Proposed Changes Affecting Pricing, Competition And Supply-chain Transparency In Bulgaria

May 2026 – The newly appointed Bulgarian government has proposed amendments to the Bulgarian Consumer Protection Act (the “CPA”) and the Bulgarian Protection of Competition Act (the “PCA”), both aiming to address ongoing issues related to retail prices, with the proposed measures primarily targeting retailers and dominant market participants.

1. Proposed amendments to the CPA

The amendments to the CPA aim to extend, systematise and build on the mechanisms introduced by the Introduction of the Euro in the Republic of Bulgaria (the “IERB”) concerning economically unjustified price increases. In practice, the draft bill transfers and supplements part of the Euro adoption price-control framework into the CPA and extends its application for one additional year – from 9 August 2026 until 9 August 2027.

1.1 Price increase justification and information obligations

The draft bill prohibits price increases for goods and services offered to consumers that are not “economically justified”. For these purposes, a price increase would be any increase in the final retail price of the same good or service offered by the same trader compared to a “comparable previous period”, i.e. a period allowing an objective price comparison under similar economic conditions.

The draft also introduces a definition of an “economically justified price increase”. In broad terms, a price increase may be considered justified if it is linked to and proportionate with objective factors, such as higher production, import, delivery, transport, labour, energy, fuel, raw material, tax or other external costs or factors beyond the trader’s control which significantly impact the costs and terms of sale.

A key practical point is that the trader would bear the burden of proof for establishing that the price increase is “economically justified”. If the Commission for Consumer Protection (the “CCP”) identifies a price increase, the trader would have to prove its economic justification by providing information and evidence on how the price was formed before and after the increase. This must include details of the relevant price components and their value. If the trader fails to provide the requested information within the prescribed deadline (which cannot be less than five business days), the price increase would be deemed unjustified.

The detailed methodology on the terms and procedure for assessing whether a price increase is justified, including the determination of the comparable previous period, should be adopted by the Council of Ministers within three months of the law’s entry into force.

The draft also envisages sanctions. For businesses, the proposed sanction for unjustified price increases ranges from EUR 5,000 to EUR 100,000, with possible separate exposure where the infringement concerns more than one good, service or retail store.

The sanctions envisaged for non-provision of information to the CCP range from EUR 10,000 to EUR 100,000.

1.2 Daily price publication obligations

The draft bill also preserves the daily price-publication mechanism introduced under the IERB.

Retail traders of food, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, non-food goods and medicinal products with a turnover for the previous year above EUR 5,112,919 shall continue to publish on their websites and submit to the CCP the individual retail prices for the goods included in the official “large consumer basket” list, to the extent those goods are actually offered by the trader.

A newly introduced rule is that the CCP portal shall allow comparison between the wholesale price, the trader’s individual retail price and a “fair price” calculated under a methodology which shall be prepared by the Ministry of Economy, Investments and Industry. This may create additional reputational and regulatory pressure for traders whose prices materially diverge from the published benchmark.

The draft proposes increasing the range of sanctions for entities that do not comply with this obligation– from EUR 5,000 to EUR 100,000.

Practical toolkit for businesses

• Map relevant products and services – identify which goods or services may be affected by the prohibition on economically unjustified increases;
• Keep an evidence file for price increases – supplier notices, invoices, logistics data, labour/energy/fuel cost changes, tax changes, margin analysis and internal approvals;
• Document the pricing rationale – be ready to show what changed, when it changed, how it affected the final consumer price and why the increase is proportionate;
• Monitor the forthcoming methodology – once adopted, convert the assessment criteria into practical steps for commercial, finance and legal teams, including the comparable period, required cost evidence, approval thresholds and response procedures for CCP requests;
• Maintain reporting infrastructure – daily publication to the CCP’s portal of the “large consumer basket” goods in a machine-readable format by 7.00 am, internal logs and fallback procedures should remain operational for another year; and
• Prepare for CCP information requests – requested information may include pricing methodology, cost components, supplier data and other commercially sensitive materials.

2. Proposed amendments to the PCA

In addition to the consumer‑focused measures under the CPA, the proposed amendments to the PCA introduce a parallel set of competition law tools aimed at addressing market power, excessive pricing and supply‑chain transparency.

2.1 Introduction of collective dominance and prohibition of excessive pricing

The amendments introduce the concept of “collective dominance”, defined as the situation when two or more undertakings, while legally and economically independent, together possess market power. This enables them to act to a significant extent independently of their competitors, suppliers, customers or consumers and to impede effective competition on the relevant market. It is established when there is an economic link or market interdependence between the undertakings and it does not require proof of an explicit agreement or concerted practice between them.

The amendments also include a new prohibition on “excessively high prices” charged by undertakings which are in a dominant position or with collective dominance.

The definition for an “excessively high price” is a price which significantly exceeds the economically justified costs for the production, purchase and sale, including a reasonable profit margin. When determining whether the price is excessively high, the Bulgarian Commission for Protection of Competition (the “CPC”) will take into consideration the following criteria:

• The cost-plus criterion – where the selling price significantly exceeds economically justified costs and a reasonable margin profit;
• The comparative criterion – where the price substantially exceeds the prices for the same or similar goods in other EU Member States;
• The historical criterion – where there is a significant price increase in a short period without an objective economic reason; and
• The economic value criterion – where the price is disproportionate to the economic value of the goods or services.

