Canada: Top 5 Civil Appeals From The Court Of Appeal Last Month (November 2011)

Last Updated: January 10 2012
Article by Andrew C. Murray


  1. Smith v. Inco Limited
    (Doherty, McFarland JJ.A., and Hoy J. ad hoc) October 7, 2011
  2. McQueen v. Echelon General Insurance Company ,
    2011 ONCA 649 (Gillese, Armstrong and Karakatsanis JJ.A.) October 18, 2011
  3. Dean v. Mister Transmission (International) Ltd .,
    2011 ONCA 670 (Sharpe, Armstrong and Karakatsanis JJ.A.) October 27, 2011
  4. United Mexican States v. Cargill Incorporated
    (Rosenberg, Moldaver and Feldman, JJ.A.) October 4, 2011
  5. Attis v. Ontario,
    2011 ONCA 675 (Sharpe, Epstein JJ.A. and Cunningham A.C.J. ad hoc) October 31, 2011

1. Smith v. Inco Limited, 2011 ONCA 628 (Doherty, MacFarland JJ.A., and Hoy J. ad hoc), October 7, 2011

This appeal considered a July 2010 class action trial judgment, in which the trial judge held that the soil on the properties in Port Colborne contained nickel particles deposited by emissions from Inco's nearby nickel refinery. The trial judge further held that concerns about the levels of nickel in the soil caused wide-spread public concern, affecting property values after September 2000. Inco was found liable on the basis of both private nuisance and under strict liability pursuant to Rylands v. Fletcher. Damages were awarded in the amount of $36 million to the class.

Inco had operated the nickel refinery in Port Colborne from 1918 until its closure in 1984, during which time it emitted nickel oxide into the air via a 500-foot smoke stack located on its property. Nickel oxide had been found in widely varying amounts in the soil on many of the properties that are located within a several mile radius of the refinery. There was no dispute that the refinery was the source of most of the nickel in the soil, even though Inco did not operate its refinery unlawfully or negligently at any time. Indeed, the trial evidence demonstrated that Inco had complied with the various environmental and governmental regulatory schemes applicable to its refinery operation.

The class was comprised of all individuals who have, since September 2000, owned residential property within an area that takes up the majority of Port Colborne, consisting of approximately 7,000 properties. The only claim at trial related to a diminution in property values. Allegations that nickel deposits caused adverse health effects had been abandoned prior to trial.

In granting the appeal, the Court of Appeal analyzed the common law of nuisance, which is the means by which to balance the competing interests between one person's lawful and reasonable use of his property that may indirectly harm or interfere and another person's ability to use and enjoy his own property. "Nuisance", unlike "negligence", does not focus on the defendant's conduct which may be quite reasonable but still cause an unreasonable interference with a neighbouring property.

The plaintiffs did not assert that the nickel particles caused any interference with their use or enjoyment of the property; rather, the sole claim was that the nickel particulars caused physical injury to the property and a subsequent adverse effect on the value of the land.

The Court of Appeal held that a mere chemical alteration in the content of the soil, without more, does not amount to physical harm or damage to the property. The trial judge erred in finding that the nickel particles caused actual substantial physical damage to the claimants' lands. Had the claimants shown that the nickel levels in the properties posed a risk to health, they would have established that those particles caused actual substantial physical damage. In rejecting the claims, the Court of Appeal also noted that "the claims as advanced and as accepted by the trial judge were not predicated on any actual risk to health".

Rylands v. Fletcher, a case learned in law school and infrequently revisited thereafter, is given thorough treatment by the Court of Appeal. As expressed by the Court of Appeal itself, "Rylands v. Fletcher has gone largely unnoticed in appellate courts in recent years".

As a result of its analysis, the Court of Appeal pronounced that strict liability, further to a Rylands v. Fletcher analysis based exclusively on the "extra-hazardous" nature of a defendant's conduct, should not be part of the common law in Ontario. In so finding, the Court of Appeal expressly rejected contentions put forward by Allen M. Linden and Bruce Feldthusen in their text Canadian Tort Law, 8th Edition, which had been adopted at trial. Perhaps with an eye to a possible application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, however, the Court of Appeal noted that, even if strict liability for extra-hazardous activities were part of the law in Ontario, the class of claimants failed to prove that Inco's refinery did constitute such an extra-hazardous activity.

