies incorporated under Nigerian law. This broader jurisdiction places the Commission in a unique position to address complaints that legislative committees themselves may be constitutionally restrained from determining.

The Nigerian Ombudsman system bears similarities to the Swedish Justitieombudsmannen (JO) which was established to independently investigate maladministration and protect citizens against abuses of governmental authority. However, unlike its Swedish counterpart, the Nigerian Commission lacks prosecutorial powers and is largely limited to investigation and recommendation.

Challenges facing the public complaints commission.

Despite its statutory mandate, the Public Complaints Commission has remained relatively ineffective. One major limitation is the absence of enforcement or prosecutorial powers. The Commission may investigate and make findings, but it lacks authority to independently prosecute offenders or enforce compliance with its recommendations.

Another challenge arises from Section 6 of “PPCA”, which restricts the Commission from investigating matters, pending before the President, the National Assembly, or the Council of State. This provision significantly undermines the Commission’s independence and exposes its operations to political interference.

As presently structured, the Commission lacks the institutional authority necessary to function as an effective accountability mechanism capable of supplementing the oversight role of the National Assembly.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The constitutional framework governing legislative investigations in Nigeria illustrates that the National Assembly cannot exercise investigative powers beyond the purposes expressly stated in Section 88 (2) of the Constitution. Legislative oversight is therefore limited to facilitating law making and exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste in public administration.

Nevertheless, the growing complexity of governance and the increasing incidence of administrative abuse require stronger institutional mechanisms for accountability. In this regard, the Public Complaints Commission provides a useful framework through which the national assembly may indirectly enhance public oversight while remaining within constitutional limits.

To achieve this objective, the following reforms are recommended:

1. The Public Complaints Commission should be granted limited prosecutorial authority, particularly in cases involving public maladministration or abuse of citizen’s rights.
2. Section 6(b) of PPCA should be amended to guarantee greater institutional independence and prevent political interference in investigations.
3. The National Assembly should strengthen the operational capacity, funding and independence of the Commission to effectively investigate complaints against both public institutions and private entities.
4. Legislative committees should exercise greater restraint in the conduct of investigations to avoid encroachment upon judicial functions.

Ultimately, while the National Assembly possesses broad oversight powers, these powers must always be exercised within constitutional boundaries. The preservation of democratic governance requires that each arm of government operate strictly within the sphere assigned to it by the Constitution.

Footnotes

1 Friday v. Gov., Ondo State (2022) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1857) 585, at 644, para. E.

2 Section 4(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

3  (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265, at 352, paras. A-B.

4 (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 213

5 Unreported – SUIT NO: FHC/ABJ/CS/1989/2022

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