Canada: Court Of Appeal Summaries (June 20-24, 2016)

Last Updated: July 5 2016
Article by John Polyzogopoulos

Topics covered this week included family law, municipal law, contractual interpretation, reasonable apprehension of bias, and costs against a lawyer personally. Perhaps the most notable decision of the week is the short endorsement in Grant v Equifax Canada regarding credit scores. The Court of Appeal confirmed in that case that you cannot compel a credit bureau to remove reference in your credit score to debts that are more than two years old for which no claim has been brought. The next time a client calls you to complain about their credit score and for help to get the agencies to change the contents of their report on your client, have a look at the Consumer Reporting Act. That Act governs the conduct of credit bureaus and provides some rights to consumers regarding access to, and the content of, their credit scores, including a complaint mechanism for those who feel aggrieved by inaccurate information.


Beard Winter LLP v Shekhdar, 2016 ONCA 493

[Doherty J.A.(In Chambers)]

Counsel: No one appearing for the defendant (moving party)

Gavin Tighe and Robert Winterstein, for the plaintiff (Responding Party)

Keywords: Endorsement, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias


The motion was for an extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court. The moving party argued that the presiding judge should not sit on this motion. The presiding judge had sat in on two prior panels involving the moving party. The moving party alleged that the reasons of that panel for dismissing the appeal were so incorrect and only explainable by "racism, corruption, and/or criminal case fixing." The moving party also alleged that the presiding judge's tone in delivering the reasons of those panels was "scowling visage." The moving party claims that the judge has demonstrated bias to anyone who is not a "white Canadian."


  • Should the Judge recuse himself?
  • Should the extension be granted?


Motion Dismissed.


  • Justice must be administered impartially. A judge must remove himself if there is an air of reality to a bias claim. Judges, however, do the administration of justice a disservice by yielding to entirely unreasonable and unsubstantiated recusal demands. A reasonably objective observer would give no weight to the claims of partiality advanced by the moving party. The decisions cited were made unanimously by a three judge panel and were not appealed. A reasonably objective observer would also take into account the fact that this same party has made many such allegations before.
  • If there is no realistic chance of obtaining leave, it would be a waste of time to grant an extension. The merits of the argument are dubious at best and the issue raised by the moving party has no significance beyond this case. Further, the respondent has been faced with a "never-ending stream of vexatious motions and appeals" and has suffered ongoing prejudice because of the manner in which the moving party has conducted litigation.

Hersey v. Hersey, 2016 ONCA 494

[Cronk, Blair and MacFarland JJ.A.]


  1. Tait and R. Alves, for the appellant
  2. Siegel, for the respondent

Keywords: Family Law, Spousal Support Variation, Natural Justice, Sufficiency of Reasons


The parties were married in 1986 and separated either in January 2004 or April 2005. The appellant is 61 and the respondent is 64. In April, 2015 the respondent brought a motion seeking a reduction in the child support order because their son would be attending university in the fall. The appellant agreed to that change and then commenced her own motion for increased retroactive and prospective spousal support. The appellant's motion was heard in December, 2015. The motion judge determined that the appellant was not entitled to increased spousal support. The appellant appeals the dismissal of her claim for increased retroactive and prospective spousal support on the basis of the respondent's post-separation income increased and the fact that she is medically unable to work full-time.


(1) Did the motions judge fail to provide sufficient reasons, or fail to apply appropriate legal principles in denying the appellant's motion to vary spousal support payments?

Holdings: Appeal dismissed.


No. The law does not require that a motion judge deal with every piece of evidence before her and every argument made. It will be sufficient if the reasons tell the parties what the judge decided and why. While the reasons here could have been more fulsome and it would have been preferable had the motion judge specifically referenced ss. 15.3(3) and 17 of the Divorce Act, we are satisfied on reading her reasons as a whole, that she did implicitly consider those provisions. It would have been helpful to the parties and to this court if the motions judge had more clearly defined her findings in relation to the claims made. That said, the court was satisfied that reading her reasons as a whole in the context of the record, the parties know what she decided and why. Her reasoning is not so deficient that the parties are unable to know why the judge reached the conclusions she did

Best v. Ranking, 2016 ONCA 492

[Blair, Pardu and Brown JJ.A.]

