Canada: A Closer Look At The Griffiths Energy Case: Lessons And Insights On Canadian Anti-Corruption Enforcement

On January 25, 2013, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench approved a $10.35 million penalty against Griffiths Energy International Inc. (Griffiths) for a violation of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act1 (CFPOA) in connection with the actions of the company's previous management and representatives in Chad, Africa (Griffiths Judgment).2

Although the CFPOA has been in force since 1999, the Griffiths conviction joins the conviction of Niko Resources Inc. (Niko) in June of 2011 (Niko Order)3 as only the second significant conviction rendered under Canada's foreign anti-corruption legislation to date, and as such constitutes important guidance regarding the position of the courts, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Crown in respect of the prosecution of foreign corrupt practices.4

This legal update reviews the facts of the Griffiths conviction, compares them to the Niko Order where insightful, and discusses lessons to be considered going forward by Canadian individuals and organizations facing foreign anti-corruption risk in connection with their business operations. This includes consideration of a number of important legal issues related to the enforcement of the CFPOA as well as anti-corruption liability and risk mitigation in general, including (i) the influence of self-reporting as a mitigating factor, (ii) the CFPOA's broad definition of corrupt practices, (iii) lessons for directors, (iv) the role of U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) precedent, (v) the treatment of proceeds of criminal activity, (vi) matters related to jurisdiction, and (vii) anti-corruption risks associated with third party agents.

1. The Prohibited Payments and Share Issuances

The Griffiths conviction relates primarily to a series of consulting agreements and related transactions entered into by the company, a Calgary-based junior oil and gas exploration and production firm, at the direction of its previous management and in pursuit of certain production-sharing contracts (PSCs) in Chad.

As noted in the Agreed Statement of Facts (Statement of Facts) submitted to the Court of Queen's Bench on January 22, 2013,5 in and around the formation of the company in August 2009, Griffiths and several of its founding shareholders (including the company's late chairman) set out to develop contacts and arrange meetings with senior Chadian political figures, including the Chadian Ambassador to Canada (Ambassador) and the country's minister of petroleum and energy.

This led to the execution of a consulting agreement on August 30, 2009, between Griffiths and Ambassade du Tchad LLC (Tchad LLC), a U.S.-registered entity wholly owned by the Ambassador. The agreement pertained to oil and gas advisory services to be provided by Tchad LLC to Griffiths and, importantly, provided for a $2-million fee payable to Tchad LLC in the event Griffiths was awarded the desired PSCs before the end of 2009 or such other date mutually agreed upon by the parties.

Griffiths terminated the Tchad LLC consulting agreement in early September 2009 after being advised by legal counsel that it constituted an unlawful offer of a benefit to a foreign public official. However, on September 15, 2009, Griffiths entered into a second consulting agreement on terms identical to the Tchad LLC agreement with another U.S. incorporated entity, this time wholly owned by the wife of the Ambassador and named Chad Oil Consulting LLC (COCL). Griffiths simultaneously (i) granted the Ambassador's wife 1,600,000 founder shares in the company at a price of $0.001 per share, and (ii) granted an additional 2,400,000 founder shares at the same price to two individuals nominated by the Ambassador's wife, including the wife of the then Deputy Chief of the Chadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Deputy Chief).

Following the expiration of its initial term, the COCL consulting agreement was renewed by the parties effective January 1, 2011, with only minor amendments. Shortly thereafter, and after months of negotiations, a Griffiths subsidiary executed a PSC with Chad on January 19, 2011. The $2-million payment owing to COCL under the COCL agreement was then placed into escrow in February, 2011, before being transferred to COCL pursuant to deposit instructions received from the Deputy Chief.

2. Key Elements of the Agreed Statement of Facts

Griffiths acknowledged in the Statement of Facts that, by entering into the Tchad LLC and COCL consulting agreements and by issuing seed shares to the Ambassador's wife and her nominees, it violated paragraph 3(1)(b) of the CFPOA by providing direct or indirect benefits to the Ambassador in an attempt to induce the Ambassador to use his position to influence decisions of Chad in respect of the desired PSCs.

