UK: Brexit: Significant Opportunities For A Regulatory Reboot

Last Updated: 21 September 2016
Article by Barnabas W.B. Reynolds and Thomas Donegan

The article first appeared in Banking Perspectives, the quarterly journal of The Clearing House.

The UKs vote to leave the European Union has triggered a change in the political climate and in the way banks and financial markets participants are likely to be regulated in the region. The newfound fondness for the financial sector among political decision-makers is unlikely to presage a return to regulatory arbitrage, which has long been blamed as a cause of the credit crisis. However, the situation presents considerable opportunities for improving the regulatory framework for the sector as a whole.

On Brexit, there is a well-known need for an agreement to be struck between the U.K. and EU on passporting – that is, the facility for financial institutions to provide cross-border services to customers in EU countries – or for some suitable replacement. We discuss the likely shape of such an agreement and its implications below. However, the more important point is that, after Brexit, the U.K. is likely to create an environment for financial institutions that is far more attractive and reflects traditional U.K. instincts to avoid overregulation and to spread economic risks and rewards. Of course, the U.K. will still need to continue those mechanisms that clearly address too-big-to-fail (TBTF) and other matters that arose in the last crisis, in accordance with international standards. However, some of the overly zealous European regulations that came into effect after the credit crunch, which have cumulatively affected return on capital and the ability of banks to perform their functions for the benefit of the economy, could be revisited in the U.K. The U.K. can be adept and swift at deregulating and removing unnecessary red tape, and the U.K. appears already to be considering a lightening of the tax burden.

After the credit crunch, a suite of new financial regulatory measures was introduced, purportedly to address the need to avoid future taxpayer-funded rescue packages, the TBTF issue, systemic risk, and regulatory arbitrage. Before the credit crunch, some countries in Europe had sought to attract business by not rigorously applying rules. Laws and regulations were, in part, a marketing tool. This position was dealt with heavily by the G20 after the credit crunch. A G20-led set of initiatives resulted in a new array of worldwide financial regulation – from derivatives clearing to capital, as well as new concepts (in a global context) such as the liquidity ratio. The Volcker Rule and Vickers/Liikanen reforms were separate initiatives designed for similar ends in terms of reforming bank structures. Legislators have acknowledged that the cumulative impact of this raft of new regulation was unknowable until after the rules were applied. Only now is evidence arising that regulations have in some places gone too far, given the retrenchment of business lines in many banks and consequent effects on competition. Lord Jonathan Hill, the British former commissioner in the European Commission, recently kicked off a process intended to rationalize European financial regulation to some degree – for the first time in financial services in the EU. However, Brexit triggered Hill's resignation and the EU program is now in doubt. An even broader exercise of EU deregulation was proposed in former Prime Minister David Cameron's EU deal of February 2016, which now lies moribund following the Brexit vote. The U.K.'s willingness to deregulate remains, and there is now an opportunity (at least in the U.K.) for a proper reconsideration of whether all of the post-credit-crunch regulation is suitable. The U.K. will have more autonomy in determining the environment it creates for the City of London.

The result won't be a complete bonfire. Post-credit-crunch reforms aimed at regulatory harmonization and mutual recognition of premier regulators are likely to remain. However, measures that don't meaningfully reduce systemic risk, or represent a European addition to international standards, are likely to be up for examination.

THE ONGOING U.K.-EU RELATIONSHIP

Any assessment of the possible new U.K. regulatory framework must be viewed within the context of the ongoing U.K. and EU relationship. For financial services, this requires the U.K. to consider the extent to which it wishes to be able to provide certain services to EU-based customers who don't have places of business in the U.K. This is currently permissible because of passporting.

Various EU laws allow certain banks, brokers, exchanges, fund managers, clearinghouses, and other financial organizations established in the EU to "passport" the cross-border provision of their services into other EU member states without the need for further local regulatory approvals or supervision. Passport rights can also in most cases be exercised by establishing a branch in the other member state, which follows a relatively simple process. Furthermore, passporting does not only apply in the EU. It also applies in the three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) that are part of the European Economic Area (EEA), known as the EEA EFTA States. The EU plus the EEA EFTA States comprise the EEA.

The passporting system was founded in the Treaty on European Union and the EEA Agreement, both providing for the free movement of goods, services, and capital.

These concepts have been developed further by the EU by sector, with a particular recent focus on financial services. Similar passporting regimes apply for securities issuers selling their securities, filing accounts, and making other reports connected with their listings. It's worth noting that, even with a passport, some local law issues will apply, particularly consumer protection laws and some contract laws. The local courts may also have jurisdiction and, particularly (though not exclusively) for consumer matters, they can favor their own consumers. So the passport is not a panacea, but it is a helpful regulatory tool.

