1. Introduction

Advanced technology has revolutionised the delivery of products and services to consumers.  What was once tangible property (e.g., software on disks) is now most often delivered via the cloud (e.g., through digital downloads).  Services that were previously provided in person are now delivered remotely.  Over the last two decades, technology giants such as Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Facebook have comprised an increasingly large portion of the economy.  This trend is only gaining speed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Yet tax systems were designed for the in-person economy, and have not kept pace with these advancements. 

Evolving technology has thus not only shifted the delivery of products and services, but has also created tax uncertainty.  The digitalisation of the economy is requiring jurisdictions around the world to both adapt and modernise their tax codes to capture revenues that would otherwise escape taxation under frameworks put in place long before today's technology existed.  In addition, countries are reevaluating whether the existing framework's allocation of the right to tax income derived from digital sources is fair.  Challenges include addressing concerns that market-based values are not captured by existing rules, as well as issues related to the ability to move mobile assets in low-tax jurisdictions.

Responses to taxing the digitalising economy range from co-ordinated international efforts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") and the United Nations ("UN"); unilateral digital services taxes ("DSTs") proposed or enacted by more than a dozen jurisdictions around the globe; and efforts to capture and allocate domestic revenue based on customer location, such as those adopted by U.S. states and municipalities.  This chapter provides an overview of the OECD's efforts to reach a consensus-based solution to taxing the digitalising economy, a discussion of DSTs that have emerged absent international agreement, and U.S. federal, state, and local efforts to modernise taxing regimes to better meet the challenges of the digitalising economy.

2. OECD

The OECD's efforts to address the economy's digitalisation grew out of its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS") inclusive framework Action Item 1.1  Following the publication of BEPS Action Item 1 report in 2015 and the Inclusive Framework's Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation—Interim Report 2018, members of the OECD's Inclusive Framework and the G20 debated challenges posed by the digitalising economy, including how to allocate taxing rights on income from cross-border activities among competing jurisdictions.2 

In January 2019, the OECD published a Policy Note that unveiled a two-pillar construct for exploring reallocation of taxing rights and addressing issues related to profit allocation.3  Pillar 1 focuses on the allocation of taxing rights and will address the issues necessary to coherently revise profit allocation and nexus rules.  Pillar 2 is aimed at developing a global minimum tax – global anti-base erosion ("GloBE") – proposal that would modify domestic law and tax treaties to afford jurisdictions taxing rights where other jurisdictions do not exercise their primary taxing rights or the payments are subject to otherwise low levels of effective taxation.  Ultimately, the 137 members of the OECD's Inclusive Framework set a goal of reaching consensus on a solution by the end of 2020, though, as discussed below, the goal has been extended into 2021, in part due to challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The OECD has reached several important milestones with respect to developing its inclusive framework:  

  • In February–March 2019, the OECD sought public consultation on streamlining the approaches.4 
  • In May 2019, the OECD published the Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy (the "2019 Programme of Work"), which described the path ahead for each pillar.5  This 2019 Programme of Work outlined competing proposals, describing differences and commonalities.
  • In June 2019, the G20 Finance Ministers and Leaders endorsed the 2019 Programme of Work.6
  • In October 2019, the OECD Secretariat proposal of a "unified approach" that focused on the commonalities among the competing proposals to further the goal of reaching a consensus-based resolution to Pillar 1 in 2020 was released to the public for comments.7
  • In November–December 2019, the OECD Secretariat turned to public consultation on the Pillar 2 GloBE proposal.8
  • In January 2020, the Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy ("the Statement") was published.9  The Statement highlighted that the members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS ("Inclusive Framework") have endorsed the Secretariat's unified approach as the paradigm for negotiating and eventually attaining a mutually agreed-upon solution in connection with Pillar 1.  The Statement also provided that the Inclusive Framework members acknowledged the existing political disagreements to indicate that challenges lie ahead in reaching a unified solution.  Further, the Statement included a revised Programme of Work for Pillar 1, which replaced the 2019 Programme of Work on Pillar 1.
  • On October 12, 2020, the Inclusive Framework published reports for Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 (each, a "Blueprint").10  The Blueprints are not consensus-based solutions, but are indicative of significant progress and serve as a concrete basis for achieving a consensus-based solution in 2021.11  The Inclusive Framework also put forth a public consultation document to invite public's comments on the Blueprints.12

