Good afternoon everyone,
Topics covered by the Court of Appeal this week included medmal (limitation periods and need for expert evidence on standard of care and causation), the standard of proof of misconduct in police disciplinary hearings, the onus of proof on an insurer alleging material misrepresentation, family law (variation of custody order, property claim, extension of time to appeal), an appeal from an arbitrator's ruling on the interpretation of a contract, and amending judgments to add judgment-debtors omitted because of alleged misrepresentations.
Have a nice weekend.
[MacPherson, van Rensburg and Miller JJ.A.]
Sergio Grillone, for the appellants
David Stamp and Raphael Eghan, for the respondent
Keywords: Civil Procedure, Amending Order, Adding Judgment-Debtor, Discontinuance, Setting Aside, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59
The appellants commenced an action against Grocery Dayton, Wakefern and several other parties, which was discontinued against all parties save for Grocery Dayton. The appellants noted Grocery Dayton in default and were subsequently granted judgment.
The appellants allege that they were induced to discontinue their claim by a statement made by Wakefern's in-house counsel that Wakefern was not affiliated with Grocery Dayton. Wakefern argued that the appellants discontinued because of multiple defects in their claim. In the course of an unsuccessful attempt to enforce their judgment against Grocery Dayton, the appellants concluded that Grocery Dayton was not independent of Wakefern and instead was an alias used to refer to Wakefern. The appellants thus brought a motion under r. 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their judgment to add Wakefern as a judgment-debtor.
The motion judge dismissed the appellants' motion because: (1) there was insufficient evidence for a finding that Wakefern and Grocery Dayton were the same entity; (2) the appellants' failure to set aside the discontinuance of their action against Wakefern was a complete bar to the relief sought; and (3) it would be fundamentally unfair to add Wakefern as a judgment-debtor where it had had no opportunity to defend the action.
(1) Did the motion judge err by disregarding the appellant's evidence?
(2) Did the motion judge err in finding that the appellants' failure to set aside the discontinuance of their action against Wakefern a complete bar to the relief sought?
(3) Did the motion judge err in finding that it would be fundamentally unfair to add Wakefern as a judgment debtor where it had had no opportunity to defend the action?
Holding: Appeal Dismissed.
(1) No. The appellants argued that the motion judge erred by disregarding their evidence. The Court held that, while it would have been preferable for the motion judge to have provided more complete reasons, he did not make an overriding error. Moreover, while the motion judge's reasons ought to have demonstrated a greater engagement with the evidence, he also made no error in determining that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Grocery Dayton and Wakefern were the same entity.
(2) No. The appellants argued that the discontinuance would not need to be set aside given that a judgment against Grocery Dayton was, in reality, a judgment against Wakefern. The Court held that the appellants' argument could not succeed given the prior conclusion that the motion judge did not err in finding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Grocery Dayton and Wakefern were the same entity.
(3) No. The Court held that the discontinuance could have been a function of the comments made by in-house counsel for Wakefern and, given that, the Court agreed with the motion judge, who had set aside the discontinuance against Wakefern, that it would be unfair to add Wakefern as a judgment-debtor without giving it the opportunity to contest the action on its merits.
[MacPherson J.A. (In Chambers)]
William H. Fysh, for the moving party
Philip Viater, for the responding party
Keywords: Family Law, Sale of Matrimonial Home, Leave to Appeal, Rizzi v. Mavros
The applicant brings a motion seeking an order extending the time to appeal from the order of Jarvis J of the Superior Court of Justice dated April 24, 2015. The judge ordered the sale of the matrimonial home in Aurora. It is this component of the order from which the applicant seeks leave to appeal. The appeal should have commenced within 30 days of the date of the order. The applicant filed this motion April 15, 2016, eleven months late.
Should the applicant be granted leave to appeal?
Holding: Motion Dismissed
The court relied on the decision in Rizzi v. Mavros, which sets out the factors to consider on a motion for leave to extend time to appeal:
(1) whether the appellant formed an intention to appeal within
the relevant period;
(2) the length of the delay and explanation for the delay;
(3) any prejudice to the respondent;
(4) the merits of the appeal; and
(5) whether the "justice of the case requires it".
