Hobin was injured in a motor vehicle accident on March 22, 2012,
where the at-fault driver (Shaw) was driving a truck owned by the
Defendant Enterprise Rent-A-Car ("Enterpise"). At
the time, Hobin was on the job and a "worker" within the
meaning of s. 22 of the Worker's Compensation Act, RSA
2000, cW-15. Shaw was also on the job and a "worker"
whose employer was an "employer" covered by the
Worker's Compensation Act. Section 23 of the
Worker's Compensation Act prevented Hobin from
bringing a claim against either Shaw or Shaw's employer.
However, he was not precluded from bringing a claim against the
owner of the vehicle Enterprise Rent-A-Car for being vicariously
liable for Shaw's negligence. Enterprise was a
"renter" within the meaning of the Traffic Safety
Act, R.S.A 2000, c.T-6 s. 187(0.1)(c.1).
Hobin received compensation for his injuries from the Worker's
Compensation Board under the Worker's Compensation
Act.
Enterprise argued that its liability to Hobin ought to be reduced
with respect to any amounts of benefits he was paid from by the WCB
pursuant to s. 187(2.1) of the Traffic Safety Act which
provides as follows:
(2.1) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Division
except subsections (5) and (6), in an action for the recovery of
loss or damage sustained by a person by reason of a motor vehicle
on a highway, the maximum amount for which a lender, lessor, renter
or seller of the motor vehicle is liable in respect of the same
incident in its capacity as a lender, lessor, renter or seller of
the motor vehicle is the amount determined under subsection (4)
less any amounts that:
- are recovered for loss or damage
under the third party liability provisions of contracts evidenced
by a motor vehicle liability policy issued to a person other than a
lender, lessor, renter or seller,
- are in respect of the use or
operation of the motor vehicle, and
- are in respect of the same
incident.
The WCB benefits were "compensation costs" within the
meaning of s. 22(1) of the Workers Compensation Act.
Section 22(5) provides that an action vested in the WCB in the name
of the injured worker for the value of compensation costs. With
respect to proceeds of settlement or judgment from such an action,
s. 22.1(11) provides that payment of "compensation costs"
was to be distributed in priority to payment of the balance of any
judgment or settlement to the injured worker:
(11) All proceeds of settlement or judgment resulting from an
action, including any costs and disbursements recovered, shall be
paid to the Board or its designate and shall be distributed in the
following order:
...
- payment of any compensation
costs;
- payment of the balance, if any, to
the claimant.
Enterprise applied for a decision on an issue in advance of
trial, i.e. as to whether or not its liability and damages
to Hobin should be reduced for any amounts received by him from the
WCB pursuant to s. 187(2.1) of the Traffic Safety Act.
Enterprise argued that the provisions of s. 187(2.1) should be read
disjunctively such that Enterprise's liability as a
"renter" of the at-fault vehicle could be reduced by any
one of the three items listed in section 187(2.1)(a) –
(c).
The Plaintiff argued that those three factors should be interpreted
conjunctively, i.e. that a deduction from Enterprise's
liability as a "renter" would only be justified where all
three factors were met.
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II. HELD: For the
Plaintiff; application dismissed.
- The Court summarized the applicable
principles of statutory interpretation.
- In general, the Court noted as
follows:
[19] Section 10 of the Interpretation Act,
RSA 2000, c I-8, directs that an enactment shall be construed as
being remedial, and shall be given the fair, large and liberal
construction and interpretation that best ensures the attainment of
its objects. The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that
statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the
legislation alone. The words of an Act must be read in their entire
context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously
with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the
intention of Parliament. The legislature does not intend to produce
absurd, ridiculous or frivolous consequences or consequences that
are extremely unreasonable or inequitable, illogical or incoherent,
or incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the
legislative enactment or that defeat the purpose of a statute or
render some aspect of it pointless or futile:
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, Re, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27,
[1998] SCJ No 2 at paras 21 and 27.
[20] In McDonald v McDonald,
1998 ABCA 241 (CanLII), [1998] AJ No
802 at paras 24-27, the Court held that the context of an enactment
includes the legal environment of the provision, the other
provisions of the statute and related statutes, the circumstances
which led to the enactment, the aim and purpose of the legislature,
the legislator's value system and linguistic habits.
[21] This Court noted in Continental Stress
Relieving Services Ltd v Stang (1991) 115 AR 90,
[1991] AJ No 191 (QB) that courts should not expand or extend the
social policy formulations of the legislature. As outlined by
Master Smart in 1597130 Alberta Ltd v Condominium Corp
No 1023241, 2016 ABQB 195 (CanLII), [2016] AJ No
315 at para 16, there are also a number of presumptions that apply
when interpreting any statute:
- The legislature is a competent and
careful user of language and skillful crafter;
- Legislatures use simple,
straightforward and concise language;
- The legislature avoids superfluous or
meaningless words and does not repeat itself or speak in vain;
and
- The legislature uses language
carefully and consistently so that the same words have the same
meaning and different words have different meanings.
