Earlier this year, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared COVID-19 to no longer constitute a public health emergency of international concern. Whilst this appears to officially mark the end of that pandemic, scientific communities generally agree that there will inevitably be another one. It is less clear, though, what the causal agent of the next pandemic will be.
In this insight, we will consider various candidate causal agents, with a focus on some of the RNA viruses of current concern, before exploring the technologies that may enable us to prepare for, and respond to, the next pandemic.
Viruses of ‘pandemic potential'
A pandemic is broadly defined as the spread of a disease around the globe. This is in contrast to an epidemic, where a disease is confined to a specific geographical area. All of the pandemics documented since 1918 have been linked to an RNA virus, and the ‘pandemic potential' of many RNA viruses are of ongoing concern.
Coronaviruses
In the last 20 years, three deadly human-infecting coronaviruses have emerged, namely severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 1 (SARS-CoV-1), Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and SARS-CoV-2.
So-called because of the solar corona-like appearance of the surface spike proteins, coronaviruses were once not considered threats to humans. The 10% case fatality rate of SARS-CoV-1, therefore, came as a surprise in the early 2000s. About a decade later, MERS-CoV emerged, exhibiting an astonishing case fatality rate of over 30%. Despite knowledge of these two deadly coronaviruses, the ‘pandemic potential' of coronaviruses was not truly recognised until around another decade later with the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, the causal agent of COVID-19.
Compared to many other RNA viruses, coronaviruses mutate relatively slowly. However, certain mutations, when they do occur, can give rise to new variants that exhibit increased infectivity and/or immune escape. Many of these mutations localise to the spike protein, which is a structural component that enables viral entry into host cells. As the spike protein is also the primary target of many COVID-19 vaccines, spike mutations can lead to the emergence of new SARS-CoV-2 variants that are not only more infectious but also capable of evading existing vaccine-induced immunity.
Even known variants that are near-extinct in humans can persist in animal reservoirs and be reintroduced into human populations at a later date. In North America, SARS-CoV-2 variants that were last documented in humans in 2020 have been found in white-tailed deer well into 2022. The risk of reintroduction into humans could become especially high once the immunity of older people wanes and previously unexposed younger people form a larger proportion of the population.
Beyond SARS-CoV-2 variants, closely related, potentially more lethal, coronavirus species continue to circulate in animal reservoirs and could jump from non-human hosts to humans at any point.
Influenza viruses
In the influenza virus family, only influenza A viruses are known to cause pandemics. Influenza A viruses can be classified into subtypes and then clades. Subtype classification is based on the combination of two viral proteins: hemagglutinin (H, selected from H1 through to H18) and neuraminidase (N, selected from N1 through to N11). Subtype H1N1, for example, was responsible for the 1918 flu pandemic and the 2009 swine flu pandemic. Strains related to that which caused the swine flu pandemic still circulate in humans, contributing to seasonal flu epidemics.
Aside from human-adapted influenza A viruses, there has been
considerable media attention on bird-adapted highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) A viruses, in particular, HPAI
A(P> Coinciding with the global spread of HPAI A(P> The increasing number of infections in mammals is concerning
because the infections could provide opportunities for adaptation
in mammalian hosts. As humans are more closely related to other
mammals than to birds, these mammalian hosts are more likely than
birds to transmit the virus to humans. Certain practices continue to drive the emergence of new avian
influenza viruses of ‘pandemic potential', one such
practice being intensive mink farming. Notably, minks are closely
related to ferrets, which are the gold-standard experimental model
for studying the airborne transmissibility of influenza viruses in
humans. Moreover, although minks are mostly solitary in the wild,
the crowded conditions in intensive farming provide unusual
opportunities for minks to act as influenza virus mixing vessels.
Indeed, influenza viruses possess multiple RNA segments. When a
cell is co-infected with different influenza viruses, RNA segments
derived from those viruses can be shuffled to generate progeny
viruses with a novel combination of RNA segments. Should a mink be
co-infected with a bird-adapted influenza virus capable of
replicating efficiently in mammals and a human-adapted seasonal
influenza virus, a viral progeny with genetic traits conferring
efficient replication in, and selectivity for, human cells could
arise. If the viral progeny is also capable of sustained
human-to-human transmission, the result could be catastrophic,
given that there is likely little to no existing immunity in
general human populations. Genetic markers of mammalian adaptation remain rare in HPAI
A(P> Zika virus Spread predominantly through the bite of infected mosquitoes,
Zika virus has long been assumed to cause no more than symptoms
similar to those associated with mild forms of dengue fever.