The court held on the first factor, the applicant retained counsel to appeal Jarvis J's order on May 7, 2015. A motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court was delivered on May 8, 2015. The court held that the appellant formed an intent to appeal and acted on it within two weeks of the order.
With regards to the second factor, the applicant's original leave motion was filed in the wrong court. She only filed materials in the right court on April 15, 2016. She has an eleven month delay to explain, and her explanation is that she thought she was in the right court. The court did not accept this explanation. She was warned by opposing counsel and by one superior court judge that she may be in the wrong court. Further, the applicant took no steps to move the appeal forward even while it was lodged in the wrong court. The court found her explanation for the delay unpersuasive.
The court held on the third factor that there will be prejudice to the respondent if leave to appeal is granted. On the fourth factor, the court concluded that the applicant's position on the sale of the matrimonial home before, during and after the hearing was that matrimonial home be sold and therefore there was no merit to the appeal. On the final factor, the court decided that the justice of the case requires that a meritless appeal not be permitted to proceed.
[Laskin, Hourigan and Brown JJ.A.]
W Mark Wallace and Elizabeth Warren, for the appellant,
Constable Kevin Jacobs
Ian J. Roland and Michael Fenrick, for the intervenor, Police Association of Ontario
Eric Granger and Lawrence Greenspon, for the respondent, Mark Krupa
Christiane F. Huneault, for the respondents Ottawa Police Service
Benson Cowan and Kathryn Chung, for the respondent, Ontario Civilian Police Commission
Keywords: Administrative Law, Regulated Professions, Police Officers, Police Services Act, Misconduct, Standard of Proof, Clear and Convincing Evidence, Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board)
The appellant is a police officer employed by the respondent Ottawa Police Service. He was found guilty of misconduct under the Police Services Act (the "PSA") resulting from the arrest of the respondent, Mark Krupa. The respondent, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (the "Commission"), affirmed the hearing officer's finding of guilt, and the appellant's judicial review application to the Divisional Court was dismissed.
What is the standard of proof applicable to a finding of misconduct under s. 84(1) of the PSA?
Holding: Appeal granted. The matter was remitted to the Commission for further consideration.
The standard of proof in PSA hearings is a higher standard of clear and convincing evidence and not a balance of probabilities. The Court of Appeal is bound by the Supreme Court's statement in Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board) that set out the standard of proof. The Divisional Court erred in relying on F.H. v. McDougall.
[Rouleau, Pardu and Benotto JJ.A.]
Gordon S. Campbell, for the appellant S.M.
Marie-Hélène Godbout and Yanik S. Guilbault, for the respondent A.V.
Tracy Engelking, for the respondent the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa
Jennifer Gallagher, for the Officer of the Children's Lawyer
Keywords: Family Law, Custody and Access, Joint Custody, Application to Vary Divorce Order, Material Change in Circumstances, Sole Custody, Supervised Access, Children's Aid Society, Protection Application, Child and Family Services Act, ss. 47(1) and 54(8), Divorce Act, s. 17, Gordon v. Goertz
Facts: The appellant is the father of two girls. He appeals an order of the Family Court granting the mother (the respondent A.V.) sole custody of the girls with supervised access to him and allowing the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (the respondent CAS) to withdraw its Protection Application. The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) joins the respondents in asking that the appeal be dismissed.
The appellant and A.V. divorced in 2012. The divorce order provided for joint custody with a shared parenting arrangement. Ongoing disputes rendered the arrangement unworkable and CAS commenced a Protection Application. During the protection proceedings, the parties consented to an assessment by Dr. Worenklein under s. 54 of the Child and Family Services Act, who reported that the appellant was alienating the children against their mother and that the situation was extremely volatile and high-conflict. He recommended that the mother be granted full custody with supervised access to the appellant. In response to the report, CAS sought to amend the Protection Application to place the children in the custody of the mother with supervised access to the appellant. The mother then brought a motion to change the final divorce order to grant her sole custody. The appellant brought a cross-motion for sole custody. Labrosse J. concluded that the divorce order should be varied; the mother was to have sole custody and the father was to have supervised access to the children. He then determined that the children were not in need of protection and allowed CAS to withdraw its Protection Application.