If any of the above criteria are met, then the CPC may establish an infringement, unless the undertaking/s demonstrate that there are objective economic reasons including, for example, an increase in production or logistics costs, external market factors or other relevant reasons.

For infringements of the prohibition on excessively high prices, the CPC may impose a sanction of up to 10 per cent of the undertaking’s total turnover for the preceding financial year.

Further, undertakings generating certain turnover or holding certain market shares (the exact thresholds to be determined in an ordinance adopted by the Council of Ministers) in fast‑moving consumer goods retail should comply with a special transparency regime. This would require them to share pricing information, cooperate in sector analyses, and retain pricing data for at least five years.

These amendments aim to address the significant increase of prices in Bulgaria pre and post the Euro adoption. However, the provisions themselves are rather vague and it is not yet clear how the CPC will be applying the above criteria. The above criteria will be applied on the basis of an economic analysis of the CPC, pursuant to a methodology and indicators determined in an ordinance adopted by the Council of Ministers following the opinion of the CPC.

2.2 Central register

A central electronic register is proposed to ensure traceability along the supply chain for agricultural products, food, raw materials, and certain wholesale‑stage goods (to be determined in an ordinance adopted by the Council of Ministers), enabling authorities to monitor market conditions, analyse sectoral data, and detect potential unfair practices or infringements through automated and AI‑supported data processing.

Business operators should electronically submit supply‑chain information from the first placing of goods on the market through the entire wholesale‑stage distribution. The Ministry of Economy, Investment and Industry will maintain the register, while the Council of Ministers will set the detailed rules for data submission, system operation, product categories covered, and conditions for expanding the register to additional products.

For infringements under the provisions regarding the central register or providing false, incomplete or misleading information, the proposed sanctions are:

2.3 Other changes

→ Expansion of the absolute prohibitions on unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain

The draft bill proposes a significant expansion of the list of absolute prohibitions on commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain (with over 20 new items). Some examples include cases where buyers demand financial contributions or retroactive/conditional rebates that are not linked to a specific, measurable service, or make access to their distribution network conditional on payments or benefits that do not reflect real and demonstrable economic value. Also, in addition to the explicitly listed practices, any practices which based on their economic nature, purpose or result lead or may lead to bypassing, restricting or infringing the principles of good faith, equality and free competition in the agricultural and food supply chain may be determined as unfair commercial practices in an ordinance adopted by the Council of Ministers.

→ Conditional prohibitions on unfair commercial practices

The draft bill provides for an exception to the conditional prohibitions on commercial practices – they are to be allowed only when the following cumulative conditions are met: (i) they are pre‑agreed in writing (ii) the terms are clearly defined, (iii) the good/service is actually provided/performed, (iv) the value is economically justified and proportionate, (v) the supplier has received a document evidencing the performance, (vi) the payment is transparently reflected in the accounting and commercial documents, (vii) the data is submitted to the relevant register, if required. When the purchaser requires payment, they should provide the supplier with a written statement in advance detailing the legal basis, service provided, calculation method, expected results, scope, quantities, and proof of performance.

If the above described conditions are not met, it is presumed that the practice is unfair, unless the trader proves otherwise.

→ Burden of proof for lack of an unfair commercial practice

If the CPC has reasonable grounds to suspect a potentially unfair commercial practice, it may require from the purchaser to provide evidence that the practice is not unfair within a “determined short period”.

Further, if the purchaser does not provide evidence, or the evidence is insufficient, incomplete or contradictory, it is established that there is an unfair commercial practice, unless the gathered evidence shows otherwise.

This provision ultimately shifts the burden of proof to the purchaser who should establish a negative fact (i.e. a lack of unfair commercial practice), particularly in a short timeframe, or otherwise – they face the legal consequences of an established unfair commercial practice.

→ Interim measures by the CPC

The amendments provide the CPC with the power to impose interim measures in antitrust proceedings, including: (i) an obligation to cease the application or amend commercial terms; (ii) an obligation to amend pricing policy; or (iii) other required measures. These interim measures can be imposed until the conclusion of the proceedings.

Practical toolkit for businesses

• Assess dominance/collective dominance exposure on relevant markets;
• Implement excessive‑pricing controls, including cost‑plus, historical, EU‑comparison and economic‑value checks;
• Prepare for the special transparency regime (pricing structure disclosures, sector analyses);
• Identify products subject to the central register and ensure that systems can submit supply‑chain data electronically;
• Review commercial agreements in light of the new requirements for written, measurable, verifiable commercial practices.

The proposed amendments are currently pending, with a deadline until 28 May for proposals, after which a second vote in the National Assembly is expected.

In conclusion, if adopted, the proposed amendments do not prohibit all price increases as such but they do significantly raise the expectations for clear justification, documentation and transparency of pricing. For larger retailers and traders which operate in the specified sectors, the more immediate operational impact will stem from the continuation of daily price-publication and the introduction of new data-submission and traceability obligations. It is, therefore, recommended that price governance, evidence trails, internal controls, practices and reporting processes are reviewed for compliance before the new regime enters into force.

Further, in the agriculture and food distribution sector, it is recommended that the current commercial agreements are reviewed for compliance, in particular given the shifted burden of proof for unfair commercial practices.