A further difficulty in the plaintiffs' case was that the escape requirements in Rylands v. Fletcher connote something unintended, such as a flood, gas leak, chemical spill, sewage overflow, etc., but are not aimed at all risks associated with carrying out an activity. Inco's activities were purposeful, managed, regulated and controlled. While presented with the opportunity to impose strict liability on certain inherently dangerous activities, the Court of Appeal refused to do so, feeling that this was fundamentally a policy decision best introduced by legislative action and not judicial fiat.

After concluding that the trial judge erred in finding that Inco was liable under either private nuisance or the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, the Court of Appeal went on to hold that the claimants had also failed to prove their damages, which is a necessary component of either cause of action. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial evidence demonstrated no loss to Port Colborne's property appreciation rates, and, therefore, no damages of any kind.

2. McQueen v. Echelon General Insurance Company, 2011 ONCA 649 (Gillese, Armstrong and Karakatsanis JJ.A.), October 18, 2011

Motorists involved in automobile accidents in Ontario are entitled to seek recovery of certain statutory accident benefits from their automobile insurers, pursuant to the standard form automobile policy. This appeal involved a 35-year-old unemployed woman involved in a rollover motor vehicle accident on January 31, 2004. She claimed various statutory accident benefits, many of which were denied by Echelon. Following a seven-day trial, Echelon was ordered to pay Ms. McQueen housekeeping benefits, transportation benefits, the cost of three medical assessments, and – significantly - $25,000.00 in damages for mental distress.

Echelon appealed, raising some 50 grounds of appeal.

The appeal was dismissed, with a slight reduction in the quantum of the award for the transportation expense, with costs of the appeal to Ms. McQueen.

On appeal of the mental distress damages, Echelon argued that the case was simply about a denial of benefits and that a denial of benefits does not amount to bad faith. However, the Court of Appeal accepted that the findings of the trial judge laid the foundation for the claim for mental distress. In particular, as early as paragraph 12 of the trial decision, the trial judge had referred to the Supreme Court of Canada case of Fiddler v. Sun Life Assurance Company Ltd. and returned to it again in paragraphs 51 and 52 of his Reasons, noting that the court must be satisfied that:

  1. an object of the contract was a secure psychological benefit that brings mental distress upon breach, within the reasonable contemplation of the parties; and
  2. the degree of mental suffering caused by the breach was of a degree sufficient to warrant compensation.

The trial judge repeatedly noted in his judgment that Echelon refused to provide benefits on the basis that they were not reasonable and necessary, but Echelon gave no reasons for why they were not reasonable and necessary. The trial judge pointed out a number of claims that Echelon had denied contrary to medical recommendations. The trial judge was also able to refer to internal notes from Echelon's file that had been placed into evidence and which contained expressions connoting an attitude that runs against the reasoning from Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Company and Fiddler. As a result, the trial judge made the following key findings of fact:

  • Echelon had adopted an adversarial approach to the plaintiff from the start;
  • Echelon had breached its contract of insurance with the plaintiff;
  • Echelon's adversarial position poisoned the process early on, notwithstanding its duty of good faith throughout; and
  • There was a negative predisposition toward the plaintiff by Echelon.

Based on these findings, the claim of mental distress was made out, a conclusion with which the Court of Appeal did not interfere.

This case is particularly important to the development of our understanding of peace of mind contracts and the range of damages that can be awarded. Echelon had argued that Fiddler, which dealt with long-term disability claims, had no application to a standard automobile policy. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. Instead, Fiddler was found to lie at the heart of the conclusion, insofar as the Court of Appeal was concerned. People purchase motor vehicle liability policies to protect themselves from financial and emotional stress and insecurity. One object of such a contract is to secure a psychological benefit that brought the prospect of mental distress upon breach within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. Ms. McQueen was entitled to that peace of mind and the damages she suffered through the mental distress owing to Echelon's breach.