1) Did the motions judge err in finding a material change in circumstances warranting a variation of the custody arrangement in the divorce order?
2) Did the motions judge err in ordering the two motions be argued simultaneously?
3) Did the motions judge err by not holding a "hearing" in connection with the CAS motion to withdraw pursuant to s. 47(1) of the CFSA and then further err by failing to specifically find that the children were not in need of protection?
4) Did the motions judge violate s. 54(8) of the CFSA by considering the evidence of Dr. Worenklein on the motion to vary?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
1) No. The test for varying an order under s. 17 of the Divorce Act was set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Gordon v. Goertz,  2 S.C.R. 27. The motions judge made detailed findings in connection with the appellant's inability to set aside the parental conflict and meet the needs of the children. The change materially affected the children and was not contemplated when the joint custody order was made, as it was not reasonably foreseeable at the time that the relationship between the parties would reach the level of dysfunction demonstrated by the evidence. The motions judge considered the best interests of the children, and concluded that the appellant had embarked on a campaign to alienate the children from their mother.
2) No. It was a proper exercise of the motions judge's discretion and exactly what is contemplated by the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 to hear the child protection and custody proceeding simultaneously. The Rules impose a duty on the court to deal with cases justly by controlling the process of the case and by dealing with as many aspects of the case as possible on the same occasion.
3) No. The law is clear that a "hearing" in a child protection matter may take many forms. It may proceed on consent, take the form of a motion seeking leave to withdraw, a motion for summary judgment, or a trial. The motions judge considered and rejected the appellant's request for cross-examination, having determined that there were no issues that could be advanced. The decision to allow questioning is within the discretion of the motions judge. Furthermore, contrary to the appellant's submission, the motions judge did make a finding that the children were not in need of protection. The motions judge reviewed the evidence and concluded: "I am satisfied that there are no protection concerns, provided that the Mother has sole custody and that the Father's access continues to be supervised."
4) No. CFSA s. 54(8) precludes the use of an assessment report "in any other proceeding" except in child protection proceedings and other limited circumstances. The motions judge took care to separate the findings made on the Protection Application from the motion to vary. He based his conclusion that the appellant's attempt to alienate the children from their mother and his decision to grant the mother sole custody on the evidence before him, including affidavits and audio recordings, which largely came from the appellant. In any event, he observed that the report was not conclusive on the issue of custody. Furthermore, in a lengthy affidavit filed in the custody proceeding, the appellant himself put many parts of Dr. Worenklein's report into evidence. The appellant was critical of the doctor's failure to rule out the abuse allegations the appellant had previously made against the mother. The appellant cannot now raise the issue that the evidence was inadmissible.
[Blair, MacFarland and Lauwers JJ.A.]
Songyan Liu, in person
Cynthia Kuehl and Stephen Ronan, counsel to the respondents
Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Medical Malpractice, Summary Judgment, Limitation Periods, Limitations Act, 2002, Expert Evidence, Larman v Mount Sinai Hospital
The plaintiff/appellant alleged that the defendant negligently removed surgical staples from his right knee in September, 2011 approximately two weeks after the plaintiff received knee surgery to repair his knee following a motor vehicle accident. He alleged the defendant broke one of the staples in the process of removing them which caused him to suffer pain and bleeding, and resulted in his knee becoming permanently injured.
In October, 2012, the plaintiff was assessed by a different doctor under advisement by his lawyer bringing his tort claim arising out of the accident. The doctor concluded that the plaintiff's knee was permanently injured and could not return to normal, but did not provide any opinion with respect to an injury that may have arisen as a result of the staple removal. The plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice proceeding against the defendant by way of statement of claim which was issued in October, 2014.
On a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants/respondents, the motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's action as statute barred pursuant to the 2-year limitation period in the Limitations Act, 2002, as well as for his failure to adduce and file an expert medical opinion as required in cases that involve the application of clinical skills outside the ordinary knowledge and experience of a trier of fact.