However, the Statement of Facts also contains five important acknowledgements by the Crown, which informed its agreement to limit the fine imposed on Griffiths to $10.35 million (being a fine of $9 million plus a 15% victim fine surcharge).

First, the Crown acknowledged that between July and September of 2011, Griffiths hired an entirely new management team as well as appointed six new independent directors. The Crown acknowledged that the current senior leadership of Griffiths was distinct and separate from the management steering the company at the time of the corrupt practices at issue.6

Second, the Crown acknowledged that, following the discovery of the offending consulting agreements during due diligence performed in preparation for an initial public offering of securities (IPO) scheduled to be conducted by the company in the fourth quarter of 2011, Griffiths' current management and directorship took immediate and comprehensive corrective action. This included:

  1. the creation of a special committee comprised of the independent members of Griffiths' board of directors;
  2. the retention by the special committee of independent and specialized external legal counsel;
  3. the provision by the special committee of a broad mandate to its external legal counsel to conduct a thorough investigation of not only the circumstances surrounding the consulting agreements and share issuances in question, but also any other activities possibly suggestive of past corrupt practices by the company or its representatives; and
  4. that the special committee, as well as the rest of Griffiths' directorship and management, remained fully engaged, informed and cooperative in the special investigation.

Third, the Crown acknowledged the decision of Griffiths to voluntarily self-disclose its special investigation to the RCMP and representatives of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada and Alberta Justice on November 15, 2011, as well as to their counterparts in the United States shortly thereafter. Towards this end, the Crown acknowledged that Griffiths' self-disclosure marked the beginning of a full and extensive cooperative process between the company and relevant enforcement authorities that included:

  1. the sharing by Griffiths of all details of its investigation, including, in particular, legally privileged communications between the company and its former legal counsel;
  2. Griffiths agreeing to enter into a guilty plea prior to charges being formally laid by Crown prosecutors; and
  3. Griffiths continuing to cooperate with and assist the Crown in other processes and legal remedies related to its past activities.

Fourth, the Crown acknowledged various significant costs already incurred by Griffiths further to the corrupt practices of the company's past management and representatives. These included:

  1. legal and accounting costs incurred in relation to the special committee's investigation of approximately $5 million;
  2. hundreds of management hours spent on the investigation;
  3. the withdrawal by Griffiths of its IPO and the corresponding write-off of approximately $1.8 million in pre-IPO expenses, including legal and marketing costs; and
  4. the resulting increased costs of financing experienced by Griffiths when forced to turn instead to private sources of capital.

Fifth, the Crown acknowledged that (i) Griffiths had not been previously convicted or sanctioned in respect of a similar offence, and that (ii) Griffiths had already undertaken numerous actions to reduce the likelihood of it engaging in further corrupt practices, including implementing and enforcing a robust set of anti-corruption policies and procedures as well as reinforcing its existing internal control and compliance programs.

3. The Judgment of The Queen's Bench

Similar to his admonishments in the Niko Order, Justice Brooker of the Alberta Queen's Bench (Court) emphasized that the "bribing of a foreign official by a Canadian company is a serious matter" and that, beyond being an "embarrassment to all Canadians," corrupt practices "prejudice Canada's efforts to foster and promote effective governmental and commercial relations with other countries" while also undermining the "bureaucratic or governmental infrastructure of the countries for which the bribed official works."

Towards this end, Justice Brooker explained that "the penalty imposed must be sufficient to show the Court's denunciation of such conduct as well as provide deterrence to other potential offenders."

Justice Brooker stressed that the "major aggravating factor in this case is the size of the bribe made." On the other hand, he highlighted that Griffiths' decision to self-report, as well as the quick and decisive action taken by the company's management and directors, constituted the most important mitigating factors. He noted that the company's decision to self-report saved enforcement authorities significant time and resources. In his view, Griffiths' conduct upon discovering a possible breach of the CFPOA demonstrated a "complete and genuine remorse for the illegal conduct manifested by its former officers."

Referring to his position in the Niko Order, Justice Brooker stated that he would only refuse to accept the sentencing recommendations of the Crown if they were unfit or unreasonable, and that this was not the case in the matter before the Court. Significantly, and in contrast to the Niko Order, Justice Brooker also confirmed that a probation order was not necessary in the circumstances considering the "effective, comprehensive and robust anti-corruption program" instituted by Griffiths.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court approved Griffiths' guilty plea to one count of violating the CFPOA and the fine of $10.35 million.

4. Lessons and Insights From the Griffiths Energy Case

A number of instructive observations and lessons can be gleaned from the substance of the Statement of Facts and the Griffiths Judgment, both in comparison with the Niko Order and otherwise.

(a) Self-Reporting as a Mitigating Factor

As in Niko, the sentencing factors discussed by Justice Brooker in the Griffiths Judgment exhibit the clear willingness of the Court to consider various species of mitigating factors. In the Niko Order, such factors included (i) the company's guilty plea (which avoided expending further Crown resources), (ii) Niko's cooperation with authorities once it knew it was being investigated, (iii) Niko's agreement to take remedial steps and cooperate on a go-forward basis, and (iv) Niko's lack of a prior criminal record. The Statement of Facts and the Griffiths Judgement reiterate the value in the eyes of the Crown and the Court of these same principles of cooperation and correction. They also of course highlight the great weight placed by the Crown and the Court on Griffiths' immediate commitment to self-disclosure of both its suspected violations of the CFPOA as well as its internal investigation into same.

Towards this end, it would be difficult to exaggerate the apparent influence of Griffiths' self-disclosure on the amount of the fine imposed by the Crown on the company. Niko was fined $9.5 million for gifts in kind worth an aggregate of approximately $200,000.00. Griffiths, on the other hand, was fined about 8% more than Niko for payments in excess of 10 times the value of gifts provided by Niko. This strongly reinforces express statements made by the Crown and Justice Brooker that the decision to self-disclose constituted a paramount consideration in their assessment of appropriate penalties and may serve as a strong inducement for companies to consider similar self-disclosure in the future.

(b) The CFPOA's Broad Definition of Corrupt Practices

Griffiths and the Crown agreed in the Statement of Facts that criminal culpability under the CFPOA resulted both from the COCL consulting agreement under which the $2-million payment was made as well as from those earlier consulting agreements with COCL and Tchad LLC (even though no payments were actually made pursuant to these two agreements). This serves as a clear reminder that the CFPOA prohibits mere offers or promises made to, or for the benefit of, foreign public officials and not only actual payments made to or for the benefit of such officials.

Similarly, Griffiths and the Crown agreed in the Statement of Facts that no allegation or admission has been made that Griffiths actually experienced any benefit from the corrupt practices at issue. This is another clear reminder that, even though the CFPOA requires that an offer, promise or payment be made to, or for the benefit of, a foreign public official "in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business", no such "advantage in the course of business" need actually be secured by the offending party for CFPOA liability to result.

In this regard, it is also important to note that the web cast by the CFPOA is set to soon grow even wider.7 On February 5, 2013, Bill S-14, the Fighting Foreign Corruption Act, was introduced into Canada's Senate. Amongst other things, Bill S-14 removes the requirement that an entity or individual be engaged in business "for profit", resulting in potentially greater CFPOA exposure for Canadian non-profit organizations such as development agencies or charities operating overseas.

(c) Lessons for Directors

In the Statement of Facts, the parties outline the scope and substance of Griffiths' response to the actions of its previous management and representatives once discovered, including (i) immediately establishing a special committee comprised of independent members of the board of directors, (ii) engaging independent and specialized external legal counsel to conduct a special investigation, (iii) granting external legal counsel a broad mandate to investigate all matters related to the subject of concern without limitation, (iv) approving the retention of forensic accounting experts, and (v) ensuring that the special committee, as well as the remainder of the board and management, remained fully informed and engaged throughout the course of the special investigation.

As noted above, Justice Brooker was also of the view that a probation order was not necessary for Griffiths in light of the robust anti-corruption compliance program implemented by the company after discovering the corruption at issue. This is to be contrasted with Niko Order in which the Court imposed a number of significant and costly ongoing obligations regarding disclosure and reporting to the RCMP, assistance to Canadian and U.S. law enforcement authorities, strengthening internal compliance controls, and conducting independent compliance audits to be paid for by Niko.

Considering the weight placed on this quick and comprehensive response as a mitigating factor by the Crown and the Court, Griffiths' reaction to the discovery of potential corrupt practices can be considered a useful guide for companies and boards that find themselves in a similar situation in the future. However, it is also important for directors to note that the formation of a special committee comprised of independent directors, advised by independent external legal counsel and engaged in a thorough examination of all relevant activities and information may, depending on the circumstances, actually be required in order for directors to meet their duty of care owed to a corporation.8 The actions taken by Griffiths are a reminder that issues arising with potential CFPOA violations will extend beyond exclusively criminal matters and can include compliance by directors with the requirements of their duty of care.

(d) The Role of U.S. FCPA Precedent

The Niko Order was drafted in consultation with the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) and was described by the Crown as "a Canadianized version of similar enforcement actions in the United States." Moreover, the terms of the Niko Order closely followed those found in recent USDOJ deferred prosecution agreements under the FCPA and, in approving the fine recommended by the Crown, the Court also considered examples provided by the Crown of penalties levied by U.S. authorities under the FCPA.

The Griffiths Judgment differs from the Niko Order significantly in that it does not include a comprehensive set of prescriptions regarding future anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures to be adopted by the offending entity as did the Niko Order – again, because Griffiths had already voluntarily adopted a robust set of such policies and procedures during the course of its internal investigation. Although Justice Brooker commented that FCPA precedent can be of limited use for CFPOA sentencing purposes due to its heavy reliance on mathematical fomulae, the Griffiths Judgment does again exhibit the willingness of the Court to consider relevant FCPA precedent where potentially useful, on this occasion illustrated by the reference of Justice Brooker to accused companies being given a significantly discounted penalty in exchange for self-reporting and full cooperation in FCPA matters.

(e) Proceeds of Criminal Activity

In addition to monetary penalties and possible imprisonment, under the Criminal Code proceeds obtained from the bribery of foreign public officials may be forfeited to the Canadian government. Also, as an indictable offence, a violation of the CFPOA is considered a "designated offence" and therefore attracts the application of the Criminal Code's provisions against money laundering. These prohibit dealing with any property or any proceeds of property with the intent to conceal or convert, knowing or believing that the property or proceeds were obtained directly or indirectly from the bribery of foreign officials.

Although the Crown acknowledges that that the $2-million payment made by Griffiths' past management to COCL is beyond the reach of the Court, forfeiture proceedings in respect of the seed share issuances to the wife and her nominees are understood to have been initiated and are scheduled to be next heard by the Court on February 15, 2013. The experience of Griffiths may therefore serve as the first instance in Canada of the seizure of assets tainted by foreign corrupt practices.

(f) "Territorial Jurisdiction" vs. "Nationality Jurisdiction"

It was agreed by the Crown and Griffiths in the Statement of Facts that the "Court has jurisdiction over this offence by reason of the fact that there is a real and substantial link between Canada and [the] offence and that the facts of [the] case legitimately give Canada an interest in prosecuting the offence."