The passport was not always available in the EU or its predecessor, the European Community. The primacy of home member-state regulation and the current scope of the passport date from 2007. As a result of the ease of obtaining a regulatory passport, lawyers have not applied themselves in recent times to considering whether services provided are truly cross-border. Before 1995, significant cross-border business took place within the City of London without triggering the laws and regulations of other countries since the main customer base was (and still is) located in the City itself. This happened through European counterparties and customers having branches or affiliates in London or by U.K. entities using applicable exemptions under EU national laws for wholesale business, private placements, and so-called reverse solicitation. The whole point of a financial center is that it is indeed a center, where people benefit from face-to-face, local interactions.

In fact, most of the services that U.K.-based entities provide are not cross-border in law, or could be made so with minor amendments. Deposit-taking, in the U.K.'s view, takes place where the books and records of the bank are located. Phoning or emailing overseas customers needs to be more rigorously considered in determining whether it is truly a cross-border provision of services or whether it is merely marketing or a response to an inquiry (reverse solicitation). In many member states, the passport is only needed to avoid marketing restrictions, not regulatory restrictions, raising the possibility of regulated EU-based subsidiaries providing a more limited marketing service to support U.K. operations and not being responsible for the actual provision of financial services. In summary, many, if not most, of the services provided by UK-based financial markets participants do not trigger the need for an EU passport and the fact that the institutions concerned have such a passport anyway is superfluous to their needs.

CONTINUED U.K.-EU-U.K. ACCESS

For situations where the cross-border services passport has truly been necessary, the U.K. needs to consider possible trade-offs when deciding the extent to which it wishes to continue the current access arrangements for the EU's markets. There are two basic models for continuing access. First, there could be a negotiation of some version of the current passporting arrangements. Second, there could be equivalence-based access that arrives at much the same place. This is because most of the passporting regimes for EU financial institutions coexist with a side-by-side regime for third-country (non-EU) access where the regulatory framework of the third country is determined to have a set of regulations equivalent to those in that sector in Europe. These equivalency-based rights provide for access, particularly wholesale market access, for many businesses, including brokers, fund managers, investment advisers, reinsurers, and other financial entities. Equivalence-based rights operate in a similar fashion to the EU passport in relying on the supervision of the home state regulator.

Most notably, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) II, which comes into effect on January 3, 2018, well before Brexit takes effect, provides for equivalency-based access for EU nonretail investment business. This applies to broker-dealers, investment advisers, portfolio managers, non-bank custodians, and banks' investment businesses, among others. In addition, under MiFID II, U.K. firms can provide wholesale services across Europe once they have established a retail branch in a relevant member state, again subject to certain conditions, including equivalence. This provides flexibility for investment businesses operating from the U.K. It's important to remember that access needs to be two-way. It needs to apply from the U.K. to the EU and back to the U.K. There are more than 70 EU banks in the City of London, many of which operate through branch passports. The passport overrides the policy applied by the Prudential Regulation Authority that banks or investment firms from other countries operating systemically risky or significant businesses in the U.K. need to do so through local subsidiaries. The costs required for U.K. subsidiarization by EU institutions could be substantial, mirroring the significant costs imposed by the intermediate holding company requirement for certain foreign banking organizations with the largest U.S. non-branch operations. The U.K. regulators have indicated that they wouldn't apply these requirements to EU institutions going forward, but that assumes that the EU provides for suitable access for U.K.-based institutions.

Cross-border access from the EU to U.K. markets would currently be governed by the so-called "overseas persons exclusion" that allows all firms, both EU and non-EU, to access the wholesale U.K. markets for cross-border business without local regulation. Firms are merely required to comply with the U.K.'s marketing laws. Just like outbound U.K.-EU business, this arrangement doesn't work well for retail business, which remains very state-based and protectionist across most of Europe. The U.K. will have a policy choice to make as to whether to change its current level of inbound access to mirror any U.K.-EU outbound arrangements or whether to take the view that cross-border business is to be encouraged and not to impose barriers.

THE LIKELY WAY FORWARD

It seems doubtful that an acceptable version of the passporting arrangements is capable of being negotiated, given the importance of sovereignty as an issue in the Brexit referendum. Passporting requires that the U.K. applies identical rules in a similar manner to the EU. Two issues of sovereignty arise. The first issue relates to rule-making. EU financial services laws are currently made through the EU legislative process. If legislation is to be applicable in the U.K., then the U.K. would wish to have a seat at the table, which looks like participation in an EU legislative project of a kind that has been rejected in the referendum. Furthermore, it's difficult to see how the U.K. could be protected from being outvoted. Arrangements had been introduced for dealing with eurozone countries outvoting the U.K. within the existing EU construct. But even if something similar were adopted, this doesn't amount to giving the U.K. a veto over proposed rules.