Counsel: Paul J. Pape and Justin H. Nasseri, for the appellant,

Paul Slansky Mark Polley and Eric Brousseau, for the respondents

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Costs, Payable by Solicitor, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 57.07, Abuse of Process


Paul Slansky, counsel for the Plaintiff, appealed an order the he pay costs in the amount of $84,000 on a joint and several basis with his client. Mr. Best was found in contempt of court for failing to pay costs arising from a previous motion. Seeking to purge the contempt, Mr. Best swore an affidavit alleging perjury, fraud, and obstruction of justice by the opposing parties and their counsel. He retained Mr. Slansky at that stage, again seeking to appeal the finding of contempt. In his appeal, Mr. Best (through Mr. Slansky) maintained accusations of corruption and impropriety on the part of opposing counsel. The motion judge held that the repetition of these accusations, which had already been rejected in court, justified awarding costs against Mr. Best on a full indemnity scale. The Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Best`s attempt to review this decision and ordered him to pay the costs, failing which his entire action would be dismissed. He failed to pay these costs and his action was dismissed.

On behalf of his client, Mr. Best, Mr. Slansky commenced a new action, alleging intentional torts committed during the contempt proceedings by 39 defendants, and reiterating the accusations of corruption and impropriety. Counsel for the respondents informed Mr. Slansky that they intended to contest jurisdiction and would therefore not be filing a defence. Respondent`s counsel requested that Mr. Slansky not note their clients in default. This letter also noted that a motion to strike the claim was being brought by other defendants, and respondent`s counsel requested that the jurisdiction motion be deferred until the motion to strike was heard. Mr. Slansky did not agree to the deferral, and subsequently noted the respondents in default in the interim. At a case conference Mr. Slansky refused to agree to set aside the noting in default. Mr. Slansky eventually consented to an order setting aside the default judgment four days before the motion to set aside the noting in default was to be argued. Motion materials had already been exchanged. Counsel for the respondents informed Mr. Slansky that they were considering seeking costs against him personally. At a hearing to determine the costs of an examination motion and the motion to set aside the noting in default, the judge ordered that Mr. Best pay further costs as his actions had resulted in unnecessary and costly motions. Mr. Best sought leave to appeal these costs, which was denied. Upon learning that Mr. Best sought leave to appeal, respondent`s counsel again wrote to Mr. Slansky to inform him that they were considering seeking costs against him personally. The action was dismissed as an abuse of process lacking any merit. Costs were ordered against Mr. Best on a full indemnity basis. An appeal of this ruling was dismissed for failure to provide security for costs.

The respondents moved for an order under rule 57.07, seeking to hold Mr. Slansky jointly and severally liable for the costs incurred during the second action. Mr. Slansky was held jointly and severally liable with Mr. Best for all costs awarded in the respondents' favour in the second action, which amounted to $160,000. The arguments advanced in support of the motion emphasized the unreasonable procedural steps taken by Mr. Slanksy and Mr. Best.


(1) Did the appellant have reasonable notice and the opportunity to advance arguments concerning whether the second action lacked merit and should not have been brought?

(2) Does a lawyer become liable to pay costs personally because he starts an action that has little chance of success?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.


(1) Yes. Mr. Slansky had adequate notice that the merits of the second action would be a component of the rule 57.07 motion. It was open to the motion judge to conclude that it was a waste of expense to force the respondents to contest jurisdiction instead of postponing that motion until the motion to strike was resolved. It was also open to her to conclude that Mr. Slansky could offer no justification for this approach, even if instructed by Mr. Best to proceed in that fashion

(2) No. Mr. Slansky was required to pay costs because of the course of the litigation and the procedures that he followed, not because of the strength of his client's claim. In bringing the second action, Mr. Slansky repeated accusations of criminal misconduct against opposing counsel that had repeatedly been rejected as baseless. Deference is owed to a motion judge's decision as to whether a lawyer should pay costs personally. It was open to the motion judge to determine that the action was baseless.