3. Dean v. Mister Transmission (International) Ltd., 2011 ONCA 670 (Sharpe, Armstrong and Karakatsanis JJ.A.), October 27, 2011

This decision, written by Justice Karakatsanis, appears to be her last decision at the Ontario Court of Appeal prior to her appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada. The appeal concerns itself with a class action that had been brought on behalf of consumers who had had their motor vehicle transmissions repaired by Mister Transmission.

The claim alleged that Mister Transmission breached the statutory prohibition against charging a fee for an estimate of the cost of repairs that are authorized and carried out. The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, holding that no consumer had been charged a fee for an estimate as defined in the legislation and that, as such, Mister Transmission had not breached the statute. The appeal was dismissed following a thorough analysis and statutory interpretation of certain sections of the Motor Vehicle Repair Act ("MVRA") and its successor legislation, the Consumer Protection Act ("CPA").

Mister Transmission advertised an inspection service for a fee of $552.42. The transmission is removed and dismantled to determine any necessary repairs, and then re-assembled and reinstalled. The fee is based on an industry-wide data bank for the labour cost of removing and reinstalling the transmission. If a Mister Transmission customer elected not to proceed with any repairs, that customer still paid the inspection fee. Customers who did proceed with repairs would have to pay the inspection service fee as well as the additional cost of any repair. The plaintiffs asserted that, if repairs were authorized, the $552.42 fee for the estimate should be waived, as otherwise it would breach the statutory prohibition against charging a fee for an estimate if the repairs are done.

Justice Karakatsanis dismissed the appeal. First, she agreed that the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the MVRA and CPA excluded the significant labour costs involved in removing and reinstalling the transmission. These were not necessarily included in the prohibition against fees for estimates. Any other approach would not make commercial sense. Further, the consumer remains protected as he only pays for the total repairs if authorized.

Second, Justice Karakatsanis compared the English version and French version of s.3(2) of the MVRA. She noted that the French version is clearly different from the English version, although the provision of the CPA accorded with the English version of the MVRA.

Justice Karakatsanis held that, when interpreting bilingual statutes, the court must determine whether there is an ambiguity and, where there is an ambiguity in one version of a provision but not the other, the court should look for the meaning that is common to both versions. Ultimately, she agreed with the motions judge that the English version of the MVRA best reflected the legislature's intentions; the interpretation urged by the appellant was not consistent with the legislative purpose of the provisions, the legislative scheme and the commercial context in which it operates. This was another difficult outcome for the plaintiffs in a class action case.

4. United Mexican States v. Cargill Incorporated, 2011 ONCA 622 (Rosenberg, Moldaver and Feldman, JJ.A.), October 4, 2011

This appeal related to an international trade dispute and the correct application of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").

Cargill is a U.S. producer of high fructose corn syrup ("HFCS"). Mexico, the world's second largest consumer of soda pop on a per capita basis, would appear to be an ideal market for HFCS, but is an equally important market for Mexico's own refined sugar industry. After Cargill created a Mexican distribution centre and built a new production plant in Nebraska to expand its HFCS production into Mexico, Mexico enacted a number of trade barriers, all of which were found to constitute breaches of the NAFTA in an arbitration. Cargill was awarded damages of $36 million in "downstream losses", being direct loss sales and associated costs, and $41 million in "upstream losses", representing the cost of loss sales to Cargill of products made by it in the U.S., owing to its excess capacity. Mexico asked the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario to set aside the portion of the arbitral decision that awarded upstream damages, Ontario being an agreed upon forum for this purpose under the governing Model Law. The appeal was dismissed in the Superior Court.

Before the Court of Appeal, two main issues were raised:

  1. The appropriate standard of review to be applied by the Superior Court when considering the jurisdiction of the tribunal; and
  2. Whether the appropriate standard of review was misapplied in the Superior Court.

It was Mexico's position that the tribunal did not have the jurisdiction under the NAFTA to award damages to Cargill for losses that it suffered as a producer and seller of HFCS in the United States, as distinct from those losses that it sustained as an investor within Mexico. Mexico was supported in its position by both Canada and the United States, who appeared as interveners on the appeal.