Did the motion judge err in holding that:
(1) the plaintiff's action was statute barred by the 2-year limitation period provided for in the Limitations Act, 2002? and
(2) this was not one of "the clearest of cases" in which no expert's report is required to support the plaintiff's malpractice allegations?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
(1) No. The court found the motion judge was correct in dismissing the claim on the basis that it was statute barred. It was clear that the plaintiff was fully aware that he had problems with his knee immediately following – if not during – the removal of the staples by the defendant in September, 2012.
(2) No. Despite finding it unnecessary to deal with this issue, in light of the expired limitation period, the court also agreed with the motion judge's disposition with regard to the lack of an expert opinion. The court stated that medical malpractice cases are complex – even where they may appear simple to the eye of a layperson – and judges and juries lack the expertise necessary to assess difficult questions such as causation, standard of care, and breach of the standard of care, without the assistance of expert reports. For that reason, the court cited its decision in Larman v Mount Sinai Hospital, 2014, ONCA 923, for the principle that aside from "the clearest of cases" the absence of expert evidence in support of the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim is fatal.
[Strathy C.J.O., MacFarland and Brown JJ.A.]
Jeanie DeMarco, for the appellant
Susan Adam Metzler, for the respondent
Keywords: Family Law, Property, Credibility, Standard of Review, Palpable and Overriding Error
The appellant claimed a half interest in a house. The trial judge was required to make findings of fact based on conflicting evidence and assess the credibility of the parties. The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence in support of his claim to an interest in the home. The judge found the appellant's payment of $130,000 to her was a gift.
The appellant wants the court to reassess and re-weigh the evidence concerning his claim to an interest in the house.
Issues: Did the trial judge err in assessing the evidence?
Holding: Appeal dismissed.
No. The trial judge did not err in assessing the evidence. The trial judge gave sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence and accepting the respondent's.
The appellant argued two principal errors that were overriding. First, he argued the respondent's lawyer's file is strong evidence in support of his version of the facts against the respondent. The court disagreed because the file, at best, establishes that at one time the respondent may have contemplated that the appellant could acquire an interest in her house. The trial judge accepted the respondent's evidence that the appellant gave the money to her as a gift.
Second, the appellant argued that the trial judge should not have rejected the appellant's evidence on the origin of the "Declaration of Shared Ownership" and should not have found that he created the document for the lawsuit. There is no reason to interfere with the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence on this issue. There was no error in her reasoning.
[Laskin, Simmons, and Huscroft JJ.A.]
Michael D. Magonet, for the appellant
James Manson, for the respondent
Keywords: Insurance Law, Insurance Act, s.132, Voiding Coverage, Material Misrepresentation
C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. ("Robinson") retained KLM Express ("KLM") to transport cargo. The KLM truck carrying the cargo was involved in a collision and the cargo was destroyed. Robinson sued KLM for the full value of the lost cargo. KLM did not defend the action and Robinson obtained a default judgment against it. Robinson then sought payment from KLM's insurer, Northbridge, pursuant to s.132 of the Insurance Act, which entitled Robinson to recover the amount of its unsatisfied judgment from Northbridge, "but subject to the same equities as the insurer would have if the judgment had been satisfied."
The application judge denied Robinson recovery, holding that KLM's insurance policy was void because, when applying for coverage, KLM had made a material misrepresentation in answering in the negative whether it had any contracts "with shippers that stipulate limits of liability that are required to supercede the applicant's standard Bill of Lading?"
Neither KLM's "standard Bill of Lading" nor evidence regarding same was put before the application judge. Nonetheless, she held that KLM's answer amounted to a misrepresentation as the contract between Robinson and KLM provided liability for actual loss or damage that was well in excess of the limited liability under the Uniform Conditions of Carriage: Carriage of Goods regulation. The application judge concluded the misrepresentation was material as it affected KLM's premium.
(1) Did the application judge err in finding a misrepresentation in the absence of any evidence about KLM's standard bill of lading?
(2) Even if KLM made a misrepresentation, did the application judge err in finding that the misrepresentation was material to Northbridge's underwriting process?
Holding: Appeal Allowed.
(1) The insurer has the onus of showing a material misrepresentation. Northbridge contended that KLM's survey answer was a material representation, but did not produce its insured's standard bill of lading and did not lead any evidence of its terms. The Court found that, in the absence of KLM's standard bill of lading, Northbridge failed to meet its onus of showing a misrepresentation.