798839 Ontario Limited v. Platt, 2016 ONCA 488

[Strathy C.J.O., Blair and Lauwers JJ.A.]


Paul J. Pape and Joanna L. Nairn, for the appellant

Robert Isles and R. Donald Rollo, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp.


This appeal is the culmination of a long-standing litigious war of attrition between Mr. Hanemaayer and Mr. Platt. The conflict began more than a quarter of a century ago and stems from a mining deal made between the two men and their respective corporations in 1988. This part of the conflict concerns an option agreement in respect of certain mining rights (known as the 'Kipling Claims') between Mr. Platt and the appellants.

The 'Kipling Claims' were thought to contain valuable deposits of the mineral 'kaolin'. Mr. Platt's company, James Bay Kaolin Corporation ("James Bay"), agreed with the other parties ("investors") to carry out the necessary exploration development of the Claims in order to prove or disprove the existence and extent of the kaolin ore body and then to facilitate a feasibility study for a full production operation. By the time the relationship between the Hanemaayer and Platt interests broke down in 1989, the investors had advanced $10.8 million to the exploration and development of the Kipling Claims through 798 Ontario. $1.2 million was ultimately returned to Mr. Hanemaayer and used for other purposes.

At trial, the appellants, Hanemaayer and 798 Ontario, argued that the Option Agreement transferred title and ownership of the Kipling Claims to them completely. They further argued that the agreement placed Mr. Platt in the position of 'trustee', that he misused the funds in this role, and that the investors were consequently entitled to several millions of dollars in 'credits' as a result. The trial judge disagreed with these submissions and held that Mr. Hanemaayer and 798 Ontario had no interest in the Kipling Claims, and that in accordance with the Option Agreement (dated November 1, 1988), ownership and title shall revert and be restored to Platt.


Did the trial judge err in interpreting the Option Agreement to include an automatic reversion of the Kipling Claims to Platt in the event that development of the project was not fully funded?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.


No. The court found that the appellants did not comply with the conditions underpinning the option and therefore Mr. Platt remains entitled to the Kipling Claims. The trial judge properly held that in interpreting a commercial contract the court must give effect to the intention of the parties as derived from the words they have used, in the context of the contract as a harmonious whole and the factual matrix in which it was entered into. The wording of the Option Agreement makes it clear: (i) that the Optionee (798 Ontario) would only "earn a 100% interest in the said mining claims" by fulfilling its obligations, over a period not exceeding five years, to finance and carry out the required exploration, development and testing work". The trial judge did not fail to give effect to the plain wording of the agreement or misapprehend the evidence in respect of it.

Wpd Sumac Ridge Wind Incorporate v. Kawartha Lakes (City), 2016 ONCA 496

[Rouleau, Epstein and Benotto JJ.A.]


Clifford I. Cole and Konstantine Stavrakos, for the appellant

Andrew Faith, Andrew Max and Emma Carver, for the respondent

Keywords: Municipal Law, Municipal Act, s. 14, Environmental Law, Environmental Protection Act, Green Energy and Green Economy Act, Wind Turbines, Doctrine of Paramountcy, Frustration of Purpose, Croplife Canada v. Toronto (City), Alberta (Attorney General) v. Moloney


Sumac Ridge ("Sumac") initiated a renewable energy project to build, operate and retire five industrial wind turbines in the City of Kawartha Lakes (the "City"). As required by the Environment Protection Act (the "EPA"), Sumac applied to the Ministry of the Environment for a Renewable Energy Approval (the "Approval") authorizing the project. Sumac proposed to locate the facility on privately owned lands, but planned to build its main access road on an unopened municipal road allowance, Wild Turkey Road. The proposal contemplated widening an unopened portion of the road by one metre and levelling its surface to allow for the delivery of the wind turbines. Sumac undertook to pay for the upgrading, operation and retiring of the road. Sumac took steps beyond the consultation required by the regulation to engage the City in the approval process. The City voiced no concerns at the time, however, outside of the Renewable Energy Approval process it made it clear that it opposed wind turbine projects.