The U.K. also has a fundamentally different legislative approach and legal tradition compared with many EU countries and the European Commission (EC). The commission, which has sole authority within the EU to propose legislation, has never repealed financial services regulation. It has only added to or re-enacted regulations. The EC's instinct is to make more and more rules. In addition, various European countries take a protectionist approach to rule-making rather than the free market, deregulatory approach favored by the U.K. After the credit crunch, despite the globally agreed upon need for extensive regulation to resolve too-big-to-fail concerns, many would agree that some EU laws have gone too far. The U.K. would not wish to have to persuade others to come along with it on the reformist path, and to be subject to evolving regulation that is likely to be at odds with its freer market wishes.

The second issue of sovereignty relating to passporting arises from the involvement of supranational bodies. The passport necessitates taking an equivalent interpretative approach to the rules. In order to achieve this, the EU has introduced European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which are intended to ensure a consistency of interpretation by national regulators. These agencies don't directly supervise institutions, with the exception of trade repositories. However, they have supranational authority.

The interpretation of EU laws and regulations is also ultimately decided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a body many in the U.K. regard as highly politicized such that legal rigor can be sacrificed, particularly in favor of EU integration. The ECJ has made no positive decisions on "subsidiarity," for instance, which was a concept introduced in part at the behest of the U.K. in 1993 to ensure decisions are taken, where possible, at a member-state level.

It is possible that arrangements could be set up where the U.K. courts were the ultimate arbiter on the meaning of pan-EU rules as applied in the U.K., and the U.K. and European institutions coordinated the application of those rules across the U.K. and Europe together. There could be a joint body of the U.K. and EU established to resolve any differences. However, there are still fundamental issues, in light of the vote, with the U.K. adopting rules coordinated by a supranational body with a view to reflecting some form of combined U.K.-EU set of interpretations – and presumably the same concerns would arise in the EU.

On top of all of this, some in the EU have stated that passporting can't come without freedom of movement for people. It is conceivable that some restriction could be placed on that free movement. For instance, if the U.K. became an EEA EFTA State, it could impose restrictions on immigration in the way that Liechtenstein has done. Whether the other EU and EEA states would accept this and whether any new restrictions would satisfy the U.K. public's concerns over migration is not at all certain.

EQUIVALENCE

As a result of the potential obstacles for maintaining passporting post-Brexit, equivalence-based access requires consideration. This approach involves more work for the U.K. and EU, since it involves a determination on a topic-by-topic basis of how equivalent outcomes might be achieved. There are certain gaps in the coverage of the equivalence regimes that would need to be considered.

Third-country equivalency rights are typically based on three things: the relevant institution being properly supervised in its home country; the legal and regulatory regime, including AML and tax arrangements, of the home country being deemed "equivalent"; and the establishment of cooperation arrangements between the home country and EU states or the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). Some equivalence regimes further require a "member state of reference" to take responsibility for the third-country firm. Countries as culturally and legally diverse as Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, and the U.S. have all been declared equivalent under the regimes for reinsurance and clearinghouses, and their financial institutions in the relevant sectors have access to the EU single market. For some sectors, such as standalone lending or insurance mediation, there is no such equivalence framework yet, but one could be developed based on the existing blueprints.

For the U.K. to fall within equivalency regimes will require cooperation between the U.K. and EU regulators and rule-makers. Regulators know from the credit crunch that harmonized rule-making is essential to manage systemic risks and minimize regulatory arbitrage. The U.K. regulators already work closely with their EU counterparts.

The process of being deemed "equivalent" following Brexit should be reasonably straightforward. There is a fast route and a more negotiated route available. On the fast route, the U.K. would grandfather all existing EU legislation "as is," so the U.K.'s laws would be identical to the EU's, not just equivalent. Going forward, the U.K. could, in dialogue with the EU, gradually move away from current EU laws and develop its own approach. The slower route would involve a more negotiated solution, removing or paring back EU laws that are seen by many to have overreached.

There is much to be said for the slower route. Numerous aspects of financial services regulation are not of systemic importance, and could be done away with without damaging any credible application of equivalence. Examples include the requirement in European Market Infrastructure Regulation for both counterparties to a derivative to report trades; some of the antitrust-driven financial infrastructure access rules in MiFID II, which trespass on the U.K.'s sovereignty to deal with market structure and potentially have negative systemic effects such as the fragmentation of markets; the application of the Basel capital standards to domestic and smaller banks; and the bonus cap, which the U.K. addresses in a different way through longer deferral periods (and which the U.K. even challenged in the ECJ). Further, the Liikanen reforms, which were the EU's answer to the Volcker Rule and the U.K.'s similar Vickers proposals, could be reconsidered in their U.K. application.

Brexit represents a moment for the U.K. to reboot its markets and, in the words of some of its proponents, "take back control." Clearly, in many areas, equivalence discussions will require the U.K. to continue applying the thrust of EU laws. But "equivalent" does not mean "identical." The equivalence route should provide an opportunity for businesses to adopt a more unique approach within the U.K. to regulation and other topics.

In addition, the U.K. could consider establishing financial free zones, such as the one just established in Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi Global Market. Such zones could be carved out of any equivalence discussions and could be purely for local dealings. An even more business-friendly approach could be adopted in the zones, which could, for instance, be set up in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Equivalence determinations can take time if there are material differences to be considered. This, however, is not a position unique to the U.K. All third countries relying on equivalency determinations for third-country passporting will need to take into account those determinations in formulating their own financial regulatory laws. Equivalency determinations have thus far been highly technical matters. For example, equivalency with respect to the United States for derivatives clearing was delayed while a deal was negotiated on the technicalities of different margin calculations arising from two methodologies of calculation, which are now broadly harmonized.

THE PRACTICALITIES

There are those seeking to prevent Brexit completely. There is a challenge before the U.K. courts seeking to require a vote of Parliament prior to the service of the Article 50 notice. This is despite it seeming fairly clear as a constitutional law question that the government may enter into and terminate treaties under its royal prerogative powers. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (the Lisbon Treaty) provides that a state may withdraw from the EU "in accordance with its own constitution." Parliamentary approval will, however, be required for the purposes of amending existing U.K. legislation to implement Brexit.

There is also an issue of which aspects of Article 50 require only a "qualified majority" vote (QMV) – a vote weighted by size of population in each member state – and which aspects default to a requirement for unanimous voting by EU members. Article 50 requires that the EU shall reach an agreement with the departing state "setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union."

The extent to which the future trading relationship must be included within the Article 50 agreement is subject to argument. The agreement that is covered by Article 50 requires a QMV of remaining EU member states to vote in its favor and a majority vote of the European Parliament. It must also be ratified by the U.K. Parliament. This contrasts with the position for new treaties, which require unanimity among member states and in some cases other national referenda. On a plain reading, it would appear that Article 50 is intended to be all-encompassing and for QMV to apply to all aspects. It is difficult to see how the withdrawal arrangements could take into account "the framework for [the U.K.'s] future relationship with the [EU]" unless that framework has been agreed upon as part of the same process.

Finally, unless the U.K. is certain that there will be an adequate transitional arrangement such that businesses can wait until termination has been negotiated before considering their positions, the U.K. should not serve its Article 50 notice at all but should continue current discussions so that there is clarity on the deal.

WHAT TO DO NOW

Although many institutions are sensibly considering contingency plans, there are many reasons to wait and see. Both the U.K. and EU need to come up with a new deal for financial services access that preserves the current access arrangements and potentially relieves (at least in the deregulation-minded U.K.) some of the regulatory burdens currently inflicted upon financial institutions. We expect these outcomes to be achievable. The post- Brexit arrangements present significant opportunities for the rationalization and reduction of some of the heavy-handed effects of separate legislative and regulatory initiatives. There is good reason for financial businesses to be optimistic about the post-Brexit outcome.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Authors
Barnabas W.B. Reynolds
 
In association with
Up-coming Events Search
Tools
Print
Font Size:
Translation
Channels
Mondaq on Twitter
 
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
 
Email Address
Company Name
Password
Confirm Password
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Accounting
 Anti-trust
 Commercial
 Consumer
 Criminal
 Employment
 Energy
 Environment
 Family
 Finance
 Government
 Healthcare
 Immigration
 Insolvency
 Insurance
 International
 IP
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Litigation
 Media & IT
 Privacy
 Real Estate
 Strategy
 Tax
 Technology
 Transport
 Wealth Mgt
Regions
Africa
Asia
Asia Pacific
Australasia
Canada
Caribbean
Europe
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
U.K.
United States
Worldwide Updates
Check to state you have read and
agree to our Terms and Conditions

Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement

Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

Use of www.mondaq.com

You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about Mondaq.com’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.

Disclaimer

Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.

Registration

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to unsubscribe@mondaq.com with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.

Cookies

A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.

Links

This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.

Mail-A-Friend

If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.

Security

This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to webmaster@mondaq.com.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at enquiries@mondaq.com.

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.