The Court also found that Northbridge drafted the survey in question and must accept the consequences of the answers to the questions it posed. The question in issue focused on KLM's standard bill of lading, which was not produced and thus could not be analyzed. The Court reasoned that, presumably, Northbridge was able to produce its insured's standard bill of lading if it existed, and its failure to do so undermined its misrepresentation defence. The Court allowed the appeal and granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff.
(2) Given the finding on the first issue, the second issue did not require any comment from the Court.
[MacPherson, van Rensburg and Miller JJ.A.]
W.A. Derry Millar, Keith A. MacLaren and Owen Bourns, for the appellant
Ronald F. Caza and Anne M. Tardif, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Leases, Interpretation, Arbitration, Arbitration Act, Standard of Review, Reasonableness, Sattva Capital Corp v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53
The appellant, The Coliseum Inc. ("Coliseum"), entered into a long-term lease agreement (the "Stadium Agreement") with the respondent, the City of Ottawa (the "City") to operate an indoor sports and recreation facility under a dome. The Stadium Agreement was in relation to Frank Clair Stadium at Lansdowne Park in Ottawa.
In 2004, there was a dispute between the parties about Coliseum's right of possession. The dispute was resolved by Minutes of Settlement. A further dispute arose and an arbitrator interpreted the two crucial provisions of the Minutes of Settlement in favour of Coliseum. The City appealed and the application judge granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal and overturned the arbitrator's award. Coliseum appeals to this court.
There are two main issues, leave to appeal and reasonableness of the arbitrator's decision.
Leave to Appeal
(1) Does this court have jurisdiction to review a decision of a Superior Court judge granting leave to appeal an arbitral decision under s. 45(1) of the Arbitration Act?
(2) If the answer to 1(a) is in the affirmative, did the application judge err in granting leave to appeal?
Reasonableness of the arbitrator's decision
(1) Did the application judge err in finding the arbitrator's interpretation of the Minutes of Settlement unreasonable?
(2) If the answer to 2(a) is in the negative, did the application judge err in finding the arbitrator's decision on waiver and estoppel unreasonable?
(3) If the answer to 2(a) is in the affirmative, did the application judge err in finding the arbitrator's decision not to reduce damages by 40 per cent unreasonable?
Holding: Appeal allowed.
Leave to Appeal
(1) With respect to commercial arbitrations, leave to appeal to the Superior Court of Justice is governed by s. 45 and s. 49 of the Arbitration Act. The court held that it has no jurisdiction on this appeal to review the application judge's decision to grant leave to appeal from the arbitral award, citing Denison Mines Ltd. v. Ontario Hydro.
(1) The arbitrator found that paragraph 6 of the Minutes of Settlement must be read in light of the more general provisions of paragraph 5. In particular, he found that the City had to provide a site similar to Ben Franklin Park as it was in 2004, provided that the "alternative site(s) were appropriate for Coliseum Inc.'s operations". The application judge disagreed with the arbitrator's analysis. She interpreted paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Minutes of Settlement in a two-step fashion. Paragraph 5 mandated that Coliseum and the City work together in "good faith negotiations" to find an alternative site for Coliseum's operations if Frank Clair Stadium became unavailable.
The court held that the application judge's interpretation of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Minutes is a possible- even a reasonable – interpretation. However, that is not the relevant point. In the court's view, the same could be said about the arbitrator's interpretation. The court held that the arbitrator's reasoning was entirely faithful to this approach. His reasoning and result simply cannot attract the label "unreasonable". Accordingly, the application judge erred by setting aside the arbitrator's interpretation of the Minutes of Settlement and substituting her own. The fact that the application judge's interpretation is also reasonable does not affect the result, as the arbitrator was owed deference on his reasonable interpretation. In light of this ruling, the court did not deal with the second matter of waiver and estoppel.
(3) The court stated because the application judge allowed the appeal on the contractual interpretation issue, she did not, strictly speaking, need to consider the damages issue. The court held that the arbitrator's decision on damages cannot be unreasonable. The court held that the arbitrator dealt with the issue and concluded that Coliseum Inc.'s damages should not be reduced on account of the privity of contract issue, despite significant reservations on this issue.