Given its involvement with NAFTA arbitral tribunals, the ADR Chambers in Toronto was also given leave to intervene to assist the court on the issue of standard of review. ADR Chambers argued in favour of a nuanced approach to the issue. It suggested that the domestic administrative law tests do not apply when a court reviews the decision of an international arbitration panel under the Model Law. Traditional arbitral nomenclature is not applicable. Rather, the proper description of the standard to be applied, in ADR Chambers' submissions, was "the highest degree of deference".

Justice Feldman, for the court, agreed that applying domestic concepts of standard of review may not be helpful to courts reviewing international arbitration awards. She referred to multiple Canadian authorities that have held that courts should accord international arbitration tribunals a high degree of deference, and that they should interfere only sparingly or in extraordinary cases. Justice Feldman considered United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., a B.C. decision also dealing with NAFTA review under the Model Law, where it was held that the standard of review on a question of jurisdiction was correctness. Next, she considered the English Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan. While labelled in different language, Dallah essentially applied a variant of the correctness standard as well.

After looking at the specific article of the Model Law under which the appeal was launched, and after informing herself by analogy to the reasoning from the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, Justice Feldman concluded that the tribunal only had authority to make any decision in accordance with the provisions of the NAFTA as interpreted in accordance with the principles of international law. On its own, it had no authority to expand its jurisdiction by incorrectly interpreting the submission referred for arbitration or the NAFTA.

Accordingly, Justice Feldman concluded that the standard of review of the award that the Superior Court was to have applied is a standard of correctness in the sense that the tribunal had to be correct in its determination that it had the ability to make the decision that it did make. That being said, a standard of correctness does not create great latitude for interference. To the contrary, courts are expected to intervene only in rare circumstances where there is a true question of jurisdiction. Justice Feldman indicated that the cautionary approach in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, namely that courts should take a narrow view of what constitutes a question of jurisdiction, is magnified in the international arbitration context.

Having clarified the appropriate standard of review, Justice Feldman tackled the application of that standard to the specific facts. She ultimately determined that the tribunal did act within its jurisdiction, and that it was unnecessary for the Superior Court to review the entire analysis from the tribunal to decide if the result was reasonable. A review of the merits of the decision was unnecessary.

The appeal was dismissed with costs and with a lasting and helpful legacy concerning the issue of standard of review of international trade arbitration disputes.

5. Attis v. Ontario, 2011 ONCA 675 (Sharpe, Epstein JJ.A. and Cunningham A.C.J. ad hoc), October 31, 2011

To what extent can a defendant examine the nature of solicitor and client communications for the purpose of determining whether a cost award should be made against the solicitor personally? The answer, according to the Court of Appeal, is that a defendant has no right to inquire into the legal advice given to the plaintiff by the plaintiff's lawyer, as this is purely a matter between solicitor and client.

This case is this month's third class action-related decision. Although not mentioned in the appeal, the class action was part of the multi-country breast implant litigation. The certification motion in the underlying action was dismissed in 2007, at which time costs were awarded to the Attorney General against the plaintiffs in the amount of $125,000.00. The dismissal of the certification motion was appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal in 2008 and awarded the AG a further $40,000.00 in costs. In 2009, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed, with a further modest cost award. Later that year, the AG was informed that the plaintiffs were impecunious.

Being unable to obtain its costs from the plaintiffs, the AG brought a motion in late 2009 seeking to re-open the issue of costs, with the request that it become the responsibility of plaintiffs' counsel. By then, one plaintiff herself had already sued the plaintiff class action lawyer for failing to advise her of the potential of being personally liable for costs.

Following four days of argument, Cullity J. ordered plaintiffs' counsel to pay the costs to the AG personally – the cost order was converted from the plaintiffs' responsibility to their lawyer's responsibility. An appeal ensued.

At the Court of Appeal, the AG argued that, because the solicitor and client relationship is dependant on counsel warning clients so they fully understand potential risks, the failure to do so resulted in the plaintiffs not being informed. Consequently, plaintiffs' counsel were not "authorized" to commence the proceeding in the first place, and should be liable for the costs.

The Court of Appeal distinguished between being authorized to commence the proceedings at all and a failure to understand the cost implications of initiating proceedings. The Court of Appeal held that it is for an aggrieved party to take action, which is exactly what one plaintiff did.