However, following outbreaks in the Americas and an epidemic
beginning in 2015, an association was found between infection in
pregnancy and infant microencephaly. In rare cases, infection in
adults can lead to Guillain-Barré syndrome, which involves
rapid-onset muscle weakness caused by the immune system damaging
the peripheral nervous system. The global distribution of the most cited carrier, the yellow
fever mosquito, is presently more extensive than ever recorded,
partially due to global trade and travel. A mosquito population
capable of carrying Zika virus has even been found in Washington DC
and may have survived at least four consecutive winters in the
region according to genetic studies. Although Zika virus is largely
confined to tropical areas, rising global temperatures and
increased precipitation threaten to further expand the distribution
of its main carrier. To date, no clinically approved vaccines
against Zika virus are available. In previous pandemics, innovation in biomedicine and genomics
has enabled not only the detection and characterisation of the
causal agent but also the development of new vaccines and
therapies. Innovation will similarly be essential for containing
any future pandemics, whatever the causal agent may be. Vaccines For some, the term “vaccines” is almost synonymous
with “pandemic preparedness”. Vaccine platforms may be genetic (in the form of mRNA or DNA) or
non-genetic (in the form of inactivated viruses, protein subunits
or viral vectors). Non-genetic platforms are well established and
in use against influenza virus strains that cause seasonal flu.
Beyond these non-genetic platforms, the COVID-19 pandemic saw the
clinical approval of mRNA vaccines for use in humans for the first
time. As discussed in a previous insight, mRNA vaccines have many
advantages over traditional vaccines; they can be simpler to
produce and more easily modified for use against new viral strains
or variants. Building upon years of prior RNA research, it only
took Moderna around two months to go from obtaining the genomic
sequence of SARS-CoV-2 to beginning phase I clinical trials of its
mRNA-1273 vaccine. Moderna's mRNA-1893 vaccine is now in
phase II clinical trials and could be the first clinically approved
vaccine against Zika virus. DNA vaccines are also relatively simple to produce and modify,
and may be similarly useful in a pandemic where the causal agent is
constantly changing. It appears that DNA vaccines currently do not
induce sufficient cellular and humoral immune responses in humans.
Ongoing research in DNA codon optimisation, adjuvants, and
electroporation will be necessary to overcome this hurdle. Antigenic cartography Many developed countries have stockpiles of P> This is where antigenic cartography comes in. Using data from
virus samples, antigenic cartography can quantify and visualise
antigenic differences between viruses. Specifically, in the process
of updating seasonal flu vaccines, data is obtained by exposing
ferrets to different influenza virus strains to raise an immune
response. If the antibodies raised in response to a first strain
(e.g. a strain targeted by a seasonal flu vaccine) can effectively
neutralise a second strain (e.g. a new strain predicted to spread
and cause illness in an upcoming flu season), then the first and
second strains are considered antigenically similar and any flu
vaccines protective against the first strain would be expected to
be protective against the second. In contrast, if the antibodies
cannot effectively neutralise the second strain, then flu vaccines
protective against the first strain will need to be updated to
provide protection against the second in the upcoming flu
season. Accordingly, antigenic data is useful for identifying whether a
vaccine provides broad protection and when it needs updating. By
further visualising the data using antigenic cartography,
unassuming mutations that cause large antigenic differences can be
revealed and long-term trends can be identified to improve our
understanding of antigenic evolution. The WHO has used antigenic cartography in the flu vaccine strain
selection process for the last two decades. Antigenic cartography
also played a part in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and is
often considered a core tool for pandemic preparedness. Gene drives The distribution of certain viral vectors, such as the yellow
fever mosquito, is expanding. However, proof-of-concept studies
have shown that populations of viral vectors can be controlled by
introducing gene drives into the genome of these viral vectors
using CRISPR-Cas9 technology. Gene drives are genetic elements that reduce individual fitness
but nonetheless are inherited at higher-than-expected frequencies.
In one application, gene drives can be introduced to bias sex
ratios, hence causing population decline and reducing vector-borne
disease transmission. For instance, homing gene drives, which
‘home' into a target genomic site, have been used to
disrupt female fertility genes in germline cells of mosquitoes to
achieve male bias and cause a population crash. In theory, gene drives could spread indefinitely through a
species. Societal consensus should, therefore, be reached through
public engagement prior to the deployment of any gene drives into
the wild. Ultimately, the potential ecological consequences of gene
drives spreading beyond target populations and impacting wider
ecosystems should be balanced against the potential benefits for
public health. Pandemics are increasingly likely to happen in view of more
frequent human-animal interactions and climate change. Beyond
coronaviruses, influenza viruses and Zika virus, there is a
plethora of other pathogens that could cause a major disease
outbreak. The last few years have been testament to the importance
of scientific ingenuity and innovation in mounting an effective
response to a pandemic. However, the technologies that helped
combat COVID-19 did not materialise overnight but were the
culmination of years of research and preparation. Equally, it is
the ongoing research and innovation of today that will put the
world in a better position to respond to what is around the
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about your specific circumstances.Technologies for pandemic preparation
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