[Rouleau, Pardu and Benotto JJ.A.]
Godfred Kwaku Hiamey
The respondents were neither present nor represented at the hearing
Keywords: Employment Law, Wrongful Dismissal, Human Rights Complaint, Extension of Time to Appeal, Motion Dismissed
Lynda Keith Marketing, Communications and Events Inc. v. Camp Maple Leaf Incorporated, 2016 ONCA 341
[Laskin, Pepall and Brown JJ.A.]
Samuel Nash, for the appellants
Brian Sherman, for the respondent
Key Words: Appeal Book Endorsement, Varying Judgment, Incorrect Defendants
[Laskin, Pepall and Brown JJ.A.]
Glenroy Bastien, for the appellants
James Smith, for the respondent
Keywords: Contracts, Statute of Frauds, s. 4, Part Performance, Tax Avoidance, Limitations Act, 2002, Appeal Dismissed
CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS
[Cronk, Juriansz and Watt JJ.A.]
Robert Sheppard, for the appellant
Moiz Rahman, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Sexual Offences, Inconsistent Verdict, Jury Charge, Elements of the Offence, Credibility
[Cronk, Juriansz and Watt JJ.A.]
Carol Cahill, for the appellant
Katie Doherty, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Robbery, Cumulative Sentence, Pre-Disposition Custody, Enhanced Credit, R. v. Summers
[Pardu and Benotto JJ.A.]
Vikram Singh, for the appellant
Shawn Porter, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Unlawful Confinement, Misapprehension and Weighing of Evidence, Adequacy of Reasons, Unreasonable Verdict, Elements of the Offence, Appeal Allowed
[Feldman, Simmons and Pepall JJ.A.]
Telman Najafov, in person
Erika Chozik, duty counsel
Leslie Paine, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Sexual Assault, Unlawful Confinement, Sentencing, Appeal Dismissed
Key Words: Criminal Law, Publication Ban
[Weiler, Simmons and Epstein JJ.A.]
James Carlisle and Haran Aruliah, for the appellant
Roger Shallow, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Aggravated Assault, Assault Causing Bodily Harm, Included Offence, Mens Rea, Appeal Allowed
[Cronk, Juriansz and Watt JJ.A.]
Andrew Furgiuele, for the appellant
John A. Neander, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Possession of a Firearm, Evidence, Confidential Informant, Hearsay, Closing Address, Jury Charge, Appeal Allowed
[Simmons, van Rensburg and Benotto JJ.A.]
Breana Vandebeek, for the appellant
Jessica Smith Joy, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Attempting to Possess a Firearm, Misapprehension of Evidence, Unreasonable Verdict, Mens Rea, Appealed Allowed in Part
[Brown J.A. (In Chambers)]
Stephen Whitzman, for the appellant
Michael Perlin, for the respondent
Key Words: Criminal Law, Manslaughter, Bail Pending Appeal, Public Interest, Good Character Evidence, Application Dismissed
[Gillese J.A. (In Chambers)]
Michael Lacy and Marco Sciarra, for the applicant
Lorna Bolton, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, First Degree Murder, Appointment of Counsel, Criminal Code, s. 684(1), Legal Aid, Financial Disclosure
[Doherty, Simmons and van Rensburg JJ.A.]
Howard L. Krongold, for the appellant
James D. Sutton, for the respondent
Keywords: Criminal Law, Possession for Purpose of Trafficking, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Arbitrary Detention, s. 9, Right to Counsel, s. 10(b), Unreasonable Search or Seizure, s. 8, Exclusion of Evidence, s. 24(2), Police Misconduct, Appeal Allowed
ONTARIO REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS
[Epstein, Pepall and van Rensburg JJ.A.]
Stephen F. Gehl, for the appellant
Janice Blackburn, for St. Joseph's Health Care Hamilton
Brock Jones, for the Attorney General of Ontario
Keywords: Ontario Review Board, Criminal Harassment, Not Criminally Responsible, Conditional Discharge, Public Safety
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