The AG raised a further argument to the effect that the plaintiffs' lawyer breached his warranty of authority. This argument was moot because, since the plaintiffs were impecunious, the AG would not have recovered costs from them in any event. To award the AG costs after the fact would be to put the AG in a better position than if the action had proceeded with authority and failed. Accordingly, this argument was rejected.

In obiter, the court noted that, since a multiplicity of legal proceedings is undesirable, the unconventional approach taken by the motions judge of awarding costs against the solicitor personally, in the face of an existing civil action by the clients against the solicitor, was one that ought to have been avoided. It would have been preferable, given the seriously conflicting positions, to direct a trial of the issue which could easily have taken place at the same time as the trial of the action as between solicitor and client. For all these reasons, the appeal was allowed.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

To print this article, all you need is to be registered on

Click to Login as an existing user or Register so you can print this article.

Andrew C. Murray
In association with
Related Topics
Related Articles
Related Video
Up-coming Events Search
Font Size:
Mondaq on Twitter
Register for Access and our Free Biweekly Alert for
This service is completely free. Access 250,000 archived articles from 100+ countries and get a personalised email twice a week covering developments (and yes, our lawyers like to think you’ve read our Disclaimer).
Email Address
Company Name
Confirm Password
Mondaq Topics -- Select your Interests
 Law Performance
 Law Practice
 Media & IT
 Real Estate
 Wealth Mgt
Asia Pacific
European Union
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Worldwide Updates
Registration (you must scroll down to set your data preferences)

Mondaq Ltd requires you to register and provide information that personally identifies you, including your content preferences, for three primary purposes (full details of Mondaq’s use of your personal data can be found in our Privacy and Cookies Notice):

  • To allow you to personalize the Mondaq websites you are visiting to show content ("Content") relevant to your interests.
  • To enable features such as password reminder, news alerts, email a colleague, and linking from Mondaq (and its affiliate sites) to your website.
  • To produce demographic feedback for our content providers ("Contributors") who contribute Content for free for your use.

Mondaq hopes that our registered users will support us in maintaining our free to view business model by consenting to our use of your personal data as described below.

Mondaq has a "free to view" business model. Our services are paid for by Contributors in exchange for Mondaq providing them with access to information about who accesses their content. Once personal data is transferred to our Contributors they become a data controller of this personal data. They use it to measure the response that their articles are receiving, as a form of market research. They may also use it to provide Mondaq users with information about their products and services.

Details of each Contributor to which your personal data will be transferred is clearly stated within the Content that you access. For full details of how this Contributor will use your personal data, you should review the Contributor’s own Privacy Notice.

Please indicate your preference below:

Yes, I am happy to support Mondaq in maintaining its free to view business model by agreeing to allow Mondaq to share my personal data with Contributors whose Content I access
No, I do not want Mondaq to share my personal data with Contributors

Also please let us know whether you are happy to receive communications promoting products and services offered by Mondaq:

Yes, I am happy to received promotional communications from Mondaq
No, please do not send me promotional communications from Mondaq
Terms & Conditions (the Website) is owned and managed by Mondaq Ltd (Mondaq). Mondaq grants you a non-exclusive, revocable licence to access the Website and associated services, such as the Mondaq News Alerts (Services), subject to and in consideration of your compliance with the following terms and conditions of use (Terms). Your use of the Website and/or Services constitutes your agreement to the Terms. Mondaq may terminate your use of the Website and Services if you are in breach of these Terms or if Mondaq decides to terminate the licence granted hereunder for any reason whatsoever.

Use of

To Use you must be: eighteen (18) years old or over; legally capable of entering into binding contracts; and not in any way prohibited by the applicable law to enter into these Terms in the jurisdiction which you are currently located.

You may use the Website as an unregistered user, however, you are required to register as a user if you wish to read the full text of the Content or to receive the Services.

You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create derivative works from, distribute, perform, link, display, or in any way exploit any of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in these Terms or with the prior written consent of Mondaq. You may not use electronic or other means to extract details or information from the Content. Nor shall you extract information about users or Contributors in order to offer them any services or products.

