First, in McEachern v. Budnick, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 511
(April 2, 2012), the Appeals Court addressed the question of what
constitutes valid "delivery" of a trust amendment to make
it effective.
In the revocable trust instrument, the grantor, who was also the
sole trustee, expressly excluded her son as a beneficiary. In two
subsequent amendments, the grantor added language by which certain
real property was to be distributed to her son upon her death. Upon
executing these amendments, however, the grantor retained the
originals in her possession, telling her lawyer that she wanted to
hold them until she decided whether she actually wanted to provide
anything for her son.
After the grantor's death, her daughter, the successor trustee,
brought an action to evict the son from the real property. He
argued in opposition that he is the rightful owner pursuant to the
trust amendments. The Superior Court agreed, granting summary
judgment in his favor and holding that the trust amendments were
effective when executed because the grantor was also the sole
trustee, and so delivery was automatic.
The Appeals Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to
determine the grantor's intent. In so doing, the Court
explained that delivery means more than physical transfer of
possession. "Under Massachusetts law, delivery of a written
instrument amending a
trust ... is principally a question of intent."
Second, in Bank of America v. Center for Human
Development, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (April 9, 2012), a
decision issued pursuant to Rule 1:28, the trustee of a
testamentary trust sought instructions as to whether the share of
trust income paid to the Child and Family Service of Pioneer Valley
("CFS") should continue to be paid to its successor by
merger, or alternatively to the remaining charitable beneficiaries
designated in the trust. The probate court ruled that as a result
of the merger, CFS ceased to exist within the meaning of the trust
and ordered its share of the trust income to be divided amongst the
remaining designated charities. The Appeals Court vacated and
remanded the probate court's judgment, explaining that there
was insufficient evidence to establish whether CFS ceased to exist
as a result of the merger. The Court noted that the objecting
party, the Young Women's Christian Association of Western
Massachusetts, had not filed a brief in support of its position,
and that the Attorney General had not made its position
known.
Third, in Lombardi v. Director of the Office of Medicaid,
Case No. 11-P-1208, 2012 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 479 (April 17,
2012), another decision issued pursuant to Rule 1:28, the Appeals
Court affirmed a determination of an applicant's ineligibility
for long-term care benefits. The question presented was whether
MassHealth could consider a court-approved transfer of assets,
pursuant to a court-approved estate plan, in determining
eligibility for benefits. The Court rejected the applicant's
argument that a probate court can insulate asset transfers from
being considered.
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