The MOE issued a Renewable Energy Approval to Sumac Ridge on December 11, 2013. The City advised Sumac that a Municipal Class Environmental Assessment, a planning study not mandated by the Renewable Energy Approval process, would have to be prepared for the proposed use of Wild Turkey Road. Sumac agreed to undertake the study at its own expense. The Municipal Class Environmental Assessment (the "Assessment") determined the option of using Wild Turkey Road in the Approval as receiving the best overall score. Before Sumac Ridge had even completed the Assessment report requested by the City, City council passed a resolution discarding the Assessment on the basis that it provided no information of any value for council's consideration. The City refused to grant vehicular access and entrance to portions of Wild Turkey Road and to grant any approvals to upgrade it.

Sumac brought an application for judicial review to the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court quashed the City's resolution barring access to Wild Turkey Road and ordered it to consider Sumac's applications in good faith. It also held that the City's decision to refuse to allow Sumac's use of the road was made in bad faith.


  1. Did the Divisional Court err in finding that the City's resolution frustrated the legislative purpose of the Sumac Ridge Approval?
  2. Did the Divisional Court err in making an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the City to consider and grant Sumac Ridge's application without applying the test for mandamus?
  1. Did the Divisional Court err in finding that the City's resolution was made in bad faith?

Holding: Appeal Dismissed.


  1. A cardinal rule of municipal law is that all by-laws are subject to the general law of the realm and are subordinate to it, and that any by-law which is repugnant to or inconsistent with general provincial legislation is void and of no effect, or else is superseded by the general law to the extent of any conflict. This principle has been codified in s. 14 of the Municipal Act. To determine whether municipal and provincial legislative enactments conflict, a court must apply the paramountcy doctrine governing conflicts between federal and provincial legislation (Croplife Canada v. Toronto (City)). In the recent case Alberta (Attorney General) v. Moloney, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the following analytical framework:
    1. As a preliminary question, it must be determined whether both laws are validly enacted. If one is invalid, then no conflict can exist.
    2. If both laws are independently valid, the court must then examine whether the laws' concurrent operation results in a conflict under either branch of the paramountcy test:
  • Operation conflict: there is an operational conflict because it is impossible to comply with both laws, or
  • Frustration of purpose: when, although it is possible to comply with both laws, the operation of the provincial law frustrates the purpose of the federal enactment.
    • If conflict is found, the inferior law remains in force but is inoperative to the extent it conflicts with the superior law.

The party alleging conflict bears the burden of proving conflict. When examining conflict, it is the effect of the inferior law, and not its purpose that is the focus of the paramountcy analysis. However, an intention to interfere with the superior government's purpose may call into question the legitimacy of the inferior law.

In this case, the parties went straight to the second branch of the paramountcy test, frustration of purpose. A Renewable Energy Approval is an "instrument of a legislative nature" as contemplated by s. 14(1)(b) of the Municipal Act. As a result, if the City's by-law frustrates the purpose of the instrument, it is without effect. The correct characterization of the Renewable Energy Approval's purpose is, therefore, central to the appeal. The overall purpose of "Party V.0.1 – Renewable Energy" of the EPA is "to provide for the protection and conservation of the environment" and is broad. In its greater legislative context, the Renewable Energy Approval is a part of this larger scheme that aims to promote that purpose by encouraging and facilitating renewable energy projects. That larger scheme was put into place by the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, which purported to encourage and actively facilitate the development of renewable energy projects, including wind projects. The Renewable Energy Approval is a product of the regime created by the EPA and, as a result, cannot be interpreted as nothing more than a clearance certificate or finding that the project will not harm the environment. A project is only approved if, after consideration of all relevant factors including municipal concerns, the Director is of the opinion that the project is "in the public interest."