This is an acknowledgment that, at the date of the Griffiths Judgment, the applicable jurisdiction of the Court was that of "territorial jurisdiction." Pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Libman, this requires that there be a "real and substantial" connection to the territory of Canada.9 The decision in Libman has also led to objections to jurisdiction based on the principle of international comity (i.e., where a crime has a closer nexus to another country, it may be more appropriate for the matter to be prosecuted there).

However, Bill S-14 discussed above is set to shift the jurisdictional standard applicable to prosecutions of violations of the CFPOA from "territorial jurisdiction" to "nationality jurisdiction."10 Under this standard, rather than requiring a "real and substantial" connection to the territory of Canada, the Crown will merely have to establish that the violation of the CFPOA was committed (i) by a Canadian citizen, (ii) by a permanent resident (who, after the commission of the act or omission, is present in Canada), or (iii) by a company, partnership or other entity formed or organized under the laws of Canada. Importantly, this amendment will greatly reduce the ability of alleged offenders to initiate jurisdictional challenges to prosecutions brought against them by enforcement authorities based on the location in which an offence was either planned or conducted.

(g) Third Party Agents and Anti-Corruption Risk

Although the Statement of Facts paints a picture in which the previous management of Griffiths purposefully engaged a third party agent as part of a scheme to attempt to influence the government of Chad, it should not be lost on companies with overseas operations that engaging third party agents even with the best of intentions can be fraught with uncertainty and represents one of the most significant areas of anti-corruption risk facing Canadian business.

The use of third party agents in international operations or business development, whether consultants, sales representatives, customs brokers, contractors or distributors, is often unavoidable. This may be because the retention of a local agent is a requirement of foreign law, because of cultural or linguistic barriers, or because of practical or logistical realities. Canadian companies and business people with overseas operations should understand that liability under the CFPOA can accrue not only where a person deliberately instructs an agent to effect a corrupt offer, promise or payment on the person's behalf but also merely where a person is 'wilfully blind' to the fact that such a corrupt offer, promise or payment would be made by an agent on the person's behalf (i.e., where the person has reason to believe such a corrupt offer, promise or payment would be made but deliberately refrained from making further inquiries because the person would prefer to remain ignorant).11

5. Conclusion

The experience of Griffiths and its new management and directorship emphasize the need for Canadian companies with overseas operations or business partners to implement and enforce comprehensive anti-corruption policies and procedures customized to their particular circumstances in a proactive manner.12 This will best place an organization, as well as its management and directors, to detect and prevent potential violations of the CFPOA, and to quickly respond accordingly. As the RCMP and Crown have now made abundantly clear, with approximately 35 ongoing CFPOA investigations, the Canadian business community now operates in a new and aggressive era of anti-corruption enforcement.


1 S.C. 1998, c. 34

2 Transcript of Proceedings Taken in the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Judicial Centre of Calgary, Her Majesty the Queen v. Griffiths Energy International, E-File No.:CCQ13GRIFFITHSENER, Action No. 130057425Q1, January 25, 2013.

3 Transcript of Proceedings Taken in the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Calgary Courts Centre, Calgary, Alberta, Her Majesty the Queen v. Niko Resources Ltd., E-File No.: CCQ11NIKORESOURCES, June 24, 2011.

4 For further information regarding the Niko Order, please see A Deeper Dive Into Canada's First Significant Foreign Bribery Case: Niko Resources Ltd.

5 Agreed Statement of Facts, Her Majesty the Queen and Griffiths Energy International Inc., dated January 14, 2013, and submitted to the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench January 22, 2013.

6 This change in management and directorship of Griffiths occurred in part as a result of the death of a co-founder of Griffiths in a boating accident in Ontario in July of 2011.

7 For further information in respect of the significant amendments to the CFPOA set to be effected by Bill S-14, please see Significant Amendments Proposed to Strengthen Canada's Anti-Corruption Regime.

8 See, for example, the decision of the Ontario Securities Commission in In re YBM Magnex.

9 R. v. Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178

10 See supra note 7.

11 For further discussion of anti-corruption risks and risk mitigation strategies related to the retention of third party agents, please see Understanding and Mitigating Your Third Party Corruption Risk Under Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Official's Act.

12 For further information regarding anti-corruption risk assessments and customized anti-corruption policies and procedures, please see Anti-Corruption Compliance Message Received? Risk Assessment Is Your Next Step.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

In association with
Related Video
Up-coming Events Search
Font Size:
Mondaq on Twitter
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
Email Address
Company Name
Confirm Password
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Media & IT
 Real Estate
 Wealth Mgt
Asia Pacific
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Worldwide Updates
Check to state you have read and
agree to our Terms and Conditions

Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd and as a user you are granted a non-exclusive, revocable license to access the Website under its terms and conditions of use. Your use of the Website constitutes your agreement to the following terms and conditions of use. Mondaq Ltd may terminate your use of the Website if you are in breach of these terms and conditions or if Mondaq Ltd decides to terminate your license of use for whatever reason.

Use of

You may use the Website but are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the content and articles available (the Content). You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these terms & conditions or with the prior written consent of Mondaq Ltd. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information about’s content, users or contributors in order to offer them any services or products which compete directly or indirectly with Mondaq Ltd’s services and products.


Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the documents and related graphics published on this server for any purpose. All such documents and related graphics are provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers hereby disclaim all warranties and conditions with regard to this information, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. In no event shall Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use or performance of information available from this server.

The documents and related graphics published on this server could include technical inaccuracies or typographical errors. Changes are periodically added to the information herein. Mondaq Ltd and/or its respective suppliers may make improvements and/or changes in the product(s) and/or the program(s) described herein at any time.


Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including what sort of information you are interested in, for three primary purposes:

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, newsletter alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our information providers who provide information free for your use.

Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) do not sell or provide your details to third parties other than information providers. The reason we provide our information providers with this information is so that they can measure the response their articles are receiving and provide you with information about their products and services.

If you do not want us to provide your name and email address you may opt out by clicking here .

If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of products and services offered by Mondaq by clicking here .

Information Collection and Use

We require site users to register with Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to view the free information on the site. We also collect information from our users at several different points on the websites: this is so that we can customise the sites according to individual usage, provide 'session-aware' functionality, and ensure that content is acquired and developed appropriately. This gives us an overall picture of our user profiles, which in turn shows to our Editorial Contributors the type of person they are reaching by posting articles on Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) – meaning more free content for registered users.

We are only able to provide the material on the Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) site free to site visitors because we can pass on information about the pages that users are viewing and the personal information users provide to us (e.g. email addresses) to reputable contributing firms such as law firms who author those pages. We do not sell or rent information to anyone else other than the authors of those pages, who may change from time to time. Should you wish us not to disclose your details to any of these parties, please tick the box above or tick the box marked "Opt out of Registration Information Disclosure" on the Your Profile page. We and our author organisations may only contact you via email or other means if you allow us to do so. Users can opt out of contact when they register on the site, or send an email to with “no disclosure” in the subject heading

Mondaq News Alerts

In order to receive Mondaq News Alerts, users have to complete a separate registration form. This is a personalised service where users choose regions and topics of interest and we send it only to those users who have requested it. Users can stop receiving these Alerts by going to the Mondaq News Alerts page and deselecting all interest areas. In the same way users can amend their personal preferences to add or remove subject areas.


A cookie is a small text file written to a user’s hard drive that contains an identifying user number. The cookies do not contain any personal information about users. We use the cookie so users do not have to log in every time they use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example, advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement, and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not linked to personally identifiable information.


This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes. Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the functionality of the site.


If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our site, we ask them for the friend’s name and email address. Mondaq stores this information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq, but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to request the removal of this information from our database.


This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users’ information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a user’s personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode), or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way to correct, update or remove that user’s personal data provided to us. This can usually be done at the “Your Profile” page or by sending an email to

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it. If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

You can contact us with comments or queries at

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these principles, please notify us by e-mail at and we will use commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.