United States: Manipulation Of A Product´s Inherent Nature May Create Claim Beyond Immunity Statue

Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. August 5, 2002, 28 Cal.4th 856

Plaintiff, Edwin Brigham smoked cigarettes from 1950 until 1996, when he was diagnosed with lung cancer. He sued defendants, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation seeking personal injury damages on theories of negligence, product liability, and fraud. Defendants demurred, citing an immunity statute as a bar to all of plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer but granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.

When defendants thereafter demurred to plaintiff's first amended complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed plaintiff's lawsuit against defendants. On plaintiff's appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Thereafter, the California Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition for review.

At issue was what types or categories of conduct by tobacco companies fell within the immunity given to them by an immunity statute, which was in effect from January 1, 1988, until December 31, 1997. The statute specified that the immunity given to manufacturers and sellers of specified inherently unsafe products, including tobacco, applied in product liability actions. (Former § 1714.45, subd. (a), Stats, 1987, ch. 1498.)

The California Supreme Court held that under the immunity statute's broad definition of product liability lawsuits, it makes no difference whether a claim seeking damages for personal injury or death is labeled as one for negligence, manufacturer of an inherently unsafe product, or fraud. However, the Court held that the statutory immunity does not shield a tobacco company from product liability for injuries of deaths to consumers of its products caused by something not inherent in the product itself. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants had manipulated the addictive effects of cigarettes via additives and by adding ammonia. Thus, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in granting Defendants' demurrer.

Additionally, the California Supreme Court noted that the California immunity statute only governed Defendants' conduct from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1997. Thus, the immunity statute provides no protection to tobacco companies for conduct that occurred before the statute's 10-year period of immunity. Plaintiff alleged that he had smoked cigarettes since 1950, thus, the Immunity Statute did not shield Plaintiff's entire complaint.