Section 14 of the Municipal Act applies to prevent a municipality from using its authority over roads to prevent an approved project from going ahead for being against its interests and, consequently, thwarting the provincial purpose. To the extent that municipal permits are required, the only concerns a municipality can advance are reasonable considerations such as costs, indemnification and liability, and only so long as it does so in good faith. The City's resolution blocking Sumac's access to the road makes compliance with its approval impossible and, therefore, frustrates its purpose.

  1. The Divisional Court's order is not an order of mandamus directing the result of a municipality's discretionary decision-making power. There was no finding that the City could not refuse Sumac's request. The order does not require the City to alter or open Wild Turkey Road. Rather, its effect is to merely prohibit the City from continuing to frustrate the Renewable Energy Approval.
  2. The Divisional Court's finding that the City had acted in bad faith in exercising its jurisdiction over roads for an improper purpose to frustrate the Renewable Energy Approval was an inference it was entitled to draw based on the record before it.


Grant v. Equifax Canada Co., 2016 ONCA 500

[Rouleau, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A.]


Gary Grant, acting in person

Stephen Schwartz, for Equifax Canada Co.

Alan Melamud, for Trans Union of Canada

Domenico Polla, for the Ministry of Government Services and Consumer Services

Mahmud Jamal and Raphael Eghan, for the intervener Canadian Bankers Association

Keywords: Endorsement, Consumer Protection, Credit Scores, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, Consumer Reporting Act

Facts: Relying on the Limitations Act, 2002, the appellant sought an order that two consumer reporting agencies remove debts over two years old that were shown on his credit report. The appellant argued that the two year limitation period should apply in interpreting the provisions of the Consumer Reporting Act ("CRA"). The application was dismissed.

Issues: Does the limitation period prescribed in the Limitations Act apply in interpreting the provisions of the Consumer Reporting Act?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning: No. The basic limitation period set out in the Limitations Act, 2002 has no application to the statutory framework for consumer credit reporting in Ontario. The application judge was correct in finding that there was no violation by the consumer reporting agencies of the requirements of the CRA. The Limitations Act, 2002, applies to bar "claims pursued in court proceedings" that are commenced outside the applicable limitation period – it does not apply to the CRA, whether expressly or by implication.

1468025 Ontario Limited v. 998614 Ontario Inc., 2016 ONCA 504

[Rouleau, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A.]


  1. Michael Harris, for the appellants
  2. Matson, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Unregistered Mortgage, non est factum defence, adverse inference, Levesque v. Comeau

Facts: Respondent corporation had lent money to appellant corporation. An agreement was made in 2002 that advanced made by the respondent corporation would be secured by mortgages but those mortgages were never registered on title. The appellant corporation argues that because the advances could not be proven an adverse inference ought to be drawn. Further, with respect to the agreement, the applicants advanced a non est factum defence. The trial judge rejected both of these arguments.

Issues: Did the trial judge err in rejecting the appellants' arguments?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning: No. The trial judge clearly weighed the evidence when refusing to make an adverse inference from the respondent's failure to produce documentation.

The Lévesque decision does not assist the appellants. It does not stand for the proposition that a trial judge must draw an adverse inference in circumstances such as were presented in this case, which included the trial judge's finding that Dario had not intentionally withheld any relevant documents from the appellants. The trial judge correctly identified the governing legal principles and did not err in giving way to the appellants' non est factum defence.

S & J Gareri Trucking Ltd. v. Onyx Corporation, 2016 ONCA 505

[Cronk, Blair and MacFarland JJ.A.]


  1. Armagon, for the appellant
  2. Latimer, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Contract Law, Oral Subcontracts

Facts: The appellant won the bid for a 5-season snow removal agreement with the city. The appellant and respondent verbally entered into a subcontract whereby the respondent would supply the appellant with trucks. The appellant ended this agreement after the first season. The trial judge found that the duration of the subcontract should be for a five-season term.