- In particular, with respect to the
use of the word "and" between clauses, the Court
concluded that this generally meant that the clauses should be read
conjunctively but this was not mandatory:
[22] The use of the word "and" between
clauses should generally be read conjunctively, but this
interpretation is not mandatory. Moshansky J. in
Austin v Omand,
2002 ABQB [415] at paras 48-50 cited R Sullivan,
Statutory Interpretation (Irwin Law:
Concord, Ontario, 1997) and S Edgar, Craies on Statute
Law, 7th ed (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1971).
According to those authorities, the word "and" is always
conjunctive in the sense that it signals the cumulation of the
possibilities listed before and after it. However, "and"
is ambiguous in that it may be intended to mean either joint or
joint and several. In the case of a joint "and," every
listed possibility is necessarily included. In the case where
"and" is joint and several, all the possibilities may,
but need not, be included. The determination of which meaning is
appropriate depends on the context. Where "and" is used
before the final item in a list of powers, for example, it is
normally joint and several. In most legislation, "and" is
joint rather than joint and several. Where the idea of
"and/or" is intended, typically the inclusive
"or" is used. The legal and the grammatical meaning of a
statute must be determined. Where the grammatical construction is
clear, then that construction should be employed unless there is
some strong reason to the contrary such that the apparent
grammatical construction cannot be the true one.
- The Court held that the amendments to
the Traffic Safety Act and Insurance Act of 2009,
including the introduction of s. 187(2.1) into the Traffic
Safety Act, were intended to cap the liability of lenders,
renters and lessors to $1 million and to make insurers of persons
renting or leasing the vehicles the first loss payors, changing the
situation previously whereby the renters/lessors/lenders policy was
the first loss payor, and nothing more. It was not intended to add
additional reductions in liability to the lenders, lessors and
renters:
[27] In my view, the proper interpretation of the
provisions in question is informed by the larger legislative
context. The operation of s. 187(2.1), if interpreted disjunctively
as suggested by the Applicant, would reduce a renter's
liability by the Benefits paid to or on behalf of a claimant under
the WCA. Such Benefits are defined as "compensation
costs" in the WCA. Section 22(11) provides for the order of
distribution of all the proceeds of settlement or judgment
resulting from an action that are paid to the WCB. Those proceeds
would be lowered or reduced by the Benefits deducted. Section
22(11)(f) provides that payment of any compensation costs (or the
Benefits) is to be in priority to payment of the balance, if any,
to the claimant. In this manner, the Benefits can be deducted twice
from the balance of all proceeds of settlement or judgment
available to the claimant. In my view, there is nothing to suggest
that this outcome was intended by the legislature in enacting s.
187(2.1) and indeed it would appear to be unduly punitive to
claimants.
[28] The amendments to the Insurance Act and the
TSA which came into force on March 1, 2011 changed the priority in
terms of which motor vehicle liability policy is responsible for
the payment of damages caused by the operation of these vehicles,
such that insurers of persons renting or leasing vehicles became
the first loss payors in responding to a claim, prior to looking to
the insurer of the lender, lessor, renter or seller of the motor
vehicle covering the same peril. The amendments also capped the
vicarious liability of owners of leased, rented, conditionally sold
or financed vehicles to a $1 million limit when their vehicles are
operated by a lessee, rentee, buyer or other driver. An exemption
exists where there was a non-arm's length relationship with the
day-to-day operator of the vehicle.
[29] The amendments to s. 187(2.1) address the priority
of insurance; I am not satisfied that the intent of the section was
to do more than this. Specifically, I am not satisfied that the
intent of the section was to add additional reductions in liability
available to lenders, lessors, renters or sellers beyond the
deduction of payments made under third party liability by another
motor vehicle liability insurer. This interpretation coincides with
the ordinary grammatical use of the conjunctive "and."
Had the legislature sought to specifically reduce liability in the
way suggested by the Applicant, it would not have been difficult to
draft the provision so as to make this clear.
[30] This conclusion is bolstered by the difficulties
posed by the alternative proposed interpretation. Clearly, for
benefits to be deducted, they must always arise out of the same
incident. Furthermore, all motor vehicle liability policies require
use and operation to trigger third party liability coverage in all
cases. Such qualifications may state the obvious, but the
provisions are absurd and ridiculous standing on their own.
[31] The interpretation proposed by the Applicant would
allow lenders, lessors, renters or sellers to deduct amounts in
respect of the use or operation of the motor vehicle and/or amounts
in respect of the same incident, without qualification. Such an
overly broad opportunity to reduce liability could not have been
intended. The only rational and logical interpretation of section
187 (2.1) is that the three items noted in s. 187(2.1) are to be
read conjunctively, as a joint list, consistent with the
grammatical construction of the provision.
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