In Eweida and others v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37, the four claimants brought claims against the UK government in the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that UK law fails to adequately protect employees' rights to manifest their religious beliefs, as set out in the European Convention on Human Rights.
They had originally brought tribunal claims against their respective employers under the Religion or Belief Regulations, arguing that their employers' policies discriminated against them on the grounds of their religious beliefs. When these claims were unsuccessful, they challenged the UK government in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Ms Eweida, who worked for British Airways (BA) as a check-in assistant, and Mrs Chaplin, a clinical nurse, both wanted to wear a silver cross to work as an expression of their faith. However, their employers refused to allow them to do so because it was contrary to their strict uniform policies.
The Tribunal, the EAT and the Court of Appeal all rejected their claims of indirect discrimination against their employers. In Ms Eweida's case the UK courts held that BA's actions were justified as there was a legitimate aim behind their uniform policy: retaining a particular corporate image. In Ms Chaplin's case, the employer's uniform policy could be objectively justified as it pursued the important legitimate aim of protecting the health and safety of staff and patients.
In the ECtHR, the court found that the claimants did not need to show that the act in question was a requirement of their particular religion, in order for a claim to succeed. Wearing a cross was a manifestation of the claimants' religious beliefs and attracted the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights. The employers' refusal to allow the Claimants to wear crosses interfered with that right. It was therefore a question of whether that interference was justified.
The ECtHR held that in Ms Eweida's case, while BA's wish to project a certain corporate image was a legitimate aim, the Court of Appeal had accorded it too much weight in deciding that the uniform policy was objectively justified. There was no evidence that other employees wearing authorised religious clothing, such as turbans and hijabs, had any negative impact on BA's brand or image. The fact that BA subsequently allowed visible religious jewellery to be worn demonstrated that the previous ban was not crucially important. Therefore, as there was no evidence of any real encroachment on the interests of others, the ECtHR held that the UK had failed to sufficiently protect Ms Eweida's right to manifest her religion.
However, it rejected Mrs Chaplin's claim. Whilst her employer's refusal to allow her to wear a cross was an interference with her right to freedom of religion, the reason for the restriction on jewellery was to protect her health and safety and that of her patients, which had a much greater importance than the justification given in Ms Ewieda's case and was therefore justifiable.
Comment: Employers should be careful to ensure their actions are are a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, when actions encroach on employees' religious beliefs. Matters such as health and safety will usually constitute sufficient justification to warrant the encroachment, but less weighty reasons, such as "protecting a corporate image" may be more difficult to justify, especially where the employer allows exceptions to its policies and procedures for other employees in comparable circumstances.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