a.         Pillar 1 "Unified Approach" to Allocating Taxing Rights

The unified approach was first introduced in the Secretariat's October 2019 proposal, which described the approach as a mechanism for creating a new nexus that is tied to sales of an in-scope business, regardless of the business's physical presence in the taxing country or jurisdiction.  The subsequently issued Statement described the unified approach as extending taxing rights to user/market jurisdictions.  The Statement defined a user/market jurisdiction as a jurisdiction where the users of highly digital businesses are located or where products or services of multinational enterprises are sold. 

The Statement provided the following overview of the unified approach's three-tier profit allocation mechanism to market jurisdictions:

  • Amount A: This amount signifies a new taxing right: a market jurisdiction's share of a multinational enterprise group's (or business line's) residual profit associated with active and sustained participation in the market jurisdiction's economy.  Amount A would be calculated by employing a formulaic approach that would apply at the group level for multinational enterprises that meet a new nexus test in the relevant market jurisdiction, regardless of the business's physical presence in such jurisdiction.
  • Amount B: This amount represents a fixed return that is centred on the arm's-length principle for specific baseline distribution and marketing activities performed in the market jurisdiction.  Amount B does not give rise to a new taxing right—it stems from existing rules on profit allocation.
  • Amount C: This amount covers any other resulting profit stemming from activities carried out in the jurisdiction that are in excess of the baseline distribution and marketing activities remunerated under Amount B.  Similar to Amount B, Amount C does not provide a new taxing right.

Like the Statement, the Blueprint for Pillar 1 uses a three-component approach to Pillar 1.  While conserving the constructs for Amounts A and B, the Blueprint excludes Amount C and replaces the third component with an element labelled "tax certainty".  The blueprint explains this new element as an undertaking to enhance tax certainty through measures to block disputes and achieve resolutions. 

The Blueprint also introduces the following 11 building blocks as the requisite foundation for Pillar 1, allocated as follows:

  • Amount A: scope, nexus, revenue sourcing, tax base determination, profit allocation, and elimination of double taxation.
  • Amount B: scope and quantum.
  • Tax Certainty: dispute prevention and resolution for Amount A, and dispute prevention and resolution beyond Amount A.

The final building block, implementation and administration, relates to all three components.

The Blueprint for Pillar 1 sets certain thresholds for coming within scope, and divides the new taxing right's (Amount A's) in-scope activities into two categories: automated digital services; and more traditional consumer-facing businesses.  The Blueprint defines automated digital services as consisting of two elements: (1) automated (a user would only need nominal human input from the service provider once the system set-up is complete); and (2) digital (the services are offered via the Internet or an electronic network).  It offers examples of automated digital services, including online advertising services, online search engines, and social media platforms.  Likewise, the Blueprint defines consumer-facing businesses as those that derive income from routinely selling goods and services to consumers, and recognises that the digitalisation of the economy has created value for such businesses through increased opportunities for targeted marketing and branding, as well as the collection and sale of individual consumer data.  Finally, the Blueprint excludes certain sectors from the scope of Amount A: certain natural resources; certain financial services; construction; sale and leasing of residential property; and international and shipping businesses.

b.         Pillar 2 GloBE Proposal

Pillar 2 aims to subject global businesses to a minimum level of tax regardless of their physical presence (e.g., their jurisdiction of operation or headquarters).13  The Blueprint for Pillar 2 provides the following descriptions of interrelated rules that would operate to achieve this goal:

  • Income inclusion rule ("IIR") and undertaxed payments rule ("UTPR") (together, the "GloBE rules"): The IIR requires income inclusion at the shareholder level in the case that the income of a controlled foreign entity is taxed below the effective minimum rate.  The switch-over rule ("SOR") supplements the IIR.  According to the Statement, the SOR applies exemption methods that are operative in tax treaties and operates to subject certain foreign branches whose income are exempt under double-tax treaties to the IIR by turning off the treaty benefit.  Similarly, the UTPR, which imposes a tax on base-eroding payments, applies only if IIR has not already been operative.  Together, the IIR and UTPR are the "GloBE rules".  These two rules only apply to multinational enterprise groups with annual gross revenue that is equal to or greater than EUR 750 million. 
  • Subject to Tax Rule ("STTR"): The STTR, a treaty-based rule, works to complement the IIR and UTPR.  Where source countries are disadvantaged by base erosion and profit-shifting mechanisms used for intragroup payments to be taxed at a lower tax rate, the STTR enables the source country to tax certain payments up to the agreed minimum rate.

The Blueprint acknowledges that the IIR and UTPR do not require changes to bilateral tax and can be implemented by domestic law changes.  The STTR and SOR, however, can only be implemented through changes to existing bilateral tax treaties, either through bilateral or multilateral agreements.

3. Digital Services Taxes

A digital services tax or DST is a (typically) low-rate tax imposed on a portion of a business's gross revenue that is derived from activities that fall under the defined scope of such tax (sometimes referred to as a "turnover tax" based on the typical reference to gross income).  Nexus for a DST is created by local users or consumers who use or purchase the in-scope business's services or products.  A DST generally has a limited scope and applies to in-scope businesses with global revenue and/or a domestic revenue that meet threshold amounts.  The global revenue threshold typically looks to a business's global annual revenue from activities that fall within the scope.  The domestic revenue threshold typically considers a portion of such global annual revenue to determine how much of it is generated by the local users.

If a DST regime provides a safe harbour, a business may be able to avoid DST liability or pay a reduced amount of DST notwithstanding the thresholds.  For example, the UK's DST provides a safe harbour that allows businesses to use an alternative calculation in determining DST liability if a business has a low profit margin. 

While DSTs have been implemented in numerous countries around the globe, not all DSTs are permanent.14  Some DSTs sunset when a global consensus-based solution has been reached and executed.  Other DSTs without sunset clauses may be unaffected by the implementation of a unified solution. 

a.         Challenges Posed by DSTs

The movement towards implementing domestic DSTs indicates a widely shared awareness of the digitalisation of the economy and efforts to modernise the current international tax system in response.  As consensus-based solutions stall, more countries are likely to impose unilateral DSTs.  Despite the efforts, DSTs' designs are by no means perfect.  In the revenue spectrum, DSTs may be unsuccessful in generating material revenue for the taxing jurisdiction.  Such outcomes may be tied to DSTs having low rates, compared to other taxing methods that are already in place.  The lack of significant return suggests that DSTs may be a means to demonstrate a global recognition of the digitalised economy and that revenue streams should not avoid at least some level of taxation. 

On the tax liability front, users or consumers may ultimately bear the DST burden or a portion of that burden instead of the businesses that are generating the income.  Such indirect passage of the tax burden may not align with the underlying purpose if the drive behind implementing DSTs is to lay the tax burden on businesses that are profiting from the digitalised economy.

DSTs also impose challenges in implementation and administration.  Contributing factors include the need for extensive use of resources and lack of bandwidth.  Moreover, some DSTs will expire when a global consensus is reached on the two pillars and therefore may be short-lived.  As the OECD has acknowledged that a unified solution will not be reached in 2020, the lack of exact timing and other uncertainties adds to the challenge in administering DSTs.

Another issue with DSTs is the potential to subject a liable business to double taxation or cascading taxation.  The issue stems from the fact that DSTs are largely intended to fall outside the scope of income tax treaties. 

Finally, DSTs also create a reprisal risk.  In particular, the U.S. has opposed unilateral DSTs like those enacted or proposed in many nations since the majority will be imposed mainly on large technology companies, most of which are based in the U.S. (e.g., Google, Amazon, and Facebook).  As a result, the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") has opened investigations into digital taxes that Austria, Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have either adopted or proposed.  The investigations consider whether the digital taxes are "unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce" under Section 301 of the Trade Act.  The USTR has completed its investigation of France's DST, concluding that it is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.  As a result, the U.S. will impose a 25% tariff on French handbags, cosmetics, and soaps beginning in January 2021, barring any resolution of the nations' dispute.  Thus the proliferation of unilateral DSTs increases the risks of developing trade wars.

b.         Examples of DSTs: UK and Mexico

While each DST is different, the recently enacted UK and Mexican taxes are illustrative of the various existing and proposed DST regimes.

i.     The UK's DST

The UK's DST came into effect on April 1, 2020.  Local UK users create the nexus for imposing the DST at a 2% rate on a business's (or an entity group's) revenue derived from activities that fall within the scope of the tax.  The in-scope activities of the UK's DST consist of social media platforms, internet search engines, and online marketplaces.  Revenue generated from a combination of in-scope and out-of-scope activities must be examined to allocate the appropriate amount stemming from in-scope activities.

Social media platforms include platforms that derive income from users' interaction with or use of the platform (e.g., by imposing a subscription fee or through advertising).  Internet search engines are in-scope where the monitoring of user data drives revenue through advertising.  In-scope online marketplaces do not include online retail stores where goods are directly sold to UK users.  Rather, in-scope online marketplaces include platforms that derive income from allowing third parties to advertise and sell services to UK users and monetise user engagement.

The UK's DST has both global revenue and domestic revenue thresholds.  The 2% DST applies if a business's global revenue from in-scope activities exceeds £500 million (the global revenue threshold) and a portion of such revenue attributable to UK users exceeds £25 million (the domestic revenue threshold).  As noted above, the UK's DST provides a safe harbour.  Under the safe harbour, a business or the entity group may elect to use an alternative calculation of their tax liability if the business or group has a low profit margin on in-scope activities that generated the UK digital services revenues.  The alternative calculation applies a rate that is equivalent to 80% of the profit margin of such activities, instead of the 2% of the revenue.  The safe harbour may be used for any of the in-scope activities, as applicable. 

Compliance with the UK's DST entails annual examination by the businesses to determine and report their appropriate DST liability.  Finally, the UK DST has a sunset clause: if a global consensus-based solution is implemented, the UK DST will expire.

ii.    Mexico's DST

Mexico recently introduced its digital services tax regime in connection with the 2020 Tax Reform Act.  Mexico's DST imposes a 16% value added tax (VAT) on non-resident digital service providers.  Digital service providers include (i) those with a user base located in Mexico, and (ii) digital intermediation services with third-party providers located in Mexico.  The in-scope services include digital platforms where users may access multimedia content, digital services that provide distance learning, online clubs and dating applications, and digital services serving as intermediaries between third-party suppliers of services/products and the consumers of such services or products.  Failure to comply with Mexico's DST regime could result in temporary blockage of a foreign digital service in Mexico (i.e., shutting down the taxpayer's website in Mexico).

4. Taxation of the Digitalising Economy in the United States

Challenges raised by the economy's digitalisation are not limited to those that take place across international borders.  Nations are grappling with how to tax digital transactions that take place within their own borders.  In the United States, the IRS has issued proposed regulations addressing the taxation of cloud computing transactions that originate onshore and offshore, while states and municipalities across the country attempt to tax modern day revenues using relatively antiquated tax codes.

a.         IRS's Proposed Cloud Computing Regulations

The IRS is adapting the U.S. federal tax regime to account for the realities of the economy's digitalisation.  In August 2019, the agency issued long-awaited guidance regarding how companies ought to classify cloud computing transactions – including software as a service, platform as a service and infrastructure as a service – for federal tax purposes.15  The proposed regulations set forth a list of relevant factors to apply to cloud-based transactions to determine whether they constitute a provision of services or lease of tangible property.

The preamble to the proposed regulations contemplates that they will apply to a wide swath of cloud-based transactions and provides that, "[i]n general, application of the relevant factors to a cloud transaction will result in the transaction being treated as a provision of services rather than a lease of property".  This distinction can have significant implications on the tax treatment of income, including whether income is U.S.-based or foreign source.  Further guidance regarding the sourcing of income from cloud computing transactions – a complicated framework – remains forthcoming.

At the same time, the IRS's proposed amendments modernise the application of existing regulations16 by clarifying their application to "digital content".  These amendments also contain new rules regarding the sourcing of digital downloads of copyrighted material that provide that the sale is deemed to occur where the customer downloads the copyrighted material or installs it on a device.  These sourcing rules are not unlike those under consideration by the OECD and those included in certain DSTs.

The IRS's proposed regulations generated material comments and will likely be adjusted in response to those submissions.  The initial classification guidance generally upheld the manner in which most cloud-based companies were already classifying their income.  The guidance surrounding sourcing of cloud-based transactions promises to be more complicated.  Yet the sourcing rules contained in the IRS's proposed amendments to the existing regulations with respect to digital downloads suggests that cloud-based companies should, at minimum, anticipate capturing and reporting on users' locations.  Thus, the compliance challenges digital companies will face under the IRS's cloud computing regulations are not unlike those outlined with respect to the OECD proposals.

b.         State and Local Taxation of the Digitalising Economy

In addition to the U.S. federal tax regime, companies doing business in the U.S. must comply with the separate tax regimes of 50 states, as well as over 10,000 local regimes in place in municipalities around the nation.  State and local jurisdictions have taken varying, but increasingly aggressive, approaches to taxing digital companies' income and sales.

i.     State Income Taxation

Cross-border challenges arising from taxing the digitalising economy are not confined to sales across international boundaries.  In the United States, states are struggling to capture tax revenue from companies making digital sales into their states, including companies lacking any physical presence there.  As in the international arena, states are rethinking concepts of both nexus and income allocation to meet the realities of digitalisation.

Nexus concepts began shifting away from the physical presence requirement in June 2018, with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc.17  Wayfair arose from a challenge to a South Dakota law designed to capture sales tax revenue from online sales made by remote sellers having no physical presence in the state.  The Wayfair Court held that a company having sufficient economic and virtual contacts with a state had adequate nexus to require the company to collect and remit sales tax, even if it lacked physical presence in the jurisdiction.

Since the Wayfair decision, states have implemented various thresholds to measure a remote seller's economic and virtual contacts.  These thresholds typically consist of sales dollar volume, the number of transactions into a given state, or some combination thereof.

Although Wayfair was decided in the sales tax context, some states, including Massachusetts and Hawaii, are attempting to import its nexus concepts into their income tax framework, claiming the right to tax a share of the income of corporations having sufficient sustained economic contacts in the state.  It is unclear whether expansion of nexus beyond the physical presence requirement outside of the sales tax context will survive a challenge under the U.S. Constitution, but state taxing authorities appear emboldened by the Wayfair decision and will likely push the limits of the Constitution to take increasingly aggressive positions to capture additional tax revenue from digital sources.

States have also become more aggressive with respect to income apportionment as the economy has digitalised.  U.S. states apportion income for corporate income tax purposes based upon formulas that compare the taxing state's share of certain relevant factors to the company's overall totals.  State apportionment formulas vary, but traditionally consider some combination of sales into the taxing state, as well as property and payroll in the taxing state.

States vary in their sales sourcing rules, which are particularly challenging to apply in the context of digital transactions.  Recently – and in part as a response to the digitalisation of the economy – many states have moved toward market-based sourcing rules for the sale of services, which apportion income based upon where the benefit of a service is received.  Furthermore, and importantly, income is only allocated to states where companies have nexus.  Thus, as nexus requirements move away from physical presence, allocation of income will change as well.

ii.    State Sales Taxation

States and municipalities have taken dramatically different approaches to the imposition of sales tax on digital products and services.  The majority do not tax sales of most services, but do impose tax on sales of physical tangible property, including software.  As software sales have shifted from physical media to digital downloads and cloud-based hosting, taxing authorities have adopted more aggressive positions in defining tangible property in attempts to bring digital and cloud-based sales within the scope of taxation, even in the absence of clear statutory authority.

Service delivery has also digitised in recent years.  Digital services all rely on software at some level.  To determine whether a sale is of taxable software or non-taxable services, most states treat this as if it is the sale tangible property bundled with services, and then assess the "object of the transaction".  This can mean that if the software is incidental to the underlying service, the transaction will be treated, as a whole, as the sale of a service.  Disputes often arise in this context, with companies arguing that they primarily sell non-taxable services and taxing authorities asserting that the ultimate product sold is software.

Digital companies may face large exposure for uncollected sales tax, as the payment obligation shifts to the seller if it did not properly collect and remit the tax at the time of the sale.  Compliance is complicated.  The inquiry into what constitutes the object of a transaction is fact-intensive, and the contours of the law vary in each jurisdiction.  Moreover, in recent years taxing authorities have taken increasingly hardline positions, thus adding to the uncertainty of whether transactions are subject to sales tax.

5. Conclusions

The worldwide transformation of taxing regimes to address the digitalising economy will continue for the foreseeable future.  Although these changes are driven by shifts in the delivery of products and services to digital means, they will almost certainly reach non-digital transactions.  While global consensus-based solutions are facing challenges resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and uncertain political climates, members of the Inclusive Framework remain committed to reaching agreement in 2021.  In the meantime, as countries continue to introduce DSTs – both due to the lack of international consensus and the need to raise revenues in light of the COVID-19 pandemic – trade wars may develop.  The political and legal challenges ahead will be complicated, and only time will show whether an international agreement is possible.

From a practical perspective, companies will face challenges as they work to ensure compliance with the myriad digital taxing regimes that are launching around the globe.  Scope, effective dates, reporting requirements, and data collection obligations vary across jurisdictions.  Businesses must monitor the constantly developing landscape and ensure they have systems and capabilities in place to fulfil their obligations.

Footnotes

1.         See OECD, Action 1 Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation, available at (Hyperlink).

2.        In June 2020, the U.S. Treasury Secretary sent a letter to European finance ministers asking to temporarily halt OECD discussions regarding Pillar 1 in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The letter expressed support for the reform of the international tax system, but levied objections to adopting measures focusing solely on digital businesses, including domestic digital services taxes.  It explained that the U.S. felt the parties to the discussion were at an impasse on an agreement with respect to Pillar 1 that would apply on a broad basis and would not place financial burdens predominantly on the interests of a single country or industry.  Notwithstanding the U.S.' position as stated in the letter, the OECD confirmed later that month that the U.S. had not walked away from the negotiations. 

Subsequently, the July 2020 G20 Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors Meeting Communiqué recognised the impact of COVID-19 pandemic, but emphasised that continued progress on developing blueprints for both pillars would be essential for review by the next meeting to be held in October 2020.

3.       OECD (2020), Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy - January 2020, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD, Paris. (Hyperlink) (hereinafter, "the Statement") at 6-7; see OECD/G20 (2019), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy - Policy Note, OECD Publishing, Paris, (Hyperlink).

4.       The Statement, supra note 3, at 7; see OECD (2019), Public consultation document, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, 13 February - 6 March 2019.

5.        The Statement, supra note 3, at 7; see OECD (2019), Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD, Paris, (Hyperlink).

6.       The Statement, supra note 3, at 7.

7.      The Statement, supra note 3, at 7; see OECD (2019), Public consultation document, Secretariat Proposal for a "Unified Approach" under Pillar One, 9 October 2019 - 12 November 2019.

8.      See the Statement, supra note 3, at 27-28; see also OECD (2019), Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal ("GloBE") - Pillar Two, OECD Publishing, Paris, (Hyperlink).

9.       The Statement, supra note 3.

10.        OECD (2020), Public consultation document, Reports on the Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints, 12 October 2020 - 14 December 2020, at 2.

11.       OECD (2020), Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation - Report on Pillar One Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, (Hyperlink), at 8-9; OECD (2020), Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation - Report on Pillar Two Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, (Hyperlink), at 11-12.

12.      OECD (2020), Public consultation document, Reports on the Pillar One and Pillar Two Blueprints, supra note 10.

13.      OECD (2020), Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation - Report on Pillar Two Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, supra note 11, at 109.

14.      As of October 2020, the following countries have enacted a DST-type tax: Austria; Costa Rica; France; Greece; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Italy; Kenya; Malaysia; Mexico; Nigeria; Pakistan; Paraguay; Poland; Slovakia; Spain; Taiwan; Tunisia; Turkey; the United Kingdom; Uruguay; Vietnam; and Zimbabwe

15.      Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.861-19.

16.      Treas. Reg. §1.861-18.

17.     South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 585 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 2080 (2018).

Originally published by International Comparative Legal Guide - Corporate Tax 2021.

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