The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s grant of a summary judgment motion of non-infringement. The Court agreed with the district court that the exception to the "ordinary meaning" claim construction rule applied because the patentee explicitly assigned a special meaning to the claim term "interrupt," a meaning not consistent with everyday use. Using the patentee’s supplied meaning, there was no infringement. Boss Ctrl Inc. v Bombardier, Inc., Case Nos. 04-1437, -1438, -1471 (Fed. Cir., Jun. 8, 2005) (S. Prost, C.J.). The Court declined to consider infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because the defendant never presented that issue to the district court.

Boss is the owner of a patent that relates to a security power interrupt apparatus that prevents the unauthorized use of an electrically operated device. The invention disclosed differs from the prior art in that it is not simply an "on-off" device but instead uses an interrupt mode to selectively provide power to auxiliary equipment. When in the interrupt mode, the device is not completely shut off until and unless a preset electrical current is exceeded; for example, by turning on a component that draws a high current. Accused devices included snowmobiles and personal watercraft.

The dispute focused on the following language: "…wherein said controller is operative to interrupt power to the load responsive to said code-providing device being operatively disconnected from said controller." Boss contended that the district court erred in construing the limitation, and the term "interrupt" should have been given its plain and ordinary meaning of "to break off" or "to shut or cut off." Bombardier responded by arguing the inventors gave a special meaning to the term "interrupt" that does not involve a simple "on-off" control of electrical power. The Federal Circuit, citing to the specification, agreed with Bombardier, stating that "the specification…clearly gave the term ‘interrupt’ a special definition":

In the context of the invention, interruption of power to an electrical device involves two stages: a first stage in which auxiliary functions remain operational so long as a combined current draw is less than a current threshold, and a second stage in which power to the device is completely disconnected in response to the current threshold being exceeded.

Thus, the district court found that the intrinsic evidence bound Boss to a definition that was narrower than the plain meaning of the claim term.

The Federal Circuit also agreed with the district court that Bombardier did not literally infringe because the accused devices did not use the claimed two-stage interrupt mode. Rather, in both accused devices, electrical current was completely shut off to the engine at the time of disconnection, and no interrupt mode using a threshold current was employed. Although power continued to be supplied to auxiliary lights and gauges in the case of the personal watercraft, it did not depend on current levels.

Boss also argued that the district court committed reversible error by not analyzing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit again sided with the district court, noting that as Boss had failed to address the equivalents issue in its complaint or in its two summary judgment briefs, it waived the issue.

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