ARTICLE
18 September 2024

District Court Highlights Time-Honored Chapter 93A Principles In Denying Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings

GT
Greenberg Traurig, LLP

Contributor

Greenberg Traurig, LLP has more than 2750 attorneys in 48 locations in the United States, Europe and the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. The firm is a 2022 BTI “Highly Recommended Law Firm” for superior client service and is consistently among the top firms on the Am Law Global 100 and NLJ 500. Greenberg Traurig is Mansfield Rule Certified Plus by The Diversity Lab. The firm is recognized for powering its U.S. offices with 100% renewable energy as certified by the Center for Resource Solutions Green-e® Energy program and is a member of the U.S. EPA’s Green Power Partnership Program. The firm is known for its philanthropic giving, innovation, diversity, and pro bono. Web: www.gtlaw.com.
On Sept. 4, 2024, the Hon. Julia E. Kobick issued an opinion detailing some of the fundamental differences between Section 9 (consumer) and Section 11 (business) claims under Chapter 93A.
United States Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration

On Sept. 4, 2024, the Hon. Julia E. Kobick issued an opinion detailing some of the fundamental differences between Section 9 (consumer) and Section 11 (business) claims under Chapter 93A.

In Rojas v. Capital One, the plaintiffs brought claims against the defendant under Section 11, alleging the defendant withdrew funds from a bank account without authorization. The court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to various common-law claims and under the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act. However, the Chapter 93A claim remained because the defendant's arguments did not pass muster under Rule 12(c) standards, which required the court to accept all the plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts as true. When denying the defendant's motion, the court relied on time-honored Chapter 93A principles.

First, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs' Section 11 claim should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to send a 30-day, pre-suit demand letter. As the court noted, Section 11 does not have a demand letter requirement. Rather, that requirement is only found in Section 9. Specifically, absent certain circumstances contained in Section 9(3) (when the claim is asserted in a counterclaim or cross-claim, or if the defendant-respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth), Section 9 has a jurisdictional 30-day pre-suit demand letter requirement.

Second, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs did not properly plead an unfair act under Section 2. As the court explained, although Chapter 93A does not define what constitutes unfairness or deception, the First Circuit and the MA Supreme Judicial Court have held that an act or practice is unfair if it falls "within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; and causes substantial injury to consumers." At the pleading stage, with all inferences drawn in plaintiffs' favor, the plaintiffs' allegations about improper, fraudulent withdrawals and threats satisfied Section 2's concept of an unfair or deceptive act or practice.

Lastly, the court rejected the defendant's argument that its dispute with the plaintiffs was "private" and therefore did not implicate Chapter 93A. This dispute, however, appeared to occur in the ordinary conduct of trade or commerce and did not arise from a strictly private transaction, such as disputes between business partners or between an employer and employee. As a result, the court determined, it fell within the scope of Chapter 93A.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

Mondaq uses cookies on this website. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies as set out in our Privacy Policy.

Learn More