Issues: Did the trial judge err in finding the duration of the subcontract to be for a five-season term?

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Reasoning: No. The trial judge correctly applied the principles applicable to the interpretation of contracts in general and to oral contracts in particular.

Andrade v Andrade, 2016 ONCA 507

[Simmons, van Rensburg and Hourigan JJ.A.]


  1. MacKenzie and P.T. Summers, for the appellants
  2. J. Longo and P. Miehls, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Costs

Unegbu v. WFG Securities of Canada Inc., 2016 ONCA 501

[Sharpe, Lauwers and Miller JJ.A.]


  1. Unegbu, in person
  2. Szymanski and J. Oladejo, for the respondents

Keywords: Endorsement, Limitation Period, Limitations Act

Antunes v. Limen Structures Ltd., 2016 ONCA 509

[MacPherson, Sharpe and Miller JJ.A.]


  1. Scwisberg, for the appellant
  2. Van Wiechen, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Damages

Pellew v. Pellew, 2016 ONCA 506

[Sharpe, Lauwers and Miller JJ.A.]


  1. Shirtliff-Hinds, for the appellant
  2. Perruccio and J. Frustaglio, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Evidence


R v. Pourlotfali, 2016 ONCA 490

[Simmons, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A]

Counsel: D. Exner, D. Glassman and K. Smith, for the appellant

  1. Reiter, S. J. Hicks and M. Cowan, for the respondent

Keywords: Provincial Offences, Selling Tobacco to Minors, Strict Liability, Due Diligence Defence, Smoke-Free Ontario Act

R v. Blake, 2016 ONCA 508

[Sharpe, Lauwers, and Miller JJ.A]

Counsel: D. Stein, for the appellant

  1. Doherty, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Sexual Assault, Prior Conviction

R v. Scott, 2016 ONCA 499

[Doherty, Feldman and Brown JJ.A]

Counsel: E. Tache-Green, for the appellant

  1. Fawcett, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Evidence, Finding of Fact

R v. Scott, 2016 ONCA 498

[Doherty, Feldman and Brown JJ.A]

Counsel: E. Tache-Green, for the appellant

  1. Fawcett, for the respondent

Keywords: Endorsement, Criminal Law, Sentencing

R v. Cunha, 2016 ONCA 491

[MacPherson, Lauwers and Hourigan JJ.A]

Counsel: M. Dineen, for the appellant

  1. M. Garg, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Self-Defence, Mistake of Fact, Credibility

R v. Min, 2016 ONCA 495

[Feldman, Benotto and Miller JJ.A]

Counsel: E. Chozick, for the appellant

  1. Hrybinsky, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Aggravated Assault, Sentencing, Mental Illness

R v. St. Martin, 2016 ONCA 482

[Feldman, Benotto and Miller JJ.A]

Counsel: E. Chozick, for the appellant

  1. Kozlowski, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Aggravated Assault, Domestic Assault, Sentencing, Assault Endangering Life

R v. Warren, 2016 ONCA 472

[Feldman, Benotto and Miller JJ.A]

Counsel: T. Kozlowski, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Impaired Driving, Sentencing, Lifetime Driving Prohibition

R v. Jackson, 2016 ONCA 497

[Doherty, Feldman and Brown JJ.A]

Counsel: D. Bonnet, for the appellant

  1. Salih, for the respondent

Keywords: Criminal Law, Sentencing, Youth, First Offender

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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    This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

    Surveys & Contests

    From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.


    If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.


    From time to time Mondaq may send you emails promoting Mondaq services including new services. You may opt out of receiving such emails by clicking below.

    *** If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of services offered by Mondaq you may opt out by clicking here .


    This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to

    Correcting/Updating Personal Information

    If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to

    Notification of Changes

    If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

    How to contact Mondaq

    You can contact us with comments or queries at

    If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.

    By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions