In her decision in Drywall Acoustic Lathing and Insulation, Local 675
v. SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., dated October 28, 2015,
Associate Chief Justice Hoy, on behalf of a unanimous Ontario Court
of Appeal, refused to quash an appeal. She rejected arguments that
the appeal was interlocutory to the extent that it refused to grant
leave to amend pleadings. In her view, the order under appeal
finally prohibited the appellants from seeking relief under the
Ontario Securities Act ("OSA") as a result of
certain misrepresentations, in part because doing so was
statute-barred. This constituted a final order, with an appeal from
it lying to the Court of Appeal. Associate Chief Justice Hoy
nonetheless largely dismissed the appeal, holding that deference
was due to the motion judge's conclusion that the proposed
amended pleadings contained new allegations of discrete
The appellants had obtained leave to commence a proceeding
against the respondents for alleged violations of the OSA. This
action was also certified as a class action. The respondents
opposed neither the granting of leave nor the certification. After
obtaining the leave and certification orders, the appellants sought
to amend their pleadings to allege further misrepresentations. The
motion judge refused to permit the appellants to amend their
pleadings as they wished, agreeing with the respondents that the
amendments contained new allegations that required fresh leave
under the OSA. Moreover, he also agreed with the respondents that
the limitation period within the OSA "barred the appellants
from pursuing these new allegations of misrepresentation"
Court of Appeal's Jurisdiction
On appeal, the respondents sought to quash the appeal, on the
grounds that it was partially interlocutory. On the facts of this
case, Associate Chief Justice Hoy disagreed. She held:
 The appeal arises from para. 2
of the motion judge's order:
THIS COURT ORDERS that the
Plaintiffs' motion is hereby dismissed with respect to the
proposed amendments in paragraphs ... of the Plaintiffs'
proposed Fourth Fresh as Amended Consolidated Statement of Claim
... and the causes of action arising from such amendments are
 The respondents argue that the
order at issue is both interlocutory (to the extent that it
dismissed the appellants' motion to amend because the
amendments require leave under s. 138.8(1)) and final (to the
extent that it dismissed the causes of action arising from the
refused amendments because they are statute-barred). They say that
an appeal from the interlocutory portion of the order lies to the
Divisional Court, with leave, and not to this court. They say the
interlocutory portion of the appeal cannot be transferred to this
court until the Divisional Court grants leave.
 I reject the respondents'
argument that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear this
appeal and I would dismiss the respondents' motion to quash.
The respondents rely on the motion judge's reasons to
artificially parse the order under appeal. Appeals lie from orders,
not reasons. The motion judge's single paragraph permanently
prohibits the appellants from advancing the refused amendments and
pursuing the underlying misrepresentation claims and therefore
constitutes a final order. In any event, as becomes clearer below,
the motion judge's reason for refusing the amendments underlies
his conclusion that they are statute-barred.
Despite rejecting the respondents' arguments on the motion,
Associate Chief Justice Hoy largely dismissed the appeal. With one
discrete exception, she agreed with the motion judge that leave was
required to bring the proposed amendments, and that they were
statute-barred. In doing so, she held that the motion judge's
conclusion that the proposed amendments represented new allegations
of discrete misrepresentations was entitled to deference:
 The motion judge has
case-managed every aspect of this complex action. Most importantly,
he heard and granted the appellants' unopposed motion for leave
under Part XXIII.1 of the OSA. The motion judge was best positioned
to determine the nature of the claim he had granted the appellants
leave to pursue. His conclusion that the proposed amendments
constitute discrete misrepresentation claims is entitled to
In the result, Associate Chief Justice Hoy ordered that the
appellants pay the respondents costs of the appeal, but that the
respondents pay the appellants costs of the motion.
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In Irwin v. Alberta Veterinary Medical Association, 2015 ABCA 396, the Alberta Court of Appeal found that the "ABVMA" failed to afford procedural fairness to a veterinarian undergoing an incapacity assessment.
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