In your use of the Website and/or Services you shall: comply with all applicable laws, regulations, directives and legislations which apply to your Use of the Website and/or Services in whatever country you are physically located including without limitation any and all consumer law, export control laws and regulations; provide to us true, correct and accurate information and promptly inform us in the event that any information that you have provided to us changes or becomes inaccurate; notify Mondaq immediately of any circumstances where you have reason to believe that any Intellectual Property Rights or any other rights of any third party may have been infringed; co-operate with reasonable security or other checks or requests for information made by Mondaq from time to time; and at all times be fully liable for the breach of any of these Terms by a third party using your login details to access the Website and/or Services

however, you shall not: do anything likely to impair, interfere with or damage or cause harm or distress to any persons, or the network; do anything that will infringe any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights of Mondaq or any third party; or use the Website, Services and/or Content otherwise than in accordance with these Terms; use any trade marks or service marks of Mondaq or the Contributors, or do anything which may be seen to take unfair advantage of the reputation and goodwill of Mondaq or the Contributors, or the Website, Services and/or Content.

Mondaq reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to take any action that it deems necessary and appropriate in the event it considers that there is a breach or threatened breach of the Terms.

Mondaq’s Rights and Obligations

Unless otherwise expressly set out to the contrary, nothing in these Terms shall serve to transfer from Mondaq to you, any Intellectual Property Rights owned by and/or licensed to Mondaq and all rights, title and interest in and to such Intellectual Property Rights will remain exclusively with Mondaq and/or its licensors.

Mondaq shall use its reasonable endeavours to make the Website and Services available to you at all times, but we cannot guarantee an uninterrupted and fault free service.

Mondaq reserves the right to make changes to the services and/or the Website or part thereof, from time to time, and we may add, remove, modify and/or vary any elements of features and functionalities of the Website or the services.

Mondaq also reserves the right from time to time to monitor your Use of the Website and/or services.


The Content is general information only. It is not intended to constitute legal advice or seek to be the complete and comprehensive statement of the law, nor is it intended to address your specific requirements or provide advice on which reliance should be placed. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers make no representations about the suitability of the information contained in the Content for any purpose. All Content provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Mondaq and/or its Contributors and other suppliers hereby exclude and disclaim all representations, warranties or guarantees with regard to the Content, including all implied warranties and conditions of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement. To the maximum extent permitted by law, Mondaq expressly excludes all representations, warranties, obligations, and liabilities arising out of or in connection with all Content. In no event shall Mondaq and/or its respective suppliers be liable for any special, indirect or consequential damages or any damages whatsoever resulting from loss of use, data or profits, whether in an action of contract, negligence or other tortious action, arising out of or in connection with the use of the Content or performance of Mondaq’s Services.


Mondaq may alter or amend these Terms by amending them on the Website. By continuing to Use the Services and/or the Website after such amendment, you will be deemed to have accepted any amendment to these Terms.

These Terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales and you irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with these Terms. If you live outside the United Kingdom, English law shall apply only to the extent that English law shall not deprive you of any legal protection accorded in accordance with the law of the place where you are habitually resident ("Local Law"). In the event English law deprives you of any legal protection which is accorded to you under Local Law, then these terms shall be governed by Local Law and any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with these Terms shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts where you are habitually resident.

You may print and keep a copy of these Terms, which form the entire agreement between you and Mondaq and supersede any other communications or advertising in respect of the Service and/or the Website.

No delay in exercising or non-exercise by you and/or Mondaq of any of its rights under or in connection with these Terms shall operate as a waiver or release of each of your or Mondaq’s right. Rather, any such waiver or release must be specifically granted in writing signed by the party granting it.

If any part of these Terms is held unenforceable, that part shall be enforced to the maximum extent permissible so as to give effect to the intent of the parties, and the Terms shall continue in full force and effect.

Mondaq shall not incur any liability to you on account of any loss or damage resulting from any delay or failure to perform all or any part of these Terms if such delay or failure is caused, in whole or in part, by events, occurrences, or causes beyond the control of Mondaq. Such events, occurrences or causes will include, without limitation, acts of God, strikes, lockouts, server and network failure, riots, acts of war, earthquakes, fire and explosions.

By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions