Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 | March 28, 1955 | Chief Justice Warren | Docket No. 199

Short Summary:

The case before the Supreme Court deals with two separate cases, consolidated for argument before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and were heard en banc: Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. and Commissioner v. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a single opinion, affirming the Tax Court's separate rulings in favor of the taxpayers.

Glenshaw Glass Co.: The Glenshaw Glass Company (Glenshaw) was engaged in prolonged litigation with the Hartford-Empire Company (Hartford), which manufactures equipment used by Glenshaw in its glass bottle and container manufacturing business. Glenshaw, in addition to other claims, demanded exemplary damages for fraud and treble damages for injury to its business by reason of Hartford's violation of federal antitrust laws. In December 1947, the parties settled all ongoing litigation – Hartford paid Glenshaw approximately $800,000, of which $324,529.94 represented payment of punitive damages for fraud and antitrust violations. Glenshaw did not report this portion of the settlement as gross income for the corresponding tax year. The Commissioner cited a deficiency worth the entire settlement amount, minus legal fees, against Glenshaw.

William Goldman Theatres, Inc.: William Goldman Theatres, Inc. (Goldman), which operated motion picture houses, sued Loew's, Inc., alleging violation of federal antitrust laws and seeking treble damages. Upon determination that a violation had occurred, it was determined that Goldman had suffered a loss of profits equal to $125,000 and was entitled to treble damages worth $375,000. Goldman reported $125,000 as gross income but did not report the other $250,000 as gross income, claiming the latter portion to be punitive damages and thus not taxable under IRC § 22(a) (1939).

The Supreme Court granted the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (Commissioner) petition for certiorari due to the frequency with which related issues arise, and the differing treatment by lower courts of the Supreme Court's decisions related to the topic.

Key Issue:

Whether money received as exemplary damages for fraud or as the punitive two-thirds portion of a treble-damage antitrust recovery must be reported by a taxpayer as gross income under IRC § 22(a) (1939)?

Primary Holding:

Yes, money received as exemplary damages for fraud and as the punitive two-thirds portion of a treble-damage antitrust recovery must be reported by the recipient taxpayer as gross income under IRC § 22(a) (1939).

Key Points of Law:

  • The Court has repeatedly recognized that the language used by Congress in IRC § 22(a) (1939) – “gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever” – was intended to exert the full measure of its taxing power. SeeHelvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 166 (1925).
    • The Court has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted. Commissioner v. Jacobsen, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87-91 (1934).
  • The Court's characterization of gross income in Eisener v. Macomber as being “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined” was not intended to be a benchmark, but was context-specific, and the context is distinguishable from that of the present case. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
  • The recoveries at issue led to undeniable accessions to wealth, were clearly realized, and were under taxpayers' complete dominion – insofar as the recoveries at issue compensate for damages actually incurred, they are taxable.
  • Re-enactment of IRC § 22(a) (1939), without any amendments, following the Board of Tax Appeals' holding that punitive damages were not taxable in Highland Farms Corp. v. Commissioner, is an unreliable indicium at best – particularly without any evidence that Congress had the Highland Farms Corp. decision before it at the time the decision to re-enact IRC § 22(a) (1939) was made. 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
  • The 1954 IRC's simplification of the definition of gross income was not intended to have any impact on its wide-reaching scope.
  • Regarding the process of statutory interpretation, the starting point is always the plain meaning of the statute. Here, the plain meaning of IRC § 22(a) (1939) indicates Congressional intent to bring the taxing power to bear upon all receipts constitutionally taxable – that includes the recoveries at issue, as to conclude otherwise would be in direct contradiction with the statute's plain language.


This case emphasizes the breadth of Congress' taxing powers and reiterates some of the various forms of income within Congress' purview. Additionally, the case touches on the numerous instances in which the Court has liberally construed Congress' taxing powers, reiterating the need for explicit exemptions within the IRC to support claims that specific forms of income are exempt from taxation.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.