United States: FCPA Settlements: It’s A Small World After All

Last Updated: February 15 2009
Article by Raymund Wong and Dr. Patrick Conroy

"...that whole law started on the basis of my going home in the evening in the early '70s and watching the Watergate hearings. And watching at the end of the hearings where certain companies would testify as to making political contributions to Nixon."1

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits the bribery of foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. But its origins are rooted in the investigations of financial contributions related to the Watergate scandal. Recently, the FCPA has entered a new period of increased enforcement by both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ). Recognizing this stepped-up scrutiny, NERA has developed a proprietary database of settlements from 2002 through 2008. This paper examines settlement patterns and the extent of indirect impact in the form of civil litigation.2


Recently, the SEC entered a period of increased enforcement of the FCPA. This Act generally prohibits the bribery of foreign officials and requires that a company retain accurate books and records. As acknowledged by the Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC:

In the past two years we've seen a marked increase in Commission FCPA enforcement. Since January 2006, the Commission has filed more than 30 FCPA actions, which is more than were filed during the prior 28 years combined. We have also seen a significant increase in the sanctions levied in FCPA cases. Since January 2006, the Commission has ordered the payment of more than $200 million in penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest for FCPA violations. The Department of Justice is also very active in this area.3

On 27 March 2008, the DOJ stated, "One of the Department's most potent weapons in combating foreign corruption is the FCPA. Since 2001, the Department has substantially increased its focus on FCPA violations."4

While the SEC and DOJ both regulate enforcement of the FCPA, each plays a specific role:

The Department of Justice is responsible for all criminal enforcement and for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to domestic concerns and foreign companies and nationals. The SEC is responsible for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to issuers.5

With the apparent willingness to devote resources to the enforcement of the FCPA, it is likely that there will be an increase in both DOJ and SEC actions in the coming years. Both domestic and foreign public companies may have to deal with increased scrutiny and potential criminal prosecutions and fines. Some companies may also experience significant costs from indirect exposure to the FCPA through securities class actions arising from financial reporting issues related to FCPA claims.

Overview Of The FCPA

A Short History Of The Act

"The most troublesome problem confronted by the Commission has been that of political contributions and illegal payments overseas."6

In its current form, the FCPA, originally passed in 1977, has three basic provisions7:

  1. The Act requires issuers who register their securities with the SEC to keep detailed books, records, and accounts which accurately record corporate payments and transactions.8
  2. SEC registered issuers must institute and maintain internal accounting control systems to assure management's control, authority, and responsibility over the firm's assets.
  3. Domestic corporations, registered with the SEC or not, are prohibited from bribing a foreign official, a foreign political party, party official, or candidate for the purpose of obtaining or maintaining business.

The origins of the FCPA involve heightened concern over the influence of (illegal) campaign contributions in the Watergate era. Investigations by the SEC found that US companies had routed contributions to support politicians running for office indirectly through bribes to overseas companies or individuals. Stanley Sporkin, former director of the enforcement division at the SEC, addressed this trend in an SEC Historical Society Interview:

So after watching these hearings I remember coming in one day and asking Bob Ryan of the staff, to go out and find out from Gulf Oil how Gulf Oil made these payments and how did they book an illegal payment. And he came back within a day and had the whole case. They had set up two phony subsidiaries they called Bahama x and Bahama y. They put $5 million into each one of them and took the money back to the companies' offices and put it in the safe of the CEO, and that's where the payments came from. And the reason they did it that way is that they capitalized the amount of the slush fund because they didn't want to violate the Internal Revenue laws, which would have happened if they would have expensed those payments.9

The results of the SEC investigations were revealing—over 400 US companies admitted to making questionable or illegal payments in excess of $300 million to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties. This discovery, however, did not lead to a large number of FCPA actions. In fact, there were few formal FCPA investigations or settlements during the years following the FCPA's enactment. During the Reagan administration, FCPA enforcement declined and in 1983 the Wall Street Journal reported that the DOJ had disbanded its multinational fraud branch.10 The SEC settled only six actions between 1977 and 1995.11

Even with limited enforcement, many in the business community complained that the FCPA provisions lacked specificity and had a negative effect on US competitiveness. A statement by the General Accounting Office (GAO) before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 1981 noted that more than 30% of the respondents to a questionnaire (sent to 250 companies in the Fortune 1000) reported lost business due to the FCPA. Many also complained that the Act had created an uneven playing field, giving companies from countries without antibribery restrictions a competitive advantage.12

Whether due to political reasons, legislative uncertainty, or simply the lack of improved computing power and electronic records available today, the investigation and prosecution of FCPA violations to date has not been a high priority. Increased availability and scrutiny of financial data, even from countries with developing financial systems, may make the detection of FCPA violations more likely in the future.

Recently, the SEC announced a move towards international accounting standards beginning in 2014.13 The implementation of such standards may push international regulatory bodies towards a more coordinated antibribery policy. This, coupled with the SEC's move towards international mutual recognition of financial regulation, likely means the SEC and DOJ will not be alone in pursuing such cases.14

Recent FCPA Settlements

Settlement Statistics

To assess the frequency of settlements and the magnitude of penalties, NERA has collected and analyzed information on FCPA settlements from 2002 through 2008. The 10 largest regulatory settlements have ranged from $16 million to $800 million.15 These figures include settlements with the SEC and DOJ.

Exhibit 1: The Top 10 Regulatory Settlements

As shown in Exhibit 1, the top 10 FCPA regulatory settlements included payments to both the SEC and the DOJ. For example, as seen in column (5), Baker Hughes and Willbros Group paid criminal fines to the DOJ totaling $11 million and $22 million, respectively, and in a deferred prosecution agreement, Chevron paid $27 million.

In a number of cases, securities fraud class actions arising from alleged FCPA violations have been filed. Exhibit 2 shows the composition of aggregate payments from 2002 to 2008 to the SEC, DOJ, and class action settlements. Though SEC and DOJ settlements comprise the bulk of the total, settlements related to securities class actions filed in connection with FCPA-related allegations are not insignificant. Further, these results may be skewed by the recent Siemens settlement of $800 million. Without this unusually large case, settlements related to the securities class actions would actually be approximately 21% of the total.

The number of SEC monetary settlements per year has generally increased, with some fluctuation, from 2002 to 2008, as seen in Exhibit 3. Following the trend of settlements over the past five years, and considering recent statements made by the SEC, the total number of settlements going forward may continue to increase.

Exhibit 2: Total FCPA-Related Civil And Regulatory Settlements By Public Companies 2002–2008

Exhibit 3: Total Number Of FCPA SEC Settlements Including A Monetary Component

Exhibit 4: The Median SEC Settlements Of FCPA vs. All Securities Fraud Settlements16

FCPA violations including a monetary settlement tend to be more expensive to settle than the typical securities fraud violations investigated by the SEC that result in a monetary settlement. From 2004-2008, the median for non-zero company SEC settlements related to FCPA violations was higher than the median for non-zero company SEC settlements overall.

The FCPA And Securities Litigation

The direct impact of alleged FCPA violations is limited to penalties and the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. These costs represent a one-time charge to the income statement and may often be relatively small compared to the firm's total value. However, the behavior connected to the alleged FCPA violation can sometimes have a lasting impact on the company's business. A review of recently settled FCPA-related securities class actions demonstrates the link between alleged FCPA violations, ongoing revenue, and the potentially large impact on firm value.17

In the next section, we examine several instances in which FCPA-related investigations by the SEC and/or the DOJ resulted in a significant impact on a company's business.

Case Studies

"...if a corporation has secured a clearly material amount of business by bribing those in control of a country rather than through more conventional means, such as competitive excellence, is this something that is important for investors to know? Might it be argued that such business is more vulnerable, more fragile, and more susceptible to loss than business secured through more customary means?"18

In November 2006, Willbros Group, Inc. ("Willbros") settled with the SEC and DOJ for $32.3 million in disgorgement, fines, and penalties in connection with allegations of bribing foreign officials in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nigeria. However, this amount was small compared to the apparent impact on Willbros' market capitalization following the news of Willbros' potential violation of the FCPA after the market closed on 16 May 2005.19 Willbros' stock price declined by 30.90% to close at $11 on 17 May 2005, representing a $105 million aggregate decline in market capitalization.

A securities class action lawsuit was filed against Willbros in connection with its alleged FCPA violations.20 According to the complaint, 63% of the company's employees were located in Nigeria.21 Company officials were allegedly quoted as saying, "That's Nigeria, of course.

You have to pay bribes to get work," and "You either bribe them or you don't get the job."22 Given Willbros' dependence on revenues from its foreign operations, especially in Nigeria, the fallout from the investigation was substantial. According to the company's 2004 Annual Report, 60% of Willbros' contract revenues resulted from operations in Africa, South America, and the Middle East.23

In the case of FARO Technologies, Inc. ("FARO"), a securities class action lawsuit was filed when the company was accused of overstating sales, understating the cost of goods sold, and concealing its overstatement of profit margins through alleged violations of the FCPA.24 Compared to the $2.95 million settlement paid by FARO to the SEC and the DOJ, the company's $43.4 million loss in market capitalization at the first public announcement of the FCPA-related investigations implies an impact far above disgorgement, fines, and penalties.

On 29 June 2006, in its delayed annual report for 2005, FARO revealed that an internal investigation uncovered "referral fee payments in possible violation of the FCPA [of] $165,000 and $265,000 in 2004 and 2005, respectively, which were recorded in selling expenses in the Company's statement of income." Further, "[t]he related sales to customers to which payment of these referral fees had been made totaled approximately $1.3 million and $3.24 million in 2004 and 2005, respectively."

The alleged bribery-related revenues amounted to 31% and 36% of sales in China in 2004 and 2005, respectively, and sales in China accounted for 4% and 7% of total sales in those years.25

Exhibit 5: FARO Technologies, Inc.

The company acknowledged how the halt in the allegedly illegal activity could affect its business:

Depending on how this matter is resolved, the Company's sales in China could be significantly impacted. The termination of certain personnel and the cessation of improper payments in China may have a significant adverse effect on future operations in China because such action could negatively influence the decisions of a significant number of customers of the Chinese subsidiary to do business with that subsidiary. The potential magnitude of the loss of sales in China as a result of potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cannot be estimated at this time.26

Clearly, the effect of FCPA enforcement may go beyond disgorgement and cease-and-desist orders.

Another striking example of FCPA-related secondary effects can be seen in the case of Titan, Inc. ("Titan"). In mid-2004, a planned merger between Titan and Lockheed Martin Corp. disintegrated as a result of investigations by the DOJ and SEC into Titan's alleged FCPA violations.

The securities class action complaint in the matter alleged that "Titan made millions of dollars of potential illegal bribes or 'suspect payments' as late as 2003 that it failed to disclose and improperly accounted for in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia."27 In addition, there were allegations unrelated to the FCPA of "improper recognition of revenue and the inflation of accounts receivable of about $25-$30 million on a contract with the Benin national telephone company," and a $5 million supercomputer was allegedly gifted to the Saudi Ministry of the Interior.28

On 25 June 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported that, because of Titan's failure to resolve the DOJ investigation related to its foreign activity, the merger with Lockheed Martin "appeared to collapse." In response to this announcement, Titan's equity market capitalization fell by $302 million at the market close on 25 June 2004. Indeed, the next day Lockheed Martin issued a press release announcing the termination of the merger agreement.29

Titan's problems didn't end with the termination of the merger. On 1 July 2004, Moody's reported that it was considering the possibility of downgrading Titan, stating:

Moody's has placed The Titan Corporation ("Titan") on review for possible downgrade to reflect concerns about its reputation and cash flow from the impact of the company's alleged violation of provisions set forth in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Increases in accounts receivable since December 31, 2003 along with other business issues will also be explored during the review. The decision to place the company on review for possible downgrade considers the announcement by Lockheed Martin to terminate its merger with Titan.30

A week later, Titan publicly acknowledged losses associated with its alleged illegal activities in a press release announcing results for the second quarter of 2004. The press release reported net losses expected in the range of $62-$78 million, including an operating loss of $20-$25 million, half of which "pertain[ed] to impairment of fixed assets directly related to the termination of a program by a civilian government agency in the second quarter, and a reduction in scope of planned business activities in Saudi Arabia."31 In addition, the company said it "expect[ed] to record a charge of approximately $11 million, after-tax, pertaining to our discontinued Titan Wireless activities in Benin, Africa." [Emphasis in original]

In connection with these events, Titan lost a merger deal and paid $13 million in fines to the DOJ and over $28 million to the SEC. All told, the company's market capitalization also dropped markedly over this period, from $1.68 billion prior to the first announcement of the investigation, to a low of $934 million shortly after the merger with Lockheed Martin was canceled.32

With the increase in FCPA enforcement over the past few years, we can expect cases like Willbros, FARO, and Titan to become more common. Implicated companies may, of course, pay fines, penalties, and disgorgements.

Market Reaction To FCPA Announcements

"Using financial market data, an event study measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm. The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact that, given rationality in the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices."33

The way the price of a publicly traded security reacts to news is used as both a gauge for the materiality of a company announcement and a measure of the market's view of the financial implications of that announcement.34 A common method in financial economics involves constructing a market model in order to determine the relationship between market and/ or industry movements and a company's stock price. Using this market model, we assess the range of expected stock price movements for the company in question, and determine when stock price movements are out of the ordinary.

Using this methodology, we have analyzed stock price reactions to announcements of an FCPA action by publicly traded companies.35 Exhibit 6 shows the results, ordered by the market-adjusted percentage change in stock price upon the announcement.

Exhibit 6: Market-Adjusted Price Reactions to FCPA-Related News and Announcements

The table indicates that in some instances the implication of an alleged FCPA violation is considered serious by the market, over and above what one might expect given the magnitude of any disgorgements, fines, or penalties paid. For example, when Syncor International Corporation announced to the public that it was investigating suspicious payments in Asia that may have violated the FCPA, its stock price plummeted almost 45% on a market-adjusted basis, implying a loss of $343 million in market capitalization, despite the relative small amount paid in its eventual settlement with the SEC and the DOJ.

Although for most of these companies, there was no statistically significant price reaction, there are a substantial number of companies that experienced negative price reactions that are quite large in light of the relatively small regulatory settlements imposed. The companies with the largest market-adjusted price reactions had resulting 10b-5 actions.36


Our analysis shows that the majority of companies that exhibited statistically significant price reactions at the 5% level to FCPA-related news had resulting 10b-5 actions filed against them. The extent of the fallout from the relatively recent trend of increased FCPA enforcement actions remains uncertain. Given current trends toward globalization, coordinated regulatory scrutiny, and record-keeping requirements of publicly traded companies in the wake of recent market turmoil, enforcement of the FCPA may become a higher priority around the world. And as FCPA-related enforcement against domestic and foreign issuers increases, it is likely that related securities litigation will be an issue in many of these cases.


1. SEC Historical Society Interview with Stanley Sporkin. Conducted on 23 September 2003, by Irving Pollack.

2. The statistics and analyses in this paper focus on settled FCPA actions by the SEC.

3. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Remarks Before the Minority Corporate Counsel 2008 CLE Expo, Speech by SEC Staff. The referenced 30 FCPA actions filed since January 2006 should not be confused with the 33 FCPA settlements with the SEC examined in this paper.

4. Fact Sheet: the Department of Justice Public Corruption Efforts. Department of Justice, 27 March 2008.

5. http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html.

6. PLI Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., December 1975.

7. Congressional Research Service (CRS) report dated 3 March 1999 (http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/Crsfcpa.htm).

8. http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1998/amends/senaterpt.html: "The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers covered under that Act to maintain transparent books and records and provided for civil and criminal penalties."

9. SEC Historical Society Interview with Stanley Sporkin. Conducted on 23 September 2003, by Irving Pollack.

10. In a speech regarding the FCPA before the United Nations in August 1981, US Attorney General William French Smith said that the administration intended to "eliminate the more offensive provisions of our law," including the ban on paying bribes. http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1984/08/reagan.html

11. Of the actions brought in 1986, SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc. was the most important, as it established that shareholders could seek reimbursement for illegal payments made by a company. See "FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977," Shearman & Sterling, LP, 13 February 2008.

12. In a report to Congress in 1981, the GAO recommended that the criminal penalties relating to the accounting provisions of the FCPA be repealed. http://archive.gao.gov/f0102/115367.pdf, http://archive.gao.gov/d46t13/114503.pdf.

13. See Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards from US Issuers, Commissioner Elisse B. Walter, US Securities and Exchange Commission, 27 August 2008.

14. See http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_multilateral.htm and http://www.iosco.org/.

15. To date, the SEC and the DOJ have both imposed fines and/or penalties in such cases. The SEC has also required disgorgement of allegedly ill-gotten gains.

16. Preliminary NERA data. Final data forthcoming on www.securtieslitigationtrends.com.

17. This is not to say that an alleged FCPA violation will always significantly impact a company's business. However, depending on the circumstances, the impact on a company's business can and sometimes does dwarf any regulatory settlement imposed.

18. PLI Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., December 1975.

19. "Willbros Updates Status Of Audit Committee Investigation," Dow Jones News Service, 16 May 2005, 5:25pm EST. This news story also includes other negative disclosures that may have impacted Willbros' stock price.

20. The securities class action lawsuit was eventually settled for $10.5 million. See http://securities.stanford.edu/1034/WG05_01/.

21. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint In Re Willbros Group, Inc. Securities Litigation. Master File No. 05-CV-1778. Southern District Texas, Houston Division, 9 January 2006, page 17.

22. Ibid, page 30.

23. Ibid, page 2.

24. Consolidated Second Amended Class Action Complaint.In Re FARO Technologies Inc. Securities Litigation. Civil Action No. 6:05-cv-1810-ACC-DAB. Middle District of Florida, 22 February 2007, page 21. The lawsuit was eventually settled for $6.875 million. See http://securities.stanford.edu/1035/FARO05_01/.

25. Ibid, page 92.

26. Ibid, page 93.

27. Class Action Consolidated Complaint In Re Titan, Inc. Securities Litigation. Master File No. 04-CV-0676-LAB(NLS). Southern District of California, 17 September 2004, page 19.

28. Ibid, page 23-27.

29. Ibid, page 54.

30. Ibid, page 56.

31. Ibid, page 58-59.

32. The securities class action litigation was eventually settled for approximately $60 million. See http://securities.stanford.edu/1030/TTN04-01/.

33. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," MacKinlay, A. Craig, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXV (March 1997), pp. 13-39.

34. For securities class action litigation, event studies are commonly used to assess the materiality of price movements related to fraud allegations.

35. The market model analysis employed here involves measuring the relationship between the stock price movements of each company against the S&P 500 Index prior to the first apparent announcement of FCPA-related allegations. This model is then used to assess the statistical significance of the market-adjusted price movements on the day of this FCPA-related announcement. The use of a different market index or news event dates may yield different results.

36. Titan, discussed above, had a statistically significant price reaction following the canceled merger announcement rather than on the date of the first FCPA-related announcement. The market-adjusted price reaction after this announcement was about -30%, and it too had a resulting securities class action.


The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on Mondaq.com.

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

In association with
Related Video
Up-coming Events Search
Font Size:
Mondaq on Twitter
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
Email Address
Company Name
Confirm Password
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Media & IT
 Real Estate
 Wealth Mgt
Asia Pacific
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Worldwide Updates
Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:
  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.
  • Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.
    If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here
    If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq you may opt out by clicking here

    Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement

    Mondaq.com (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

    Use of www.mondaq.com

    You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about Mondaq.com’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.


    Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

    The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.


    Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

    • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
    • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
    • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

    Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

    Information Collection and Use

    We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

    We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to unsubscribe@mondaq.com with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

    Mondaq News Alerts

    In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.


    A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

    Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

    Log Files

    We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.


    This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

    Surveys & Contests

    From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.


    If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.


    From time to time Mondaq may send you emails promoting Mondaq services including new services. You may opt out of receiving such emails by clicking below.

    *** If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of services offered by Mondaq you may opt out by clicking here .


    This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to webmaster@mondaq.com.

    Correcting/Updating Personal Information

    If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

    Notification of Changes

    If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

    How to contact Mondaq

    You can contact us with comments or queries at enquiries@mondaq.com.

    If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.

    By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions